character of the trading corporation to which it has granted
concessions. Despite the promises made to private firms that early
sought to open up business in its land, the Government itself has become
a great trading corporation, with monopolist rights which close great
regions to private traders and subject the natives to vexatious burdens.
This system took definite form in September 1891, when the Government
claimed exclusive rights in trade in the extreme north and north-east.
At the close of that year Captain Baert, the administrator of these
districts, also enjoined the collection of rubber and other products by
the natives for the benefit of the State.
The next step was to forbid to private traders in that quarter the right
of buying these products from natives. In May 1892 the State monopoly in
rubber, etc., was extended to the "Equator" district, natives not being
allowed to sell them to any one but a State official. Many of the
merchants protested, but in vain. The chief result of their protest was
the establishment of privileged companies, the "Société Anversoise" and
the "Anglo-Belgian," and the reservation to the State of large areas
under the title of _Domaines privés_ (Oct. 1892)[477]. The apologetic
skill of the partisans of the Congo State is very great; but it will
hardly be equal to the task of proving that this new departure is not a
direct violation of Article V. of the General Act of the Berlin
Conference of 1885, quoted above.
[Footnote 477: For a map of the domains now appropriated by these and
other privileged "Trusts," see Morel, _op. cit._ p. 466.]
A strange commentary on the latter part of that article, according full
protection to all foreigners, was furnished by the execution of the
ex-missionary, Stokes, at the hands of Belgian officials in 1895--a
matter for which the Congo Government finally made grudging and
incomplete reparation[478]. Another case was as bad. In 1901 an Austrian
trader, Rabinek, was arrested and imprisoned for "illegal" trading in
rubber in the "Katanga Trust" country. Treated unfeelingly during his
removal down the country, he succumbed to fever. His effects were seized
and have not been restored to his heirs[479].
[Footnote 478: See the evidence in Parl. Papers, Africa. No. 8 (1896).]
[Footnote 479: Morel, _op. cit._ chaps. xxiii.-xxv.]
When such treatment is meted out to white men who pursued their trade in
reliance on the original constitution of the State, the natives may be
expected to fare badly. Their misfortunes thickened when the Government,
on the plea that natives must contribute towards the expenses of the
State, began to require them to collect and hand in a certain amount of
rubber. The evidence of Mr. Casement clearly shows that the natives
could not understand why this should suddenly be imposed on them; that
the amount claimed was often excessive; and that the punishment meted
out for failure to comply with the official demands led to many
barbarous actions on the part of officials and their native troops.
Thus, at Bolobo, he found large numbers of industrious workers in iron
who had fled from the "Domaine de la Couronne" (King Leopold's private
domain) because "they had endured such ill-treatment at the hands of the
Government officials and Government soldiers in their own country that
life had become intolerable, that nothing had remained for them at home
but to be killed for failure to bring in a certain amount of rubber, or
to die of starvation or exposure in their attempts to satisfy the
demands made upon them[480]."
[Footnote 480: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. I (1904), pp. 29, 60. A
missionary, Rev. J. Whitehead, wrote in July 1903: "During the past
seven years this 'domaine privé' of King Leopold has been a veritable
'hell on earth.'" (_Ibid_. p. 64).]
On the north side of Lake Mantumba Mr. Casement found that the
population had diminished by 60 or 70 per cent since the imposition of
the rubber tax in 1893--a fact, however, which may be partly assigned to
the sleeping sickness. The tax led to constant fighting, until at last
the officials gave up the effort and imposed a requisition of food or
gum-copal; the change seems to have been satisfactory there and in other
parts where it has been tried. In the former time the native soldiers
punished delinquents with mutilation: proofs on this subject here and in
several other places were indisputable. On the River Lulongo, Mr.
Casement found that the amount of rubber collected from the natives
generally proved to be in proportion to the number of guns used by the
collecting force[481]. In some few cases natives were shot, even by
white officers, on account of their failure to bring in the due amount
of rubber[482]. A comparatively venial form of punishment was the
capture and detention of wives until their husbands made up the tale. Is
it surprising that thousands of the natives of the north have fled into
French Congoland, itself by no means free from the grip of monopolist
companies, but not terrorised as are most of the tribes of the
"Free State"?
[Footnote 481: _Ibid_. pp. 34, 43, 44, 49, 76, etc.]
[Footnote 482: _Ibid_. p. 70. The effort made by the Chevalier De
Cuvelier to rebut Mr. Casement's charges consists mainly of an
ineffective _tu quoque_. To compare the rubber-tax of the Congo State
with the hut-tax of Sierra Leone begs the whole question. Mr. Casement
proves (p. 27) that the natives do not object to reasonable taxation
which comes regularly. They do object to demands for rubber which are
excessive and often involve great privations. Above all, the punishments
utterly cow them and cause them to flee to the forests.
The efforts of Mr. Macdonnell in _King Leopold II_. (London, 1905) to
refute Mr. Casement also seem to me weak and inconclusive. The reply of
the Congo Free State is printed by Mr. H.W. Wack in the Appendix of his
_Story of the Congo Free State_ (New York, 1905). It convicts Mr.
Casement of inaccuracy on a few details. Despite all that has been
written by various apologists, it may be affirmed that the Congo Free
State has yet made no adequate defence. Possibly it will appear in the
report which, it is hoped, will be published in full by the official
commission of inquiry now sitting.]
Livingstone, in his day, regarded ivory as the chief cause of the
slave-trade in Central and Eastern Africa; but it is questionable
whether even ivory (now a vanishing product) brought more woe to
millions of negroes than the viscous fluid which enables the
pleasure-seekers of Paris, London, and New York to rush luxuriously
through space. The swift Juggernaut of the present age is accountable
for as much misery as ever sugar or ivory was in the old slave days. But
it seems that, so long as the motor-car industry prospers, the dumb woes
of the millions of Africa will count for little in the Courts of Europe.
During the session of 1904 Lord Lansdowne made praiseworthy efforts to
call their attention to the misgovernment of the Congo State; but he met
with no response except from the United States, Italy, and Turkey(!) A
more signal proof of the weakness and cynical selfishness now prevalent
in high quarters has never been given than in this abandonment of a
plain and bounden duty.
A slight amount of public spirit on the part of the signatories of the
Berlin Act would have sufficed to prevent Congolese affairs drifting
into the present highly anomalous situation. That land is not Belgian,
and it is not international--except in a strictly legal sense. It is
difficult to say what it is if it be not the private domain of King
Leopold and of several monopolist-controlling trusts. Probably the only
way out of the present slough of despond is the definite assumption of
sole responsibility by the Belgian people; for it should be remembered
that a very large number of patriotic Belgians urgently long to redress
evils for which they feel themselves to be indirectly, and to a limited
extent, chargeable. At present, those who carefully study the evidence
relating to the Berlin Conference of 1885, and the facts, so far as they
are ascertainable to-day, must pronounce the Congo experiment to be a
terrible failure.
CHAPTER XX
RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
"This war, waged . . . for the command of the waters of the
Pacific Ocean, so urgently necessary for the peaceful
prosperity, not only of our own, but of other nations."--_The
Czar's Proclamation of March 3, 1905_.
Of all the collisions of racial interests that have made recent history,
none has turned the thoughts of the world to regions so remote, and
events so dramatic in their intensity and momentous in their results, as
that which has come about in Manchuria. The Far Eastern Question is the
outcome of the expansion of two vigorous races, that of Russia and
Japan, at the expense of the almost torpid polity of China. The struggle
has taken place in the debatable lands north and west of Korea, where
Tartars and Chinese formerly warred for supremacy, and where
geographical and commercial considerations enhance the value of the most
northerly of the ice-free ports of the Continent of Asia.
In order to understand the significance of this great struggle, we must
look back to the earlier stages of the extension of Russian influence.
Up to a very recent period the eastern growth of Russia affords an
instance of swift and natural expansion. Picture on the one side a young
and vigorous community, dowered with patriotic pride by the long and
eventually triumphant conflict with the Tartar hordes, and dwelling in
dreary plains where Nature now and again drives men forth on the quest
for a sufficiency of food. On the other hand, behold a vast territory,
well-watered, with no natural barrier between the Urals and the Pacific,
sparsely inhabited by tribes of nomads having little in common. The one
active community will absorb the ill-organised units as inevitably as
the rising tide overflows the neighbouring mud-flats when once the
intervening barrier is overtopped. In the case of Russia and Siberia the
only barrier is that of the Ural Mountains; and their gradual slopes
form a slighter barrier than is anywhere else figured on the map of the
world in so conspicuous a chain. The Urals once crossed, the slopes and
waterways invite the traveller eastwards.
The French revolutionists of 1793 used to say, "With bread and iron one
can get to China." Russian pioneers had made good that boast nearly two
centuries before it was uttered in Paris. The impelling force which set
in motion the Muscovite tide originated with a man whose name is rarely
heard outside Russia. Yet, if the fame of men were proportionate to the
effect of their exploits, few names would be more widely known than that
of Jermak. This man had been a hauler of boats up the banks of the
Volga, until his strength, hardihood, and love of adventure impelled him
to a freebooting life, wherein his powers of command and the fierce
thoroughness of his methods speedily earned him the name of Jermak, "the
millstone." In the year 1580, the wealthy family of the Stroganoffs,
tempted by stories of the wealth to be gained from the fur-bearing
animals of Siberia, turned their thoughts to Jermak and his robber band
as the readiest tools for the conquest of those plains. The enterprise
appealed to Jermak and the hardy Cossacks with whom he had to do. He and
his men were no less skilled in river craft than in fighting; and the
roving Cossack spirit kindled at the thought of new lands to harry.
Proceeding by boat from Perm, they worked their way into the spurs of
the Urals, and then by no very long _portage_ crossed one of its lower
passes and found themselves on one of the tributaries of the Obi.
Thenceforth their course was easy. Jermak and his small band of picked
fighters were more than a match for the wretchedly armed and
craven-spirited Tartars, who fled at the sound of firearms. In 1581 the
settlement, called Sibir, fell to the invaders; and, though they soon
abandoned this rude encampment for a new foundation, the town of
Tobolsk, yet the name Siberia recalls their pride at the conquest of the
enemy's capital. The traditional skill of the Cossacks in the handling
of boats greatly aided their advance, and despite the death of Jermak in
battle, his men pressed on and conquered nearly the half of Siberia
within a decade. What Drake and the sea-dogs of Devon were then doing
for England on the western main, was being accomplished for Russia by
the ex-pirate and his band from the Volga. The two expansive movements
were destined finally to meet on the shores of the Pacific in the
northern creeks of what is now British Columbia.
The later stages in Russian expansion need not detain us here. The
excellence of the Cossack methods in foraying, pioneer-work, and the
forming of military settlements, consolidated the Muscovite conquests.
The Tartars were fain to submit to the Czar, or to flee to the nomad
tribes of Central Asia or Northern China. The invaders reached the River
Lena in the year 1630; and some of their adventurers voyaged down the
Amur, and breasted the waves of the Pacific in 1636. Cossack bands
conquered Kamchatka in 1699-1700[483].
[Footnote 483: Vladimir, _Russia en the Pacific._]
Meanwhile the first collision between the white and the yellow races
took place on the River Amur, which the Chinese claimed as their own. At
first the Russians easily prevailed; but in the year 1689 they suffered
a check. New vigour was then manifested in the councils of Pekin, and
the young Czar, Peter the Great, in his longing for triumphs over Swedes
and Turks, thought lightly of gains at the expense of the "celestials."
He therefore gave to Russian energies that trend westwards and
southwards, which after him marked the reigns of Catharine II.,
Alexander I., and, in part, of Nicholas I. The surrender of the Amur
valley to China in 1689 ended all efforts of Russia in that direction
for a century and a half. Many Russians believe that the earlier impulse
was sounder and more fruitful in results for Russia than her meddling in
the wars of the French Revolution and Empire.
Not till 1846 did Russia resume her march down the valley of the Amur;
and then the new movement was partly due to British action. At that time
the hostility of Russia and Britain was becoming acute on Asiatic and
Turkish questions. Further, the first Anglo-Chinese War (1840-42) led to
the cession of Hong-Kong to the distant islanders, who also had five
Chinese ports opened to their trade. This enabled Russia to pose as the
protector of China, and to claim points of vantage whence her covering
wings might be extended over that Empire. The statesmen of Pekin had
little belief in the genuineness of these offers, especially in view of
the thorough exploration of the Amur region and the Gulf of Okhotsk
which speedily ensued.
