explorers like Stanley, Thomson, Cameron, Schweinfurth, Pogge,
Nachtigall, Pinto, de Brazza, Johnston, Wissmann, Holub, Lugard, and
others; but apart from the first two, none of them made discoveries that
can be called epoch-marking.]
The last epoch-marking work carried through by an individual was
accomplished by a Scottish explorer, whose achievements almost rivalled
those of Livingstone. Joseph Thomson, a native of Dumfriesshire,
succeeded in 1879 to the command of an exploring party which sought to
open up the country around the lakes of Nyassa and Tanganyika. Four
years later, on behalf of the Royal Geographical Society, he undertook
to examine the country behind Mombasa which was little better known than
when Vasco da Gama first touched there. In this journey Thomson
discovered two snow-capped mountains, Kilimanjaro and Kenia, and made
known the resources of the country as far inland as the Victoria Nyanza.
Considering the small resources he had at hand, and the cruel and
warlike character of the Masai people through whom he journeyed, this
journey was by far the most remarkable and important in the annals of
exploration during the eighties. Thomson afterwards undertook to open a
way from the Benuë, the great eastern affluent of the Niger, to Lake
Chad and the White Nile. Here again he succeeded beyond all expectation,
while his tactful management of the natives led to political results of
the highest importance, as will shortly appear.
These explorations and those of French, German, and Portuguese
travellers served to bring nearly the whole of Africa within the ken of
the civilised world, and revealed the fact that nearly all parts of
tropical Africa had a distinct commercial value.
This discovery, we may point out, is the necessary preliminary to any
great and sustained work of colonisation and annexation. Three
conditions may be looked on as essential to such an effort. First, that
new lands should be known to be worth the labour of exploitation or
settlement; second, that the older nations should possess enough
vitality to pour settlers and treasure into them; and thirdly, that
mechanical appliances should be available for the overcoming of natural
obstacles.
Now, a brief glance at the great eras of exploring and colonising
activity will show that in all these three directions the last thirty
years have presented advantages which are unique in the history of the
world. A few words will suffice to make good this assertion. The wars
which constantly devastated the ancient world, and the feeble resources
in regard to navigation wielded by adventurous captains, such as Hanno
the Carthaginian, grievously hampered all the efforts of explorers by
sea, while mechanical appliances were so weak as to cripple man's
efforts at penetrating the interior. The same is true of the mediaeval
voyagers and travellers. Only the very princes among men, Columbus,
Magellan, Vasco da Gama, Cabot, Cabral, Gilbert, and Raleigh, could have
done what they did with ships that were mere playthings. Science had to
do her work of long and patient research before man could hopefully face
the mighty forces and malignant influences of the tropics. Nor was the
advance of knowledge and invention sufficient by itself to equip man for
successful war against the ocean, the desert, the forest, and the swamp.
The political and social development of the older countries was equally
necessary. In order that thousands of settlers should be able and ready
to press in where the one great leader had shown the way, Europe had to
gain something like peace and stability. Only thus, when the natural
surplus of the white races could devote itself to the task of peacefully
subduing the earth rather than to the hideous work of mutual slaughter,
could the life-blood of Europe be poured forth in fertilising streams
into the waste places of the other continents.
The latter half of the eighteenth century promised for a brief space to
inaugurate such a period of expansive life. The close of the Seven
Years' War seemed to be the starting point for a peaceful campaign
against the unknown; but the efforts of Cook, d'Entrecasteaux, and
others then had little practical result, owing to the American War of
Independence, and the great cycle of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars. These in their turn left Europe too exhausted to accomplish much
in the way of colonial expansion until the middle of the nineteenth
century. Even then, when the steamship and the locomotive were at hand
to multiply man's powers, there was, as yet, no general wish, except on
the part of the more fortunate English-speaking peoples, to enter into
man's new heritage. The problems of Europe had to be settled before the
age of expansive activity could dawn in its full radiance. As has been
previously shown, Europe was in an introspective mood up to the years
1870-1878.
Our foregoing studies have shown that the years following the
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, brought about a state of political
equilibrium which made for peace and stagnation in Europe; and the
natural forces of the Continent, cramped by the opposition of equal and
powerful forces, took the line of least resistance--away from Europe.
For Russia, the line of least resistance was in Central Asia. For all
other European States it was the sea, and the new lands beyond.
Furthermore, in that momentous decade the steamship and locomotive were
constantly gaining in efficiency; electricity was entering the arena as
a new and mighty force; by this time medical science had so far advanced
as to screen man from many of the ills of which the tropics are profuse;
and the repeating rifle multiplied the power of the white man in his
conflicts with savage peoples. When all the advantages of the present
generation are weighed in the balance against the meagre equipment of
the earlier discoverers, the nineteenth century has scant claim for
boasting over the fifteenth. In truth, its great achievements in this
sphere have been practical and political. It has only fulfilled the rich
promise of the age of the great navigators. Where they could but
wonderingly skirt the fringes of a new world, the moderns have won their
way to the heart of things and found many an Eldorado potentially richer
than that which tempted the cupidity of Cortes and Pizarro.
In one respect the European statesmen of the recent past tower above
their predecessors of the centuries before. In the eighteenth century
the "mercantilist" craze for seizing new markets and shutting out all
possible rivals brought about most of the wars that desolated Europe. In
the years 1880-1890 the great Powers put forth sustained and successful
efforts to avert the like calamity, and to cloak with the mantle of
diplomacy the eager scrambles for the unclaimed lands of the world.
For various reasons the attention of statesmen turned almost solely on
Africa. Central and South America were divided among States that were
nominally civilised and enjoyed the protection of the Monroe Doctrine
put forward by the United States. Australia was wholly British. In Asia
the weakness of China was but dimly surmised; and Siam and Cochin China
alone offered any field for settlement or conquest by European peoples
from the sea. In Polynesia several groups of islands were still
unclaimed; but these could not appease the land-hunger of Europe. Africa
alone provided void spaces proportionate to the needs and ambitions of
the white man. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 served to bring the
east coast of that continent within easy reach of Europe; and the
discoveries on the Upper Nile, Congo, and Niger opened a way into other
large parts. Thus, by the year 1880, everything favoured the "partition
of Africa."
Rumour, in the guise of hints given by communicative young attachés or
"well-informed" correspondents, ascribes the first beginnings of the
plans for the partition of Africa to the informal conversations of
statesmen at the time of the Congress of Berlin (1878). Just as an
architect safeguards his creation by providing a lightning-conductor, so
the builder of the German Empire sought to divert from that fabric the
revengeful storms that might be expected from the south-west. Other
statesmen were no less anxious than Bismarck to draw away the attention
of rivals from their own political preserves by pointing the way to more
desirable waste domains. In short, the statesmen of Europe sought to
plant in Africa the lightning-conductors that would safeguard the new
arrangements in Europe, including that of Cyprus. The German and British
Governments are known then to have passed on hints to that of France as
to the desirability of her appropriating Tunis. The Republic entered
into the schemes, with results which have already been considered
(Chapter XII.); and, as a sequel to the occupation of Tunis, plans were
set on foot for the eventual conquest of the whole of the North-West of
Africa (except Morocco and a few British, Spanish, and Portuguese
settlements) from Cape Bon to Cape Verde, and thence nearly to the
mouth of the River Niger. We may also note that in and after 1883 France
matured her schemes for the conquest of part, and ultimately the whole,
of Madagascar, a project which reached completion in the year 1885[425].
[Footnote 425: For the French treaty of December 17, 1885, with
Madagascar see Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 2 (1886).]
The military occupation of Egypt by Great Britain in 1882 also served to
quicken the interest of European Powers in Africa. It has been surmised
that British acquiescence in French supremacy in Tunis, West Africa, and
Madagascar had some connection with the events that transpired in Egypt,
and that the perpetuation of British supremacy in the valley of the Nile
was virtually bought by the surrender of most of our political and
trading interests in these lands, the lapse of which under the French
"protective" regime caused much heart-burning in commercial circles.
Last among the special causes that concentrated attention on Africa was
the activity of King Leopold's Association at Brussels in opening up the
Congo district in the years 1879-1882. Everything therefore tended to
make the ownership of tropical Africa the most complex question of the
early part of the eighties.
For various reasons Germany was a little later than France and England
in entering the field. The hostility of France on the west, and, after
1878, that of Russia on the east, made it inadvisable for the new Empire
to give hostages to Fortune, in the shape of colonies, until by
alliances it secured its position at home and possessed a fleet strong
enough to defend distant possessions. In some measure the German
Government had to curb the eagerness of its "colonial party." The
present writer was in Germany in the year 1879, when the colonial
propaganda was being pushed forward, and noted the eagerness in some
quarters, and the distrust in others, with which pamphlets like that of
Herr Fabri, _Bedarf Deutschland Colonien?_ were received. Bismarck
himself at first checked the "colonials," until he felt sure of the
European situation. That, however, was cleared up to some extent by the
inclusion of Italy in the compact which thus became the Triple Alliance
(May 1882), and by the advent to office of the pacific Chancellor, de
Giers, at St. Petersburg a little later. There was therefore the less
need officially to curb the colonising instinct of the Teutonic people.
The formation of the German Colonial Society at Frankfurt in December
1882, and the immense success attending its propaganda, spurred on the
statesmen of Berlin to take action. They looked longingly (as they still
do) towards Brazil, in whose southern districts their people had settled
in large numbers; but over all that land the Monroe Doctrine spread its
sheltering wings. A war with the United States would have been madness,
and Germany therefore turned to Polynesia and Africa. We may note here
that in 1885 she endeavoured to secure the Caroline Islands from Spain,
whose title to them seemed to have lapsed; but Spanish pride flared up
at the insult, and after a short space Bismarck soothed ruffled feelings
at Madrid by accepting the mediation of the Pope, who awarded them to
Spain--Germany, however, gaining the right to occupy an islet of the
group as a coaling station.
