There the anarchy continued, with results that strained the relations

between France and Germany. Nevertheless, on February 8, 1909 (probably

owing to the friendly offices of Great Britain[531]), the two rivals

came to an agreement that France should respect the independence of

Morocco and not oppose German trade in that quarter, while Germany

declared that her sole interests there were commercial, and that she

would not oppose "the special political interests of France in that

country[532]." But, as trade depended on the maintenance of order, this

vague compact involved difficulties. Clearly, if disorders continued,

the task of France would be onerous and relatively unprofitable, for she

would be working largely for the benefit of British and German traders.

Indeed, the new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, admitted to the French

ambassador, Jules Cambon, that thenceforth Morocco was a fruit destined

to fall into the lap of France; only she must humour public opinion in

Germany. Unfortunately, the "Consortium," for joint commercial

enterprises of French and Germans in Morocco and the French Congo, broke

down on points of detail; and this produced a very sore feeling in

Germany in the spring of 1911. Further, as the Moorish rebels pushed

their raids up to the very gates of Fez, French troops in those same

months proceeded to march to that capital (April 1911). The Kaiser saw

in that move, and a corresponding advance of Spanish troops in the

North, a design to partition Morocco. Failing to secure what he

considered satisfactory assurances, he decided to send to Agadir a

corvette, the _Panther_ (July 1, 1911), replaced by a cruiser,

the _Berlin_.

[Footnote 531: Rachfahl, p. 310.]

[Footnote 532: Morel, App. XIV.]

Behind him were ambitious parties which sought to compass

world-predominance for Germany. The Pan-German, Colonial, and Navy

Leagues had gained enormous influence since 1905, when they induced the

Kaiser to visit Tangiers; and early in 1911 they issued pamphlets urging

the annexation of part of Morocco. The chief, termed _West-Marokko

deutsch_, was inspired by the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs,

Kiderlen-Wächter, who thereafter urged officially that the Government

must take into account public opinion--which he himself had manipulated.

Again, as at Tangiers in 1905, Germany's procedure was needlessly

provocative if, as the agreement of 1909 declared, her interests in

Morocco were solely commercial. If this were so, why send a war-ship,

when diplomatic insistence on the terms of 1909 would have met the needs

of the case, especially as German trade with Morocco was less than half

that of French firms and less than one-third that of British firms?

Obviously, Germany was bent on something more than the maintenance of

her trade (which, indeed, the French were furthering by suppressing

anarchy); otherwise she would not have risked the chance of a collision

which might at any time result from the presence of a German cruiser

alongside French war-ships in a small harbour.

It is almost certain that the colonial and war parties at Berlin sought

to drive on the Kaiser to hostilities. The occasion was favourable. In

the spring of 1911 France was a prey to formidable riots of

vine-growers. On June 28 occurred an embarrassing change of Ministry.

Besides, the French army and navy had not yet recovered from the

Socialist régime of previous years. The remodelling of the Russian army

was also very far from complete. Moreover, the Tsar and Kaiser had come

to a friendly understanding at Potsdam in November 1910, respecting

Persia and their attitude towards other questions, so that it was

doubtful whether Russia would assist France if French action in Morocco

could be made to appear irregular. As for Great Britain, her ability to

afford sufficiently large and timely succour to the French was open to

question. In the throes of a sharp constitutional crisis, and beset by

acute Labour troubles, she was ill-fitted even to defend herself. By the

close of 1911 the Navy would include only fourteen first-class ships as

against Germany's nine; while Austria was also becoming a Naval Power.

The weakness of France and England had appeared in the spring when they

gave way before Germany's claims in Asia Minor. On March 18, 1911, by a

convention with Turkey she acquired the right to construct from the

Bagdad Railway a branch line to Alexandretta, together with large

privileges over that port which made it practically German, and the

natural outlet for Mesopotamia and North Syria, heretofore in the sphere

of Great Britain and France. True, she waived conditionally her claim to

push the Bagdad line to the Persian Gulf; but her recent bargain with

the Tsar at Potsdam gave her the lion's share of the trade of

Western Persia.

After taking these strides in the Levant, Germany ought not to have

shown jealousy of French progress in Morocco, where her commerce was

small. As in 1905, she was clearly using the occasion to test the

validity of the Anglo-French Entente and the effectiveness of British

support to France. Probably, too, she desired either a territorial

acquisition in South Morocco, for which the colonial party and most of

the Press were clamouring; or she intended, in lieu of it, to acquire

the French Congo. At present it is not clear at which of these objects

she aimed. Kiderlen-Wächter declared privately that Germany must have

the Agadir district, and would never merely accept in exchange Congolese

territory[533].

[Footnote 533: The following facts are significant. On November 9, 1911,

the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, assured the Reichstag that Germany had

never intended to annex Moroccan territory, an assertion confirmed by

Kiderlen-Wächter on Nov. 17. But during the libel action brought against

the Berlin _Post_ it was positively affirmed that the Government and

Kiderlen-Wächter had intended to annex South-West Morocco. A high

official, Dr. Heilbronn, telephoned so to the _Post_, urging it to

demand that step.]

Whatever were the real aims of the Kaiser, they ran counter to French

and British interests. Moreover, the warning of Sir Edward Grey, on July

4, that we must be consulted as to any new developments, was completely

ignored; and even on July 21 the German ambassador in London could give

no assurance as to the policy of his Government. Consequently, on that

evening Mr. Lloyd George, during a speech at the Mansion House, apprised

Germany that any attempt to treat us as a negligible factor in the

Cabinet of Nations "would be a humiliation intolerable for a great

country like ours to endure." The tension must have been far more severe

than appeared in the published documents to induce so peace-loving a

Minister to speak in those terms. They aroused a storm of passion in the

German Press; and, somewhat later, a German admiral, Stiege, declared

that they would have justified an immediate declaration of war by

Germany[534]. Certainly they were more menacing than is usual in

diplomatic parlance; but our cavalier treatment by Germany (possibly due

to Bethmann-Hollweg's belief in blunt Bismarckian ways) justified a

protest, which, after all, was less questionable than Germany's

despatching a cruiser to Agadir, owing to the reserve of the French

Foreign Office. Up to July 27 the crisis remained acute; but on that day

the German ambassador gave assurances as to a probable agreement

with France.

[Footnote 534: Rear-Admiral Stiege in _Überall_ for March 1912.]

What caused the change of front at Berlin? Probably it was due to a

sharp financial crisis (an unexpected result of the political crisis),

which would have produced a general crash in German finance, then in an

insecure position; and prudence may have counselled the adoption of the

less ambitious course, namely a friendly negotiation with the French for

territorial expansion in their Congo territory in return for the

recognition of their protectorate of Morocco. Such a compromise (which,

as we shall see, was finally arrived at) involved no loss for Germany.

On the contrary, she gained fertile districts in the tropics and left

the French committed to the Morocco venture, which, at great cost to

them, would tend finally to benefit commerce in general, and therefore

that of Germany.

Also, before the end of these discussions there occurred two events

which might well dispose the Kaiser to a compromise with France.

Firstly, as a result of his negotiations with Russia (then beset by

severe dearth) he secured larger railway and trading concessions in

Persia, the compact of August 19 opening the door for further German

enterprises in the Levant. Secondly, on September 29, Italy declared war

on Turkey, partly (it is said) because recent German activity in Tripoli

menaced the ascendancy which she was resolved to acquire in that land.

This event greatly deranged the Kaiser's schemes. He had hoped to keep

the Triple Alliance intact, and yet add to it the immense potential

fighting force of Turkey and the Moslem World. Now, however he might

"hedge," he could hardly avoid offending either Rome or Constantinople;

and even if he succeeded, his friends would exhaust each other and be

useless for the near future. Consequently, the Italo-Turkish War (with

its sequel, the Balkan War of 1912) dealt him a severe blow. The Triple

Alliance was at once strained nearly to breaking-point by Austria

forbidding Italy to undertake naval operations in the Adriatic (probably

also in the Aegean). Equally serious was the hostility of Moslems to

Europeans in general which compromised the Kaiser's schemes for

utilising Islam. Accordingly, for the present, his policy assumed a more

peaceful guise.

Here, doubtless, are the decisive reasons for the Franco-German accord

of November 4, 1911, whereby the Berlin Government recognised a French

protectorate over Morocco and agreed not to interfere in the

Franco-Spanish negotiation still pending. France opened certain "closed"

ports (among them Agadir), and guaranteed equality of trading rights to

all nations. She also ceded to Germany about 100,000 square miles of

fertile land in the north-west of her Congo territory, which afforded

access to the rivers Congo and Ubangi. The explosion of Teutonic wrath

produced by these far from unfavourable conditions revealed the

magnitude of the designs that prompted the _coup_ of Agadir. The

Colonial Minister at once resigned; and scornful laughter greeted the

Chancellor when he announced to the Reichstag that the _Berlin_ would be

withdrawn from that port, the protection of German subjects being no

longer necessary. He added that Germany would neither fight for Southern

Morocco nor dissipate her strength in distant expeditions. In fact, he

would "avoid any war which was not required by German honour." Far

different was the tone of the Conservative leader, Herr Heydebrand, who

declared Mr. Lloyd George's "challenge" to be one which the German

people would not tolerate; England had sought to involve them in a war

with France, but they now saw "where the real enemy was to be found."

The Crown Prince, who was present, loudly applauded these Anglophobe

outbursts. The German Press showed no less bitterness. Besides

criticising the Chancellor's blustering beginning and huckstering

conclusion, they manifested a resolve that Germany should always and

everywhere succeed. The Berlin journal, the _Post_, went so far as to

call the Kaiser _ce poltron misérable_ for giving up South Morocco; and

it was clear that a large section of the German people ardently desired

war with the Western Powers.

Many Frenchmen and Belgians credited the German colonial party with the

design of acquiring the whole of the French Congo, as a first step

towards annexing the Belgian Congo[535]. Belgium became alarmed, and in

1913 greatly extended the principle of compulsory military service. On

the other hand, the German Chauvinists certainly desired the acquisition

of a naval base in Morocco which would help to link up their naval

stations and facilitate the conquest of a World Empire. This was the

policy set forth by Bernhardi in the closing parts of his work, _Germany

and the next War,_ where he protested against the Chancellor's surrender

of Morocco as degrading to the nation and damaging to its future.

Following the lead of Treitschke, he depreciated colonies rich merely in

products; for Germany needed homes for her children in future

generations, and she must fight for them with all her might at the first

favourable opportunity. This is the burden of Bernhardi's message, which

bristles with rage at the loss of Morocco. He regarded that land as more

important than the Congo; for, in addition to the strategic value of its

coasts, it offered a fulcrum in the west whereby to raise the Moslems

against the Triple Entente. In the Epilogue he writes: "Our relations

with Islam have changed for the worse by the abandonment of

Morocco. . . . We have lost prestige in the whole Mohammedan world,

which is a matter of the first importance for us."

[Footnote 535: Hanotaux, _La Politique de l'Équilibre_, p. 417.]

The logical conclusion of Bernhardi's thesis was that Germany and

Austria should boldly side with the Moors and Turks against France and

Italy, summoning Islam to arms, if need be, against Christendom. Perhaps

if Turkey had possessed the 1,500,000 troops whom her War Minister,

Chevket Pacha, was hopefully striving to raise, this might have been the

outcome of events. As it was, _Realpolitik_ counselled prudence, and the

observance of the forms of Christianity.