The Czar, in fact, now inaugurated a forward Asiatic policy, and
confided it to an able governor, Muravieff (1847). The new departure was
marked by the issue of an imperial ukase (1851) ordering the Russian
settlers beyond Lake Baikal to conform to the Cossack system; that is,
to become liable to military duties in return for the holding of land in
the more exposed positions. Three years later Muravieff ordered 6000
Cossacks to migrate from these trans-Baikal settlements to the land
newly acquired from China on the borders of Manchuria[484]. In the same
year the Russians established a station at the mouth of the Amur, and in
1853 gained control over part of the Island of Saghalien.
[Footnote 484: Popowski, _The Rival Powers in Central Asia_, p. 13.]
For the present, then, everything seemed to favour Russia's forward
policy. The tribes on the Amur were passive; an attack of an
Anglo-French squadron on Petropaulovsk, a port in Kamchatka, failed
(Aug. 1854); and the Russians hoped to be able to harry British commerce
from this and other naval bases in the Pacific. Finally, the rupture
with England and France, and the beginning of the Taeping rebellion in
China, induced the Court of Pekin to agree to Russia's demands for the
Amur boundary, and for a subsequent arrangement respecting the ownership
of the districts between the mouth of that river and the bay on which
now stands the port of Vladivostok (May 15, 1858). The latter concession
left the door open for Muravieff to push on Russia's claims to this
important wedge of territory. His action was characteristic. He settled
Cossacks along the River Ussuri, a southern tributary of the Amur, and,
by pressing ceaselessly on the celestials (then distracted by a war with
England and France), he finally brought them to agree to the cession of
the district around the new settlement, which was soon to receive the
name of Vladivostok ("Lord of the East"). He also acquired for the Czar
the Manchurian coast down to the bounds of Korea (November 2, 1860).
Russia thus threw her arms around the great province which had provided
China with her dynasty and her warrior caste, and was still one of the
wealthiest and most cherished lands of that Empire. Having secured these
points of vantage in Northern China, the Muscovites could await with
confidence further developments in the decay of that once
formidable organism.
Such, in brief, is the story of Russian expansion from the Urals to the
Sea of Japan. Probably no conquest of such magnitude was ever made with
so little expenditure of blood and money. In one sense this is its
justification, that is, if we view the course of events, not by the
limelight of abstract right, but by the ordinary daylight of expediency.
Conquests which strain the resources of the victors and leave the
vanquished longing for revenge, carry their own condemnation. On the
other hand, the triumph of Russia over the ill-organised tribes of
Siberia and northern Manchuria reminds one of the easy and unalterable
methods of Nature, which compels a lower type of life to yield up its
puny force for the benefit of a higher. It resembles the victory of man
over quadrupeds, of order over disorder, of well-regulated strength over
weakness and stupidity.
Muravieff deserves to rank among the makers of modern Russia. He waited
his time, used his Cossack pawns as an effective screen to each new
opening of the game, and pushed his foes hardest when they were at their
weakest. Moreover, like Bismarck, he knew when to stop. He saw the limit
that separated the practicable from the impracticable. He brought the
Russian coast near to the latitudes where harbours are free from ice;
but he forbore to encroach on Korea--a step which would have brought
Japan on to the field of action. The Muscovite race, it was clear, had
swallowed enough to busy its digestive powers for many a year; and it
was partly on his advice that Russian North America was sold to the
United States.
Still, Russia's advance southwards towards ice-free ports was only
checked, not stopped. In 1861 a Russian man-of-war took possession of
the Tshushima Isles between Korea and Japan, but withdrew on the protest
of the British admiral. Six years later the Muscovites strengthened
their grip on Saghalien, and thereafter exercised with Japan joint
sovereignty over that island. The natural result followed. In 1875
Russia found means to eject her partner, the Japanese receiving as
compensation undisputed claim to the barren Kuriles, which they already
possessed[485].
[Footnote 485: _The Russo-Japanese Conflict_, by K. Asakawa (1904), p.
67; _Europe and the Far East_, by Sir R.K. Douglas (1904), p. 191.]
Even before this further proof of Russia's expansiveness, Japan had seen
the need of adapting herself to the new conditions consequent on the
advent of the Great Powers in the Far East. This is not the place for a
description of the remarkable Revolution of the years 1867-71. Suffice
it to say that the events recounted above undoubtedly helped on the
centralising of the powers in the hands of the Mikado, and the
Europeanising of the institutions and armed forces of Japan. In face of
aggressions by Russia and quarrels with the maritime Powers, a vigorous
seafaring people felt the need of systems of organisation and
self-defence other than those provided by the rule of feudal lords, and
levies drilled with bows and arrows. The subsequent history of the Far
East may be summed up in the statement that Japan faced the new
situation with the brisk adaptability of a maritime people, while China
plodded along on her old tracks with a patience and stubbornness
eminently bovine.
The events which finally brought Russia and Japan into collision arose
out of the obvious need for the construction of a railway from St.
Petersburg to the Pacific having its terminus on an ice-free port. Only
so could Russia develop the resources of Siberia and the Amur Province.
In the sixties and seventies trans-continental railways were being
planned and successfully laid in North America. But there is this
difference: in the New World the iron horse has been the friend of
peace; in the Far East of Asia it has hurried on the advent of war; and
for this reason, that Russia, having no ice-free harbour at the end of
her great Siberian line, was tempted to grasp at one which the yellow
races looked on as altogether theirs.
The miscalculation was natural. The rapid extension of trade in the
Pacific Ocean seemed to invite Russia to claim her full share in a
development that had already enriched England, the United States, and,
later, Germany and France; and events placed within the Muscovite grasp
positions which fulfilled all the conditions requisite for commercial
prosperity and military and naval domination.
For many years past vague projects of a trans-Siberian railway had been
in the air. In 1857 an English engineer offered to construct a horse
tramway from Perm, across the Urals, and to the Pacific. An American
also proposed to make a railway for locomotives from Irkutsk to the head
waters of the Amur. In 1875 the Russian Government decided to construct
a line from Perm as far as a western affluent of the River Obi; but
owing to want of funds the line was carried no farther than Tiumen on
the River Tobol (1880).
The financial difficulty was finally overcome by the generosity of the
French, who, as we have already seen (Chapter XII.), late in the
eighties began to subscribe to all the Russian loans placed on the Paris
Bourse. The scheme now became practicable, and in March 1891 an imperial
ukase appeared sanctioning the mighty undertaking. It was made known at
Vladivostok by the Czarevitch (now Nicholas II.) in the course of a
lengthy tour in the Far East; and he is known then to have gained that
deep interest in those regions which has moulded Russian policy
throughout his reign. Quiet, unostentatious, and even apathetic on most
subjects, he then, as we may judge from subsequent events, determined to
give to Russian energies a decided trend towards the Pacific. As Czar,
he has placed that aim in the forefront of his policy. With him the Near
East has always been second to the Far East; and in the critical years
1896-97, when the sufferings of Christians in Turkey became acute, he
turned a deaf ear to the cries of myriads who had rarely sent their
prayers northwards in vain. The most reasonable explanation of this
callousness is that Nicholas II. at that time had no ears save for the
call of the Pacific Ocean. This was certainly the policy of his
Ministers, Prince Lobánoff, Count Muravieff, and Count Lamsdorff. It
was oceanic.
The necessary prelude to Russia's new policy was the completion of the
trans-Siberian railway, certainly one of the greatest engineering feats
ever attempted by man. While a large part of the route offers no more
difficulty than the conquest of limitless levels, there are portions
that have taxed to the utmost the skill and patience of the engineer.
The deep trough of Lake Baikal has now (June 1905) been circumvented by
the construction of a railway (here laid with double tracks) which
follows the rocky southern shore. This part of the line, 244 versts (162
miles) long, has involved enormous expense. In fifty-six miles there
are thirty-nine tunnels, and thirteen galleries for protection against
rock-slides. This short section is said to have cost £1,170,000. The
energy with which the Government pushed on this stupendous work during
the Russo-Japanese war yields one more proof of their determination to
secure at all costs the aims which they set in view in and after the
year 1891[486].
[Footnote 486: See an article by Mr. J.M. Price in _The Fortnightly
Review_ for May 1905.]
Other parts of the track have also presented great difficulties. East of
Lake Baikal the line gradually winds its way up to a plateau some 3000
feet higher than the lake, and then descends to treacherous marsh lands.
The district of the Amur bristles with obstacles, not the least being
the terrible floods that now and again (as in 1897) turn the whole
valley into a trough of swirling waters[487].
[Footnote 487: _Russia on the Pacific_, by "Vladimir"; _The Awakening of
the East_, by P. Leroy-Beaulieu, chaps, ix. x.]
All these difficulties have been overcome in course of time; but there
remained the question of the terminus. Up to the year 1894 the objective
had been Vladivostok; but the outbreak of the Chino-Japanese War at that
time opened up vast possibilities. Russia could either side with the
islanders and share with them the spoils of Northern China, or, posing
as the patron of the celestials, claim some profitable _douceurs_ as
her reward.
She chose the latter alternative, and, in the opinion of some of her own
writers, wrongly. The war proved the daring, the patriotism, and the
organising skill of the Japanese to be as signal as the sloth and
corruptibility of their foes. Then, for the first time, the world saw
the utter weakness of China--a fact which several observers (including
Lord Curzon) had vainly striven to make clear. Even so, when Chinese
generals and armies took to their heels at the slightest provocation;
when their battleships were worsted by Japanese armoured cruisers; when
their great stronghold, Port Arthur, was stormed with a loss of about
400 killed, the moral of it all was hidden from the wise men of the
West. Patronising things were said of the Japanese as conquerors--of the
Chinese; but few persons realised that a new Power had arisen. It seemed
the easiest of undertakings to despoil the "venomous dwarfs" of the
fruits of their triumph over China[488].
[Footnote 488: See the evidence adduced by V. Chirol, _The Far Eastern
Question, _chap, xi., as to the _ultimately_ aggressive designs of China
on Japan.]
The chief conditions of the Chino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki (April
17, 1895) were the handing over to Japan the island of Formosa and the
Liaotung Peninsula. The latter was very valuable, inasmuch as it
contained good ice-free harbours which dominated the Yellow Sea and the
Gulf of Pechili; and herein must be sought the reason for the action of
Russia at this crisis. Li Hung Chang, the Chinese negotiator, had
already been bought over by Russia in an important matter[489], and he
early disclosed the secret of the terms of peace with Japan. Russia was
thus forewarned; and, before the treaty was ratified at Pekin, her
Government, acting in concert with those of France and Germany,
intervened with a menacing declaration that the cession of the Liaotung
Peninsula would give to Japan a dangerous predominance in the affairs of
China and disturb the whole balance of power in the Far East. The
Russian Note addressed to Japan further stated that such a step would
"be a perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East." Had
Russia alone been concerned, possibly the Japanese would have referred
matters to the sword; but, when face to face with a combination of three
Powers, they decided on May 4 to give way, and to restore the Liaotung
Peninsula to China[490].
[Footnote 489: _Manchu and Muscovite, _by B.L. Putnam Weale, p. 60.]
[Footnote 490: Asakawa, _op. cit. _p, 76.]
The reasons for the conduct of France and Germany in this matter are not
fully known. We may safely conjecture that the Republic acted conjointly
with the Czar in order to clinch the new Franco-Russian alliance, not
from any special regard for China, a Power with which she had frequently
come into collision respecting Tonquin. As for Germany, she was then
entering on new colonial undertakings; and she doubtless saw in the
joint intervention of 1895 a means of sterilising the Franco-Russian
alliance, so far as she herself was concerned, and possibly of gaining
Russia's assent to the future German expansion in the Far East.
Here, of course, we are reduced to conjecture, but the conjecture is
consonant with later developments. In any case, the new Triple Alliance
was a temporary and artificial union, which prompt and united action on
the part of Great Britain and the United States would have speedily
dissolved. Unfortunately these Powers were engrossed in other concerns,
and took no action to redress the balance which the self-constituted
champions of political stability were upsetting to their own advantage.