Africa, however, absorbed nearly all the energy of the German colonial
party. The forward wing of that party early in the year 1884 inaugurated
an anti-British campaign in the press, which probably had the support of
the Government. As has been stated in chapter XII., that was the time
when the Three Emperors' League showed signs of renewed vitality; and
Bismarck, after signing the secret treaty of March 24, 1884 (later on
ratified at Skiernevice), felt safe in pressing on colonial designs
against England in Africa, especially as Russia was known to be planning
equally threatening moves against the Queen's Empire in Asia. We do not
know enough of what then went on between the German and Russian
Chancellors to assert that they formed a definite agreement to harry
British interests in those continents; but, judging from the general
drift of Bismarck's diplomacy and from the "nagging" to which England
was thenceforth subjected for two years, it seems highly probable that
the policy ratified at Skiernevice aimed at marking time in European
affairs and striding onwards in other continents at the expense of the
Island Power.
The Anglophobes of the German press at once fell foul of everything
British; and that well-known paper the _Kölnische Zeitung_ in an article
of April 22, 1884, used the following words:--"Africa is a large pudding
which the English have prepared for themselves at other people's
expense, and the crust of which is already fit for eating. Let us hope
that our sailors will put a few pepper-corns into it on the Guinea
coast, so that our friends on the Thames may not digest it too rapidly."
The sequel will show whether the simile correctly describes either the
state of John Bull's appetite or the easy aloofness of the
Teutonic onlooker.
It will be convenient to treat this great and complex subject on a
topographical basis, and to begin with a survey of the affairs of East
Africa, especially the districts on the mainland north and south of the
island of Zanzibar. At that important trade centre, the natural starting
point then for the vast district of the Great Lakes, the influence of
British and Indian traders had been paramount; and for many years the
Sultan of Zanzibar had been "under the direct influence of the United
Kingdom and of the Government of India[426]." Nevertheless, in and after
1880 German merchants, especially those of Hamburg, pressed in with
great energy and formed plans for annexing the neighbouring territories
on the mainland.
[Footnote 426: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1886), p. 2.]
Their energy was in strange contrast to the lethargy shown by the
British Government in the protection of Anglo-Indian trade interests. In
the year 1878 the Sultan of Zanzibar, who held a large territory on the
mainland, had offered the control of all the commerce of his dominions
to Sir W. Mackinnon, Chairman of the British-India Steam Navigation
Company; but, for some unexplained reason, the Beaconsfield Cabinet
declined to be a party to this arrangement, which, therefore, fell
through[427]. Despite the fact that England and France had in 1862
agreed to recognise the independence of the Sultan of Zanzibar, the
Germans deemed the field to be clear, and early in November 1884, Dr.
Karl Peters and two other enthusiasts of the colonial party landed at
Zanzibar, disguised as mechanics, with the aim of winning new lands for
their Fatherland. They had with them several blank treaty forms, the
hidden potency of which was soon to be felt by dusky potentates on the
mainland. Before long they succeeded in persuading some of these novices
in diplomacy to set their marks to these documents, an act which
converted them into subjects of the Kaiser, and speedily secured 60,000
square miles for the German tricolour. It is said that the Government of
Berlin either had no knowledge of, or disapproved of, these proceedings;
and, when Earl Granville ventured on some representations respecting
them, he received the reply, dated November 28, 1884, that the Imperial
Government had no design of obtaining a protectorate over Zanzibar[428].
It is difficult to reconcile these statements with the undoubted fact
that on February 17, 1885, the German Emperor gave his sanction to the
proceedings of Dr. Peters by extending his suzerainty over the signatory
chiefs[429]. This event caused soreness among British explorers and
Indian traders who had been the first to open up the country to
civilisation. Nevertheless, the Gladstone Ministry took no effective
steps to safeguard their interests.
[Footnote 427: _The Partition of Africa_, by J. Scott Keltie (1893), pp.
157, 225.]
[Footnote 428: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1886), p. 1.]
[Footnote 429: _Ibid_. pp. 12-20.]
In defence of their academic treatment of this matter some
considerations of a general nature may be urged.
The need of colonies felt by Germany was so natural, so imperious, that
it could not be met by the high and dry legal argument as to the
priority of Great Britain's commercial interests. Such an attitude would
have involved war with Germany about East Africa and war with France
about West Africa, at the very time when we were on the brink of
hostilities with Russia about Merv, and were actually fighting the
Mahdists behind Suakim. The "weary Titan"--to use Matthew Arnold's
picturesque phrase--was then overburdened. The motto, "Live and let
live," was for the time the most reasonable, provided that it was not
interpreted in a weak and maudlin way on essential points.
Many critics, however, maintain that Mr. Gladstone's and Lord
Granville's diplomatic dealings with Germany in the years 1884 and 1885
displayed most lamentable weakness, even when Dr. Peters and others were
known to be working hard at the back of Zanzibar, with the results that
have been noted. In April 1885 the Cabinet ordered Sir John Kirk,
British representative at Zanzibar, and founder of the hitherto
unchallenged supremacy of his nation along that coast, forthwith to undo
the work of a lifetime by "maintaining friendly relations" with the
German authorities at that port. This, of course, implied a tacit
acknowledgment by Britain of what amounted to a German protectorate over
the mainland possessions of the Sultan. It is not often that a
Government, in its zeal for "live and let live," imposes so humiliating
a task on a British representative. The Sultan did not take the serene
and philosophic view of the situation that was held at Downing Street,
and the advent of a German squadron was necessary in order to procure
his consent to these arrangements (August-December 1885.)[430]
[Footnote 430: J. Scott Keltie, _The Partition of Africa_, ch. xv.]
The Blue Book dealing with Zanzibar (Africa, No. 1, 1886) by no means
solves the riddle of the negotiations which went on between London and
Berlin early in the year 1885. From other sources we know that the most
ardent of the German colonials were far from satisfied with their
triumph. Curious details have appeared showing that their schemes
included the laying of a trap for the Sultan of Zanzibar, which failed
owing to clumsy baiting and the loquacity of the would-be captor. Lord
Rosebery also managed, according to German accounts, to get the better
of Count Herbert Bismarck in respect of St. Lucia Bay (see page 528)
and districts on the Benuë River; so that this may perhaps be placed
over against the losses sustained by Britain on the coast opposite
Zanzibar. Even there, as we have seen, results did not fully correspond
to the high hopes entertained by the German Chauvinists[431].
[Footnote 431: _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, vol. iii.
pp. 135, 144-45. Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1886), pp. 39-45, 61 _et
seq_.; also No. 3 (1886), pp. 4, 15.]
In the meantime (June 1885) the Salisbury Cabinet came into office for a
short time, but the evil effects of the slackness of British diplomacy
were not yet at an end. At this time British merchants, especially those
of Manchester, were endeavouring to develop the mountainous country
around the giant cone of Mt. Kilimanjaro, where Mr. (now Sir) Harry
Johnston had, in September 1884, secured some trading and other rights
with certain chiefs. A company had been formed in order to further
British interests, and this soon became the Imperial British East Africa
Company, which aspired to territorial control in the parts north of
those claimed by Dr. Peters' Company. A struggle took place between the
two companies, the German East Africa Company laying claim to the
Kilimanjaro district. Again it proved that the Germans had the more
effective backing, and, despite objections urged by our Foreign
Minister, Lord Rosebery, against the proceedings of German agents in
that tract, the question of ownership was referred to the decision of an
Anglo-German boundary commission.
Lord Iddesleigh assumed control of the Foreign Office in August, but the
advent of the Conservatives to power in no way helped on the British
case. By an agreement between the two Powers, dated November 1, 1886,
the Kilimanjaro district was assigned to Germany. From the northern
spurs of that mountain the dividing line ran in a north-westerly
direction towards the Victoria Nyanza. The same agreement recognised
the authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar as extending over the island of
that name, those of Pemba and Mafia, and over a strip of coastline ten
nautical miles in width; but the ownership of the district of Vitu north
of Mombasa was left open[432]. (See map at the close of this volume.)
[Footnote 432: Banning, _op. cit._ pp. 45-50; Parl. Papers, Africa, No.
3 (1887), pp. 46, 59.]
On the whole, the skill which dispossessed a sovereign of most of his
rights, under a plea of diplomatic rearrangements and the advancement of
civilisation, must be pronounced unrivalled; and Britain cut a sorry
figure as the weak and unwilling accessory to this act. The only
satisfactory feature in the whole proceeding was Britain's success in
leasing from the Sultan of Zanzibar administrative rights over the coast
region around Mombasa. The gain of that part secured unimpeded access
from the coast to the northern half of Lake Victoria Nyanza. The German
Company secured similar rights over the coastline of their district, and
in 1890 bought it outright. By an agreement of December 1896, the River
Rovuma was recognised by Germany and Portugal as the boundary of their
East African possessions.
The lofty hopes once entertained by the Germans as to the productiveness
of their part of East Africa have been but partially realised[433].
Harsh treatment of the natives brought about a formidable revolt in
1888-89. The need of British co-operation in the crushing of this revolt
served to bring Germany to a more friendly attitude towards this
country. Probably the resignation, or rather the dismissal, of Bismarck
by the present Emperor, in March 1890, also tended to lessen the
friction between England and Germany. The Prince while in retirement
expressed strong disapproval of the East African policy of his
successor, Count Caprivi.
[Footnote 433: See the Report on German East Africa for 1900, in our
_Diplomatic and Consular Reports_.]
Its more conciliatory spirit found expression in the Anglo-German
agreement of July 1, 1890, which delimited the districts claimed by the
two nations around the Victoria Nyanza in a sense favourable to Great
Britain and disappointing to that indefatigable treaty-maker, Dr.
Peters. It acknowledged British claims to the northern half of the
shores and waters of that great lake and to the valley of the Upper
Nile, as also to the coast of the Indian Ocean about Vitu and thence
northwards to Kismayu.