Certainly there was no sufficient pretext for war. France and Russia had

humoured Germany. As to "the real enemy," light was thrown on her

attitude during the debate of November 27, 1911, at Westminster. Sir

Edward Grey then stated that we had consistently helped on, and not

impeded, the Franco-German negotiations. Never had we played the

dog-in-the-manger to Germany. In fact, the Berlin Government would

greatly have eased the tension if she had declared earlier that she did

not intend to take part of Morocco. Further, the Entente with France

(made public on November 24) contained no secret articles; nor were

there any in any compact made by the British Government. On December 6,

Mr. Asquith declared that we had no secret engagement with any Power

obliging us to take up arms. "We do not desire to stand in the light of

any Power which wants to find its place in the sun. The first of British

interests is, as it always has been, the peace of the world; and to its

attainment British diplomacy and policy will be directed." The German

Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, also said in the Reichstag, "We also,

sirs, sincerely desire to live in peace and friendship with England"--an

announcement received with complete silence. Some applause greeted his

statement that he would welcome any definite proof that England desired

friendlier relations with Germany.

Thus ended the year 1911. Frenchmen were sore at discovering that the

Entente entailed no obligation on our part to help them by force of

arms[536]; and Germans, far from rejoicing at their easy acquisition of

a new colony, harboured resentment against both the Western Powers.

Britons had been aroused from party strifes and Labour quarrels by

finding new proofs of the savage enmity with which Junkers, Colonials,

and Pan-Germans regarded them; and the problem was--Should England seek

to regain Germany's friendship, meanwhile remaining aloof from close

connections with France and Russia; or should she recognise that her

uncertain attitude possessed all the disadvantages and few of the

advantages of a definite alliance?

[Footnote 536: Hanotaux, _La Politique de l'Équilibre,_ p. 419.]

Early in 1912 light was thrown on the situation, and the Berlin

Government thenceforth could not plead ignorance as to our intentions;

for efforts, both public and private, were made to improve Anglo-German

relations. Mr. Churchill advocated a friendly understanding in naval

affairs. Lord Haldane also visited Berlin on an official invitation. He

declared to that Government that "we would in no circumstances be a

party to any sort of aggression upon Germany." But we must oppose a

violation of the neutrality of Belgium, and, if the naval competition

continued, we should lay down two keels to Germany's one. As a sequel to

these discussions the two Governments discussed the basis of an Entente.

It soon appeared that Germany sought to bind us almost unconditionally

to neutrality in all cases. To this the British Cabinet demurred, but

suggested the following formula:

The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and

friendship between them, England declares that she will

neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon

Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and

forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to

which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to

anything that has such an object.

Further than this it refused to go; and Mr. Asquith in his speech of

October 2, 1914, at Cardiff thus explained the reason:

They [the Germans] wanted us to go further. They asked us to

pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of

Germany being engaged in war, and this, mark you, at a time

when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive

and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea. They

asked us (to put it quite plainly) for a free hand, so far as

we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to

overbear, to dominate, the European World. To such a demand,

but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we

gave[537].

[Footnote 537: See _Times_ of October 3, 1914, and July 20, 1915 (with

quotations from the _North German Gazette_). Bethmann-Hollweg declared

to the Reichstag, on August 19, 1915, that Asquith's statement was

false; but in a letter published on August 26, and an official statement

of September 1, 1915, Sir E. Grey convincingly refuted him.]

Thus, efforts for a good understanding with Germany broke down owing to

the exacting demands of German diplomacy for our neutrality in all

circumstances (including, of course, a German invasion of Belgium).

Thereupon she proceeded with a new Navy Act (the fifth in fourteen

years) for a large increase in construction[538].

[Footnote 538: Castle and Hurd, _German Naval Power_, pp. 142-152.]

Perhaps Germany would have been more conciliatory if she had foreseen

the events of the following autumn. As has already appeared, Italy's

attack upon the Turks (coinciding with difficulties which their rigour

raised up) furnished the opportunity--for which the Balkan States had

been longing--to shake off the Turkish yoke. On March 13, 1912, Servia

and Bulgaria framed a secret treaty of alliance against Turkey, which

contained conditions as to joint action against Austria or Roumania, if

they attacked, and a general understanding as to the partition of

Macedonia. Greece came into the agreement later[539]. No time was fixed

for action against Turkey; but in view of her obstinacy and intolerance

action was inevitable. She precipitated matters by massacring Christians

in and on the borders of Macedonia. Thereupon the three States and

Montenegro demanded the enforcement of the reforms and toleration

guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin (see p. 242). The Turks having as

usual temporised (though they were still at war with Italy[540]), the

four States demanded complete autonomy and the reconstruction of

frontiers according to racial needs. Both sides rejected the joint

offers of Austria and Russia for friendly intervention; whereupon Turkey

declared war upon Bulgaria and Servia (October 17). On the morrow Greece

declared war upon her. Montenegro had already opened hostilities. In

view of these facts, the later assertions of the German Powers, that the

Balkan League was a Russian plot for overthrowing Turkey and weakening

Teutonic influence, is palpably false. Turkey had treated her Christian

subjects (including the once faithful Albanians) worse than ever. Their

union against Turkey had long been foretold. It was helped on by

Ottoman misrule, and finally cemented by massacre. Further, Russia and

Austria acted together in seeking to avert an attack on Turkey; and the

Powers collectively warned the Balkan States that no changes of boundary

would be tolerated. Those States refused to accept the European fiat;

for the present misrule was intolerable, and the inability of the Turks

to cope with either the Italians or the Albanian rebels opened a vista

of hope. The German accusations levelled at Russia were obviously part

of the general scheme adopted at Berlin and Vienna for exasperating

public opinion against the Slav cause.

[Footnote 539: The claim that the Greek statesman, Venizelos, founded

the league seems incorrect. So, too, is the rumour that Russia, through

her minister, Hartvig, at Belgrade, framed it (but see N. Jorga, _Hist.

des États balcaniques_, p. 436). Miliukoff, in a "Report to the Carnegie

Foundation," denies this. The plan occurred to many men so soon as

Turkish Reform proved a sham. Venizelos is said to have mooted it to Mr.

James Bourchier in May 1911. (R. Rankin, _Inner History of the Balkan

War_, p. 13.)]

[Footnote 540: Italy made peace on October 15, gaining possession of

Tripoli and agreeing to evacuate the Aegean Isles, but on various

pretexts kept her troops there. A little later she renewed the Triple

Alliance with Germany and Austria for five years. This may have resulted

from the Balkan crisis then beginning, and from the visits of the

Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, to Paris and London, whereupon it

was officially stated that Russia adhered both to her treaty with France

and her Entente with England. He added that the grouping of the great

States was necessary in the interests of the Balance of Power.]

The Balkan States, though waging war with no combined aim, speedily

overthrew the Turks in the most dramatic and decisive conflict of our

age. The Greeks entered Salonica on November 8 (a Bulgarian force a few

days later); on November 18 the Servians occupied Monastir, and the

Albanian seaport, Durazzo, at the end of the month. The Bulgar army

meanwhile drove the Turks southwards in headlong rout until in the third

week of November the fortified Tchataldja Lines opposed an invincible

obstacle. There, on December 3, all the belligerents, except Greece,

concluded an armistice, and negotiations for peace were begun at London

on December 16. Up to January 22, 1913, Turkey seemed inclined towards

peace; but on the morrow a revolution took place at Constantinople, the

Ministry of Kiamil Pacha being ousted by the warlike faction of Enver

Bey. He, one of the contrivers of the revolution of July 1908, had since

been attached to the Turkish Embassy at Berlin; and his successful coup

was a triumph of German influence. The Peace Conference at London broke

up on February 1. In March the Greeks and Bulgars captured Janina and

Adrianople respectively, while Scutari fell to the Montenegrins (April

22). The Powers (Russia included) demanded the evacuation of this town

by Montenegro; for they had decided to constitute Albania (the most

turbulent part of the Peninsula) an independent State, including

Scutari.

In Albania, as elsewhere, the feuds of rival races had drenched the

Balkan lands with blood; Greek and Bulgar forces had fought near

Salonica, and there seemed slight chance of a peaceful settlement in

Central Macedonia. That chance disappeared when the Powers in the

resumed Peace Conference at London persisted in ruling the Serbs and

Montenegrins out of Albania, a decision obviously dictated by the

longings of Austria and Italy to gain that land at a convenient

opportunity. This blow to Servia's aspirations aroused passionate

resentment both there and in Russia. Finally the Serbs gave way, and

claimed a far larger part of Macedonia than had been mapped out in their

agreement with Bulgaria prior to the war. Hence arose strifes between

their forces, in which the Greeks also sided against the Bulgars.

Meanwhile, the London Conference of the Powers and the Balkan States

framed terms of peace, which were largely due to the influence of Sir

Edward Grey[541].

[Footnote 541: See _Times_ of May 30, 1913; Rankin, _op. cit._ p. 517.]

They may be disregarded here; for they were soon disregarded by all the

Balkan States. Seeking to steal a march upon their rivals, the Bulgar

forces (it is said on the instigation of their King and his unofficial

advisers) made a sudden and treacherous attack. Now, the dour, pushing

Bulgars are the most unpopular race in the Peninsula. Therefore not only

Serbs and Greeks, but also Roumanians and Turks turned savagely upon

them[542]. Overwhelmed on all sides, Bulgaria sued for peace; and again

the Great Powers had to revise terms that they had declared to be final.

Ultimately, on August 10, 1913, the Peace of Bukharest was signed. It

imposed the present boundaries of the Balkan States, and left them

furious but helpless to resist a policy known to have been dictated

largely from Vienna and Berlin. In May 1914 a warm friend of the Balkan

peoples thus described its effects: "No permanent solution of the Balkan

Question has been arrived at. The ethnographical questions have been

ignored. A portion of each race has been handed over to be ruled by

another which it detests. Servia has acquired a population which is

mostly Bulgar and Albanian, though of the latter she has massacred and

expelled many thousands. Bulgars have been captured by Greeks, Greeks by

Bulgars, Albanians by Greeks, and not one of these races has as yet

shown signs of being capable to rule another justly. The seeds have been

sown of hatreds that will grow and bear fruit[543]." Especially

lamentable were the recovery of the Adrianople district by the Turks and

the unprovoked seizure of the purely Bulgar district south of Silistria

by Roumania. On the other hand, Kaiser William thus congratulated her

king, Charles (a Hohenzollern), on the peace, a "splendid result, for

which not only your own people but all the belligerent States and the

whole of Europe have to thank your wise and truly statesmanlike policy.

At the same time your mentioning that I have been able to contribute to

what has been achieved is a great satisfaction to me. I rejoice at our

mutual co-operation in the cause of peace."

[Footnote 542: Roumania's sudden intervention annoyed Austria, who had

hoped for a longer and more exhausting war in the Balkans.]

[Footnote 543: Edith Durham, _The Struggle for Scutari_, p. 315.]

This telegram, following the trend of Austro-German policy, sought to

win back Roumania to the Central Powers, from which she had of late

sheered off. In other respects the Peace of Bukharest was a notable

triumph for Austria and Germany. Not only had they rendered impossible a

speedy revival of the Balkan League which had barred their expansion

towards the Levant, but they bolstered up the Ottoman Power when its

extrusion from Europe seemed imminent. They also exhausted Servia,

reduced Bulgaria to ruin, and imposed on Albania a German prince,

William of Wied, an officer in the Prussian army, who was destined to

view his principality from the quarter-deck of his yacht. Such was the

Treaty of Bukharest. Besides dealing a severe blow to the Slav cause, it

perpetuated the recent infamous spoliations and challenged every one

concerned to further conflicts. Within a year the whole of the Continent

was in flames.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE CRISIS OF 1914

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is

wider than that which we have in the literal operation of the

guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether

this country would quietly stand by and witness the

perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages

of history and thus become participators in the

sin."--GLADSTONE:

Speech of August 1870.