The effects of their action were diverse, and for the most part
unforeseen. In the first place, Japan, far from being discouraged by
this rebuff, set to work to perfect her army and navy, and with a
thoroughness which Roon and Moltke would have envied. Organisation,
weapons, drill, marksmanship (the last a weak point in the war with
China) were improved; heavy ironclads were ordered, chiefly in British
yards, and, when procured, were handled with wonderful efficiency. Few,
if any, of those "disasters" which are so common in the British navy in
time of peace, occurred in the new Japanese navy--a fact which redounds
equally to the credit of the British instructors and to the pupils
themselves.
The surprising developments of the Far Eastern Question were soon to
bring the new armaments to a terrible test. Japan and the whole world
believed that the Liaotung Peninsula was made over to China in
perpetuity. It soon appeared that the Czar and his Ministers had other
views, and that, having used France and Germany for the purpose of
warning off Japan, they were preparing schemes for the subjection of
Manchuria to Russian influence. Or rather, it is probable that Li Hung
Chang had already arranged the following terms with Russia as the price
of her intervention on behalf of China. The needs of the Court of Pekin
and the itching palms of its officials proved to be singularly helpful
in the carrying out of the bargain. China being unequal to the task of
paying the Japanese war indemnity, Russia undertook to raise a four per
cent loan of 400,000,000 francs--of course mainly at Paris--in order to
cover the half of that debt. In return for this favour, the Muscovites
required the establishment of a Russo-Chinese Bank having widespread
powers, comprising the receipt of taxes, the management of local
finances, and the construction of such railway and telegraph lines as
might be conceded by the Chinese authorities.
This in itself was excellent "brokerage" on the French money, of which
China was assumed to stand in need. At one stroke Russia ended the
commercial supremacy of England in China, the result of a generation of
commercial enterprise conducted on the ordinary lines, and substituted
her own control, with powers almost equal to those of a Viceroy. They
enabled her to displace Englishmen from various posts in Northern China
and to clog the efforts of their merchants at every turn. The British
Government, we may add, showed a singular equanimity in face of this
procedure.
But this was not all. At the close of March 1896, it appeared that the
gratitude felt by the Chinese Andromeda to the Russian Perseus had
ripened into a definite union. The two Powers framed a secret treaty of
alliance which accorded to the northern State the right to make use of
any harbour in China, and to levy Chinese troops in case of a conflict
with an Asiatic State. In particular, the Court of Pekin granted to its
ally the free use of Port Arthur in time of peace, or, if the other
Powers should object, of Kiao-chau. Manchuria was thrown open to Russian
officers for purposes of survey, etc., and it was agreed that on the
completion of the trans-Siberian railway, a line should be constructed
southwards to Talienwan or some other place, under the joint control of
the two Powers[491].
[Footnote 491: Asakawa, pp. 85-87.]
The Treaty marks the end of the first stage in the Russification of
Manchuria. Another stage was soon covered, and, as it seems, by the
adroitness of Count Cassini, Russian Minister at Pekin. The details, and
even the existence, of the Cassini Convention of September 30, 1896,
have been disputed; but there are good grounds for accepting the
following account as correct. Russia received permission to construct
her line to Vladivostok across Manchuria, thereby saving the northern
detour down the difficult valley of the Amur; also to build her own line
to Mukden, if China found herself unable to do so; and the line
southwards to Talienwan and Port Arthur was to be made on Russian plans.
Further, all these new lines built by Russia might be guarded by her
troops, presumably to protect them from natives who objected to the
inventions of the "foreign devils." As regards naval affairs, the Czar's
Government gained the right to "lease" from China the harbour of
Kiao-chau for fifteen years; and, in case of war, to make use of Port
Arthur. The last clauses granted to Russian subjects the right to
acquire mining rights in Manchuria, and to the Czar's officers to drill
the levies of that province in the European style, should China desire
to reorganise them.[492]
[Footnote 492: Asakawa, chap. ii.]
But the protector had not reaped the full reward of his timely
intervention in the spring of 1895. He had not yet gained complete
control of an ice-free harbour. In fact, the prize of Kiao-chau, nearly
within reach, now seemed to be snatched from his grasp by Kaiser
Wilhelm. The details are well known. Two German subjects who were Roman
Catholic missionaries in the Shan-tung province were barbarously
murdered by Chinese ruffians on November 1, 1897. The outrage was of a
flagrant kind, but in ordinary times would have been condoned by the
punishment of the offenders and a fine payable by the district. But the
occasion was far from ordinary. A German squadron therefore steamed into
Kiao-chau and occupied that important harbour.
There is reason to think that Germany had long been desirous of gaining
a foothold in that rich province. The present writer has been assured by
a geological expert, Professor Skertchley, who made the first map of the
district for the Chinese authorities, that that map was urgently
demanded by the German envoy at Pekin about this time. In any case, the
mineral wealth of the district undoubtedly influenced the course of
events. In accordance with a revised version of the old Christian
saying: "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of--the Empire," the
Emperor William despatched his brother Prince Henry--the "mailed fist"
of Germany--with a squadron to strengthen the Imperial grip on
Kiao-chau. The Prince did so without opposition either from China or
Russia. Finally, on March 5, 1898, the Court of Pekin confirmed to
Germany the lease of that port and of the neighbouring parts of the
province of Shan-tung.
The whole affair caused a great stir, because it seemed to prelude a
partition of China, and that, too, in spite of the well-meaning
declarations of the Salisbury Cabinet in favour, first, of the integrity
of that Empire, and, when that was untenable, of the policy of the "open
door" for traders of all nations. Most significant of all was the
conduct of Russia. As far as is known, she made no protest against the
action of Germany in a district to which she herself had laid claim. It
is reasonable, on more grounds than one, to suppose that the two Powers
had come to some understanding, Russia conceding Kiao-chau to the
Kaiser, provided that she herself gained Port Arthur and its peninsula.
Obviously she could not have faced the ill-will of Japan, Great Britain,
Germany, and the United States--all more or less concerned at her rapid
strides southward; and it is at least highly probable that she bought
off Germany by waiving her own claims to Kiao-chau, provided that she
gained an ideal terminus for her Siberian line, and a great naval and
military stronghold. It is also worth noting that the first German
troops were landed at Kiao-chau on November 17, 1897, while three
Russian warships steamed into Port Arthur on December 18; and that the
German "lease" was signed at Pekin on March 5, 1898; while that
accorded to Russia bears date March 27[493].
[Footnote 493: Asakawa, p. 110, note.]
If we accept the naive suggestion of the Russian author, "Vladimir," the
occupation of Kiao-chau by Germany "forced" Russia "to claim some
equivalent compensation." Or possibly the cession of Port Arthur was
another of the items in Li Hung Chang's bargain with Russia. In any
case, the Russian warships entered Port Arthur, at first as if for a
temporary stay; when two British warships repaired thither the Czar's
Government requested them to leave--a request with which the Salisbury
Cabinet complied in an inexplicably craven manner (January 1898). Rather
more pressure was needed on the somnolent mandarins of Pekin; but, under
the threat of war with Russia if the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula
were not granted by March 27, it was signed on that day. She thereby
gained control of that peninsula for twenty-five years, a period which
might be extended "by mutual agreement." The control of all the land
forces was vested in a Russian official; and China undertook not to
quarter troops to the north without the consent of the Czar. Port Arthur
was reserved to the use of Russian and Chinese ships of war; and Russia
gained the right to erect fortifications.
The British Government, which had hitherto sought to uphold the
integrity of China, thereupon sought to "save its face" by leasing
Wei-hai-wei (July 1). An excuse for the weakness of the Cabinet in
Chinese affairs has been put forward, namely, that the issue of the
Sudan campaign was still in doubt, and that the efforts of French and
Russians to reach the Upper Nile from the French Congo and Southern
Abyssinia compelled Ministers to concentrate their attention on that
great enterprise. But this excuse will not bear examination. Strength at
any one point of an Empire is not increased by discreditable surrenders
at other points. No great statesman would have proceeded on such an
assumption.
Obviously the balance of gain in these shabby transactions in the north
of China was enormously in favour of Russia. She now pushed on her
railway southwards with all possible energy. It soon appeared that Port
Arthur could not remain an open port, and it was closed to merchant
ships. Then Talienwan was named in place of it, but under restrictions
which made the place of little value to foreign merchants. Thereafter
the new port of Dalny was set apart for purposes of commerce, but the
efficacy of the arrangements there has never been tested. In the
intentions of the Czar, Port Arthur was to become the Gibraltar of the
Far East, while Dalny, as the commercial terminus of the trans-Siberian
line, figured as the Cadiz of the new age of exploration and commerce
opening out to the gaze of Russia.
That motives of genuine philanthropy played their part in the Far
Eastern policy of the Czar may readily be granted; but the enthusiasts
who acclaimed him as the world's peacemaker at the Hague Congress (May
1899) were somewhat troubled by the thought that he had compelled China
to cede to his enormous Empire the very peninsula, the acquisition of
which by little Japan had been declared to be an unwarrantable
disturbance of the balance of power in the Far East.
These events caused a considerable sensation in Great Britain, even in a
generation which had become inured to "graceful concessions." In truth,
the part played by her in the Far East has been a sorry one; and if
there be eager partisans who still maintain that British Imperialism is
an unscrupulously aggressive force, ever on the search for new enemies
to fight and new lands to annex, a course of study in the Blue Books
dealing with Chinese affairs in 1897-99 may with some confidence be
prescribed as a sedative and lowering diet. It seems probable that the
weakness of British diplomacy induced the belief at St. Petersburg that
no opposition of any account would be forthcoming. With France acting as
the complaisant treasurer, and Germany acquiescent, the Czar and his
advisers might well believe that they had reached the goal of their
efforts, "the domination of the Pacific."
With the Boxer movement of the years 1899-1900 we have here no concern.
Considered pathologically, it was only the spasmodic protest of a body
which the dissectors believed to be ready for operation. To assign it
solely to dislike of European missionaries argues sheer inability to
grasp the laws of evidence. Missionaries had been working in China for
several decades, and were no more disliked than other "foreign devils."
The rising was clearly due to indignation at the rapacity of the
European Powers. We may note that it gave the Russian governor of the
town of Blagovestchensk an opportunity of cowing the Chinese of northern
Manchuria by slaying and drowning some 4500 persons at that place (July
1900). Thereafter Russia invaded Manchuria and claimed the unlimited
rights due to actual conquest. On April 8, 1902, she promised to
withdraw; but her persistent neglect to fulfil that promise (cemented by
treaty with China) led to the outbreak of hostilities with Japan[494].
[Footnote 494: Asakawa, chap. vii.; and for the Korean Question, chaps.
xvi, xvii]
We can now see that Russia, since the accession of Nicholas II., has
committed two great faults in the Far East. She has overreached herself;
and she has overlooked one very important factor in the problem--Japan.
The subjects of the Mikado quivered with rage at the insult implied by
the seizure of Port Arthur; but, with the instinct of a people at once
proud and practical, they thrust down the flames of resentment and
turned them into a mighty motive force. Their preparations for war,
steady and methodical before, now gained redoubled energy; and the whole
nation thrilled secretly but irresistibly to one cherished aim, the
recovery of Port Arthur. How great is the power of chivalry and
patriotism the world has now seen; but it is apt to forget that love of
life and fear of death are feelings alike primal and inalienable among
the Japanese as among other peoples. The inspiring force which nerved
some 40,000 men gladly to lay down their lives on the hills around Port
Arthur was the feeling that they were helping to hurl back in the face
of Russia the gauntlet which she had there so insolently flung down as
to an inferior race.
CHAPTER XXI
THE NEW GROUPING OF THE GREAT POWERS[495]
(1900-1907)
When I penned the words at the end of Chapter XX. it seemed probable
that the mad race in armaments must lead either to war or to revolution.
In these three supplementary chapters I seek to trace very briefly the
causes that have led to war, in other words, to the ascendancy (perhaps
temporary) of the national principle over the social, and international
tendencies of the age.
[Footnote 495: Written in May-July 1915.]