On the other hand, Germany acquired the land north of Lake Nyassa, where
British interests had been paramount. The same agreement applied both to
the British and German lands in question the principle of free or
unrestricted transit of goods, as also between the great lakes. Germany
further recognised a British Protectorate over the islands held by the
Sultan of Zanzibar, reserving certain rights for German commerce in the
case of the Island of Mafia. Finally, Great Britain ceded to Germany the
Island of Heligoland in the North Sea. On both sides of the North Sea
the compact aroused a storm of hostile comment, which perhaps served to
emphasise its fairness[434]. Bismarck's opinion deserves quotation:--
Zanzibar ought not to have been left to the English. It would
have been better to maintain the old arrangement. We could
then have had it at some later time when England required our
good offices against France or Russia. In the meantime our
merchants, who are cleverer, and, like the Jews, are
satisfied with smaller profits, would have kept the upper
hand in business. To regard Heligoland as an equivalent shows
more imagination than sound calculation. In the event of war
it would be better for us that it should be in the hands of a
neutral Power. It is difficult and most expensive to
fortify[435].
[Footnote 434: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 6 (1890).]
[Footnote 435: _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, vol. iii.
p. 353. See, too, S. Whitman, _Personal Reminiscences of Prince
Bismarck_, p. 122.]
The passage is instructive as showing the aim of Bismarck's colonial
policy, namely, to wait until England's difficulties were acute (or
perhaps to augment those difficulties, as he certainly did by furthering
Russian schemes against Afghanistan in 1884-85[436]), and then to apply
remorseless pressure at all points where the colonial or commercial
interests of the two countries clashed.
[Footnote 436: _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, vol. iii.
pp. 124, 133: also see p. 426 of this work.]
The more his policy is known, the more dangerous to England it is seen
to have been, especially in the years 1884-86. In fact, those persons
who declaim against German colonial ambitions of to-day may be asked to
remember that the extra-European questions recently at issue between
Great Britain and Germany are trivial when compared with the momentous
problems that were peacefully solved by the agreement of the year 1890.
Of what importance are Samoa, Kiao-chow, and the problem of Morocco,
compared with the questions of access to the great lakes of Africa and
the control of the Lower Niger? It would be unfair to Wilhelm II., as
also to the Salisbury Cabinet, not to recognise the statesmanlike
qualities which led to the agreement of July 1, 1890--one of the most
solid gains peacefully achieved for the cause of civilisation throughout
the nineteenth century.
Among its many benefits may be reckoned the virtual settlement of long
and tangled disputes for supremacy in Uganda. We have no space in which
to detail the rivalries of French and British missionaries and agents at
the Court of King M'tesa and his successor M'wanga, or the futile
attempt of Dr. Peters to thrust in German influence. Even the
Anglo-German agreement of 1890 did not end the perplexities of the
situation; for though the British East Africa Company (to which a
charter had been granted in 1888) thenceforth had the chief influence on
the northern shores of Victoria Nyanza, the British Government declined
to assume any direct responsibility for so inaccessible a district.
Thanks, however, to the activity and tact of Captain Lugard,
difficulties were cleared away, with the result that the large and
fertile territory of Uganda (formerly included in the Khedive's
dominions) became a British Protectorate in August 1894 (see
Chapter XVII).
The significance of the events just described will be apparent when it
is remembered that British East Africa, inclusive of Uganda and the
Upper Nile basin, comprises altogether 670,000 square miles, to a large
extent fertile, and capable of settlement by white men in the more
elevated tracts of the interior. German East Africa contains 385,000
square miles, and is also destined to have a future that will dwarf that
of many of the secondary States of to-day.
The prosperity of British East Africa was greatly enhanced by the
opening of a railway, 580 miles long, from Mombasa to Victoria Nyanza in
1902. Among other benefits, it has cut the ground from under the
slave-trade, which used to depend on the human beast of burden for the
carriage of all heavy loads[437].
[Footnote 437: For the progress and prospects of this important colony,
see Sir G. Portal, _The British Mission to Uganda in 1893_; Sir Charles
Elliot, _British East Africa_ (1905); also Lugard, _Our East African
Empire_; Sir H. Johnston, _The Uganda Protectorate_.]
The Anglo-German agreement of 1890 also cleared up certain questions
between Britain and Germany relating to South-West Africa which had made
bad blood between the two countries. In and after the year 1882 the
attention of the colonial party in Germany was turned to the district
north of the Orange River, and in the spring of the year 1883 Herr
Lüderitz founded a factory and hoisted the German flag at Angra Pequeña.
There are grounds for thinking that that district was coveted, not so
much for its intrinsic value, which is slight, as because it promised to
open up communications with the Boer Republics. Lord Granville ventured
to express his doubts on that subject to Count Herbert Bismarck, whom
the Chancellor had sent to London in the summer of 1884 in order to take
matters out of the hands of the too Anglophil ambassador, Count Münster.
Anxious to show his mettle, young Bismarck fired up, and informed Lord
Granville that his question was one of mere curiosity; later on he
informed him that it was a matter which did not concern him[438].
[Footnote 438: _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, vol. iii.
p. 120.]
It must be admitted, however, that the British Government had acted in
a dilatory and ineffective manner. Sir Donald Currie had introduced a
deputation to Lord Derby, Colonial Minister in the Gladstone Cabinet,
which warned him seriously as to German aims on the coast of Damaraland;
in reply to which that phlegmatic Minister stated that Germany was not a
colonising Power, and that the annexation of those districts would be
resented by Great Britain as an "unfriendly act[439]." In November 1883
the German ambassador inquired whether British protection would be
accorded to a few German settlers on the coast of Damaraland. No
decisive answer was given, though the existence of British interests
there was affirmed. Then, when Germany claimed the right to annex it, a
counter-claim was urged from Whitehall (probably at the instigation of
the Cape Government) that the land in question was a subject of close
interest to us, as it might be annexed in the future. It was against
this belated and illogical plea that Count Bismarck was sent to lodge a
protest; and in August 1884 Germany clinched the matter by declaring
Angra Pequeña and surrounding districts to be German territory. (See
note at the end of the chapter.)
[Footnote 439: See Sir D. Currie's paper on South Africa to the members
of the Royal Colonial Institute, April 10, 1888 (_Proceedings_, vol.
xix. p. 240).]
In this connection we may remark that Angra Pequeña had recently figured
as a British settlement on German maps, including that of Stieler of the
year 1882. Walfisch Bay, farther to the north, was left to the Union
Jack, that flag having been hoisted there by official sanction in 1878
owing to the urgent representations of Sir Bartle Frere, the Governor of
Cape Colony. The rest of the coast was left to Germany; the Gladstone
Government informed that of Berlin that no objection would be taken to
her occupation of that territory. Great annoyance was felt at the Cape
at what was looked on as an uncalled for surrender of British claims,
especially when the Home Government failed to secure just treatment for
the British settlers. Sir Charles Dilke states in his _Problems of
Greater Britain_ that only the constant protests of the Cape Ministry
prevented the authorities at Whitehall from complying with German
unceasing requests for the cession of Walfisch Bay, doubtless as an item
for exchange during the negotiations of 1889-90[440].
[Footnote 440: _Op. cit._ vol. i. p. 502.]
We may add here that in 1886 Germany defined the northern limits of
"South-West Africa"--such was the name of the new colony--by an
agreement with Portugal; and in 1890 an article of the Anglo-German
agreement above referred to gave an eastward extension of that northern
border which brought it to the banks of the River Zambesi.
The British Government took a firmer stand in a matter that closely
concerned the welfare of Natal and the relations of the Transvaal
Republic to Germany. In 1884 some German prospectors sought to gain a
footing in St. Lucia Bay in Zululand and to hoist the German flag. The
full truth on this interesting matter is not yet known; it formed a
pendant to the larger question of Delagoa Bay, which must be briefly
noticed here.
Friction had arisen between Great Britain and Portugal over conflicting
claims respecting Delagoa Bay and its adjoining lands; and in this
connection it may be of interest to note that the Disraeli Ministry had
earlier missed an opportunity of buying out Portuguese claims. The late
Lord Carnarvon stated that, when he took the portfolio for colonial
affairs in that Ministry, he believed the purchase might have been
effected for a comparatively small sum. Probably the authorities at
Lisbon were aroused to a sense of the potential value of their Laurenço
Marquez domain by the scramble for Africa which began early in the
eighties; and it must be regretted that the British Government, with the
lack of foresight which has so often characterised it, let slip the
opportunity of securing Delagoa Bay until its value was greatly
enhanced. It then agreed to refer the questions in dispute to the
arbitration of General MacMahon, President of the French Republic
(1875). As has generally happened when foreign potentates have
adjudicated on British interests, his verdict was wholly hostile to us.
It even assigned to Portugal a large district to the south of Delagoa
Bay which the Portuguese had never thought of claiming from its native
inhabitants, the Tongas[441]. In fact, a narrative of all the gains
which have accrued to Portugal in Delagoa Bay, and thereafter to the
people who controlled its railway to Pretoria, would throw a sinister
light on the connection that has too often subsisted between the noble
theory of arbitration and the profitable practice of peacefully willing
away, or appropriating, the rights and possessions of others. Portugal
soon proved to be unable to avail herself of the opportunities opened up
by the gift unexpectedly awarded her by MacMahon. She was unable to
control either the Tongas or the Boers.
[Footnote 441: Sir C. Dilke, _Problems of Greater Britain_, vol. i. pp.
553-556.]
England having been ruled out, there was the chance for some other Power
to step in and acquire St. Lucia Bay, one of the natural outlets of the
southern part of the Transvaal Republic. It is an open secret that the
forerunners of the "colonial party" in Germany had already sought to
open up closer relations with the Boer Republics. In 1876 the President
of the Transvaal, accompanied by a Dutch member of the Cape Parliament,
visited Berlin, probably with the view of reciprocating those advances.