The Prussian and German Army Bills of 1860 and onwards have tended to

make military preparedness a weighty factor in the recent development of

nations; and the issue of events has too often been determined, not by

the justice of a cause, but rather by the armed strength at the back of

it. We must therefore glance at the military and naval preparations

which enabled the Central Powers to win their perilous triumph over

Russia and the Slavs of the Balkans. In April 1912 the German Chancellor

introduced to the Reichstag Army and Navy Bills (passed on May 21)

providing for great increases in the navy, also forces amounting to two

new army corps, and that, too, though Germany's financial position was

admitted to be "very serious," and the proposed measures merely

precautionary. Nevertheless, only Socialists, Poles, and Alsatians voted

against them. But the events of the first Balkan War were cited as

menacing Germany with a conflict in which she "might have to protect,

against several enemies, frontiers which are extended and by nature to a

large extent open." A new Army Bill was therefore introduced in March

1913 (passed in June), which increased the total of the forces by

145,000, and raised their peace strength in 1914 to more than 870,000

men. The Chancellor referred gratefully to "the extraordinary ability

and spirit of conciliation" of Sir Edward Grey during the Conference at

London, and admitted that a collision between Germans and Slavs was not

inevitable; but Germany must take precautions, this, too, at a time when

Russia and Austria agreed to place their forces again on a peace

footing. Germany, far from relaxing her efforts after the sharp rebuff

to the Slavonic cause in the summer of 1913, continued her military

policy. It caused grave apprehension, especially as the new drastic

taxes (estimated to produce £50,000,000) were loudly declared a burden

that could not long be borne. As to the naval proposals, the Chancellor

commended Mr. Churchill's suggestion (on March 26) of a "naval holiday,"

but said there were many difficulties in the way.

The British Naval Budget of 1912 had provided for a six years' programme

of 25 _Dreadnoughts_ against Germany's 14; and for every extra German

ship two British would be added. In March 1913 this was continued, with

the offer of a "holiday" for 1914 if Germany would soon accept. No

acceptance came. The peace strength of the British Regular Army was

reckoned early in 1914 at 156,000 men, with about 250,000 effective

Territorials.

The increases in the German army induced the French Chambers, in July

1913, to recur to three years' military service, that of two years being

considered inadequate in face of the new menace from beyond the

Rhine[544]. Jaurès and the Socialists, who advocated a national militia

on the Swiss system, were beaten by 496 votes to 77, whereupon some of

them resorted to obstructive tactics, and the measure was carried with

some difficulty on July 8. The General Confederation of Labour and the

Anarchist Congress both announced their resolve to keep up the

agitation in the army against the three years' service. Mutinous

symptoms had already appeared. The military equipment of the French army

was officially admitted to be in an unsatisfactory state during the

debate of July 13, 1914, when it appeared that France was far from ready

for a campaign. The peace strength of the army was then reckoned at

645,000 men.

[Footnote 544: The _Temps_ of March 30, 1913, estimated that Germany

would soon have 500,000 men in her first line, as against 175,000

French, unless France recurred to three years' service. See M. Sembat,

_Faites un Roi, si non faites la Paix._]

In Russia in 1912 the chief efforts were concentrated on the navy. As

regards the army, it was proposed in the Budget of July 1913 to retain

300,000 men on active service for six months longer than before, thus

strengthening the forces, especially during the winter months. Apart

from this measure (a reply to that of Germany) no important development

took place in 1912-14. The peace strength of the Russian army for Europe

in 1914 exceeded 1,200,000[545]. That of Austria-Hungary exceeded

460,000 men, that of Italy 300,000 men. Consequently the Triple Entente

had on foot just over 2,000,000 men as against 1,590,000 for the Triple

Alliance; but the latter group formed a solid well-prepared block, while

the Triple Entente were separate units; and the Russian and British

forces could not be speedily marshalled at the necessary points on the

Continent. Moreover, all great wars, especially from the time of

Frederick the Great, have shown the advantage of the central position,

if vigorously and skilfully used.

[Footnote 545: G. Alexinsky, _La Russie et la guerre_, pp. 83-88.]

In these considerations lies the key to the European situation in the

summer of 1914. The simmering of fiscal discontent and unsated military

pride in Germany caused general alarm, especially when the memories of

the Wars of Liberation of 1813-14 were systematically used to excite

bellicose ardour against France. Against England it needed no official

stimulus, for professors and teachers had long taught that "England was

the foe." In particular preparations had been made in South-West Africa

for stirring up a revolt of the Boers as a preliminary to the expulsion

of the British from South Africa. Relations had been established with

De Wet and Maritz. In 1913 the latter sent an agent to the German colony

asking what aid the Kaiser would give and how far he would guarantee the

independence of South Africa. The reply came: "I will not only

acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee

it, provided the rebellion is started immediately[546]." The reason for

the delay is not known. Probably on further inquiry it was found that

the situation was not ready either in Europe or in South Africa. But as

to German preparations for a war with England both in South-West Africa

and Egypt there can be no doubt. India and probably Ireland also were

not neglected.

[Footnote 546: General Botha's speech at Cape Town, July 25, 1915.]

In fact a considerable part of the German people looked forward to a war

with Great Britain as equally inevitable and desirable. She was rich and

pleasure-loving; her Government was apt to wait till public opinion had

been decisively pronounced; her sons, too selfish to defend her, paid

"mercenaries" to do it. Her scattered possessions would therefore fall

an easy prey to a well-organised, warlike, and thoroughly patriotic

nation. Let the world belong to the ablest race, the Germanic. Such had

been the teachings of Treitschke and his disciples long before the Boer

War or the Anglo-French Entente. Those events and the Morocco Question

in 1905 and 1911 sharpened the rivalry; but it is a superficial reading

of events to suppose that Morocco caused the rivalry, which clearly

originated in the resolve of the Germans to possess a World-Empire. So

soon as their influential classes distinctly framed that resolve a

conflict was inevitable with Great Britain, which blocked their way to

the Ocean and possessed in every sea valuable colonies which she seemed

little able to defend. The Morocco affair annoyed them because, firstly,

they wanted that strategic position, and secondly, they desired to

sunder the Anglo-French Entente. But Morocco was settled in 1911, and

still the friction continued unabated. There remained the Eastern

Question, a far more serious affair; for on it hung the hopes of Germany

in the Orient and of Austria in the Balkans.

The difficulty for Germany was, how to equate her world-wide ambitions

with the restricted and diverse aims of Austria and Italy. The interests

of the two Central Empires harmonised only respecting the Eastern

Question. _Weltpolitik_ in general and Morocco in particular did not in

the least concern Austria. Further, the designs of Vienna and Rome on

Albania clashed hopelessly. An effort was made in the Triple Alliance,

as renewed in 1912, to safeguard Italian interests by insisting that, if

Austria gained ground in the Balkans, Italy should have "compensation."

The effort to lure the Government of Rome into Balkan adventures

prompted the Austrian offer of August 9, 1913, for joint action against

Servia. Italy refused, alleging that, as Servia was not guilty of

aggression, the Austro-Italian Alliance did not hold good for such a

venture. Germany also refused the Austrian offer--why is not clear.

Austria was annoyed with the gains of Servia in the Peace of Bukharest,

for which Kaiser William was largely responsible. Probably, then, they

differed as to some of the details of the Balkan settlement. But it is

far more probable that Germany checked the Austrians because she was not

yet fully ready for vigorous action. The doctrine of complete

preparedness was edifyingly set forth by a well-informed writer,

Rohrbach, who, in 1912, urged his countrymen to be patient. In 1911 they

had been wrong to worry France and England about Morocco, where German

interests were not vital. Until the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways had

neared their goals, Turkish co-operation in an attack on Egypt would be

weak. Besides, adds Rohrbach, the Kiel-North Sea Canal was not ready,

and Heligoland and other coast defences were not sufficiently advanced

for Germany confidently to face a war with England. Thanks to the

Kaiser, the fleet would soon be in a splendid condition, and then

Germany could launch out boldly in the world. The same course was urged

by Count Reventlow early in 1914. Germany must continue to arm, though

fully conscious that she was "constructing for her foreign politics and

diplomacy, a Calvary which _nolens volens_ she would have to

climb[547]."

[Footnote 547: Rohrbach, _Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt_ (1912), p.

216 (more than 10,000 copies of this work were sold in a year);

Reventlow, _Deutschlands auswärtige Politik,_ p. 251.]

Other evidence, especially from Bernhardi, Frobenius, and the works of

the Pan-German and Navy Leagues, might be quoted in proof of Germany's

design to begin war when she was fully prepared. Now, the immense sums

voted in the War Budget of 1913 had not as yet provided the stores of

artillery and ammunition that were to astonish the world. Nor had Turkey

recovered from the wounds of 1912. Nor was the enlarged Kiel-North Sea

Canal ready. Its opening at Midsummer 1914 created a naval situation far

more favourable to Germany. A year earlier a French naval officer had

prophesied that she would await the opening of the canal before

declaring war[548].

[Footnote 548: _Revue des questions diplomatiques_ (1913), pp. 417-18.]

At Midsummer 1914 the general position was as follows. Germany had

reached the pitch of perfection in armaments, and the Kiel Canal was

open. France was unready, though the three years' service promised to

improve her army. The Russian forces were slowly improving in number and

cohesion. Belgium also, alarmed by the German menace both in Europe and

on the Congo, had in 1912-13 greatly extended the principle of

compulsory service, so that in 1914 she would have more than 200,000 men

available, and by 1926 as many as 340,000. In naval strength it was

unlikely that Germany would catch up Great Britain. But the submarine

promised to make even the most powerful ironclads of doubtful value.

Consequently, Germany and her friends (except perhaps Turkey) could

never hope to have a longer lead over the Entente Powers than in 1914,

at least as regards efficiency and preparedness. Therefore in the eyes

of the military party at Berlin the problem resembled that of 1756,

which Frederick the Great thus stated: "The war was equally certain and

inevitable. It only remained to calculate whether there was more

advantage in deferring it a few months or beginning at once." We know

what followed in 1756--the invasion of neutral Saxony, because she had

not completed her armaments[549]. For William II. in 1914 the case of

Belgium was very similar. She afforded him the shortest way of striking

at his enemy and the richest land for feeding the German forces. That

Prussia had guaranteed Belgian neutrality counted as naught; that in

1912 Lord Haldane had warned him of the hostility of England if he

invaded Belgium was scarcely more important. William, like his ancestor,

acted solely on military considerations. He despised England: for was

she not distracted by fierce party feuds, by Labour troubles, by wild

women, and by what seemed to be the beginnings of civil war in Ireland?

All the able rulers of the House of Hohenzollern have discerned when to

strike and to strike hard. In July 1914 William II.'s action was

typically Hohenzollern; and by this time his engaging personality and

fiery speeches, aided by professorial and Press propaganda, had

thoroughly Prussianised Germany. In regard to _moral_ as well as

_matériel_, "the day" had come by Midsummer 1914.

[Footnote 549: Frédéric, _Hist. de la guerre de sept Ans_, i. p. 37.]

Moreover, her generally passive partner, Austria, was then excited to

frenzy by the murder of the heir to the throne, Archduke Francis

Ferdinand. The criminals were Austrian Serbs; but no proof was then or

has since been forthcoming as to the complicity of the Servian

Government. Nevertheless, in the state of acute tension long existing

between Servia and Austria-Hungary, the affair seemed the climax of a

series of efforts at wrecking the Dual Monarchy and setting up a

Serbo-Croatian Kingdom. Therefore German and Magyar sentiment caught

flame, and war with Servia was loudly demanded. Dr. Dillon, while

minimising the question of the murder, prophesied that the quarrel would

develop into a gigantic struggle between Teuton and Slav[550]. In this

connection we must remember that the Central Empires had twice dictated

to the rest of Europe: first, in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9; secondly,

in the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Bukharest (August 1913).