The collapse of the international and pacifist movement may be ascribed
to various causes. The Franco-German and Russo-Turkish Wars left behind
rankling hatreds which rendered it very difficult for nations to disarm;
and, after the decline of those resentments, there arose others as the
outcome of the Greco-Turkish War and the Boer War. Further, the conflict
between Japan and Russia so far weakened the latter as to leave Germany
and Austria almost supreme in Europe; and, while in France and the
United Kingdom the social movement has made considerable progress,
Germany and Austria have remained in what may be termed the national
stage of development, which offers many advantages over the
international for purposes of war. Then again in the Central Empires
parliamentary institutions have not been successful, tending on the
whole to accentuate the disputes between the dominant and the subject
races. The same is partially true of Russia, and far more so of the
Balkan States. Consequently, in Central and Eastern Europe the national
idea has become militant and aggressive; while Great Britain, the
Netherlands, and to some extent France, have sought as far as possible
to concentrate their efforts upon social legislation, arming only in
self-defence. In this contrast lay one of the dangers of the situation.
Nationality caused the movements and wars of 1848-77. Thereafter, that
principle seemed to wane. But it revived in redoubled force among the
Balkan peoples owing partly to the brutal oppressions of the Sublime
Porte; and the cognate idea, aiming, however, not at liberty but
conquest, became increasingly popular with the German people after the
accession of Kaiser William II. The sequel is only too well known.
Civilisation has been overwhelmed by a recrudescence of nationalism, and
the wealthiest age which the world has seen is a victim to the
perfection and potency of its machinery. A recovery of the old belief in
the solidarity of mankind and a conviction of the futility of all
efforts for domination by any one people, are the first requisites
towards the recovery of conditions that make for peace and good-will.
Meanwhile, recent history has had to concern itself largely with
groupings or alliances, which have in the main resulted from ambition,
distrust, or fear. As has already been shown, the Partition of Africa
was arranged without a resort to arms; but after that appropriation of
the lands of the dark races, the white peoples in the south came into
collision late in 1899.
Much has been written as to the causes of the Boer War; but the secret
encouragements which those brave farmers received from Germany are still
only partly known. Even in 1894 Mr. Merriman warned Sir Edward Grey of
the danger arising from "the steady way in which Krüger was Teutonising
the Transvaal." Germany undoubtedly stiffened the neck of Krüger and the
reactionary Boers in resisting the much-needed reforms. It is
significant that the Kaiser's telegram to Krüger after the defeat of
Jameson's raiders was sent only a few days before his declaration,
January 18, 1896, that Germany must now pursue a World-Policy, as she
did by browbeating Japan in the Far East. These developments had been
rendered possible by the opening of the Kiel-North Sea Canal in 1895, an
achievement which doubled the naval power of Germany. Thenceforth she
pushed on construction, especially by the Navy Bill of 1898. Reliance on
her largely accounts for the obstinate resistance of the Boers to the
just demands of England and the Outlanders in 1899. A German historian,
Count Reventlow, has said that "a British South Africa could not but
thwart all German interests"; and the anti-British fury prevalent in
Germany in and after 1899 augured ill for the preservation of peace in
the twentieth century so soon as her new fleet was ready[496].
[Footnote 496: E, Lewin, _The Germans and Africa_, p. xvii. and chaps.
v.-xiii.; J.H. Rose, _The Origins of the War_, Lectures I.-III.;
Reventlow, _Deutschlands auswärtige Politik_, p. 71.]
The results of the Boer War were as follows. For the time Great Britain
lost very seriously in prestige and in material resources. Amidst the
successes gained by the Boers, the intervention of one or more European
States in their favour seemed highly probable; and it is almost certain
that Krüger relied on such an event. He paid visits to some of the chief
European capitals, and was received by the French President (November
1900), but not by Kaiser William. The personality and aims of the Kaiser
will concern us later; but we may notice here that in that year he had
special reasons for avoiding a rupture with the United Kingdom. The
Franco-Russian Alliance gave him pause, especially since June 1898, when
a resolute man, Delcassé, became Foreign Minister at Paris and showed
less complaisance to Germany than had of late been the case[497].
Besides, in 1898, the Kaiser had concluded with Great Britain a secret
arrangement on African affairs, and early in 1900 acquired sole control
of Samoa instead of the joint Anglo-American-German protectorate, which
had produced friction. Finally, in the summer of 1900, the Boxer Rising
in China opened up grave problems which demanded the co-operation of
Germany and the United Kingdom.
[Footnote 497: Delcassé was Foreign Minister in five Administrations
until 1905.]
It has often been stated that the Kaiser desired to form a Coalition
against Great Britain during the Boer War; and it is fairly certain that
he sounded Russia and France with a view to joint diplomatic efforts to
stop the war on the plea of humanity, and that, after the failure of
this device, he secretly informed the British Government of the danger
which he claimed to have averted[498]. His actions reflected the
impulsiveness and impetuosity which have often puzzled his subjects and
alarmed his neighbours; but it seems likely that his aims were limited
either to squeezing the British at the time of their difficulties, or to
finding means of breaking up the Franco-Russian alliance. His energetic
fishing in troubled waters caused much alarm; but it is improbable that
he desired war with Great Britain until his new navy was ready for sea.
The German Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, has since written as follows:
"We gave England no cause to thwart us in the building of our fleet: . . .
we never came into actual conflict with the Dual Alliance, which would
have hindered us in the gradual acquisition of a navy[499]." This,
doubtless, was the governing motive in German policy, to refrain from
any action that would involve war, to seize every opportunity for
pushing forward German claims, and, above all, to utilise the prevalent
irritation at the helplessness of Germany at sea as a means of
overcoming the still formidable opposition of German Liberals to the
ever-increasing naval expenditure.
[Footnote 498: Sir V. Chirol, _Quarterly Review_, Oct. 1914.]
[Footnote 499: Bülow, _Imperial Germany_, pp. 98-9 (Eng. transl.);
Rachfahl, _Kaiser und Reich_ (p. 163), states that, as in 1900-1, the
German fleet, even along with those of France and Russia, was no match
for the British fleet, Germany necessarily remained neutral. See, too,
Hurd and Castle, _German Sea Power_, chap. v.]
In order to discourage the futile anti-British diatribes in the German
Press, Bülow declared in the Reichstag that in no quarter was there an
intention to intervene against England. There are grounds for
questioning the sincerity of this utterance; for the Russian statesman,
Muraviev, certainly desired to intervene, as did influential groups at
Petrograd, Berlin, and Paris. In any case, the danger to Great Britain
was acute enough to evoke help from all parts of the Empire, and implant
the conviction of the need of closer union and of maintaining naval
supremacy. The risks of the years 1899-1902 also revealed the very grave
danger of what had been termed "splendid isolation," and aroused a
desire for a friendly understanding with one or more Powers as occasion
might offer.
The war produced similar impressions on the German people. Dislike of
England, always acute in Prussia, especially in reactionary circles, now
spread to all parts and all classes of the nation; and the Kaiser, as we
have seen, made skilful use of it to further his naval policy. His
speech at Hamburg on October 18, 1899, on the need of a great navy,
marked the beginning of a new era, destined to end in war with Great
Britain. Admiral von Tirpitz, in introducing the Amending Bill of
February 1900, demanded the doubling of the navy in a scheme working
automatically until 1920. The Socialist leader, Bebel, opposed it as
certain to strain relations with England, a war with whom would be the
greatest possible misfortune for the German people. On the other hand,
the Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, voiced the opinions of the governing
class and the German Navy League when he declared that the demand for a
great navy originated in the ambition of the German nation to become a
World-Power[500]. The Bill passed; and thenceforth the United Kingdom
and Germany became declared rivals at sea. Fortunately for the
islanders, the new German Navy could not be ready for action before the
year 1904; otherwise, a very dangerous situation would have arisen. Even
as it was, British statesmen were induced to secure an ally and to end
the Boer War as quickly as possible.
[Footnote 500: Prince Hohenlohe, _Memoirs_, vol. ii. p. 480.]
During that conflict the tension between England and the Dual Alliance
(France and Russia) was at times so acute as to render it doubtful
whether we should not gravitate towards the rival Triple Alliance. The
problem was the most important that had confronted British statesmen
during a century. Kinship and tradition seemed to beckon us towards
Germany and Austria. On the other hand, democracy and social intercourse
told in favour of the French connection. Further, now that Russia was
retiring more and more from her Balkan and Central Asian projects in
order to concentrate on the Far East, she ceased to threaten India and
the Levant. Moreover, the personality of the Tsar, Nicholas II., was
reassuring, while that of Kaiser Wilhelm II. aroused distrust and alarm.
In truth, the inordinate vanity, restless energy, and flamboyant
Chauvinism of the Kaiser placed great difficulties in the way of an
Anglo-German Entente. An article believed to have been inspired by
Bismarck contained the following reference to the Kaiser's megalomania:
"It causes the deepest anxiety in Germany, because it is feared that it
may lead to some irreparable piece of want of tact, and thence to war.
For it is argued that, vanity being at the bottom of it all, and the
Emperor finding he is unable to gain the premature immortality he
thirsts for by peaceful prodigies, his restless nervous irritability may
degenerate into recklessness, and then his megalomania may blind him to
the dangers he and, above all, poor blood-soaken Germany may encounter
on the war-path[501]." Kaiser William possesses more power of
self-restraint than this passage indicates; for, though he has spread a
warlike enthusiasm through his people, he has also restrained it until
there arrived a fit opportunity for its exercise. It arrived when
Germany and her Allies were far better prepared, both by land and sea,
than the Powers whom she expected to meet in arms.
[Footnote 501: _Contemporary Review_, April 1892.]
His attitude towards Great Britain has varied surprisingly. During
several years he figured as her friend. But it is difficult to believe
that a man of his keen intellect did not discern ahead the collision
which his policy must involve. His many claims to acquire maritime
supremacy and a World-Empire were either mere bluff or a portentous
challenge. Only the good-natured, easy-going British race could so long
have clung to the former explanation, thereby leaving the most diffuse,
vulnerable, and ill-armed Empire that has ever existed face to face with
an Empire that is compact, well-fortified, and armed to the teeth. In
this contrast lies one of the main causes of the present war.
Moreover, the internal difficulties of France and the preoccupation of
Russia in the Far East gave to Kaiser William a disquietingly easy
victory in the affairs of the Near East. His visit to Constantinople and
Palestine in 1898 inaugurated a Levantine policy destined to have
momentous results. On the Bosphorus he scrupled not to clasp the hand of
Sultan Abdul Hamid II., still reeking with the blood of the Christians
of Armenia and Macedonia. At Jerusalem he figured as the Christian
knight-errant, but at Damascus as the champion of the Moslem creed.
After laying a wreath on the tomb of Saladin, he made a speech which
revealed his plan of utilising the fighting power of Islam. He said:
"The three hundred million Mohammedans who live scattered over the globe
may be assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend at
all times." Taken in conjunction with his pro-Turkish policy, this
implied that the Triple Alliance was to be buttressed by the most
terrible fighting force in the East[502].
[Footnote 502: See Hurgronje, _The Holy War; made in Germany_, pp.
27-39, 68-78; also G.E. Holt, _Morocco the Piquant_ (1914), who says
(chap, xiv.): "Islam is waiting for war in Europe. . . . A war between any
two European Powers, in my opinion, would mean the uprising of Islam."]
During the tour he did profitable business with the Sublime Porte by
gaining a promise for the construction of a railway to Bagdad and the
Persian Gulf, under German auspices. The scheme took practical form in
1902-3, when the Sultan granted a firman for the construction of that
line together with very extensive proprietary rights along its course.
Russian opposition had been bought off in 1900 by the adoption of a more
southerly course than was originally designed; and the Kaiser now sought
to get the financial support of England to the enterprise. British
public opinion, however, was invincibly sceptical, and with justice, for
the scheme would have ruined our valuable trade on the River Tigris and
the Persian Gulf; while the proposed prolongation of the line to Koweit
on the gulf would enable Germany, Austria, and Turkey to threaten India.