They had an interview with Bismarck, the details of which are not fully
known. Nothing, however, came of it at the time, owing to Bismarck's
preoccupation in European affairs. Early in the "eighties," the German
colonial party, then beginning its campaign, called attention repeatedly
to the advantages of gaining a foothold in or near Delagoa Bay; but the
rise of colonial feeling in Germany led to a similar development in the
public sentiment of Portugal, and indeed of all lands; so that, by the
time that Bismarck was won over to the cause of Teutonic Expansion, the
Portuguese refused to barter away any of their ancient possessions. This
probably accounts for the concentration of German energies on other
parts of the South African coast, which, though less valuable in
themselves, might serve as _points d'appui_ for German political agents
and merchants in their future dealings with the Boers, who were then
striving to gain control over Bechuanaland. The points selected by the
Germans for their action were on the coast of Damaraland, as already
stated, and St. Lucia Bay in Zululand, a position which President
Burgers had striven to secure for the Transvaal in 1878.
In reference to St. Lucia Bay our narrative must be shadowy in outline
owing to the almost complete secrecy with which the German Government
wisely shrouds a failure. The officials and newspaper writers of Germany
have not yet contracted the English habit of proclaiming their
intentions beforehand and of parading before the world their
recriminations in case of a fiasco. All that can be said, then, with
certainty is that in the autumn of 1884 a German trader named Einwold
attempted to gain a footing in St. Lucia Bay and to prepare the way for
the recognition of German claims if all went well. In fact, he could
either be greeted as a _Mehrer des Reichs_, or be disowned as an
unauthorised busybody.
We may here cite passages from the Diary of Dr. Busch, Bismarck's
secretary, which prove that the State took a lively interest in
Einwold's adventure. On February 25, 1885, Busch had a conversation with
Herr Andrae, in the course of which they "rejoiced at England's
difficulties in the Sudan, and I expressed the hope that Wolseley's head
would soon arrive in Cairo, nicely pickled and packed." Busch then
referred to British friction with Russia in Afghanistan and with France
in Burmah, and then put the question to Andrae, "'Have we given up South
Africa; or is the Lucia Bay affair still open?' He said that the matter
was still under consideration[442]."
[Footnote 442: _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, vol. iii.
p. 132.]
It has since transpired that the British Government might have yielded
to pressure from Berlin, had not greater pressure been exercised from
Natal and from British merchants and shipowners interested in the South
African trade. Sir Donald Currie, in the paper already referred to,
stated that he could easily have given particulars of the means which
had to be used in order to spur on the British Government to decisive
action. Unfortunately he was discreetly reticent, and merely stated that
not only St. Lucia Bay, but the whole of the coast between Natal and the
Delagoa Bay district was then in question, and that the Gladstone
Ministry was finally induced to telegraph instructions to Cape Town for
the despatch of a cruiser to assert British claims to St. Lucia Bay.
H.M.S. _Goshawk_ at once steamed thither, and hoisted the British flag,
by virtue of a treaty made with a Zulu chief in 1842. Then ensued the
usual interchange of angry notes between Berlin and London; Bismarck and
Count Herbert sought to win over, or browbeat, Lord Rosebery, then
Colonial Minister. In this, however, he failed; and the explanation of
the failure given to Busch was that Lord Rosebery was too clever for him
and "quite mesmerised him." On May 7, 1885, Germany gave up her claims
to that important position, in consideration of gaining at the expense
of England in the Cameroons[443]. Here again a passage from Busch's
record deserves quotation. In a conversation which he had with Bismarck
on January 5, 1886, he put the question:--
"Why have we not been able to secure the Santa Lucia Bay?" I
asked. "Ah!" he replied, "it is not so valuable as it seemed
to be at first. People who were pursuing their own interests
on the spot represented it to be of greater importance than
it really was. And then the Boers were not disposed to take
any proper action in the matter. The bay would have been
valuable to us if the distance from the Transvaal were not so
great. And the English attached so much importance to it that
they declared it was impossible for them to give it up, and
they ultimately conceded a great deal to us in New Guinea and
Zanzibar. In colonial matters we must not take too much in
hand at a time, and we already have enough for a beginning.
We must now hold rather with the English, while, as you
know, we were formerly more on the French side[444]. But, as
the last elections in France show, every one of any
importance there had to make a show of hostility to us."
[Footnote 443: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 6 (1885), p. 2.]
[Footnote 444: He here referred to the Franco-German agreement of Dec.
24, 1885, whereby the two Powers amicably settled the boundaries of
their West African lands, and Germany agreed not to thwart French
designs on Tahiti, the Society Isles, the New Hebrides, etc. See
Banning, _Le Partage politique de l'Afrique_, pp. 22-26.]
This passage explains, in part at least, why Bismarck gave up the
nagging tactics latterly employed towards Great Britain. Evidently he
had hoped to turn the current of thought in France from the
Alsace-Lorraine question to the lands over the seas, and his henchmen in
the Press did all in their power to persuade people, both in Germany and
France, that England was the enemy. The Anglophobe agitation was fierce
while it lasted; but its artificiality is revealed by the passage
just quoted.
We may go further, and say that the more recent outbreak of Anglophobia
in Germany may probably be ascribed to the same official stimulus; and
it too may be expected to cease when the politicians of Berlin see that
it no longer pays to twist the British lion's tail. That sport ceased in
and after 1886, because France was found still to be the enemy.
Frenchmen did not speak much about Alsace-Lorraine. They followed
Gambetta's advice: "Never speak about it, but always think of it." The
recent French elections revealed that fact to Bismarck; and, lo! the
campaign of calumny against England at once slackened.
We may add that two German traders settled on the coast of Pondoland,
south of Natal; and in August 1885 the statesmen of Berlin put forth
feelers to Whitehall with a view to a German Protectorate of that coast.
They met with a decisive repulse[445].
[Footnote 445: Cape Colony, Papers on Pondoland, 1887, pp. 1, 41. For
the progress of German South-West Africa and East Africa, see Parl.
Papers, Germany, Nos. 474, 528, 2790.]
Meanwhile, the dead-set made by Germany, France, and Russia against
British interests in the years 1883-85 had borne fruit in a way little
expected by those Powers, but fully consonant with previous experience.
It awakened British statesmen from their apathy, and led them to adopt
measures of unwonted vigour. The year 1885 saw French plans in
Indo-China checked by the annexation of Burmah. German designs in South
Africa undoubtedly quickened the resolve of the Gladstone Ministry to
save Bechuanaland for the British Empire.
It is impossible here to launch upon the troublous sea of Boer politics,
especially as the conflict naturally resulting from two irreconcilable
sets of ideas outlasted the century with which this work is concerned.
We can therefore only state that filibustering bands of Boers had raided
parts of Bechuanaland, and seemed about to close the trade-route
northwards to the Zambesi. This alone would have been a serious bar to
the prosperity of Cape Colony; but the loyalists had lost their
confidence in the British Government since the events of 1880, while a
large party in the Cape Ministry, including at that time Mr. Cecil
Rhodes, seemed willing to abet the Boers in all their proceedings. A
Boer deputation went to England in the autumn of 1883, and succeeded in
cajoling Lord Derby into a very remarkable surrender. Among other
things, he conceded to them an important strip of land west of the River
Harts[446].
[Footnote 446: For the negotiations and the Convention of February 27,
1884, see Papers relating to the South African Republic, 1887.]
Far from satisfying them, this act encouraged some of their more
restless spirits to set up two republics named Stellaland and Goshen.
There, however, they met a tough antagonist, John Mackenzie. That
devoted missionary, after long acquaintance with Boers and Bechuanas,
saw how serious would be the loss to the native tribes and to the cause
of civilisation if the raiders were allowed to hold the routes to the
interior. By degrees he aroused the sympathy of leading men in the
Press, who thereupon began to whip up the laggards of Whitehall and
Downing Street. Consequently, Mackenzie, on his return to South Africa,
was commissioned to act as British Resident in Bechuanaland, and in that
capacity he declared that country to be under British protection (May
1884). At once the Dutch throughout South Africa raised a hue and cry
against him, in which Mr. Rhodes joined, with the result that he was
recalled on July 30.
His place was taken by a statesman whose exploits raised him to a high
place among builders of the Empire. However much Cecil Rhodes differed
from Mackenzie on the native question and other affairs, he came to see
the urgent need of saving for the Empire the central districts which, as
an old Boer said, formed "the key of Africa." Never were the loyalists
more dispirited at the lack of energy shown by the Home Government; and
never was there greater need of firmness. In a sense, however, the
action of the Germans on the coast of Damaraland (August-October 1884)
helped to save the situation. The imperious need of keeping open the
route to the interior, which would be closed to trade if ever the Boers
and Germans joined hands, spurred on the Gladstone Ministry to support
the measures proposed by Mr. Rhodes and the loyalists of Cape Colony.
When the whole truth on that period comes to be known, it will probably
be found that British rule was in very grave danger in the latter half
of the year 1884.
Certainly no small expedition ever accomplished so much for the Empire,
at so trifling a cost and without the effusion of blood, as that which
was now sent out. It was entrusted to Sir Charles Warren. He recruited
his force mainly from the loyalists of South Africa, though a body named
Methuen's Horse went out from these islands. In all it numbered nearly
5000 men. Moving quickly from the Orange River through Griqualand West,
he reached the banks of the Vaal at Barkly Camp by January 22, 1885,
that is, only six weeks after his arrival at Cape Town. At the same time
3000 troops took their station in the north of Natal in readiness to
attack the Transvaal Boers, should they fall upon Warren. It soon
transpired, however, that the more respectable Boers had little sympathy
with the raiders into Bechuanaland. These again were so far taken aback
by the speed of his movements and the thoroughness of his organisation
as to manifest little desire to attack a force which seemed ever ready
at all points and spied on them from balloons. The behaviour of the
commander was as tactful as his dispositions were effective; and, as a
result of these favouring circumstances (which the superficial may
ascribe to luck), he was able speedily to clear Bechuanaland of those
intruders[447].
[Footnote 447: See Sir Charles Warren's short account of the expedition,
in the _Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute for _1885-86, pp.