On other occasions Kaiser William had bent the will of Tsar Nicholas

II., notably in the Potsdam interview of November 1910. It is therefore

possible that Berlin reckoned once more on the complaisance of Russia;

and in that event Austria would have dragooned Servia and refashioned

the Balkan lands at her will, Germany meanwhile "keeping the ring." This

explanation of the crisis is, however, open to the objection that the

questions at issue more vitally affected Russia than did those of

1908-10, and she had nearly recovered normal strength. Unless the

politicians of Berlin and Vienna were blind, they must have foreseen

that Russia would aid Servia in resisting the outrageous demands sent

from Vienna to Belgrade on July 23. Those demands were incompatible with

Servia's independence; and though she, within the stipulated forty-eight

hours, acquiesced in all save two of them, the Austrian Government

declared war (July 28). In so doing it relied on the assurances of the

German Ambassador, von Tchirsky, that Russia would not fight. But by way

of retort to the Austrian order for complete mobilisation (July 31, 1

A.M.), Russia quite early on that same day ordered a similar

measure[551].

[Footnote 550: _Daily Telegraph_, July 25, 1914.]

[Footnote 551: _J'accuse_, pp. 134-5 (German edition). The partial

mobilisations of Austria and Russia earlier were intended to threaten

and protect Servia. The time of Austria's order for complete

mobilisation is shown in French Yellow Book, No. 115. That of Russia in

Austrian "Rotbuch," No. 52, and Russian Orange Book, No. 77.]

The procedure of Austria and Germany now claims our attention. The

policy of Count Berchtold, Austria's Foreign Minister, had generally

been pacific. On July 28 he yielded to popular clamour for war against

Servia, but only, it appears, because of his belief that "Russia would

have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria

sought no territorial aggrandisement." On July 30 and 31 he consented to

continue friendly discussions with Russia. Even on August 1 the Austrian

Ambassador at Petrograd expressed to the Foreign Minister, Sazonoff,

the hope that things had not gone too far[552]. There was then still a

hope that Sir Edward Grey's offer of friendly mediation might be

accepted by Germany, Austria, and Russia. But on August 1 Germany

declared war on Russia.

[Footnote 552: Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 50-56; British White Papers,

Miscellaneous (1914), No. 6 (No. 137), and No. 10, p. 3; French Yellow

Book, No. 120.]

It is well to remember that by her action in August 1913 she held back

Austria from a warlike policy. In July 1914 some of Germany's officials

knew of the tenor of the Austrian demands on the Court of Belgrade; and

her Ambassador at Vienna stated on July 26 that Germany knew what she

was doing in backing up Austria. Kaiser William, who had been on a

yachting cruise, hurriedly returned to Berlin on the night of July

26-27. He must have approved of Austria's declaration of war against

Servia on July 28, for on that day his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg,

finally rejected Sir Edward Grey's proposal of a Peace Conference to

settle that dispute. The Chancellor then also expressed to our

Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, the belief that Russia had no right to

intervene in the Austro-Serb affair. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin

also opined that "Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make

war." This belief was widely expressed in diplomatic circles at Berlin.

Military men probably viewed matters from that standpoint; and in all

probability there was a struggle between the civilians and the soldiers,

which seems to have ended in a victory for the latter in an important

Council meeting held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29. Immediately

afterwards the Chancellor summoned Sir Edward Goschen and made to him

the "infamous proposals" for the neutrality of Great Britain in case of

a European War, provided that Germany (1) would engage to take no

territory from the mainland of France (he would make no promise

respecting the French colonies); (2) would respect the neutrality of

Holland; (3) would restore the independence of Belgium in case the

French menace compelled her to invade that country.

These proposals prove that by the evening of July 29 Germany regarded

war as imminent[553]. But why? Even in the East matters did not as yet

threaten such a conflict. Russia had declared that Servia was not to be

made a vassal of the Hapsburgs; and, to give effect to that declaration,

she had mobilised the southern and eastern portions of her forces as a

retort to a similar partial mobilisation by Austria. But neither Russia

nor, perhaps, Austria wished for, or expected, a European war[554].

Austria seems to have expected a _limited_ war, _i.e._ only with the

Serbs. She denied that the Russians had any right to intervene so long

as she did not annex Serb land. Her aim was to reduce the Serbs to

vassalage, and she expected Germany successfully to prevent Russia's

intervention, as in 1909[555]. The German proposals of July 29 are the

first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the

probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England,

might be involved while Holland would be left alone. In the course of

his remarks the Chancellor said that "he had in mind a general

neutrality agreement between England and Germany"--a reference to the

German offers of 1912 described in this chapter. As at that time the

Chancellor sought to tie our hands in view of any action by Germany, so,

too, at present his object clearly was to preclude the possibility of

our stirring on behalf of Belgium. Both Goschen and Grey must have seen

the snare. The former referred the proposals to Grey, who of course

decisively refused them.

[Footnote 553: M. Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin to his Government

on July 30 that late on July 29 Germany had ordered mobilisation, but

countermanded it in view of the reserve of Sir Edward Goschen as to

England's attitude, and owing to the Tsar's telegram of July 29 to the

Kaiser. Berlin papers which had announced the mobilisation were seized.

All measures preliminary to mobilisation had been taken (French Yellow

Book, No. 107; German White Book, No. 21).]

[Footnote 554: Russian Orange Book, Nos. 25, 40, 43, 58.]

[Footnote 555: Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 28, 31, 44; Brit. White Paper,

Nos. 91-97, 161. _J'accuse_ (III. A) goes too far in accusing Austria of

consciously provoking a European War; for, as I have shown, she wished

on August 1 to continue negotiations with Russia. The retort that she

did so only when she knew that Germany was about to throw down the

gauntlet, seems to me far-fetched. Besides, Austria was not ready;

Germany was.]

This was the first of Grey's actions which betokened tension with

Germany. Up to the 28th his efforts for peace had seemed not unlikely to

be crowned with success. On July 20, that is three days before Austria

precipitated the crisis, he begged the Berlin Government to seek to

moderate her demands on Servia. The day after the Austrian Note he urged

a Conference between France and England on one side and Germany and

Italy on the other so as to counsel moderation to their respective

Allies, Russia and Austria. It was Germany and Austria who negatived

this by their acts of the 28th. Still Grey worked for peace, with the

approval of Russia, and, on July 30 to August 1, of Austria. But on July

31 and August 1 occurred events which frustrated these efforts. On July

31 the Berlin Government, hearing of the complete mobilisation by Russia

(a retort to the similar proceeding of Austria a few hours earlier),

sent a stiff demand to Petrograd for demobilisation within twelve hours;

also to Paris for a reply within eighteen hours whether it would remain

neutral in case of a Russo-German War.

Here we must pause to notice that to ask Russia to demobilise, without

requiring the same measure from Austria, was manifestly unjust. Russia

could not have assented without occupying an inferior position to

Austria. If Germany had desired peace, she would have suggested the same

action for each of the disputants. Further, while blaming the Russians

for mobilising, she herself had taken all the preliminary steps,

including what is called _Kriegsgefahr_, which made her army far better

prepared for war than mobilisation itself did for the Russian Empire in

view of its comparatively undeveloped railway system. Again, if the

Kaiser wished to avoid war, why did he not agree to await the arrival

(on August 1) of the special envoy, Tatisheff, whom, on the night of

July 30, the Tsar had despatched to Berlin[556]? There is not a single

sign that the Berlin Government really feared "the Eastern Colossus,"

though statements as to "the eastern peril" were very serviceable in

frightening German Socialists into line.

[Footnote 556: German White Book, No. 23_a_; _J'accuse_, Section III. B,

pp. 153, 164 (German edit.), shows that the German White Book suppressed

the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser, inviting him to

refer the Austro-Serb dispute to the Hague Tribunal. (See, too, J.W.

Headlam, _History of Twelve Days,_ p. 183.)]

The German ultimatum failed to cow Russia; and as she returned no

answer, the Kaiser declared war on August 1. He added by telegram that

he had sought, _in accord with England,_ to mediate between Russia and

Austria, but the Russian mobilisation led to his present action. In

reply to the German demand at Paris the French Premier, M. Viviani,

declared on August 1 at 1 P.M. that France would do that "which her

interests dictated"--an evasive reply designed to gain time and to see

what course Russia would take. The Kaiser having declared war on Russia,

France had no alternative but to come to the assistance of her Ally. But

the Kaiser's declaration of war against France did not reach Paris until

August 3 at 6.45 P.M.[557] His aim was to leave France and Belgium in

doubt as to his intentions, and meanwhile to mass overwhelming forces on

their borders, especially that of Belgium.

[Footnote 557: German White Book, Nos. 26, 27; French Yellow Book, No.

147.]

Meanwhile, on August 1, German officials detained and confiscated the

cargoes of a few British ships. On August 2 German troops violated the

neutrality of Luxemburg. On the same day Sir Edward Grey assured the

French ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, that if the German fleet attacked

that of France or her coasts, the British fleet would afford protection.

This assurance depended, however, on the sanction of Parliament. It is

practically certain that Parliament would have sanctioned this

proceeding; and, if so, war would have come about owing to the naval

understanding with France[558], that is, if Germany chose to disregard

it. But another incident brought matters to a clearer issue. On August

3, German troops entered Belgium, though on the previous day the German

ambassador had assured the Government of King Albert that no such step

would be taken. The pretext now was that the French were about to

invade Belgium, as to which there was then, and has not been since, any

proof whatever.

[Footnote 558: British White Paper, No. 105 and _Enclosures_, also No.

116.]

Here we must go back in order to understand the action of the British,

French, and German Governments. They and all the Powers had signed the

treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the independence of Belgium; and nothing had

occurred since to end their engagement. The German proposals of July 29,

1914, having alarmed Sir Edward Grey, he required both from Paris and

Berlin assurances that neither Power would invade Belgium. That of

France on August 1 was clear and satisfactory. On July 31 the German

Secretary of State, von Jagow, declined to give a reply, because "any

reply they [the Emperor and Chancellor] might give could not but

disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war

ensuing." As on August 2 the official assurances of the German

ambassador at Brussels were satisfactory, the British Foreign Office

seems to have felt no great alarm on this topic. But at 7 P.M. of that

evening the same ambassador presented a note from his Government

demanding the right to march its troops into Belgium in order to prevent

a similar measure by the French. On the morrow Belgium protested against

this act, and denied the rumour as to French action. King Albert also

telegraphed to King George asking for the help of the United Kingdom.

The tidings reached the British Cabinet after it had been carefully

considering whether German aggression on Belgium would not constitute a

_casus belli_[559].

[Footnote 559: British White Paper, Nos. 123, 151, 153; Belgian Grey

Book, Nos. 20-25. For a full and convincing refutation of the German

charges that our military attachés at Brussels in 1906 and 1912 had

bound us by _conventions_(!) to land an army in Belgium, see second

Belgian Grey Book, pp. 103-6; Headlam, _op. cit._, ch. xvi., also p.

377, on the charge that France was about to invade Belgium.]