By the year 1903 Austria was so far mistress of the Balkans as to render
it possible for her and Germany in the near future to send troops
through Constantinople and Asia Minor by the railways which they
controlled. Accordingly, affairs in the Near East became increasingly
strained; and, when Russia was involved in the Japanese War, no Great
Power could effectively oppose Austro-German policy in that quarter. The
influence of France and Britain, formerly paramount both politically and
commercially in the Turkish Empire, declined, while that of Germany
became supreme. Every consideration of prudence therefore prompted the
Governments of London and Paris to come to a close understanding, in
order to make headway against the aggressive designs of the two Kaisers
in the Balkans and Asia Minor. Looking forward, we may note that the
military collapse of Russia in 1904-5 enabled the Central Powers to push
on in the Levant. Germany fastened her grip on the Turkish Government,
exploited the resources of Asia Minor, and posed as the champion of the
Moslem creed. Early in the twentieth century that creed became
aggressive, mainly under the impulse of Sultan Abdul Hamid II., who
varied his propagandism by massacre with appeals to the faithful to look
to him as their one hope in this world. Constantinople and Cairo were
the centres of this Pan-Islamic movement, which, aiming at the closer
union of all Moslems in Asia, Europe, and Africa around the Sultan,
threatened to embarrass Great Britain, France, and Russia. The Kaiser,
seeing in this revival of Islam an effective force, took steps to
encourage the "true believers" and strengthen the Sultan by the
construction of a branch line of the Bagdad system running southwards
through Aleppo and the district east of the Dead Sea towards Mecca.
Purporting to be a means for lessening the hardships of pilgrims, it
really enabled the Sultan to threaten the Suez Canal and Egypt.
The aggressive character of these schemes explains why France, Great
Britain, and Russia began to draw together for mutual support. The three
Powers felt the threat implied in an organisation of the Moslem world
under the aegis of the Kaiser. He, a diligent student of Napoleon's
career, was evidently seeking to dominate the Near East, and to enrol on
his side the force of Moslem enthusiasm which the Corsican had forfeited
by his attack on Egypt in 1798. The construction of German railways in
the Levant and the domination of the Balkan Peninsula by Austria would
place in the hands of the Germanic Powers the keys of the Orient, which
have always been the keys to World-Empire.
Closely connected with these far-reaching schemes was the swift growth
of the Pan-German movement. It sought to group the Germanic and cognate
peoples in some form of political union--a programme which threatened to
absorb Holland, Belgium, the greater part of Switzerland, the Baltic
Provinces of Russia, the Western portions of the Hapsburg dominions,
and, possibly, the Scandinavian peoples. The resulting State or
Federation of States would thus extend from Ostend to Reval, from
Amsterdam (or Bergen) to Trieste.
Even those Germans who did not espouse these ambitious schemes became
deeply imbued with the expansively patriotic ideas championed by the
Kaiser. So far back as 1890 he ordered their enforcement in the
universities and schools[503]. Thenceforth professors and teachers vied
in their eagerness to extol the greatness of Germany and the civilising
mission of the Hohenzollerns, whose exploits in the future were to
eclipse all the achievements of Frederick the Great and William I.
Moreover, the new German Navy was acclaimed as a necessary means to the
triumph of German _Kultur_ throughout the world. Other nations were
depicted as slothful, selfish, decadent; and the decline in the prestige
of Great Britain, France, and Russia to some extent justified these
pretensions. The Tsar, by turning away from the Balkans towards Korea,
deadened Slav aspirations. For the time Pan-Slavism seemed moribund.
Pan-Germanism became a far more threatening force.
[Footnote 503: Latterly, the catchword, _England ist der Feind
_("England is the enemy"), has been taught in very many schools.]
Summing up, and including one topic that will soon be dealt with, we may
conclude as follows: Germany showed that she did not want England's
friendship, save in so far as it would help her to oppose the Monroe
Doctrine or supply her with money to finish the Bagdad Railway. For
reasons that have been explained, she and Austria were likely to
undermine British interests in the Near East; while, on the other hand,
the diversion of Russia's activities from Central Asia and the Balkans
to the Far East, lessened the Muscovite menace which had so long
determined the trend of British policy. Moreover, Russia's ally, France,
showed a conciliatory spirit. Forgetting the rebuff at Fashoda (see
_ante_, pp. 501-6), she aimed at expansion in Morocco. Now, Korea and
Morocco did not vitally concern us. The Bagdad Railway and the Kaiser's
court to Pan-Islamism were definite threats to our existence as an
Empire. Finally, the development of the German Navy and the growth of a
furiously anti-British propaganda threatened the long and vulnerable
East Coast of Great Britain.
A temporary understanding with Germany could have been attained if we
had acquiesced in her claim for maritime equality and in the oriental
and colonial enterprises which formed its sequel. But that course, by
yielding to her undisputed ascendancy in all parts of the world, would
have led to a policy of partition. Now, since 1688, British statesmen
have consistently opposed, often by force of arms, a policy of partition
at the expense of civilised nations. Their aim has been to support the
weaker European States against the stronger and more aggressive, thus
assuring a Balance of Power which in general has proved to be the chief
safeguard of peace. In seeking an Entente with France, and subsequently
with Russia, British policy has followed the course consistent with the
counsels of moderation and the teachings of experience. We may note here
that the German historian, Count Reventlow, has pointed out that the
Berlin Government could not frame any lasting agreement with the
British; for, sooner or later, they would certainly demand the
limitation of Germany's colonial aims and of her naval development, to
neither of which could she consent. The explanation is highly
significant[504].
[Footnote 504: Reventlow, _Deutschlands auswärtige Politik_, pp. 178-9;
_Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches_, vol. ii. p. 68.]
Nevertheless, at first Great Britain sought to come to a friendly
understanding with Germany in the Far East, probably with a view to
preventing the schemes of partition of China which in 1900 assumed a
menacing guise. At that time Russia seemed likely to take the lead in
those designs. But opposite to the Russian stronghold of Port Arthur was
the German province of Kiao Chau, in which the Kaiser took a deep
interest. His resolve to play a leading part in Chinese affairs appeared
in his speech to the German troops sent out in 1900 to assist in
quelling the Boxer Rising. He ordered them to adopt methods of terrorism
like those of Attila's Huns, so that "no Chinaman will ever again dare
to look askance at a German." The orders were ruthlessly obeyed. After
the capture of Pekin by the Allies (September 1900) there ensued a time
of wary balancing. Russia and Germany were both suspected of designs to
cut up China; but they were opposed by Great Britain and Japan. This
obscure situation was somewhat cleared by the statesmen of London and
Berlin agreeing to maintain the territorial integrity of China and
freedom of trade (October 1900). But in March 1901 the German
Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, nullified the agreement by officially
announcing that it did not apply to, or limit, the expansion of Russia
in Manchuria. What caused this _volte face_ is not known; but it implied
a renunciation of the British policy of the _status quo_ in the Far East
and an official encouragement to Russia to push forward to the Pacific
Ocean, where she was certain to come into conflict with Japan. Such a
collision would enfeeble those two Powers; while Germany, as _tertius
gaudens_ would be free to work her will both in Europe and Asia[505].
[Footnote 505: In September 1895 the Tsar thanked Prince Hohenlohe for
supporting his Far East policy, and said he was weary of Armenia and
distrustful of England; so, too, in September 1896, when Russo-German
relations were also excellent (_Hohenlohe Mems_., Eng. edit., ii.
463, 470).]
On the other hand, Eckardstein, the German ambassador in London, is said
to have made proposals of an Anglo-German-Japanese Alliance in
March-April 1901. If we may trust the work entitled _Secret Memoirs of
Count Hayashi_ (Japanese ambassador in London) these proposals were
dangled for some weeks, why, he could never understand. Probably Germany
was playing a double game; for Hayashi believed that she had a secret
understanding with Russia on these questions. He found that the
Salisbury Cabinet welcomed her adhesion to the principles of maintaining
the territorial integrity of China and of freedom of commerce in the Far
East[506].
[Footnote 506: _Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi_ (London, 1915), pp.
97-131. There are suspicious features about this book. I refer to it
with all reserve. Reventlow (_Deutschlands auswärtige Politik_, p. 178)
thinks Eckardstein may have been playing his own game--an improbable
suggestion.]
In October 1901 Germany proposed to the United Kingdom that each Power
should guarantee the possessions of the other in every Continent except
Asia. Why Asia was excepted is not clear, unless Germany wished to give
Russia a free hand in that Continent. The Berlin Government laid stress
on the need of our support in North and South America, where its aim of
undermining the Monroe Doctrine was notorious. The proposed guarantee
would also have compelled us to assist Germany in any dispute that might
arise between her and France about Alsace-Lorraine or colonial
questions. The aim was obvious, to gain the support of the British fleet
either against the United States or France. A British diplomatist of
high repute, who visited Berlin, has declared that the German Foreign
Office made use of garbled and misleading documents to win him over to
these views[507]. It was in vain. The British Government was not to be
hoodwinked; and, as soon as it declined these compromising proposals, a
storm of abuse swept through the German Press at the barbarities of
British troops in South Africa. That incident ended all chance of an
understanding, either between the two Governments or the two peoples.
[Footnote 507: _Quarterly Review_, Oct. 1914, pp. 426-9.]
The inclusion of Germany in the Anglo-Japanese compact proving to be
impossible, the two Island Powers signed a treaty of alliance at London
on January 30, 1902. It guaranteed the maintenance of the _status quo_
in the Far East, and offered armed assistance by either signatory in the
event of its ally being attacked by more than one Power[508]. The
alliance ended the isolation of the British race, and marked the entry
of Japan into the circle of the World-Powers. The chief objections to
the new departure were its novelty, and the likelihood of its embroiling
us finally with Russia and France or Russia and Germany. These fears
were groundless; for France and even Russia(!) expressed their
satisfaction at the treaty. Lord Lansdowne's diplomatic _coup_ not only
ended the isolation of two Island States, which had been severally
threatened by powerful rivals; it also safeguarded China; and finally,
by raising the prestige of Great Britain, it helped to hasten the end of
the Boer War. During the discussion of their future policy by the Boer
delegates at Vereeniging on May 30, General Botha admitted that he no
longer had any hope of intervention from the Continent of Europe; for
their deputation thither had failed. All the leaders except De Wet
agreed, and they came to terms with Lords Kitchener and Milner at
Pretoria on May 31. That the Anglo-Japanese compact ended the last hopes
of the Boers for intervention can scarcely be doubted.
[Footnote 508: _E.g._, if the Russians alone attacked Japan we were not
bound to help her: but if the French also attacked Japan we must help
her. The aim clearly was to prevent Japan being overborne as in 1895
(see p. 577). The treaty was signed for five years, but was renewed on
August 12, 1905, and in July 1911.]
Still more significant was the new alliance as a warning to Russia not
to push too far her enterprises in the Far East. On April 12, 1902, she
agreed with China to evacuate Manchuria; but (as has appeared in Chapter
XX.) she finally pressed on, not only in Manchuria, but also in Korea,
in which the Anglo-Japanese treaty recognised that Japan had predominant
interests. For this forward policy Russia had the general support of the
Kaiser, whose aims in the Near East were obviously served by the
transference thence of Russia's activities to the Far East. It is,
indeed, probable that he and his agents desired to embroil Russia and
Japan. Certain it is that the Russian people regarded the Russo-Japanese
War, which began in February 1904, as "The War of the Grand Dukes." The
Russian troops fought an uphill fight loyally and doggedly, but with
none of the enthusiasm so conspicuous in the present truly national
struggle. In Manchuria the mistakes and incapacity of their leaders led
to an almost unbroken series of defeats, ending with the protracted and
gigantic contests around Mukden (March 1-10, 1905). The almost complete
destruction of the Russian Baltic fleet by Admiral Togo at the Battle of
Tsushima (May 27-28) ended the last hopes of the Tsar and his ministers;
and, fearful of the rising discontent in Russia, they accepted the
friendly offers of the United States for mediation. By the Treaty of
Portsmouth (Sept. 5, 1905) they ceded to Japan the southern half of
Saghalien and the Peninsula on which stands Port Arthur: they also
agreed to evacuate South Manchuria and to recognise Korea as within
Japan's sphere of influence. No war indemnity was paid. Indeed it could
not be exacted, as Japan occupied no Russian territory which she did
not intend to annex. To Russia the material results of the war were the
loss of some 350,000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners; of two fleets;
and of the valuable provinces and ice-free harbours for the acquisition
of which she had constructed the Trans-Siberian Railway. So heavy a blow
had not been dealt to a Great Power since the fall of Napoleon III.; and
worse, perhaps, than the material loss was that of prestige in accepting
defeat at the hands of an Island State, whose people fifty years before
fought with bows and arrows.
Japan emerged from the war triumphant, but financially exhausted.