5-45; also Mackenzie's _Austral Africa_, vol. ii. _ad init_., and _John
Mackenzie_, by W.D. Mackenzie (1902).]
On September 30 it became what it has since remained--a British
possession, safeguarding the route into the interior and holding apart
the Transvaal Boers from the contact with the Germans of Damaraland
which could hardly fail to produce an explosion. The importance of the
latter fact has already been made clear. The significance of the former
will be apparent when we remember that Mr. Rhodes, in his later and
better-known character of Empire-builder, was able from Bechuanaland as
a base to extend the domain of his Chartered Company up to the southern
end of Lake Tanganyika in the year 1889.
It is well known that Rhodes hoped to extend the domain of his company
as far north as the southern limit of the British East Africa Company.
Here, however, the Germans forestalled him by their energy in Central
Africa. Finally, the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 assigned to Germany
all the _hinterland_ of Zanzibar as far west as the frontier of the
Congo Free State, thus sterilising the idea of an all-British route from
the Cape to Cairo, which possessed for some minds an alliterative and
all-compelling charm.
As for the future of the vast territory which came to be known popularly
as Rhodesia, we may note that the part bordering on Lake Nyassa was
severed from the South Africa Company in 1894, and was styled the
British Central Africa Protectorate. In 1895 the south of Bechuanaland
was annexed to Cape Colony, a step greatly regretted by many
well-wishers of the natives. The intelligent chief, Khama, visited
England in that year, mainly in order to protest against the annexation
of his lands by Cape Colony and by the South Africa Company. In this he
was successful; he and other chiefs are directly under the protection of
the Crown, but parts of the north and east of Bechuanaland are
administered by the British South Africa Company. The tracts between the
Rivers Limpopo and Zambesi, and thence north to the Tanganyika, form a
territory vaster and more populous than any which has in recent years
been administered by a company; and its rule leaves much to be desired.
* * * * *
It is time now to turn to the expansion of German and British spheres of
influence in the Bight of Guinea and along the course of the Rivers
Niger and Benuë. In the innermost part of the Bight of Guinea, British
commercial interests had been paramount up to about 1880; but about that
time German factories were founded in increasing numbers, and, owing to
the dilatory action of British firms, gained increasing hold on the
trade of several districts. The respect felt by native chiefs for
British law was evinced by a request of five of the "Kings" of the
Cameroons that they might have it introduced into their lands (1879).
Authorities at Downing Street and Whitehall were deaf to the request. In
striking contrast to this was the action of the German Government, which
early in the year 1884 sent Dr. Nachtigall to explore those districts.
The German ambassador in London informed Earl Granville on April 19,
1884, that the object of his mission was "to complete the information
now in possession of the Foreign Office at Berlin on the state of German
commerce on that coast." He therefore requested that the British
authorities there should be furnished with suitable recommendations for
his reception[448]. This was accordingly done, and, after receiving
hospitality at various consulates, he made treaties with native chiefs,
and hoisted the German flag at several points previously considered to
be under British influence. This was especially the case on the coast to
the east of the River Niger.
[Footnote 448: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1885), p. 14.]
The British Government was incensed at this procedure, and all the more
so as plans were then on foot for consolidating British influence in the
Cameroons. On that river there were six British, and two German firms,
and the natives had petitioned for the protection of England; but H.M.S.
_Flint_, on steaming into that river on July 20, found that the German
flag had been hoisted by the officers of the German warship _Möwe_.
Nachtigall had signed a treaty with "King Bell" on July 12, whereby
native habits were to remain unchanged and no customs dues levied, but
the whole district was placed under German suzerainty[449]. The same had
happened at neighbouring districts. Thereupon Consul Hewitt, in
accordance with instructions from London, established British supremacy
at the Oil Rivers, Old and New Calabar, and several other points
adjoining the Niger delta as far west as Lagos.
[Footnote 449: _Ibid_. p. 24.]
For some time there was much friction between London and Berlin on these
questions, but on May 7, 1885, an agreement was finally arrived at, a
line drawn between the Rio del Rey and the Old Calabar River being fixed
on as the boundary of the spheres of influence of the two Powers, while
Germany further recognised the sovereignty of Britain over St. Lucia Bay
in Zululand, and promised not to annex any land between Natal and
Delagoa Bay[450]. Many censures were lavished on this agreement, which
certainly sacrificed important British interests in the Cameroons in
consideration of the abandonment of German claims on the Zulu coast
which were legally untenable. Thus, by pressing on various points
formerly regarded as under British influence, Bismarck secured at least
one considerable district--one moreover that is the healthiest on the
West African coast. Subsequent expansion made of the Cameroons a colony
containing some 140,000 square miles with more than 1,100,000
inhabitants.
[Footnote 450: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 6 (1885), p. 2.]
It is an open secret that Germany was working hard in 1884-85 to get a
foothold on the Lower Niger and its great affluent, the Benuë. Two
important colonial societies combined to send out Herr Flegel in the
spring of 1885 to secure possession of districts on those rivers where
British interests had hitherto been paramount. Fortunately for the cause
of Free Trade (which Germany had definitely abandoned in 1880) private
individuals had had enough foresight and determination to step in with
effect, and to repair the harm which otherwise must have come from the
absorption of Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues in home affairs.
In the present case, British merchants were able to save the situation,
because in the year 1879 the firms having important business dealings
with the River Niger combined to form the National African Company in
order to withstand the threatening pressure of the French advance soon
to be described. In 1882 the Company's powers were extended, largely
owing to Sir George Taubman Goldie, and it took the name of the National
African Company. Extending its operations up the River Niger, it
gradually cut the ground from under the French companies which had been
formed for the exploitation and ultimate acquisition of those districts,
so that after a time the French shareholders agreed to merge themselves
in the British enterprise.
This important step was taken just in time to forestall German action
from the side of the Cameroons, which threatened to shut out British
trade from the banks of the River Benuë and the shores of Lake Chad.
Forewarned of this danger, Sir George Goldie and his directors urged
that bold and successful explorer, Mr. Joseph Thomson, to safeguard the
nation's interests along the Benuë and north thereof. Thomson had
scarcely recovered from the hardships of his epoch-marking journey
through Masailand; but he now threw himself into the breach, quickly
travelled from England to the Niger, and by his unrivalled experience
alike of the means of travel and of native ways, managed to frame
treaties with the Sultans of Sokoto and Gando, before the German envoy
reached his destination (1885). The energy of the National African
Company and the promptitude and tact of Mr. Thomson secured for his
countrymen undisputed access to Lake Chad and the great country peopled
by the warlike Haussas[451].
[Footnote 451: This greatest among recent explorers of Africa died in
1895. He never received any appropriate reward from the Court for his
great services to science and to the nation at large.]
Seeing that both France and Germany seek to restrict foreign trade in
their colonies, while Great Britain gives free access to all merchants
on equal terms, we may regard this brilliant success as a gain, not only
for the United Kingdom, but for the commerce of the world. The annoyance
expressed in influential circles in Germany at the failure of the plans
for capturing the trade of the Benuë district served to show the
magnitude of the interests which had there been looked upon as
prospectively and exclusively German. The delimitation of the new
British territory with the Cameroon territory and its north-eastern
extension to Lake Chad was effected by an Anglo-German agreement of
1886, Germany gaining part of the upper Benuë and the southern shore of
Lake Chad. In all, the territories controlled by the British Company
comprised about 500,000 square miles (more than four times the size of
the United Kingdom).
It is somewhat characteristic of British colonial procedure in that
period that many difficulties were raised as to the grant of a charter
to the company which had carried through this work of national
importance; but on July 10, 1886, it gained that charter with the title
of the Royal Niger Company. The chief difficulties since that date have
arisen from French aggressions on the west, which will be noticed
presently.
In 1897 the Royal Niger Company overthrew the power of the turbulent and
slave-raiding Sultan of Nupe, near the Niger, but, as has so often
happened, the very success of the company doomed it to absorption by the
nation. On January 1, 1900, its governing powers were handed over to the
Crown; the Union Jack replaced the private flag; and Sir Frederick
Lugard added to the services which he had rendered to the Empire in
Uganda by undertaking the organisation of this great and fertile colony.
In an interesting paper, read before the Royal Geographical Society in
November 1903, he thus characterised his administrative methods: "To
rule through the native chiefs, and, while checking the extortionate
levies of the past, fairly to assess and enforce the ancient tribute. By
this means a fair revenue will be assured to the emirs, in lieu of their
former source of wealth, which consisted in slaves and slave-raiding,
and in extortionate taxes on trade. . . . Organised slave-raiding has
become a thing of the past in the country where it lately existed in its
worst form." He further stated that the new colony has made satisfactory
progress; but light railways were much needed to connect Lake Chad with
the Upper Nile and with the Gulf of Guinea. The area of Nigeria (apart
from the Niger Coast Protectorate) is about 500,000 square miles[452].
[Footnote 452: _The Geographical Journal_, January 1, 1904, pp. 5, 18,
27.]
The result, then, of the activity of French and Germans in West Africa
has, on the whole, not been adverse to British interests. The efforts
leading to these noteworthy results above would scarcely have been made
but for some external stimulus. As happened in the days of Dupleix and
Montcalm, and again at the time of the little-known efforts of Napoleon
I. to appropriate the middle of Australia, the spur of foreign
competition furthered not only the cause of exploration but also the
expansion of the British Empire.
* * * * *
The expansion of French influence in Africa has been far greater than
that of Germany; and, while arousing less attention on political
grounds, it has probably achieved more solid results--a fact all the
more remarkable when we bear in mind the exhaustion of France in 1871,
and the very slow growth of her population at home. From 1872 to 1901
the number of her inhabitants rose from 36,103,000 to 38,962,000; while
in the same time the figures for the German Empire showed an increase
from 41,230,000 to 56,862,000. To some extent, then, the colonial growth
of France is artificial; at least, it is not based on the imperious need
which drives forth the surplus population of Great Britain and Germany.