The news of the German demand and the King's appeal reached Westminster

just before the first debate on August 3. Sir Edward Grey stated that we

were not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance, of which we did not

know the exact terms; and there was no binding compact with France; but

the conversations on naval affairs pledged us to consult her with a

view to preventing an unprovoked attack by the German navy. He explained

his conditional promise to M. Cambon. Thereupon Mr. Redmond promised the

enthusiastic support of all Irishmen. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, though

demurring to the policy of Sir Edward Grey, said, "If the Right

Honourable gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European

nationality like Belgium is in danger, and could assure us that he is

going to confine the conflict to that question, then we would support

him." Now, the Cabinet had by this time resolved that the independence

of Belgium should be a test question, as it was in 1870. Therefore,

there seemed the hope that not only the Irish but all the Labour party

would give united support to the Government. By the evening debate

official information had arrived; and, apart from some cavilling

criticisms, Parliament was overwhelmingly in favour of decided action on

behalf of Belgium. Sir Edward Grey despatched to Berlin an ultimatum

demanding the due recognition of Belgian neutrality by Germany. No

answer being sent, Great Britain and Germany entered on a state of war

shortly before midnight of August 4.

The more fully the facts are known, the clearer appears the aggressive

character of German policy. Some of her Ministers doubted the

advisability of war, and hoped to compass their ends by threats as in

1909 and 1913; but they were overborne by the bellicose party on or

shortly before July 29. Whether the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, or the

General Staff is most to blame, it is idle to speculate; but German

diplomacy at the crisis shows every sign of having been forced on by

military men. Bethmann-Hollweg was never remarkable for breadth of view

and clearness of insight; yet he alone could scarcely have perpetrated

the follies which alienated Italy and outraged the sentiments of the

civilised world in order to gain a few days' start over France and stab

her unguarded side. It is a clumsy imitation of the policy of

Frederick in 1756.

As to the forbearance of Great Britain at the crisis, few words are

needed. In earlier times the seizure of British ships and their cargoes

(August 1) would have led to a rupture. Clearly, Sir Edward Grey and his

colleagues clung to peace as long as possible. The wisdom of his

procedure at one or two points has been sharply impugned. Critics have

said that early in the crisis he should have empowered Sir George

Buchanan, our ambassador at Petrograd, to join Russia and France in a

declaration of our resolve to join them in case of war[560]. But (1) no

British Minister is justified in committing his country to such a course

of action. (2) The terms of the Ententes did not warrant it. (3) A

menace to Germany and Austria would, by the terms of the Triple

Alliance, have compelled Italy to join them, and it was clearly the aim

of the British Government to avert such a disaster. (4) On July 30 and

31 Grey declared plainly to Germany that she must not count on our

neutrality in all cases, and that a Franco-German War (quite apart from

the question of Belgium) would probably draw us in[561].

[Footnote 560: British White Paper, Nos. 6, 24, 99; Russian Orange Book,

No. 17.]

[Footnote 561: British White Paper, Nos. 101, 102, 111, 114, 119. I

dissent from Mr. F.S. Oliver (_Ordeal by Battle,_ pp. 30-34) on the

question discussed above. For other arguments, see my _Origins of the

War,_ pp. 167-9. The ties binding Roumania to Germany and Austria were

looser; but anything of the nature of a general threat to the Central

Powers would probably have ranged her too on their side.]

Sir Edward is also charged with not making our intentions clear as to

what would happen in case of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

But he demanded, both from France and Germany, assurances that they

would respect that neutrality; and on August 1 he informed the German

ambassador in London of our "very great regret" at the ambiguity of the

German reply. Also, on August 2 the German ambassador at Brussels

protested that Belgium was quite safe so far as concerned Germany[562].

When a great Power gives those assurances, it does not improve matters

to threaten her with war if she breaks them. She broke them on August 3;

whereupon Grey took the decided action which Haldane had declared in

1912 that we would take. The clamour raised in Germany as to our

intervention being unexpected is probably the result of blind adherence

to a preconceived theory and of rage at a "decadent" nation daring to

oppose an "invincible" nation. The German Government of course knew the

truth, but its education of public opinion through the Press had become

a fine art. Therefore, at the beginning of the war all Germans believed

that France was about to invade Belgium, whereupon they stepped in to

save her; that the Eastern Colossus had precipitated the war by its

causeless mobilisation (a falsehood which ranged nearly all German

Socialists on the side of the Government); that Russia and Servia had

planned the dismemberment of Austria; that, consequently, Teutons (and

Turks) must fight desperately for national existence in a conflict

forced upon them by Russia, Servia, and France, England perfidiously

appearing as a renegade to her race and creed.

[Footnote 562: British White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, 125; Belgian

Grey Book, No. 19.]

By these falsehoods, dinned into a singularly well-drilled and docile

people, the Germans were worked up to a state of frenzy for an

enterprise for which their rulers had been preparing during more than a

decade. The colossal stores of war material, amassed especially in

1913-14 (some of them certain soon to deteriorate), the exquisitely

careful preparations at all points of the national life, including the

colonies, refute the fiction that war was forced upon Germany. The

course of the negotiations preceding the war, the assiduous efforts of

Germany to foment Labour troubles in Russia before the crisis, the

unpreparedness of the Allies for the fierce and sustained energy of the

Teutonic assault,--all these symptoms prove the guilt of Germany[563].

The crowning proof is that up to the present (August 1915) she has not

issued a complete set of diplomatic documents, and not one despatch

which bears out the Chancellor's statement that he used his influence at

Vienna for peace. The twenty-nine despatches published in her White Book

are a mere fragment of her immense diplomatic correspondence which she

has found it desirable to keep secret, and, as we have seen, her

officials suppressed the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 urging that

the Austro-Serb dispute be referred to the Hague Tribunal.

[Footnote 563: See the damning indictment by a German in _J'accuse_,

Section III., also the thorough and judicial examination by J.W.

Headlam, _The History of Twelve Days_.]

The sets of despatches published by the Allies show conclusively that

each of them worked for peace and was surprised by the war. Their

unpreparedness and the absolute preparedness of Germany have appeared so

clearly during the course of hostilities as to give the lie to the

German pamphleteers who have striven to prove that in the last resort

the war was "a preventive war," that is, designed to avert a future

conflict at a time unfavourable to Germany. There is not a sign that any

one of the Powers of the Entente was making more than strictly defensive

preparations; and, as has been shown, the Entente themselves were formed

in order to give mutual protection in case of aggression from her. The

desperate nature of that aggression appeared in her unscrupulous but

successful efforts to force Turkey into war (Oct.-Nov. 1914). No crime

against Christendom has equalled that whereby the champions of _Kultur_

sought to stir up the fanatical passions of the Moslem World against

Europe. Fortunately, that design has failed; and incidentally it added

to the motives which have led Italy to break loose from the Central

Powers and assist the Allies in assuring the future of the oppressed

nationalities of Europe.

[Illustration: THE PARTITION OF AFRICA IN 1902.]

INDEX.

Abdul, Aziz 168-9

Abdul Hamid II., 169-70, 174, 177-9, 185-6, 204, 223-4, 238, 245-9,

259, 266-9, 274-5, 277, 285, 328, 436, 447-8, 453, 457, 591-2, 618

Abdul Kerim, 194-6, 200, 204, 206

Abdur Rahman, 389, 400, 404-5, 407, 417, 418-19, 428-31, 433

Abeken, Herr, 44

Abu Klea, Battle of, 480

Abyssinia, 335, 487, 504

Adam, Mme, 333

Adrianople, 221, 223, 229, 251, 270

Aehrenthal, Count, 613-4

Afghanistan, 334, 345-6, 366, 378-9, 386-91, 472, 527

War in (1878-9), chap. xiv. 394 _passim_

Africa, Partition of, chap. xviii, _passim_, 586

Africa, South-West, 635-6

Agadir, Coup d', 621, 623, 625

Albania, 158, 229

Albania, autonomy of, 630-1

Albert, King of Belgium, 644-5

Albrecht, Archduke, 33-6

Alexander I., 31, 160-1, 297, 364

Alexander II., 145, 167, 173-5, 180-83, 192, 204-5, 209-10, 215, 222-8,

234, 254-6, 289, 293, 295-8, 306, 308, 313, 318, 322, 325, 355, 398-9

Alexander III., 255-65, 272-86, 298-9, 301-4, 309-11, 331, 337, 340,

343-6, 423-4, 428-9

Alexander, Prince of Bulgaria, 254, 260-82, 286, 339, 428

Alexandretta, 622

Alexandria, bombardment of, 450-52

Alfonso, King of Spain, 619

_Algeciras_, Conference of, 604, 606-8, 610

Act of, 607

Alikhanoff, M., 424

Alsace, 94, 105, 132, 133-4

Alvensleben, General von, 61, 65-7, 77

Amur, river, 571, 572, 580

Andrassy, Count, 164, 232, 599

André, General, 600

Anglo-French Entente (1904), 601-4, 606, 607, 609, 622, 626, 636

Anglo-German Agreement (1890), 520-523,525, 532

Anglo-Japanese Compact, 597-8, 602

Anglo-Russian Conventions, 608-10

Angra Pequeña, 523, 524

Antonelli, Cardinal, 89

Arabi Pasha, 266, 444, 447-9, 452, 453-7

Archinard, M., 539

Argyll, Duke of, 371-2, 376, 417

Armenia, 220, 229, 242, 244, 250, 307

Army Bill, French (1875), 119, 121-2

Arnim, Count von, 123, 318

Artomoroff, Colonel, 504

Asquith, H.H., 626-8

Atbara, Battle of the, 490-91

Augustenburg, Duke of, 16

Aumale, Duc d', 117

Austria, 4-23, 32-7, 55, 63, 137, 148, 164, 177, 180-81, 184-6, 194,

227-8, 231, 232, 238, 242, 246, 257-8, 259, 271, 282, 284, 318,

320, 323-7, 331-3, 350-51, 485, 585, 592-3, 601, 604, 607, 609,

612-17, 622, 629-32, 634, 637, 639, 644, 647, 649

Army of, 635

Austro-German Alliance, 324-7

Austro-Prussian War (1866), 17-21

Austro-Russian Agreements (1897 and 1903), 615

Austro-Russian Treaty (1877), 179-180

Ayub Khan, 407, 415, 418-9

Baden, 12, 21

Baden, Grand Duke of, 130

Baert, Captain, 564

Bagdad Railway, 591-4, 609, 615, 622, 637

Bahr-el-Ghazal, the, 504, 506, 552, 558-9

Bakunin, 292-5

Balfour, Mr. A., 431-2

Balkan League, the, 629, 632

Balkan Peninsula, 25, 332

Balkan Question, the, 631-2

Balkan States, 586, 592, 616, 628-9, 633

Balkan War (1912), 624, 629-31, 633

Balkh, 399, 433

Baluchistan, 367, 381, 384-6, 432

Baring, Sir E., 463, 466-473

Batak, 170, 171

Batoum, 205, 229, 234, 241, 276

Bavaria, 18, 20, 21, 131, 133-5

Bazaine, Marshall, 63-5, 67-73, 75-8, 97

Bazeilles, 79-82

Beaconsfield, Earl of, 29, 165-6, 171, 175, 181, 182, 187-8, 220, 231,

232-3, 234, 236-7, 240-41, 243-5, 287, 328, 380, 282-3, 391-3,

400, 405, 440, 516

Beaumont, Battle of, 78

Bebel, Herr, 589

Bechuanaland, 530-33

Beernaert, M., 556

Belfort, 98, 104, 105

Belgium, 5, 16, 26, 148, 550-52, 555-7, 567, 625, 627-8, 638-9, 641-2,

644-8

Bendereff, 271, 278-9

Benedek, General, 18

Benedetti, M., 40-43, 48

Bentley, Rev. W.H., 546

Berber, 473, 475, 478, 488, 490

Berchtold, Count, 640

Beresford, Lord Charles, 480

Berlin Conference (1885), 548-50, 552, 559, 562, 567

Congress of (1878), 228, 235-42, 247, 259, 323, 328, 345, 388, 513

Memorandum, the, 167-9, 181

Berlin, Treaty of (1878), 237-42, 253, 267-8, 275, 291, 332, 353, 612,

629

Bernhardi, General von, 625-6, 638

Besika Bay, 168, 171, 172, 177, 224

Bessarabia, 160, 205, 230, 234, 260

Bethman-Hollweg, Chancellor, 620, 623, 625, 627, 633-4, 641-2, 645-6, 648

Beust, Count von, 32, 36, 37

Biarritz, 16

Biddulph, General, 398

Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 8, 12-22, 27, 30, 31, 39, 41-49, 85, 86, 89,