Accordingly, she was not loath to conclude with Russia, on July 30,
1907, a convention which adjusted outstanding questions in a friendly
manner[509]. The truth about this Russo-Japanese _rapprochement_ is, of
course, not known; but it may reasonably be ascribed in part to the good
services of England (then about to frame an _entente_ with Russia); and
in part to the suspicion of the statesmen of Petrograd and Tokio that
German influences had secretly incited Russia to the policy of reckless
exploitation in Korea which led to war and disaster.
[Footnote 509: Hayashi, _op. cit._ ch. viii. and App. D. On June 10,
1907, Japan concluded with France an agreement, for which see Hayashi,
ch. vi. and App. C.]
The chief results of the Russo-Japanese War were to paralyse Russia,
thereby emasculating the Dual Alliance and leaving France as much
exposed to German threats as she was before its conclusion; also to
exalt the Triple Alliance and enable its members (Germany, Austria, and
Italy) successively to adopt the forward policy which marked the years
1905, 1908, 1911, and 1914. The Russo-Japanese War therefore inaugurated
a new era in European History. Up to that time the Triple Alliance had
been a defensive league, except when the exuberant impulses of Kaiser
William forced it into provocative courses; and then the provocations
generally stopped at telegrams and orations. But in and after 1905 the
Triple Alliance forsook the watchwords of Bismarck, Andrassy and
Crispi. Expansion at the cost of rivals became the dominant aim.
We must now return to affairs in France which predisposed her to come to
friendly terms, first with Italy, then with Great Britain. Her internal
history in the years 1895-1906 turns largely on the Dreyfus affair. In
1895, he, a Jewish officer in the French army, was accused and convicted
of selling military secrets to Germany. But suspicions were aroused that
he was the victim of anti-Semites or the scapegoat of the real
offenders; and finally, thanks to the championship of Zola, his
condemnation was proved to have been due to a forgery (July 1906).
Meanwhile society had been rent in twain, and confidence in the army and
in the administration of justice was seriously impaired. A furious
anti-militarist agitation began, which had important consequences.
Already in May 1900, the Premier, Waldeck-Rousseau, appointed as
Minister of War General André, who sympathised with these views and
dangerously relaxed discipline. The Combes Ministry, which succeeded in
June 1902, embittered the strife between the clerical and anti-clerical
sections by measures such as the separation of Church and State and the
expulsion of the Religious Orders. In consequence France was almost
helpless in the first years of the century, a fact which explains her
readiness to clasp the hand of England in 1904 and, in 1905, after the
military collapse of Russia in the Far East, to give way before the
threats of Germany[510].
[Footnote 510: Even in 1908 reckless strikes occurred, and there were no
fewer than 11,223 cases of insubordination in the army. Professor
Gustave Hervé left the University in order to direct a paper, _La Guerre
sociale_, which advocated a war of classes.]
The weakness of France predisposed Italy to forget the wrong done by
French statesmen in seizing Tunis twenty years before. That wrong (as we
saw on pp. 328, 329) drove Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria.
But now Crispi and other pro-German authors of the Triple Alliance had
passed away; and that compact, founded on passing passion against France
rather than community of interest or sentiment with the Central
Empires, had sensibly weakened. Time after time Italian Ministers
complained of disregard of their interests by the men of Berlin and
Vienna[511], whereas in 1898 France accorded to Italy a favourable
commercial treaty. Victor Emmanuel III. paid his first state visit to
Petrograd, not to Berlin. In December 1900 France and Italy came to an
understanding respecting Tripoli and Morocco; and in May 1902 the able
French Minister, Delcassé, then intent on his Morocco enterprise,
prepared the way for it by a convention with Italy, which provided that
France and Italy should thenceforth peaceably adjust their differences,
mainly arising out of Mediterranean questions. Seeing that Italy and
Austria were at variance respecting Albania, the Franco-Italian Entente
weakened the Triple Alliance; and the old hatred of Austria appeared in
the shouts of "Viva Trento," "Viva Trieste," often raised in front of
the Austrian embassy at Rome. Despite the renewal of the Triple Alliance
in 1907 and 1912, the adhesion of Italy was open to question, unless the
Allies became the object of indisputable aggression.
[Footnote 511: Crispi, _Memoirs_ (Eng. edit.) vol. ii. pp. 166, 169,
472; vol. iii. pp. 330, 347.]
Still more important was the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. That the
Anglophobe outbursts of the Parisian Press and populace in 1902 should
so speedily give way to a friendly understanding was the work, partly of
the friends of peace in both lands, partly of the personal tact and
charm of Edward VII. as manifested during his visit to Paris in May
1903, but mainly of the French and British Governments. In October 1903
they agreed by treaty to refer to arbitration before the Hague Tribunal
disputes that might arise between them. This agreement (one of the
greatest triumphs of the principle of arbitration[512]) naturally led to
more cordial relations. During the visit of President Loubet and M.
Delcassé to London in July 1903, the latter discussed with Lord
Lansdowne the questions that hindered a settlement, namely, our
occupation of Egypt (a rankling sore in France ever since 1882); French
claims to dominate Morocco both commercially and politically, "the
French shore" of Newfoundland, the New Hebrides, the French
convict-station in New Caledonia, as also the territorial integrity of
Siam, championed by England, threatened by France. A more complex set of
problems never confronted statesmen. Yet a solution was found simply
because both of them were anxious for a solution. Their anxiety is
intelligible in view of the German activities just noticed, and of the
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904. True, France was
allied to Russia only for European affairs; and our alliance with Japan
referred mainly to the Far East. Still, there was danger of a collision,
which both Paris and London wished to avert. It was averted by the skill
and tact of Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcassé, whose conversations of July
1903 pointed the way to the definitive compact of April 8, 1904.
[Footnote 512: Sir Thomas Barclay, _Anglo-French Reminiscences_
(1876-1906), ch. xviii-xxii; M. Hanotaux (_La Politique de l'Équilibre_,
p. 415) claims that Mr. Chamberlain was chiefly instrumental in starting
the negotiations leading to the Entente with France.]
Stated briefly, France gave way on most of the questions named above,
except one, that is, Morocco. There she attained her end, the
recognition by us of her paramount claims. For this she conceded most of
the points in dispute between the two countries in Egypt, though she
maintains her Law School, hospitals, mission schools, and a few other
institutions. Thenceforth England had opposed to her in that land only
German influence and the Egyptian nationalists and Pan-Islam fanatics
whom it sought to encourage. France also renounced some of her fishing
rights in Newfoundland in return for gains of territory on the River
Gambia and near Lake Chad. In return for these concessions she secured
from us the recognition of her claim to watch over the tranquillity of
Morocco, together with an offer of assistance for all "the
administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it
needs." True, she promised not to change the political condition of
Morocco, as also to maintain equality of commercial privileges. Great
Britain gave a similar undertaking for Egypt[513].
[Footnote 513: A. Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques de l'année 1904,
_Appendix II. England in 1914 annulled the promise respecting Egypt
because of the declaration of war by Turkey and the assistance afforded
her by the Khedive, Abbas II. (see Earl of Cromer, _Modern Egypt and
Abbas II_.), On February 15, 1904, France settled by treaty with Siam
frontier disputes of long standing.]
The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 is the most important event of modern
diplomacy. Together with the preceding treaty of arbitration, it removed
all likelihood of war between two nations which used to be "natural
enemies"; and the fact that it in no respect menaced Germany appeared in
the communication of its terms to the German ambassador in Paris shortly
before its signature. On April 12 Bülow declared to the Reichstag his
approval of the compact as likely to end disputes in several quarters,
besides assuring peace and order in Morocco, where Germany's interests
were purely commercial. Two days later, in reply to the Pan-German
leader, Count Reventlow, he said he would not embark Germany on any
enterprise in Morocco. These statements were reasonable and just. The
Entente lessened the friction between Great Britain and Russia during
untoward incidents of the Russo-Japanese War. After the conclusion of
the Entente the Russian ambassador in Paris publicly stated the approval
of his Government, and, quoting the proverb, "The friends of our friends
are _our_ friends," added with a truly prophetic touch--"Who knows
whether that will not be true?" The agreement also served to strengthen
the position of France at a time when her internal crisis and the first
Russian defeats in the Far East threatened to place her almost at the
mercy of Germany. A dangerous situation would have arisen if France had
not recently gained the friendship both of England and Italy.
Finally, the Anglo-French Entente induced Italy to reconsider her
position. Her dependence on us for coal and iron, together with the
vulnerability of her numerous coast-towns, rendered a breach with the
two Powers of the Entente highly undesirable, while on sentimental
grounds she could scarcely take up the gauntlet for her former
oppressor, Austria, against two nations which had assisted in her
liberation. As we shall see, she declared at the Conference of Algeciras
her complete solidarity with Great Britain.
Even so, Germany held a commanding position owing to the completion of
the first part of her naval programme, which placed her far ahead of
France at sea. For reasons that have been set forth, the military and
naval weakness of France was so marked as greatly to encourage German
Chauvinists; but the Entente made them pause, especially when France
agreed to concentrate her chief naval strength in the Mediterranean,
while that of Great Britain was concentrated in the English Channel and
the North Sea. It is certain that the Entente with France never amounted
to an alliance; that was made perfectly clear; but it was unlikely that
the British Government would tolerate an unprovoked attack upon the
Republic, or look idly on while the Pan-Germans refashioned Europe and
the other Continents. Besides, Great Britain was strong at sea. In 1905
she possessed thirty-five battleships mounting 12-in. guns; while the
eighteen German battleships carried only 11-in. and 9.4-in. guns.
Further, in 1905-7 we began and finished the first _Dreadnought_; and
the adoption of that type for the battle-fleet of the near future
lessened the value of the Kiel-North Sea Canal, which was too small to
receive _Dreadnoughts_. In these considerations may perhaps be found the
reason for the caution of Germany at a time which was otherwise very
favourable for aggressive action.
Meanwhile Kaiser William, pressed on by the colonials, had intervened in
a highly sensational manner in the Morocco Affair, thus emphasising his
earlier assertion that nothing important must take place in any part of
the world without the participation of Germany. Her commerce in Morocco
was unimportant compared with that of France and Great Britain; but the
position of that land, commanding the routes to the Mediterranean and
the South Atlantic, was such as to interest all naval Powers, while the
State that gained a foothold in Morocco would have a share in the Moslem
questions then arising to prime importance. As we have seen, the Kaiser
had in 1898 declared his resolve to befriend all Moslem peoples; and his
Chancellor, Bülow, has asserted that Germany's pro-Islam policy
compelled her to intervene in the Moroccan Question. The German
ambassador at Constantinople, Baron von Marschall, said that, if after
that promise Germany sacrificed Morocco, she would at once lose her
position in Turkey, and therefore all the advantages and prospects that
she had painfully acquired by the labour of many years[514].
[Footnote 514: Bülow, _Imperial Germany_, p. 83.]
On the other hand, the feuds of the Moorish tribes vitally concerned
France because they led to many raids into her Algerian lands which she
could not merely repel. In 1901 she adopted a more active policy, that
of "pacific penetration," and, by successive compacts with Italy, Great
Britain, and Spain, secured a kind of guardianship over Moroccan
affairs. This policy, however, aroused deep resentment at Berlin. Though
Germany was pacifically penetrating Turkey and Asia Minor, she grudged
France her success in Morocco, not for commercial reasons but for
others, closely connected with high diplomacy and world-policy. As the
German historian, Rachfahl, declared, Morocco was to be a test of
strength[515].
[Footnote 515: Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques de 1904_, pp. 56-102;
Rachfahl, _Kaiser und Reich_, pp. 230-241; E.D. Morel, _Morocco in
Diplomacy_, chaps, i-xii.]