Nevertheless, so far as governmental energy and organising skill can
make colonies successful, the French possessions in West Africa,
Indo-China, Madagascar, and the Pacific, have certainly justified their
existence[453]. No longer do we hear the old joke that a French colonial
settlement consists of a dozen officials, a _restaurateur_, and a
hair-dresser.
[Footnote 453: See _La Colonisation chez les Peuples modernes_, by Paul
Leroy-Beaulieu; _Discours et Opinions_, by Jules Ferry; _La France
coloniale_ (6th edit. 1893), by Alfred Rambaud; _La Colonisation de
l'Indo-Chine_ (1902), by Chailley-Bert; _L'Indo-Chine française_ (1905),
by Paul Doumer (describing its progress under his administration);
_Notre Epopée coloniale_ (1901), by P. Legendre; _La Mise en Valeur de
notre Domaine coloniale_ (1903), by C. Guy; _Un Siècle d'Expansion
coloniale_ (1900), by M. Dubois and A. Terrier; _Le Partage de
l'Afrique_ (1898), by V. Deville.]
In the seventies the French Republic took up once more the work of
colonial expansion in West Africa, in which the Emperor Napoleon III.
had taken great interest. The Governor of Senegal, M. Faidherbe, pushed
on expeditions from that colony to the head waters of the Niger in the
years 1879-81. There the French came into collision with a powerful
slave-raiding chief, Samory, whom they worsted in a series of campaigns
in the five years following. Events therefore promised to fulfil the
desires of Gambetta, who, during his brief term of office in 1881,
initiated plans for the construction of a trans-Saharan railway (never
completed) and the establishment of two powerful French companies on the
Upper Niger. French energy secured for the Republic the very lands which
the great traveller Mungo Park first revealed to the gaze of civilised
peoples. It is worthy of note that in the year 1865 the House of
Commons, when urged to promote British trade and influence on that
mighty river, passed a resolution declaring that any extension of our
rule in that quarter was inexpedient. So rapid, however, was the
progress of the French arms on the Niger, and in the country behind our
Gold Coast settlements, that private individuals in London and Liverpool
began to take action. Already in 1878 the British firms trading with the
Lower Niger had formed the United African Company, with the results
noted above. A British Protectorate was also established in the year
1884 over the coast districts around Lagos, "with the view of guarding
their interests against the advance of the French and Germans[454]."
[Footnote 454: For its progress see Colonial Reports, Niger Coast
Protectorate, for 1898-99. For the Franco-German agreement of December
24, 1885, delimiting their West African lands, see Banning, _Le Partage
politique de l'Afrique_, pp. 22-26. For the Anglo-French agreement of
August 10, 1889, see Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 3 (1890).]
Meanwhile the French were making rapid progress under the lead of
Gallieni and Archinard. In 1890 the latter conquered Segu-Sikoro, and a
year later Bissandugu. A far greater prize fell to the tricolour at the
close of 1893. Boiteux and Bonnier succeeded in leading a flotilla and a
column to the mysterious city of Timbuctu; but a little later a French
force sustained a serious check from the neighbouring tribes. The affair
only spurred on the Republic to still greater efforts, which led finally
to the rout of Samory's forces and his capture in the year 1898. That
redoubtable chief, who had defied France for fifteen years, was sent as
a prisoner to Gaboon.
These campaigns and other more peaceful "missions" added to the French
possessions a vast territory of some 800,000 square kilometres in the
basin of the Niger. Meanwhile disputes had occurred with the King of
Dahomey, which led to the utter overthrow of his power by Colonel Dodds
in a brilliant little campaign in 1892. The crowned slave-raider was
captured and sent to Martinique.
These rapid conquests, especially those on the Niger, brought France
and England more than once to the verge of war. In the autumn of the
year 1897, the aggressions of the French at and near Bussa, on the right
bank of the Lower Niger, led to a most serious situation. Despite its
inclusion in the domains of the Royal Niger Company, that town was
occupied by French troops. At the Guildhall banquet (November 9), Lord
Salisbury made the firm but really prudent declaration that the
Government would brook no interference with the treaty rights of a
British company. The pronouncement was timely; for French action at
Bussa, taken in conjunction with the Marchand expedition from the Niger
basin to the Upper Nile at Fashoda (see Chapter XVII.), seemed to
betoken a deliberate defiance of the United Kingdom. Ultimately,
however, the tricolour flag was withdrawn from situations that were
legally untenable. These questions were settled by the Anglo-French
agreement of 1898, which, we may add, cleared the ground for the still
more important compact of 1904.
* * * * *
The limits of this chapter having already been passed, it is impossible
to advert to the parts played by Italy and Portugal in the partition of
Africa. At best they have been subsidiary; the colonial efforts of Italy
in the Red Sea and in Somaliland have as yet produced little else than
disaster and disappointment. But for the part played by Serpa Pinto in
the Zambesi basin, the rôle of Portugal has been one of quiescence. Some
authorities, as will appear in the following chapter, would describe it
by a less euphonious term; it is now known that slave-hunting goes on in
the upper part of the Zambesi basin owned by them. The French settlement
at Obock, opposite Perim, and the partition of Somaliland between
England and Italy, can also only be named.
The general results of the partition of Africa may best be realised by
studying the map at the close of this volume, and by the following
statistics as presented by Mr. Scott Keltie in the _Encyclopoedia
Britannica_:--
Square Miles.
French territories in Africa (inclusive of
the Sahara) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,804,974
British (inclusive of the Transvaal and
Orange River Colonies, but exclusive
of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan--610,000
square miles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,713,910
German. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,380
Congo Free State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,000
Portuguese. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 790,124
Italian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188,500
These results correspond in the main to the foresight and energy
displayed by the several States, and to the initial advantages which
they enjoyed on the coast of Africa. The methods employed by France and
Germany present a happy union of individual initiative with intelligent
and persistent direction by the State; for it must be remembered that up
to the year 1880 the former possessed few good bases of operation, and
the latter none whatever. The natural portals of Africa were in the
hands of Great Britain and Portugal. It is difficult to say what would
have been the present state of Africa if everything had depended on the
officials at Downing Street and Whitehall. Certainly the expansion of
British influence in that continent (apart from the Nile valley) would
have been insignificant but for the exertions of private individuals.
Among them the names of Joseph Thomson, Sir William Mackinnon, Sir John
Kirk, Sir Harry Johnston, Sir George Goldie, Sir Frederick Lugard, John
Mackenzie, and Cecil Rhodes, will be remembered as those of veritable
Empire-builders.
Viewing the matter from the European standpoint, the partition of Africa
may be regarded as a triumph for the cause of peace. In the years
1880-1900, France, Germany, Great Britain, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium
came into possession of new lands far larger than those for which French
and British fleets and armies had fought so desperately in the
eighteenth century. If we go further back and think of the wars waged
for the possession of the barrier towns of Flanders, the contrast
between the fruitless strifes of that age and the peaceful settlement of
the affairs of a mighty continent will appear still more striking. It is
true, of course, that the cutting up of the lands of natives by white
men is as indefensible morally as it is inevitable in the eager
expansiveness of the present age. Further, it may be admitted that the
methods adopted towards the aborigines have sometimes been disgraceful.
But even so, the events of the years 1880-1900, black as some of them
are, compare favourably with those of the long ages when the term
"African trade" was merely a euphemism for slave-hunting.
* * * * *
NOTE.--The Parliamentary Papers on Angra Pequeña (1884) show that the
dispute with Germany was largely due to the desire of Lord Derby to see
whether the Government of Cape Colony would bear the cost of
administration of that whole coast if it were annexed. Owing to a change
of Ministry at Cape Town early in 1884, the affirmative reply was very
long in coming; and meantime Germany took decisive action, as described
on p. 524.
CHAPTER XIX
THE CONGO FREE STATE
"The object which unites us here to-day is one of those which
deserve in the highest degree to occupy the friends of
humanity. To open to civilisation the only part of our globe
where it has not yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness which
envelops entire populations, is, I venture to say, a crusade
worthy of this century of progress."--KING LEOPOLD II.,
_Speech to the Geographical Congress of 1876 at Brussels_.
The Congo Free State owes its origin, firstly, to the self-denying
pioneer-work of Livingstone; secondly, to the energy of the late Sir
H.M. Stanley in clearing up the problems of African exploration which
that devoted missionary had not fully solved, and thirdly, to the
interest which His Majesty, Leopold II., King of the Belgians, has
always taken in the opening up of that continent. It will be well
briefly to note the chief facts which helped to fasten the gaze of
Europe on the Congo basin; for these events had a practical issue; they
served to bring King Leopold and Mr. Stanley into close touch with a
view to the establishment of a settled government in the heart
of Africa.
In 1874 Mr. H.M. Stanley (he was not knighted until the year 1899)
received a commission from the proprietors of the _Daily Telegraph_ to
proceed to Central Africa in order to complete the geographical
discoveries which had been cut short by the lamented death of
Livingstone near Lake Bangweolo. That prince of explorers had not fully
solved the riddle of the waterways of Central Africa. He had found what
were really the head waters of the Congo at and near Lake Moero; and
had even struck the mighty river itself as far down as Nyangwe; but he
could not prove that these great streams formed the upper waters of
the Congo.
Stanley's journey in 1874-1877 led to many important discoveries. He
first made clear the shape and extent of Victoria Nyanza; he tracked the
chief feeder of that vast reservoir; and he proved that Lake Tanganyika
drained into the River Congo. Voyaging down its course to the mouth, he
found great and fertile territories, thus proving what Livingstone could
only surmise, that here was the natural waterway into the heart of "the
Dark Continent."