94, 97, 103-5, 109, 114, 118, 123, 129-32, 137, 140, 141, 153, 164,

168, 173, 184, 228, 257, 261, 282, 317-27, 332, 335, 336-8, 342, 426,

446, 457, 513-15, 520-21, 527, 528, 534, 547, 548, 590, 599, 609

and "Protection," 141-150

Bismarck, Count Herbert, 523-4, 528

Blagovestchensk, 584

Blowitz, M. de, 321-2

Blumenthal, Count von, 72, 77, 85, 94

Boer War, 585-8, 590, 597-8, 610, 636

Bokhara, 365, 371

Bonnier, M., 539

Bordeaux, 98, 99, 103, 105, 106, 116, 118

Bosnia, 163, 168, 238, 242, 258, 332

Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexation of, 612, _seq_. 640

Botha, General, 598

Boulanger, General, 126, 333, 337, 339, 341

Bourbaki, General, 98

Bourbon, House of, 3-6

Bourgas, 278

Bourgeois, M., 504

Boxer Movement, the, 583

Boxer Rising in China (1900), 588, 595

Brazza, M. de, 546

Bremen, 132, 142

Bright, Mr. J., 417, 452

British Central Africa Protectorate, 533

Broadwood, General, 487, 496, 498

Browne, General Sir Samuel, 394

Brussels, Conference at (1876), 545

Anti-Slavery Conference at, 534

Buchanan, Sir George, 647

Bukharest, Peace of (1913), 631-2, 637, 639

Bukharest, Treaty of (1886), 272

Bulgaria, 157-9, 163, 170-72, 176, 180, 225, 229-30, 234, 237-9,

251-288, 302, 333, 334

Campaigns in, 194-216

Bülow, Prince von, 588-9, 596, 603, 605, 607, 617

Bundesrath, the, 133-4, 138

Burmah, 527, 530

Annexation of, 432

Burnaby, Colonel, 480

Burrows, Brigadier-General, 407

Busa, 540

Busch, Dr., 22, 143

Cabul, 370, 381, 383, 387, 388, 390, 401-5, 412-413, 431

Cabul, Treaty of (1905), 435

Cairo, capture of, 455-6

Cairoli, Signor, 329

"Caisse de la Delte" (Egyptian), 442, 459

Cambon, Jules, 620

Paul, 644, 646

Cameroons, 528, 533-6

Candahar, 367, 381, 387, 398, 405, 407, 413-18, 432

Canning, Lord, 368

Canrobert, Marshal, 72

Caprivi, Count, 520

Carnarvon, Lord, 225, 525

Carnot, President Sadi, 127

Casement, Mr. Roger, 558, 560-62, 565, 566

Cassini, Count, 580

Catharine II., 361

Cattier, M., 552, 563, 564

Cavagnari, Sir Louis, 401

Cavour, Count, 8-11, 13, 90, 142, 161

Centralisation of Governments, 111-112, 315

Chad, Lake, 537

Châlons-sur-Marne, 68, 74, 75

Chamberlain, Mr., 417

Chambord, Comte de, 117, 122, 123

Charasia, Battle of (1878), 402-3

Charles, King of Roumania, 192, 206, 210, 215, 230, 262, 632

Charles Albert, King, 6-8

Chevket Pacha, 626

China, 568, 571-2, 576-82, 595-7

Chino-Japanese War, 576-7

Chitral, 386, 388, 433

Chotek, Countess, 613

Christian IX., 14

Churchill, Winston, 627, 634

Clement, Bishop, 280, 282

Cobden, Mr., 142

Colombey, Battle of, 63-5

Combes, M., 349, 600

Congo Free State, the, 502, 541, _passim_ chap. xix.

Congo, French, 622, 625

Constantinople, Conference of (1876), 174, 176-9

Constitution, French (1875), 124-5

German, 132-7

Turkish (1876), 177-9

Constitution of Finland, 308, 309

Cossacks, the, 360-62, 434, 435, 453

Coulmiers, Battle of, 97

Cranbrook, Lord, 387

Crete, 240, 248

Crimean War, 8, 13, 30, 31, 161-2, 345, 365, 425, 434

Crispi, Signor, 336, 337, 355, 600

Cromer, Lord. _See_ Baring, Sir E.

Cronstadt, 343, 346

Crown Prince of Saxony, 74, 130

Currie, Sir Donald, 524, 528

Curzon, Lord, 423, 431, 432, 576

Cyprus, 328

Convention, 234-5, 243-4, 250

Dahomey, 539

Dalmatia, 329

Dalny, 583

Dardanelles, the, 168, 222, 224, 225, 241

Decazes, Duc, 321-2, 440

Delagoa Bay, 525-6, 528, 534

Delcassé, M., 587, 601, 606, 607

Denghil Tepe, Battle of, 420-23, 500

Denmark, 4, 5, 13-16, 35

Depretis, Signor, 329, 335-6, 355

Derby, Lord, 166, 176, 178, 181, 222, 224, 225, 226, 231, 243, 440,

524, 530

De Wet, General, 598, 635

Dhanis, Commandant, 553

Dilke, Sir Charles, 465, 563

Dillon, Dr., 639

Disraeli. _See_ Beaconsfield

Dobrudscha, 197, 199, 229-30, 240

Dodds, Colonel, 539

Dolgorukoff, General, 280-81

Dongola, 474, 476, 479, 488, 489

Dost Mohammed, 368, 379

Dragomiroff, General, 197

Dreyfus, M., 600

Drouyn de Lhuys, 20

Drury Lowe, General Sir, 454-6

Dual Alliance, 342-50, 587-8, 590, 599, 609, 616, 644

Dual Control, the (in Egypt), 442, 443, 445, 457

Ducrot, General, 80, 81, 83

Dufaure, M., 126, 245, 246

Dufferin, Lord, 326, 424, 426-8, 429, 458, 461-2

Dulcigno, 246-7

Durand, Sir Mortimer, 433

Durbar at Delhi (1878), 383

East Africa (British), 520-21, 523

(German), 520-23

East Africa Company (British), 519-22

Eastern Question, the, 155-189, 222-250, 383, 615, 636-7

Eastern Roumelia, 238, 253, 259, 260, 263-4, 268, 275-6, 333

Eckardstein, Herr, 527

Edward VII., 601, 608, 618-9

Egypt, 166, 244, 266, 275, 602, 636-7,

_passim_ chaps. xv. xvi. xvii.

Einwold, Herr, 527

Elgin, Lord, 368

Elliott, Sir Henry, 176, 177, 221

El Obeid, Battle of, 461, 462

El Teb, Battle of, 470

Ems, 42-5

Ena, Queen of Spain, 619

England. _See_ Great Britain

Enver Bey, 630

Epirus, 241, 248

Erzeroum, 194, 241

Eugénie, Empress, 19, 29, 38, 47, 75, 87, 97, 139

Faidherbe, M. 538

Fashoda, 349, 501-6, 594

Faure, President, 127, 346

Favre, M. Jules, 87, 88, 94, 98, 103, 114

Ferdinand, Prince, 285-6

Ferdinand, Tsar, of Bulgaria, 612, 631

Fergusson, Sir James, 336

Ferry, M., 266, 329

Finland, 304, 307-14

Flegel, Herr, 535

Floquet, M., 126

Flourens, M., 343

Forbach, Battle of, 62, 63

Formosa, Island of, 577

Fox Bourne, Mr., 563

France, 3-6, 9, 19, 20, 25-9, 32, 33, 35, 46-9, 52-6, 87-9, 112, 161,

228, 318, 320-24, 326, 333-6, 337-8, 341-5, 347-9, 350, 437-8,

442, 446, 448, 452-3, 457, 458-9, 485, 513-514, 529, 535, 537-41,

546-9, 558, 559, 577-9, 585-6, 591, 593-4, 597, 599-608, 614-6, 618,

620-2, 624, 626, 638, 641-8

and Morocco, 602, 604-7, 609-10, 620 _seq_., 636-7

Army of, 634-5

France and the Sudan, 501-6

France and Tunis, 328-30

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 613-4, 639

Francis Joseph, 6, 32, 36, 173, 232, 318, 613

Franco-German War, causes of, 36-49

Franco-Italian Entente, 601

Franco-Russian Alliance. (_See_ Dual Alliance)

Frankfurt, Treaty of, 105, 114

Frankfurt-on-Main, 11, 12, 21, 22

Frederick the Great, 594, 635, 638, 646

Frederick III., Crown Prince of Germany and Emperor, 18, 74, 76, 80,

130, 136, 151, 236

Frederick VII., 14

Frederick Charles, Prince, 66, 68

Frederick William IV., 11-13, 31, 593

Free Trade (in Germany), 141-3

(in France), 142

French Congoland, 506, 546, 622, 625

French Revolution of 1830, 5

Frere, Sir Bartle, 380-81, 524

Freycinet, M. de, 446, 447, 452, 456, 502, 503

Frobenius, Herr, 638

Frossard, General, 63-5

Galatz, 197

Galbraith, Colonel, 411

Gallieni, M., 539

Gallipoli, 222, 226

Gambetta, M., 87, 96-101, 110, 125, 318, 330, 446, 452, 538

Gandamak, Treaty of, 400, 418

Garde Mobile, the, 55, 94

Garde Nationale, the, 55, 94

Garibaldi, 6, 7, 9-11, 28, 90-91, 327

Gastein, Convention of, 16

Gatacre, General, 490, 492

Gavril, Pasha, 263

Geok Tepe. _See_ Denghil Tepe

George V., King of England, 645

George, David Lloyd, 623, 625

German Army, 135, 633-4

German Army, Kriegsgefahr, 643

Confederation (1815-66), 4-22

Constitution (1871), 132-7

Empire, 129. _See_ Germany

Navy, 587-9, 594, 609, 617, 628, 633, 638

Zollverein, the, 141-2

Germany, 3-6, 11-18, 20-23, 27, 34, 39, 45-9, 51-5, 129-154, 164-6,

223, 246, 275, 277, 282, 318-27, 329, 330, 337-9, 350, 447-8, 453,

457, 472, 485, 513-18, 520-22, 524-30, 533-7, 541, 547, 559,

577-9, 581, 585-9, 592, 595-7, 600-609, 615-18, 620-21, 623-8,

632, 634, 635-8, 640-49

Gervais, Admiral, 343

Ghaznee, Battle of, 405

Giers, M. de, 258, 263, 265, 276, 281, 285, 302, 332, 333-5, 337, 424,

427, 515

Gladstone, Mr., 29, 46, 172, 223, 244, 275, 356, 371, 372, 376, 380,

392, 405, 417, 427-9, 446, 448-9, 452, 458, 461, 465, 484-5, 502,

517, 524, 528, 530, 531

Glave, Mr., 562

Gold Coast, 539

Goldie, Sir George T., 535, 541

Gontaut-Biron, M. de, 421

Gordon, General, _passim_ chaps. xvi. xvii.