In one respect Germany had cause for complaint. On October 6, 1904,
France signed a Convention with Spain in terms that were suspiciously
vague. They were interpreted by secret articles which defined the
spheres of French and Spanish influence in case the rule of the Sultan
of Morocco ceased. It does not appear that Germany was aware of these
secret articles at the time of her intervention[516]. But their
existence, even perhaps their general tenor, was surmised. The effective
causes of her intervention were, firstly, her resolve to be consulted
in every matter of importance, and, secondly, the disaster that befel
the Russians at Mukden early in March 1905. At the end of the month, the
Kaiser landed at Tangier and announced in strident terms that he came to
visit the Sultan as an independent sovereign. This challenge to French
claims produced an acute crisis. Delcassé desired to persevere with
pacific penetration; but in the debate of April 19 the deficiencies of
the French military system were admitted with startling frankness; and a
threat from Berlin revealed the intention of humiliating France, and, if
possible, of severing the Anglo-French Entente. Here, indeed, is the
inner significance of the crisis. Germany had lately declared her
indifference to all but commercial questions in Morocco. But she now
made use of the collapse of Russia to seek to end the Anglo-French
connection which she had recently declared to be harmless. The aim
obviously was to sow discord between those two Powers. In this she
failed. Lord Lansdowne and Delcassé lent each other firm support, so
much so that the Paris _Temps_ accused us of pushing France on in a
dangerous affair which did not vitally concern her. The charge was not
only unjust but ungenerous; for Germany had worked so as to induce
England to throw over France or make France throw over England. The two
Governments discerned the snare, and evaded it by holding firmly
together[517].
[Footnote 516: Rachfahl, pp. 235, 238. For details, _see_ Morel, chap.
ii.]
[Footnote 517: In an interview with M. Tardieu at Baden-Baden on October
4, 1905, Bülow said that Germany intervened in Morocco because of her
interests there, and also to protest against this new attempt to isolate
her (Tardieu, _Questions actuelles de Politique étrangère_, p. 87). If
so, her conduct increased that isolation. Probably the second
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of August 12, 1905 (published on September 27),
was due to fear of German aggression. France and Germany came to a
preliminary agreement as to Morocco on September 28.]
The chief difficulty of the situation was that it committed France to
two gigantic tasks, that of pacifying Morocco and also of standing up to
the Kaiser in Europe. In this respect the ground for the conflict was
all in his favour; and both he and she knew it. Consequently, a
compromise was desirable; and the Kaiser himself, in insisting on the
holding of a Conference, built a golden bridge over which France might
draw back, certainly with honour, probably with success; for in the
diplomatic sphere she was at least as strong as he. When, therefore,
Delcassé objected to the Conference, his colleagues accepted his
resignation (June 6). His fall was hailed at Berlin as a humiliation for
France. Nevertheless, her complaisance earned general sympathy, while
the bullying tone of German diplomacy, continued during the Conference
held at Algeciras, hardened the opposition of nearly all the Powers,
including the United States. Especially noteworthy was the declaration
of Italy that her interests were identical with those of England. German
proposals were supported by Austria alone, who therefore gained from the
Kaiser the doubtful compliment of having played the part of "a brilliant
second" to Germany.
It is needless to describe at length the Act of Algeciras (April 7,
1906). It established a police and a State Bank in Morocco, suppressed
smuggling and the illicit trade in arms, reformed the taxes, and set on
foot public works. Of course, little resulted from all this; but the
position of France was tacitly regularised, and she was left free to
proceed with pacific penetration. "We are neither victors nor
vanquished," said Bülow in reviewing the Act; and M. Rouvier echoed the
statement for France. In reality, Germany had suffered a check. Her
chief aim was to sever the Anglo-French Entente, and she failed. She
sought to rally Italy to her side, and she failed; for Italy now
proclaimed her accord with France on Mediterranean questions. Finally
the _North German Gazette_ paid a tribute to the loyal and peaceable
aims of French policy; while other less official German papers deplored
the mistakes of their Government, which had emphasised the isolation of
Germany[518]. This is indeed the outstanding result of the Conference.
The threatening tone of Berlin had disgusted everybody. Above all it
brought to more cordial relations the former rivals, Great Britain
and Russia.
[Footnote 518: Tardieu, _La Conference d'Algeciras_, pp. 410-20.]
As has already appeared, the friction between Great Britain and Russia
quickly disappeared after the Japanese War. During the Congress of
Algeciras the former rivals worked cordially together to check the
expansive policy of Germany, in which now lay the chief cause of
political unrest. In fact, the Kaiser's Turcophile policy acquired a new
significance owing to the spread of a Pan-Islamic propaganda which sent
thrills of fanaticism through North-West Africa, Egypt, and Central
Asia. At St. Helena Napoleon often declared Islam to be vastly superior
to Christianity as a fighting creed; and his imitator now seemed about
to marshal it against France, Russia, and Great Britain. Naturally, the
three Powers drew together for mutual support. Further, Germany by
herself was very powerful, the portentous growth of her manufactures and
commerce endowing her with wealth which she spent lavishly on her army
and navy. In May 1906 the Reichstag agreed to a new Navy Bill for
further construction which was estimated to raise the total annual
expenditure on the navy from £11,671,000 in 1905 to £16,492,000 in 1917;
this too though Bebel had warned the House that the agitation of the_
German Navy League had for its object a war with England.
In 1906 and 1907 Edward VII. paid visits to William II., who returned
the compliment in November 1907. But this interchange of courtesies
could not end the distrust caused by Germany's increase of armaments.
The peace-loving Administration of Campbell-Bannerman, installed in
power by the General Election of 1906, sought to come to an
understanding with Berlin, especially at the second Hague Conference of
1907, with respect to a limitation of armaments. But Germany rejected
all such proposals[519]. The hopelessness of framing a friendly
arrangement with her threw us into the arms of Russia; and on August 31,
1907, Anglo-Russian Conventions were signed defining in a friendly way
the interests of the two Powers in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet.
True, the interests of Persian reformers were sacrificed by this
bargain; but it must be viewed, firstly, in the light of the Bagdad
Railway scheme, which threatened soon to bring Germany to the gates of
Persia and endanger the position of both Powers in that land[520];
secondly, in that of the general situation, in which Germany and Austria
were rapidly forcing their way to a complete military ascendancy and
refused to consider any limitation of armaments. The detailed reasons
which prompted the Anglo-Russian Entente are of course unknown. But the
fact that the most democratic of all British Administrations should come
to terms with the Russian autocracy is the most convincing proof of the
very real danger which both States discerned in the aggressive conduct
of the Central Powers. The Triple Alliance, designed by Bismarck solely
to safeguard peace, became, in the hands of William II., a menace to his
neighbours, and led them to form tentative and conditional arrangements
for defence in case of attack. This is all that was meant by the Triple
Entente. It formed a loose pendant to the Dual Alliance between France
and Russia, which _was_ binding and solid. With those Powers the United
Kingdom formed separate agreements; but they were not alliances; they
were friendly understandings on certain specific objects, and in no
respect threatened the Triple Alliance so long as it remained
non-aggressive[521].
[Footnote 519: See the cynical section in Reventlow, _op. cit._ (pp.
280-8), entitled "Utopien und Intrigen im Haag." For Austria's efforts
to prevent the Anglo-Russian Entente, see H.W. Steed, _The Hamburg
Monarchy_, p. 230.]
[Footnote 520: Rachfahl (p. 307) admits this, but accuses England of
covert opposition everywhere, even at the Hague Conference.]
[Footnote 521: On December 24, 1908, the Russian Foreign Minister,
Izvolsky, assured the Duma that "no open or secret agreements directed
against German interests existed between Russia and England."]
One question remains. When was it that the friction between Great
Britain and Germany first became acute? Some have dated it from the
Morocco Affair of 1905-6. The assertion is inconsistent with the facts
of the case. Long before that crisis the policy of the Kaiser tended
increasingly towards a collision. His patronage of the Boers early in
1896 was a threatening sign; still more so was his World-Policy,
proclaimed repeatedly in the following years, when the appointments of
Tirpitz and Bülow showed that the threats of capturing the trident, and
so forth, were not mere bravado. The outbreak of the Boer War in 1899,
followed quickly by the Kaiser's speech at Hamburg, and the adoption of
accelerated naval construction in 1900, brought about serious tension,
which was not relaxed by British complaisance respecting Samoa. The
coquetting with the Sultan, the definite initiation of the Bagdad scheme
(1902-3), and the completion of the first part of Germany's new naval
programme in 1904 account for the Anglo-French Entente of that year. The
chief significance of the Morocco Affair of 1905-6 lay in the Kaiser's
design of severing that Entente. His failure, which was still further
emphasised during the Algeciras Conference, proved that a policy which
relies on menace and ever-increasing armaments arouses increasing
distrust and leads the menaced States to form defensive arrangements.
That is also the outstanding lesson of the career of Napoleon I.
Nevertheless, the Kaiser, like the Corsican, persisted in forceful
procedure, until Army Bills, Navy Bills, and the rejection of pacific
proposals at the Hague, led to their natural result, the Anglo-Russian
agreement of 1907. This event should have made him question the wisdom
of relying on armed force and threatening procedure. The Entente between
the Tsar and the Campbell-Bannerman Administration formed a tacit but
decisive censure of the policy of Potsdam; for it realised the fears
which had haunted Bismarck like a nightmare[522]. Its effect on William
II. was to induce him to increase his military and naval preparations,
to reject all proposals for the substitution of arbitration in place of
the reign of force, and thereby to enclose the policy of the Great
Powers in a vicious circle from which the only escape was a general
reduction of armaments or war.
[Footnote 522: _Bismarck, his Reflections and Recollections_, vol. ii.
pp. 252, 289. There are grounds for thinking that William II. has been
pushed on to a bellicose policy by the Navy, Colonial, and Pan-German
Leagues. In 1908 he seems to have sought to pause; but powerful
influences (as also at the time of the crises of July 1911 and 1914)
propelled him. See an article in the _Revue de Paris_ of April 15, 1913,
"Guillaume II et les pangermanistes." In my narrative I speak of the
Kaiser as equivalent to the German Government; for he is absolute and
his Ministers are responsible solely to him.]
CHAPTER XXII
TEUTON _versus_ SLAV (1908-13)
"To tell the truth, the Slav seems to us a born
slave."--TREITSCHKE, June 1876.
On October 7, 1908, Austria-Hungary exploded a political bomb-shell by
declaring her resolve to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the Treaty of
Berlin of 1878, she had provisionally occupied and administered those
provinces as mandatory of Europe (see p. 238). But now, without
consulting Europe, she appropriated her charge. On the other hand, she
consented to withdraw from the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar which she had
occupied by virtue of a secret agreement with Russia of July 1878. Even
so, her annexation of a great province caused a sharp crisis for the
following reasons: (1) It violated the international law of Europe
without any excuse whatever. (2) It exasperated Servia, which hoped
ultimately to possess Bosnia, a land peopled by her kindred and
necessary to her expansion seawards. (3) It no less deeply offended the
Young Turks, who were resolved to revivify the Turkish people and assert
their authority over all parts of the Ottoman dominions. (4) It came at
the same time as the assumption by Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria of the
title of Tsar of the Bulgarians. This change of title, which implied a
prospect of sovereignty over the Bulgars of Macedonia, had been arranged
during a recent visit to Buda-Pest, and foreshadowed the supremacy of
Austrian influence not only in the new kingdom of Bulgaria but
eventually in the Bulgar districts of Macedonia[523].
[Footnote 523: H.W. Steed, _The Hapsburg Monarchy_, pp. 52, 214.]
Thus, Austria's action constituted a serious challenge to the Powers in
general, especially to Russia, Servia, and to regenerated Turkey[524].
So daring a _coup_ had not been dealt by Austria since 1848, when
Francis Joseph ascended the throne; it is believed that he desired to
have the provinces as a jubilee gift, a set off to the loss of Lombardy
and Venetia in 1859 and 1866. Certainly Austria had carried out great
improvements in Bosnia; but an occupier who improves a farm does not
gain the right to possess it except by agreement with others who have
joint claims. Moreover, the Young Turks, in power since July 1908,
boasted their ability to civilise Bosnia and all parts of their Empire.
Servia also longed to include it in the large Servo-Croat kingdom of
the future.
[Footnote 524: The constitutional regime which the Young Turks imposed
on the reactionary Abdul Hamid II., in July 1908, was hailed as a
victory for British influence. The change in April 1909 favoured German
influence. I have no space for an account of these complex events.]