Up to the year 1877 nearly all the pioneer work in the interior of the
Congo basin was the outcome of Anglo-American enterprise. Therefore, so
far as priority of discovery confers a claim to possession, that claim
belonged to the English-speaking peoples. King Leopold recognised the
fact and allowed a certain space of time for British merchants to enter
on the possession of what was potentially their natural "sphere of
influence." Stanley, however, failed to convince his countrymen of the
feasibility of opening up that vast district to peaceful commerce. At
that time they were suffering from severe depression in trade and
agriculture, and from the disputes resulting from the Eastern Question
both in the Near East and in Afghanistan. For the time "the weary Titan"
was preoccupied and could not turn his thoughts to commercial expansion,
which would speedily have cured his evils. Consequently, in November
1878, Stanley proceeded to Brussels in order to present to King Leopold
the opportunity which England let slip.
Already the King of the Belgians had succeeded in arousing widespread
interest in the exploration of Africa. In the autumn of 1876 he convened
a meeting of leading explorers and geographers of the six Great Powers
and of Belgium for the discussion of questions connected with the
opening up of that continent; but at that time, and until the results
of Stanley's journey were made known, the King and his coadjutors
turned their gaze almost exclusively on East Africa. It is therefore
scarcely appropriate for one of the Belgian panegyrists of the King to
proclaim that when Central Africa celebrates its Day of Thanksgiving for
the countless blessings of civilisation conferred by that monarch, it
will look back on the day of meeting of that Conference (Sept. 12, 1876)
as the dawn of the new era of goodwill and prosperity[455]. King
Leopold, in opening the Conference, made use of the inspiring words
quoted at the head of this chapter, and asked the delegates to discuss
the means to be adopted for "planting definitely the standard of
civilisation on the soil of Central Africa."
[Footnote 455: _L'Afrique nouvelle_. Par. E. Descamps, Brussels, Paris,
1903, p. 8.]
As a result of the Conference, "The International Association for the
Exploration and Civilisation of Africa" was founded. It had committees
in most of the capitals of Europe, but the energy of King Leopold, and
the sums which he and his people advanced for the pioneer work of the
Association, early gave to that of Brussels a priority of which good use
was made in the sequel[456]. The Great Powers were at this time
distracted by the Russo-Turkish war and by the acute international
crisis that supervened. Thus the jealousies and weakness of the Great
Powers left the field free for Belgian activities, which, owing to the
energy of a British explorer, were definitely concentrated upon the
exploitation of the Congo.
[Footnote 456: For details see J. de C. Macdonell, _King Leopold II_.,
p. 113.]
On November 25, 1878, a separate committee of the International
Association was formed at Brussels with the name of "Comité d'Études du
Haut Congo." In the year 1879 it took the title of the "International
Association of the Congo," and for all practical purposes superseded its
progenitor. Outwardly, however, the Association was still international.
Stanley became its chief agent on the River Congo, and in the years
1879-1880 made numerous treaties with local chiefs. In February 1880 he
founded the first station of the Association at Vivi, and within four
years established twenty-four stations on the main river and its chief
tributaries. The cost of these explorations was largely borne by
King Leopold.
The King also commissioned Lieutenant von Wissmann to complete his
former work of discovery in the great district watered by the River
Kasai and its affluents; and in and after 1886 he and his coadjutor, Dr.
Wolf, greatly extended the knowledge of the southern and central parts
of the Congo basin[457]. In the meantime the British missionaries, Rev.
W.H. Bentley and Rev. G. Grenfell, carried on explorations, especially
on the River Ubangi, and in the lands between it and the Congo. The part
which missionaries have taken in the work of discovery and pacification
entitles them to a high place in the records of equatorial exploration;
and their influence has often been exerted beneficially on behalf of the
natives. We may add here that M. de Brazza did good work for the French
tricolour in exploring the land north of the Congo and Ubangi rivers; he
founded several stations, which were to develop into the great French
Congo colony.
[Footnote 457: H. von Wissmann, _My Second Journey through Equatorial
Africa_, 1891. Rev. W.H. Bentley, _Pioneering on the Congo_, 2 vols.]
Meanwhile events had transpired in Europe which served to give stability
to these undertakings. The energy thrown into the exploration of the
Congo basin soon awakened the jealousy of the Power which had long ago
discovered the mouth of the great river and its adjacent coasts. In the
years 1883, 1884, Portugal put forward a claim to the overlordship of
those districts on the ground of priority of discovery and settlement.
On all sides that claim was felt to be unreasonable. The occupation of
that territory by the Portuguese had been short-lived, and nearly all
traces of it had disappeared, except at Kabinda and one or two points on
the coast. The fact that Diogo Cam and others had discovered the mouth
of the Congo in the fifteenth century was a poor argument for closing to
other peoples, three centuries later, the whole of the vast territory
between that river and the mouth of the Zambesi. These claims raised the
problem of the Hinterland, that is, the ownership of the whole range of
territory behind a coast line. Furthermore, the Portuguese officials
were notoriously inefficient and generally corrupt; while the customs
system of that State was such as to fetter the activities of trade with
shackles of a truly mediaeval type.
Over against these musty claims of Portugal there stood the offers of
"The International Association of the Congo" to bring the blessings of
free trade and civilisation to downtrodden millions of negroes, if only
access were granted from the sea. The contrast between the dull
obscurantism of Lisbon and the benevolent intentions of Brussels struck
the popular imagination. At that time the eye of faith discerned in the
King of the Belgians the ideal godfather of a noble undertaking, and
great was the indignation when Portugal interfered with freedom of
access to the sea at the mouth of the Congo. Various matters were also
in dispute between Portugal and Great Britain respecting trading rights
at that important outlet; and they were by no means settled by an
Anglo-Portuguese Convention of February 26 (1884), in which Lord
Granville, Foreign Minister in the Gladstone Cabinet, was thought to
display too much deference to questionable claims. Protests were urged
against this Convention, by the United States, France, and Germany, with
the result that the Lisbon Government proposed to refer all these
matters to a Conference of the Powers; and arrangements were soon made
for the summoning of their representatives to Berlin, under the
presidency of Prince Bismarck.
Before the Conference met, the United States took the decisive step of
recognising the rights of the Association to the government of that
river-basin (April 10, 1884)--a proceeding which ought to have secured
to the United States an abiding influence on the affairs of the State
which they did so much to create. The example set by the United States
was soon followed by the other Powers. In that same month France
withdrew the objections which she had raised to the work of the
Association, and came to terms with it in a treaty whereby she gained
priority in the right of purchase of its claims and possessions. The way
having been thus cleared, the Berlin Conference met on November 15,
1884. Prince Bismarck suggested that the three chief topics for
consideration were (1) the freedom of navigation and of trade in the
Congo area; (2) freedom of navigation on the River Niger; (3) the
formalities to be thenceforth observed in lawful and valid annexations
of territories in Africa. The British plenipotentiary, Sir Edward Malet,
however, pointed out that, while his Government wished to preserve
freedom of navigation and of trade upon the Niger, it would object to
the formation of any international commission for those purposes, seeing
that Great Britain was the sole proprietory Power on the Lower Niger
(see Chapter XVIII.)[458]. This firm declaration possibly prevented the
intrusion of claims which might have led to the whittling down of
British rights on that great river. An Anglo-French Commission was
afterwards appointed to supervise the navigation of the Niger.
[Footnote 458: See Protocols, _Parl. Papers_, Africa, No. 4 (1885), pp.
119 _et seq_.]
The main question being thus concentrated on the Congo, Portugal was
obliged to defer to the practically unanimous refusal of the Powers to
recognise her claims over the lower parts of that river; and on November
19 she conceded the principle of freedom of trade on those waters. Next,
it was decided that the Congo Association should acquire and hold
governing rights over nearly the whole of the vast expanse drained by
the Congo, with some reservations in favour of France on the north and
Portugal on the south. The extension of the principle of freedom of
trade nearly to the Indian Ocean was likewise affirmed; and the
establishment of monopolies or privileges "of any kind" was distinctly
forbidden within the Congo area.
An effort strictly to control the sale of intoxicating liquors to
natives lapsed owing to the strong opposition of Germany and Holland,
though a weaker motion on the same all-important matter found acceptance
(December 22). On January 7, 1885, the Conference passed a stringent
declaration against the slave-trade:--". . . these regions shall not be
used as markets or routes of transit for the trade in slaves, no matter
of what race. Each of these Powers binds itself to use all the means at
its disposal to put an end to this trade, and to punish those engaged
in it."
The month of February saw the settlement of the boundary claims with
France and Portugal, on bases nearly the same as those still existing.
The Congo Association gained the northern bank of the river at its
mouth, but ceded to Portugal a small strip of coast line a little
further north around Kabinda. These arrangements were, on the whole,
satisfactory to the three parties. France now definitively gained by
treaty right her vast Congo territory of some 257,000 square miles in
area, while Portugal retained on the south of the river a coast nearly
1000 miles in length and a dominion estimated at 351,000 square miles.
The Association, though handing over to these Powers respectively 60,000
and 45,000 square miles of land which its pioneers hoped to obtain,
nevertheless secured for itself an immense territory of some 870,000
square miles.
The General Act of the Berlin Conference was signed on February 26,
1885. Its terms and those of the Protocols prove conclusively that the
governing powers assigned to the Congo Association were assigned to a
neutral and international State, responsible to the Powers which gave it
its existence. In particular, Articles IV. and V. of the General Act ran
as follows:--
Merchandise imported into these regions shall remain free
from import and transit dues. The Powers reserve to
themselves to determine, after the lapse of twenty years,
whether this freedom of import shall be retained or not.
No Power which exercises, or shall exercise, sovereign rights
in the above mentioned regions shall be allowed to grant
therein a monopoly or favour of any kind in matters of trade.
Foreigners, without distinction, shall enjoy protection of
their persons and property, as well as the right of acquiring
and transferring movable and immovable possessions, and
national rights and treatment in the exercise of their
professions.