Gortchakoff, Prince, 164, 168, 190, 222, 226, 320, 322-3, 366

Goschen, Lord, 244, 246, 442

Goschen, Sir Edward, 641-2

Gough, General, 404

Gramont, Duc de, 32, 40, 42, 43, 47

Grant Duff, Sir Mountstuart, 322

Granville, Earl, 45, 389, 425-6, 447, 463, 465, 470, 473-4, 517, 523,

533, 547

Gravelotte, Battle of, 68-73

Great Britain, 14, 29, 30, 52, 95, 145, 147-9, 160-61, 168-77, 181,

187-8, 190, 231, 259, 266, 282, 284, 322-4, 328, 336, 337, 342,

364-6, 372-4, 382-4, 392-4, 400, 404-6, 417, 435, 513-14, 521,

523-30, 533-7, 541, 547, 578-9, 581-2, 585-7, 600, 604-9, 616,

618, 620, 622-3, 626-8, 636-9, 641-8

Army of, 634

Great Britain and Egypt, _passim_ chaps. xv. xvi. xvii.

Great Britain and Russia (1878), 222-8

Greco-Turkish War, 585

Greece, 5, 158, 160, 194, 227, 240-41, 245-8, 257, 267

Grenfell, Rev. G., 546

Grévy, M., 337, 355

Grey, Sir Edward, 503, 586, 623, 626, 631, 634, 641-7

Griffin, Sir Lepel, 405-6

Gurko, General, 201-3, 208, 219

Habibulla, Ameer of Afghanistan, 431, 435

Hague Conference, 608

Congress, the (1899), 583

Tribunal, 601, 649

Haldane, Lord, 627, 639, 647

Hamburg, 132, 142

Hanotaux, M., 504

Hanover, 11, 21, 23

Hartington, Lord, 417, 465, 476

Hayashi, Count, 596

Heligoland, 521, 637

Herat, 367, 368, 381, 387, 388, 405, 425

Héricourt, Battle of, 98

Herzegovina, 163-5, 170, 238, 332

Hesse-Cassel, 12, 21, 23

Hesse Darmstadt, 20

Heydebrand, Herr, 625

Hicks, Pasha, 461-2

Hinde, Captain S.L., 553

Hinterland, Question of the, 547, 550

Hohenlohe, Prince, 589

Hohenzollern, House of, 11, 39-41, 129;

also _see_ Germany

Holland, 5, 554-5, 641-2

Holstein, 5, 26

Holy Alliance, the, 5, 319

Holy Roman Empire, the, 136

Hornby, Admiral, 224

Hoskier, M., 340

Hudson, Sir James, 274

Hungary, 32, 36, 159, 263, 277

Hunter, General, 487

Iddesleigh, Lord, 519

Ignatieff, General, 174, 177, 181, 229, 230, 232, 332

India, 165, 212, 365, 368, 592

"International Association of the Congo," 545, 547-9

"Internationale," the, 292

Isabella, Queen, 40

Ismail, Khedive, 438-40, 442

Istria, 329

Isvolsky, M., 615

"_Italia irredenta_," 329

Italo-Turkish War, the, 624, 628

Italy, 4-11, 16-23, 28, 30, 34, 37, 38, 55, 56, 63, 89-92, 148, 228,

266, 284, 319, 335, 350, 453, 485, 487, 540, 541, 567, 601, 603-5,

607, 615-17, 624, 628, 631, 636, 643, 646-7, 649

Italy and the Triple Alliance, 327-331, 600, 601, 615, 624, 637, 647

Jacob, General, 385

Jacobabad, Treaty of, 385

Jagow, Herr von, 645

Jameson, Dr. 587

Janssen, M., 552

Japan, 348, 572-4, 576-8, 581-4, 585, 597-9

Jaurés, M., 634

Jermak, 361, 569, 570

Jesuits, the, 138

Jews, persecution of the, 304, 305

Johnstone, Sir Harry, 519, 541

Kamchatka, 570, 571

Karaveloff, M., 256, 259, 280

Kars, 194, 229, 234

Kassala, 487, 488, 491

Katkoff, M., 259, 283, 324, 332, 333, 334, 337

Kaufmann, General, 366, 383, 398

Kaulbars, General, 255, 257-8, 283, 284

Khalifa, _passim_ chap. xvii.

Khama, 533

Khartum, 437, 439, 445, _passim_ chaps. xvi. xvii.

Khelat, Khan of, 384-5

Khiva, 365, 374, 377

Khokand, 383

Khyber Pass, 386, 390, 394, 401, 412

Kiamil Pacha, 630

Kiao-chau, 580-81

Kiderlen-Wächter, Herr, 621-2

Kiel, North Sea Canal, 587, 604, 637-8

Kirk, Sir John, 518, 541

Kitchener, Lord, 441, 479, 598, _passim_ chap. xvii.

Komaroff, General, 427, 428

Königgrätz, Battle of, 18-20

Kordofan, 461, 462, 470, 476

Korea, 568

Korsakoff, General, 254

Kossuth, 6

Krüdener, General, 200, 206-7

Krüger, President, 586-7

Kultur-Kampf, the, 139-41

Kuropatkin, General, 311-12, 314, 422-3

Kurram Valley, the, 394-7, 400

Labouchere, Mr., 336

Lado, 502, 558-9

Lagos, 539

Lamsdorff, Count, 575

Lansdowne, Lord, 433, 567, 597, 602, 606

Lavigerie, Cardinal, 534

Lawrence, Lord J., 365, 368-9, 371, 385, 387

Layard, Sir Henry, 221, 226, 245, 246

Leboeuf, Marshall, 47, 53, 64, 65

Lebrun, General, 34-6, 65

Leflô, General, 322

Le Mans, Battle of, 98

Leo XIII., 327, 331, 335

Leopold II. (King of the Belgians), 342, 465, 509, 514, 543,

550-52, 555-7, 558, 565

Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern, 40, 42

Lessar, M., 424

Lesseps, M. de, 438, 441

Lewis, General, 487

Liaotung Peninsula, 577, 578, 581-2

Liberation, Wars of (1813-14), 635

Li-Hung Chang, 577, 578, 582

Lissa, Battle of, 17

Livingstone, D., 508-9, 543-4, 567

Lobánoff, Prince, 575

Local Government (French), 119, 120

Lomakin, General, 420

Lombardy, 5-11, 32

London, Conference of (1867), 15, 28

Congress of (1871), 95

London, Peace Conference at (1913), 630-31, 634

Lorraine, 94, 103, 105, 132, 133-4

Lothaire, Commandant, 553

Loubet, M., 127, 601

Louis Philippe, King, 6

Lovtcha, 210, 212

Lübeck, 132, 142

Lüderitz, Herr, 523

Lugard, Sir Frederick, 522, 537, 541

Lumsden, Sir Peter, 426

Luxemburg, 27, 28, 32, 39

Lyttleton, Colonel, 492

Lytton, Lord, 481-7, 490-92, 405-6, 417, 419

Macdonald, General, 402, 487, 491, 496-8

Macdonald, Ramsay, 646

Macedonia, 158, 230, 248, 250, 287-8, 391

Mackenzie, Rev. John, 530-31, 541

Mackinnon, Sir William, 516, 541

Maclaine, Lieutenant, 408, 415

MacMahon, Marshall, 59-61, 74-80, 123, 125-7, 322, 525-6

Mahdi, the, 266; chaps. xvi. xvii. _passim_

Maiwand, Battle of, 407-11

Malet, Sir Edward, 548

Malmesbury, Lord, 47

Manchuria, 345-6, 349, 568, 578, 580, 584

Mancíní, Sígnor, 355

Manin, 7

Marchand, Colonel, 501-6, 540

Maritz, General, 635

Marschall, Baron von, 605

Mars-la-Tour, Battle of, 67-70

Maxwell, General, 487, 491, 497

"May Laws," the, 139-41, 319

Mayo, Lord, 372-3

Mazzini, 6, 7, 91, 92, 304, 327

Mecklenburg, 17, 142

Mehemet Ali, Pasha, 204, 209, 215-16

Melikoff, General Loris, 194, 296-8

Méline, M., 504

Mentana, Battle of, 28, 90

Mercantile System, the, 150

Merriman, Mr., 586

Merv, 345, 374, 387, 388, 423-5, 431, 518

Metternich, Prince, 7, 36

Metz, 55, 63-73, 97, 104

Mexico, 19, 26, 31

Midhat, Pasha, 178-9, 186

Milan, King, 167, 263, 269-72

Milner, Lord, 440, 448, 598

Milutin, General, 204, 215

Mir, the, 294, 307

Mohammed Ali, 437-8

Mohammed V., 618

Moltke, Count von, 18, 43, 65, 66, 78, 85, 104, 130, 193, 205, 320

Mombasa, 520, 523

Montenegro, 158, 163, 167, 173-4, 180, 194, 204, 225, 229, 232, 238,

242, 246-7, 263

Morier, Sir Robert, 187, 273, 286, 302, 428

Morley, Mr. John, 427

Morocco, 602, 604-7, 609-10, 620 _seq_., 636-7

Moslem Creed, the, and Christians, 156-8, 186-7

Mukden, 598, 606

Mukhtar, Pasha, 208

Münster, Count, 523

Murad V., 169

Muravieff, Count, 571-3, 575, 589

Nabokoff, Captain, 278

Nachtigall, Dr., 533-4

Napoleon I., 2-4, 12, 13, 15-17, 23, 25, 89, 100, 160, 325, 437, 537,

593, 608, 610

Napoleon III., 6, 7, 9-11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 25-33, 37-40, 46-9, 52, 63-5,