The Bosnian Question sprang out of a conflict of racial claims, which
two masterful men, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Austrian
Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, were resolved to decide in favour of
Austria. The Archduke disliked, and was disliked by, the Germans and
Magyars on account of his pro-Slav tendencies. In 1900 he contracted
with a Slav lady, the Countess Chotek, a morganatic marriage, which
brought him into strained relations with the Emperor and Court. A
silent, resolute man, he determined to lessen German and Magyar
influence in the Empire by favouring the law for universal suffrage
(1906), and by the appointment as Foreign Minister of Aehrenthal, who
harboured ambitiously expansive schemes. The Archduke also furthered a
policy known as Trialism, that of federalising the Dual Monarchy by
constituting the Slav provinces as the third of its component groups.
The annexation of Bosnia would serve to advance this programme by
depressing the hitherto dominant races, the Germans and Magyars,
besides rescuing the monarchy from the position of "brilliant second" to
Germany. Kaiser William was taken aback by this bold stroke, especially
as it wounded Turkey; but he soon saw the advantage of having a vigorous
rather than a passive Ally; and, in a visit which he paid to the
Archduke in November 1908, their intercourse, which had hitherto been
coldly courteous, ripened into friendship, which became enthusiastic
admiration when the Archduke advocated the building of Austrian
_Dreadnoughts_.
The annexation of Bosnia was a defiance to Europe, because, at the
Conference of the Powers held at London in 1871, they all (Austria
included) solemnly agreed not to depart from their treaty engagements
without a previous understanding with the co-signatories. Austria's
conduct in 1908, therefore, dealt a severe blow to the regime of
international law. But it was especially resented by the Russians,
because for ages they had lavished blood and treasure in effecting the
liberation of the Balkan peoples. Besides, in 1897, the Tsar had framed
an agreement with the Court of Vienna for the purpose of exercising
conjointly some measure of control over Balkan affairs; and he then
vetoed Austria's suggestion for the acquisition of Bosnia. In 1903, when
the two Empires drew up the "February" and "Mürzsteg" Programmes for
more effectually dealing with the racial disputes in Macedonia, the
Hapsburg Court did not renew the suggestion about Bosnia, yet in 1908
Austria annexed that province. Obviously, she would not have thus defied
the public law of Europe and Russian, Servian, and Turkish interests,
but for the recent humiliation of Russia in the Far East, which explains
both the dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier against Russia's
ally, France, and the sudden apparition of Austria as an aggressive
Power. In his speech to the Austro-Hungarian Delegations Aehrenthal
declared that he intended to continue "an active foreign policy," which
would enable Austria-Hungary to "occupy to the full her place in the
world." She had to act because otherwise "affairs might have developed
against her."
Thus the Eastern Question once more became a matter of acute
controversy. The Austro-Russian agreements of 1897 and 1903 had huddled
up and cloaked over those racial and religious disputes, so that there
was little chance of a general war arising out of them. But since 1908
the Eastern Question has threatened to produce a general conflict unless
Austria moderated her pretensions. She did not do so; for, as we have
seen, Germany favoured them in order to assure uninterrupted
communications between Central Europe and her Bagdad Railway. Already
Hapsburg influence was supreme at Bukharest, Sofia, and in Macedonian
affairs. If it could dominate Servia (anti-Austrian since the accession
of King Peter in 1903) the whole of the Peninsula would be subject to
Austro-German control. True, the influence of Germany at Constantinople
at first suffered a shock from the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908;
and those eager nationalists deeply resented the annexation of Bosnia,
which they ascribed to the Austro-German alliance. The men of Berlin,
however, so far from furthering that act, disapproved of it as
endangering their control of Turkey and exploitation of its resources.
In fact, Germany's task in inducing her prospective vassals, the Turks,
to submit to spoliation at the hands of her ally, Austria, was
exceedingly difficult; and in the tension thus created, the third
partner of the Triple Alliance, Italy, very nearly parted company, from
disgust at Austrian encroachments in a quarter where she cherished
aspirations. As we have seen, Victor Emmanuel III., early in his reign,
favoured friendly relations with Russia; and these ripened quickly
during the "Annexation Crisis" of 1908-9, as both Powers desired to
maintain the _status quo_ against Austria[525]. On December 24, 1908,
the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, declared that, with that aim in
view, he was acting in close concert with France, Great Britain, and
Italy. He urged Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro to hold closely
together for the defence of their common interests: "Our aim must be to
bring them together and to combine them with Turkey in a common ideal of
defence of their national and economic development." A cordial union
between the Slav States and Turkey now seems a fantastic notion; but it
was possible then, under pressure of the Austro-German menace, which the
Young Turks were actively resisting.
[Footnote 525: Tittoni, _Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy_ (English
translation, p. 128). Tittoni denied that the Triple Alliance empowered
Italy to demand "compensation" if Austria expanded in the Balkans. But
the Triple Alliance Treaty, as renewed in 1912, included such a
clause, No. VII.]
During the early part of 1909 a general war seemed imminent; for
Slavonic feeling was violently excited in Russia and Servia. But,
hostilities being impossible in winter, passions had time to cool. It
soon became evident that those States could not make head against
Austria and Germany. Moreover, the Franco-Russian alliance did not bind
France to act with Russia unless the latter were definitely attacked;
and France was weakened by the widespread strikes of 1907-8 and the
vehement anti-militarist agitation already described. Further, Italy was
distracted by the earthquake at Messina, and armed intervention was not
to be expected from the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry. Bulgaria and
Roumania were pro-Austrian. Turkey alone could not hope to reconquer
Bosnia, and a Turco-Serb-Russian league was beyond the range of
practical politics. These material considerations decided the issue of
events. Towards the close of March, Kaiser William, the hitherto silent
backer of Austria, ended the crisis by sending to his ambassador at
Petrograd an autograph letter, the effect of which upon the Tsar was
decisive. Russia gave way, and dissociated herself from France, England,
and Italy. In consideration of an indemnity of £2,200,000 from Austria,
Turkey recognised the annexation. Consequently no Conference of the
Powers met even to register the _fait accompli_ in Bosnia. The Germanic
Empires had coerced Russia and Servia, despoiled Turkey, and imposed
their will on Europe. Kaiser William characteristically asserted that it
was his apparition "in shining armour" by the side of Austria which
decided the issue of events. Equally decisive, perhaps, was Germany's
formidable shipbuilding in 1908-9, namely, four _Dreadnoughts_ to
England's two, a fact which explains this statement of Bülow: "When at
last, during the Bosnian crisis, the sky of international politics
cleared, when German power on the Continent burst its encompassing
bonds, we had already got beyond the stage of preparation in the
construction of our fleet[526]."
[Footnote 526: Bülow, _Imperial Germany_, p. 99.]
The crisis of 1908-9 revealed in a startling manner the weakness of
international law in a case where the stronger States were determined to
have their way. It therefore tended to discourage the peace propaganda
and the social movement in Great Britain and France. The increased speed
of German naval construction alarmed the British people, who demanded
precautionary measures[527]. France and Russia also improved their
armaments, for it was clear that Austria, as well as Germany, intended
to pursue an active foreign policy which would inflict other rebuffs on
neighbours who were unprepared. Further, the Triple Entente had proved
far too weak for the occasion. True, France and England loyally
supported Russia in a matter which chiefly concerned her and Servia, and
her sudden retreat before the Kaiser's menace left them in the lurch.
Consequently, the relations between the Western Powers and Russia were
decidedly cool during the years 1909-10, especially in and after
November 1910, when the Tsar met Kaiser William at Potsdam, and framed
an agreement, both as to their general relations and the railways then
under construction towards Persia. On the other hand, the rapid advance
of Germany and Austria alarmed Italy, who, in order to safeguard her
interests in the Balkans (especially Albania), came to an understanding
with Russia for the support of their claims. The details are not known,
neither are the agreements of Austria with Bulgaria and Roumania,
though it seems probable that they were framed with the two kings rather
than with the Governments of Sofia and Bukharest. Those sovereigns were
German princes, and the events of 1908-9 naturally attracted them
towards the Central Powers.
[Footnote 527: Annoyance had been caused by the Kaiser's letter of Feb.
18, 1908, to Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty, advising
(though in friendly terms) the cessation of suspicion towards Germany's
naval construction. It was held to be an attempt to put us off
our guard.]
In 1909-10 France and England also lost ground in Turkey. There the
Young Turks, who seized power in July 1908, were overthrown in April
1909, when Abdul Hamid II. was deposed. He was succeeded by his weakly
complaisant brother, Mohammed V. This change, however, did not promote
the cause of reform. The Turkish Parliament became a bear-garden, and
the reformers the tools of reaction. In the four years 1908-12 there
were seven Ministries and countless ministerial crises, and the Young
Turks, copying the forms and killing the spirit of English Liberalism,
soon became the most intolerant oppressors of their non-Moslem subjects.
In administrative matters they acted on the old Turkish proverb--"The
Sultan's treasure is a sea, and he who does not draw from it is a pig."
Germany found means to satisfy these dominating and acquisitive
instincts, and thus regained power at the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman
Empire therefore remained the despair of patriotic reformers, a
hunting-ground for Teutonic _concessionnaires_, a Hell for its Christian
subjects, and the chief storm-centre of Europe[528].
[Footnote 528: Lack of space precludes an account of the Cretan
Question, also of the Agram and Friedjung trials which threw lurid light
on Austria's treatment of her South-Slav subjects, for which see
Seton-Watson, _Corruption and Reform in Hungary_. Rohrbach, _Der
deutsche Gedanke in der Welt_ (1912), p. 172, explains the success of
German efforts at the Porte by the belief of the Young Turks that
Germany was the only Power that wished them well--Germany who helped
Austria to secure Bosnia; Germany, whose Bagdad Railway scheme
mercilessly exploited Turkish resources! (See D. Fraser, _The Short Cut
to India_, chs. iii. iv.)]
The death of King Edward VII. on May 6, 1910, was a misfortune for the
cause of peace. His tact and discernment had on several occasions
allayed animosity and paved the way for friendly understandings. True,
the German Press sought to represent those efforts as directed towards
the "encircling" (_Einkreisung_) of Germany. But here we may note that
(1) King Edward never transgressed the constitutional usage, which
prescribed that no important agreement be arrived at apart from the
responsible Ministers of the Crown[529]. (2) The agreements with Spain,
Italy, France, Germany, and Portugal (in 1903-4) were for the purposes
of arbitration. (3) The alliance with Japan and the Ententes with France
and Russia were designed to end the perilous state of isolation which
existed at the time of his accession. (4) At that time Germany was
allied to Austria, Italy, and (probably) Roumania, not to speak of her
secret arrangements with Turkey. She had no right to complain of the
ending of our isolation. (5) The marriage of King Alfonso of Spain with
Princess Ena of Battenberg (May 1906), was a love-match, and was not the
result of King Edward's efforts to detach Spain from Germany. It had no
political significance. (6) The Kaiser's sister was Crown Princess (now
Queen) of Greece; the King of Roumania was a Hohenzollern; and the King
of Bulgaria and the Prince Consort of Holland were German Princes. (7)
On several occasions King Edward testified his friendship with Germany,
notably during his visit to Berlin in February 1909, which Germans admit
to have helped on the friendly Franco-German agreement of that month on
Morocco; also in his letter of January 1910, on the occasion of the
Kaiser's birthday, when he expressed the hope that the United Kingdom
and Germany might always work together for the maintenance of
peace[530].
[Footnote 529: I have been assured of this on high authority.]
[Footnote 530: Viscount Esher, _the Influence of King Edward: and Other
Essays_, p. 56. The "encircling" myth is worked up by Rachfahl, _Kaiser
und Reich_, p, 228; Reventlow, _op, cit._ pp. 254, 279, 298, etc.; and
by Rohrbach, _Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt_ (ch. vi.), where he says
that King Edward's chief idea from the outset was to cripple Germany. He
therefore won over Japan, France, Spain, and Russia, his aim being to
secure all Africa from the Cape to Cairo, and all Asia from the Sinaitic
Peninsula to Burmah.]
The chief danger to public tranquillity arises from the vigorous
expansion of some peoples and the decay of others. Nearly all the great
nations of Europe are expansive; but on their fringe lie other peoples,
notably the Turks, Persians, Koreans, and the peoples of North Africa,
who are in a state of decline or semi-anarchy. In such a state of things
friction is inevitable and war difficult to avoid, unless in the
councils of the nations goodwill and generosity prevail over the
suspicion and greed which are too often the dominant motives. Scarcely
was the Bosnian-Turkish crisis over before Morocco once more became a
danger to the peace of the world.