75-8, 84-6, 88-9, 98, 99, 105, 123, 138, 142, 162, 538, 599

Napoleon, Prince Jerome, 20, 37

Natal, 527, 528, 529, 534

National African Company, the, 535

National Assembly, the French, 98-108, 115-26

Nationality, 2-12, 23, 25, 26-8, 36, 89, 586

Nelidoff, Count, 265, 274, 277

Nelson, 437, 441

Nesselrode, Count, 364

Netherlands, the, 586

Nice, 9, 30, 39

Nicholas, I., 160, 289, 292, 304, 308, 364

Nicholas II., 289, 311-14, 346, 349, 506, 575, 580, 584, 590, 594, 598,

610, 614, 617, 621-2, 640, 643, 649

Nicholas, Grand Duke, 192-3, 200-2, 206, 210, 215, 223, 229, 291, 292

Nicholas, Prince of Montenegro, 263

Nicopolis, 196, 200-1, 206, 217

Niger, river, 533-40, 548

Nigeria, 534-7

Nihilism, 112, 233, 266-7, 291-8, 300-4, 327

Nikolsburg, 19

Northbrook, Lord, 373-4, 376, 379, 381, 465

Northcote, Sir Stafford, 168, 224, 225, 243

North German Confederation, 22, 35, 51, 52, 136

Norway, 4, 5

Novi-Bazar, 332

Novi-Bazar, Sanjak of, 612

Nuttall, General, 411

Obock, 504, 540

Obretchoff, General, 324, 326

O'Donovan, Mr., 424, 462

Ollivier, M., 28, 29, 34, 41, 46, 47, 55, 65

Olmütz, Convention of, 12, 18

Omdurman, Battle of, 441, 493-500

Orleans, 97

Osman Digna, 470, 486

Osman Pasha, 196, 200, 205, 214-19

Palikao, Count, 65, 75, 77, 79, 87

Palmerston, Lord, 30, 438, 441

Pan-German Movement, 593-4, 621

Pan-Islamic Movement, 592-3, 608

Panjdeh, 346, 426-9, 432

Papal States, the, 9, 10

Paris, 87, 88, 95, 97, 98, 105, 107-113, 120

Paris Commune, the (1871), 106-113, 116, 315

Paris, Comte de, 117, 122

Paris, Treaty of (1856), 161, 176

Peiwar, Kotal, Battle at, 396

Pekin, Capture of, 595

Persia, 367, 368, 374, 378, 380, 609, 624

Persian Gulf, the, 592

Peshawur, 394

Peter, King of Servia, 615

Peters, Dr. Karl, 517-19, 522

Phayre, General, 416

Philippopolis, 219, 260, 263-4, 270, 271, 281

Picard, M., 103

Piedmont, 7

Pishin, 400

Pius IX., 6, 7, 38, 89-91, 122, 138-9, 141, 327

Plevna, Battles at, 206-19

Pobyedonosteff, 299, 300

Poland, 4, 5, 25, 26, 31, 301

Pondoland, 529

Port Arthur, 346, 580

Porte, the. _See_ Turkey

Portsmouth, Treaty of, 598

Portugal, 520, 525, 526, 540, 541, 546-9

Posen, 141

Primrose, General, 407, 411

Prudhon, 292-5

Prussia (1815-66), 4-22, 26, 51-5, 95, 130, 140, 141. _See_ Germany

Quadrilateral, the Turkish, 194-7, 199-200

Quetta, 381, 385, 398, 412, 416, 432

Rabinek, Herr, 565

Rachfahl, Herr, 605

Radetzky, General, 209, 220

Radowitz, Herr von, 321

Radziwill, Princess, 236-7, 291

Rauf Pasha, 460-61

Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 380

Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de, 188

Redmond, Mr., 646

Reichstag, the German, 133-4, 140, 141, 145-6

Reventlow, Count, 587, 595, 603, 637-8

Revolutions of 1848, 6-7, 11-12

Rezonville, Battle of, 67-70

Rhodes, Mr. Cecil, 530-32, 541

Rhodesia, 532

Riaz Pasha, 445

Ribot, M., 346

Ripon, Lord, 406, 412, 417

Roberts, Lord, 379, 389, 392-3, 395-8, 402-4, 535

Rohrbach, Herr, 637

Rome, 7, 10, 38, 89-92, 95, 138

Roon, Count von, 17, 43

Rosebery, Earl of, 275, 276, 503, 519, 528

Roumania, 26, 157, 158, 162, 192-3, 220, 222, 225, 229-30, 238-40,

257, 260-62, 269

Roumania, King of, 41

Rouvier, M., 607

Royal Niger Company, the, 526, 540

Rubber Tax, in Congo State, 565-7

Russell, Lord John, 14, 15

Russell, Lord Odo, 322

Russia, 5, 9, 12, 13, 26, 31, 32, 55, 95, 112, 145, 148, 161, 164-8, 172,

182, 190-92, 231, 234, 240, 289, 290, 318, 322-7, 331-5, 337, 341-5,

347-9, 371, 446, 447-8, 457, 458, 472, 485, 527, 586, 590-91, 593-5,

597, 603, 606-8, 612-13, 615-17, 621, 624, 626, 629-31, 633-4,

640-44, 647-8

and Bulgaria, 253-88

and Finland, 307-14

and Japan, 585, 592, 598-9

and the Jews, 304-5

and Turkey, 222-7, 229-42

army of, 635, 638

Russia in Central Asia, 359-66, 371-4, 376-80, 383, 387-91, 398-9, 403,

419-30

in the Far East, 595-6, 598, 614, chap. xx. _passim_

Russo-Japanese War, 598-9, 602

Russo-Turkish War, 585

Rustchuk, 194, 199, 208, 265, 280-82, 285, 334

Saarbrücken, Battle of, 61, 62

Said, Khedive, 438

St. Hilaire, Barthélémy de, 328

St. Lucia Bay, 519, 525, 527, 528, 534

St. Privat, Battle of _See_ Gravelotte

St. Quentin, Battle of, 98

Saladin, 591

Salisbury, Marquis of, 176-7, 187, 232-4, 240, 243, 266-9, 272, 275,

283, 287, 328, 336, 380-81, 383, 387, 428, 505, 519, 522, 540,

554, 581

Salonica, 167, 229

Samarcand, 365-6, 371, 388-9, 604

Samoa, 588, 610

Samory, 539

San Stefano, Treaty of, 229-32, 233, 238, 253

Sandeman, Sir Robert, 384-5

Sardinia, Kingdom of, 8-11, 162

Saxony, 4, 5, 11, 18, 134-6

Sazonoff, M., 641

Schleswig-Holstein, 5, 12, 13-16, 21, 26, 142

Schnaebele, M., 334, 338

Sedan, Battle of, 77-88

Septennate, the (in France), 123

Serpa Pinto, 540

Servia, 158-9, 163, 167, 173-4, 180, 194, 225, 229, 232, 238, 242, 257,

258, 267, 612-13, 615-16, 631, 637, 639-43, 648-9

Seymour, Admiral, 449-50

Shan-tung, Province of, 580, 581

Shere Ali, 369-74, 376-7, 379-80, 384, 386-8, 390-92, 398-400

Sherpur, Engagements at (1878), 404

Shipka Pass, 197, 201-3, 208, 220

Shumla, 194, 208

Shutargardan Pass, the, 402

Shuvaloff, Count, 233, 235

Siberia, 361, 366, 570-72, 574

Sibi, 398, 400

Simon, Jules, 103

Sistova, 196, 197, 199, 208, 217

Skiernewice, 258, 266, 284, 302, 332-5, 426, 515-18

Skobeleff, General, 198-9, 203, 210, 211-15, 220, 259, 330, 388-9,

421-4, 431

Slave-trade, the, 558, 562

Slavophils, the, 310-12, 339

Slivnitza, Battle of, 270-71

Soboleff, General, 255, 257-8

Sofia, 210, 219, 271, 273, 278-9

Solferino, Battle of, 9

Somaliland, 540

South Africa Company, British, 533

South German Confederation, 21, 22, 35

South-West Africa (German), 523-7, 531-2

Spain, 40, 41, 42, 605

Spicheren, Battle of, 62, 63

Stambuloff, 256, 259, 264, 289, 283-6, 334

Stanley, Sir H.M., 465, 508-9, 543-4, 552, 553

State Socialism (in Germany), 150-53

Steinmetz, General, 71

Stephenson, General, 474

Stepniak, 294, 303

Stewart, Colonel, 466, 476

Stewart, Sir Donald, 398, 405

Stewart, Sit Herbert, 480

Stiege, Admiral, 623

Stoffel, Colonel, 53

Stokes, Mr., execution of, 565

Stolieteff, General, 388-90, 398

Stundists, the, 305-7

Suakim, 462, 473, 478, 486, 488, 518

Sudan, the, _passim_ chaps. xvi. xvii.

Suez Canal, the, 166, 190, 225, 438, 439, 457, 513

Suleiman Pasha, 204, 208-9, 215, 216, 219, 221

Swat Valley, the, 433

Sweden, 4, 5

Switzerland, 98, 148

Tamai, Battle of, 470

Tangier, 614

Tashkend, 365, 388, 433

Tatisheff, M., 643

Tchernayeff, General, 174

Tchirsky, Herr von, 640

Tel-el-Kebir, Battle of, 454-5

Tewfik, Khedive, 442-7, 452-3, 458, 461, 466-7, 487, 503, 507

Thessaly, 240-41, 248-9

Thiers, M., 26, 27, 47, 87, 94, 100-6, 108,

114-19, _passim_ chaps. iv. v.

Thomson, Joseph, 509-10, 535-6, 541

Thornton, Sir Edward, 427

Three Emperors' League, the, 179, 184, 319-23, 326, 332-4, 448, 515

Tilsit, Treaty of, 308

Timbuctu, 539

Tipu Tib, 553

Tirard, M., 341

Tirpitz, Admiral von, 589, 609

Tisza, M., 180, 283

Todleben, 216-17

Togo, Admiral, 598

Trans-Siberian Railway, the, 574-6, 580, 582-3, 599

Transvaal, the, 525, 527, 586

Treitschke, Herr, 626, 636

Trentino, 335

Triple Alliance, the, 21, 327-33, 335-9, 453, 515, 590-1, 599-601, 609,

615, 624, 635, 637, 647

Triple Entente, the, 593, 595, 609, 617, 635, 647, 649

Trochu, General, 101

Tsushima, Battle of, 598

Tunis, 328-30, 436, 448, 513-14, 600

Turgenieff, 294, 295

Turkestan, 361, 364, 366-7, 419-30

Turkey, 5, 155, 168-77, 181, 187-8, 190-221, 229-42, 332, 342, 348,

436-8, 446, 502, 567, 592, 613, 615-616, 618, 624, 628-30, 632,

638-9

Uganda, 502, 522-3

Umballa, Conference at, 372-3

Umberto I., King of Italy, 327, 329-31, 333, 335, 336

United Kingdom. _See_ Great Britain

United Netherlands, Kingdom of, 5

United States, the, 30, 31, 547, 567, 578, 581, 596-8, 607

Vandervelde, M., 557

Venetia, 5-11, 17, 19, 21

Verdun, 65, 68

Versailles, 103, 106, 108, 109, 129

Victor Emmanuel II., King of Italy, 2-11, 37, 63, 90, 327

Victor Emmanuel III., 601, 615

Victoria, Queen, 14, 145, 165, 171, 223-4, 261, 322

proclaimed Empress of India, 382

Victoria, Crown Princess of Germany, 323

Vienna, Treaty of (1815), 4, 5

Vionville, Battle of, 67-70

Viviani, M., 644

Vladivostok, 572, 575, 580

Waddington, M., 240, 245, 246, 328

Wady Halfa, 439, 476, 478, 483, 484, 486, 489, 502

Waldeck-Rousseau, M., 600

Waldemar, Prince, 284

Walfisch Bay, 524

Wallachia, 160-62

Warren, Sir Charles, 531-2

Wei-hai-wei, 582

West Africa, 533-40

White, Major G., 402

White, Sir William, 177, 187, 265, 267-9, 273-4, 287, 302

Widdin, 194, 196, 200, 206, 270

William I. (King of Prussia, German Emperor), 11-22, 31, 32, 41-6, 73,

104, 129-30, 137, 152, 236, 321-2, 325, 335, 339, 517, 594

William II. (King of Prussia, German Emperor), 151-3, 339-40, 342, 522,

580, 582, 586-93, 598-9, 604, 606-611, 614, 616-7, 620-1, 623-4,

632, 636-7, 639-41, 643-6

William, Crown Prince of Germany, 625, 646

William of Weid, Prince, 632

Wilson, Sir Charles, 480

Wimpffen, General de, 79-86

Winton, Sir Francis de, 552

Wissmann, Lieutenant von, 546

Wolf, Dr., 546

Wolff, Sir H. Drummond, 485

Wolseley, Lord, 454-6, 466, 475, 476, 478, 481, 507

Wörth, Battle of, 59-62

Würtemberg, 21, 131, 133-5, 137

Yakub Khan, 379, 400-3

Young Turk Party, the, 612-3, 616, 618

Revolution (1908), 615

Zankoff, M., 280

Zanzibar, 516-21, 532, 553

Zazulich, Vera, 292

Zebehr, Pasha, 469-73

Zemstvo, the, 293, 296, 301

Zola, Emile, 600

Zulfikar Pass, the, 428