Before describing the growth of the Congo State, it is needful to refer
to two preliminary considerations. Firstly, it should be noted that the
Berlin Conference committed the mistake of failing to devise any means
for securing the observance of the principles there laid down. Its work,
considered in the abstract, was excellent. The mere fact that
representatives of the Powers could meet amicably to discuss and settle
the administration of a great territory which in other ages would have
provoked them to deadly strifes, was in itself a most hopeful augury,
and possibly the success of the Conference inspired a too confident
belief in the effective watchfulness of the Powers over the welfare of
the young State to which they then stood as godfathers. In any case it
must be confessed that they have since interpreted their duties in the
easy way to which godfathers are all too prone. As in the case of the
Treaty of Berlin of 1878, so in that of the Conference of Berlin of
1885, the fault lay not in the promise but in the failure of the
executors to carry out the terms of the promise.
Another matter remains to be noted. It resulted from the demands urged
by Portugal in 1883-84. By way of retort, the plenipotentiaries now
declared any occupation of territory to be valid only when it had
effectively taken place and had been notified to all the Powers
represented at the Conference. It also defined a "sphere of influence"
as the area within which one Power is recognised as possessing priority
of claims over other States. The doctrine was to prove convenient for
expansive States in the future.
The first important event in the life of the new State was the
assumption by King Leopold II. of sovereign powers. All nations, and
Belgium not the least, were startled by his announcement to his
Ministers, on April 16, 1885, that he desired the assent of the Belgian
Parliament to this proceeding. He stated that the union between Belgium
and the Congo State would be merely personal, and that the latter would
enjoy, like the former, the benefits of neutrality. The Parliament on
April 28 gave its assent, with but one dissentient voice, on the
understanding stated above. The Powers also signified their approval. On
August 1, King Leopold informed them of the facts just stated, and
announced that the new State took the title of the Congo Free State
(_L'État indépendant du Congo_)[459].
[Footnote 459: _The Story of the Congo Free State_, by H.W. Wack (New
York, 1905), p. 101; Wauters, _L'État indépendant du Congo_, pp. 36-37.]
Questions soon arose concerning the delimitation of the boundary with
the French Congo territory; and these led to the signing of a protocol
at Brussels on April 29, 1887, whereby the Congo Free State gave up
certain of its claims in the northern part of the Congo region (the
right bank of the River Ubangi), but exacted in return the addition of a
statement "that the right of pre-emption accorded to France could not be
claimed as against Belgium, of which King Leopold is sovereign[460]."
[Footnote 460: _The Congo State_, by D.C. Boulger (London, 1896), p.
62.]
There seems, however, to be some question whether this clause is likely
to have any practical effect. The clause is obviously inoperative if
Belgium ultimately declines to take over the Congo territory, and there
is at least the chance that this will happen. If it does happen, King
Leopold and the Belgian Parliament recognise the prior claim of France
to all the Congolese territory. The King and the Congo Ministers seem to
have made use of this circumstance so as to strengthen the financial
relations of France to their new State in several ways, notably in the
formation of monopolist groups for the exploitation of Congoland. For
the present we may remark that by a clause of the Franco-Belgian Treaty
of Feb. 5, 1895, the Government of Brussels declared that it "recognises
the right of preference possessed by France over its Congolese
possessions, in case of their compulsory alienation, in whole or in
part[461]."
[Footnote 461: Cattier, _Droit et Administration de l'État indépendent
du Congo_, p. 82.]
Meanwhile King Leopold proceeded as if he were the absolute ruler of the
new State. He bestowed on it a constitution on the most autocratic
basis. M. Cattier, in his account of that constitution sums it up by
stating that
The sovereign is the direct source of legislative, executive,
and judiciary powers. He can, if he chooses, delegate their
exercise to certain functionaries, but this delegation has no
other source than his will. . . . He can issue rules, on which,
so long as they last, is based the validity of certain acts
by himself or by his delegates. But he can cancel these rules
whenever they appear to him troublesome, useless, or
dangerous. The organisation of justice, the composition of
the army, financial systems, and industrial and commercial
institutions--all are established solely by him in accordance
with his just or faulty conceptions as to their usefulness or
efficiency[462].
[Footnote 462: Cattier, _op. cit._ pp. 134-135.]
A natural outcome of such a line of policy was the gradual elimination
of non-Belgian officials. In July 1886 Sir Francis de Winton, Stanley's
successor in the administration of the Congo area, gave place to a
Belgian "Governor-General," M. Janssen; and similar changes were made in
all grades of the service.
Meanwhile other events were occurring which enabled the officials of the
Congo State greatly to modify the provisions laid down at the Berlin
Conference. These events were as follows. For many years the Arab
slave-traders had been extending their raids in easterly and
south-easterly directions, until they began to desolate the parts of the
Congo State nearest to the great lakes and the Bahr-el-Ghazal.
Their activity may be ascribed to the following causes. The slave-trade
has for generations been pursued in Africa. The negro tribes themselves
have long practised it; and the Arabs, in their gradual conquest of
many districts of Central Africa, found it to be by far the most
profitable of all pursuits. The market was almost boundless; for since
the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Congress of Verona (1822) the
Christian Powers had forbidden their subjects any longer to pursue that
nefarious calling. It is true that kidnapping of negroes went on
secretly, despite all the efforts of British cruisers to capture the
slavers. It is said that the last seizure of a Portuguese schooner
illicitly trading in human flesh was made off the Congo coast as late as
the year 1868[463]. But the cessation of the trans-Atlantic slave-trade
only served to stimulate the Arab man-hunters of Eastern Africa to
greater efforts; and the rise of Mahdism quickened the demand for slaves
in an unprecedented manner. Thus, the hateful trade went on apace,
threatening to devastate the Continent which explorers, missionaries,
and traders were opening up.
[Footnote 463: A.J. Wauters, _L'État indépendent du Congo_, p. 52.]
The civilising and the devastating processes were certain soon to clash;
and, as Stanley had foreseen, the conflict broke out on the Upper Congo.
There the slave-raiders, subsidised or led by Arabs of Zanzibar, were
specially active. Working from Ujiji and other bases, they attacked some
of the expeditions sent by the Congo Free State. Chief among the raiders
was a half-caste Arab negro nick-named Tipu Tib ("The gatherer of
wealth"), who by his energy and cunning had become practically the
master of a great district between the Congo and Lake Tanganyika. At
first (1887-1888) the Congo Free State adopted Stanley's suggestion of
appointing Tipu Tib to be its governor of the Stanley Falls district, at
a salary of £30 a month[464]. So artificial an arrangement soon broke
down, and war broke out early in 1892. The forces of the Congo Free
State, led by Commandants Dhanis and Lothaire, and by Captain S.L.
Hinde, finally worsted the Arabs after two long and wearisome campaigns
waged on the Upper Congo. Into the details of the war it is impossible
to enter. The accounts of all the operations, including that of Captain
Hinde[465], are written with a certain reserve; and the impression that
the writers were working on behalf of civilisation and humanity is
somewhat blurred by the startling admissions made by Captain Hinde in a
paper read by him before the Royal Geographical Society in London, on
March 11, 1895. He there stated that the Arabs, "despite their
slave-raiding propensities," had "converted the Manyema and Malela
country into one of the most prosperous in Central Africa." He also
confessed that during the fighting the two flourishing towns, Nyangwe
and Kasongo, had been wholly swept away. In view of these statements the
results of the campaign cannot be regarded with unmixed satisfaction.
[Footnote 464: Stanley, _In Darkest Africa_, vol. i. pp. 60-70.]
[Footnote 465: _The Fall of the Congo Arabs_, by Capt. S.L. Hinde
(London, 1897).]
Such, however, was not the view taken at the time. Not long before, the
Continent had rung with the sermons and speeches of Cardinal Lavigerie,
Bishop of Algiers, who, like a second Peter the Hermit, called all
Christians to unite in a great crusade for the extirpation of slavery.
The outcome of it all was the meeting of an Anti-Slavery Conference at
Brussels, at the close of 1889, in which the Powers that had framed the
Berlin Act again took part. The second article passed at Brussels
asserted among other things the duties of the Powers "in giving aid to
commercial enterprises to watch over their legality, controlling
especially the contracts for service entered into with natives." The
abuses in the trade in firearms were to be carefully checked and
controlled.
Towards the close of the Conference a proposal was brought forward (May
10, 1890) to the effect that, as the suppression of the slave-trade and
the work of upraising the natives would entail great expense, it was
desirable to annul the clause in the Berlin Act prohibiting the
imposition of import duties for, at least, twenty years from that date
(that is, up to the year 1905). The proposal seemed so plausible as to
disarm the opposition of all the Powers, except Holland, which strongly
protested against the change. Lord Salisbury's Government neglected to
safeguard British interests in this matter; and, despite the
unremitting opposition of the Dutch Government, the obnoxious change was
finally registered on January 2, 1892, it being understood that the
duties were not to exceed 10 per cent _ad valorem_ except in the case of
spirituous liquors, and that no differential treatment would be accorded
to the imports of any nation or nations.
Thus the European Powers, yielding to the specious plea that they must
grant the Congo Free State the power of levying customs dues in order to
further its philanthropic aims, gave up one of the fundamentals agreed
on at the Berlin Conference. The _raison d'être_ of the Congo Free State
was, that it stood for freedom of trade in that great area; and to sign
away one of the birthrights of modern civilisation, owing to the plea of
a temporary want of cash in Congoland, can only be described as the act
of a political Esau. The General Act of the Brussels Conference received
a provisional sanction (the clause respecting customs dues not yet being
definitively settled) on July 2, 1890[466].
[Footnote 466: On August 1, 1890, the Sultan of Zanzibar declared that
no sale of slaves should thenceforth take place in his dominions. He
also granted to slaves the right of appeal to him in case they were
cruelly treated. See Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1890-91).]
On the next day the Congo Free State entered into a financial
arrangement with the Belgian Government which marked one more step in
the reversal of the policy agreed on at Berlin five years previously. In
this connection we must note that King Leopold by his will, dated August
2, 1889, bequeathed to Belgium after his death all his sovereign rights
over that State, "together with all the benefits, rights and advantages
appertaining to that sovereignty." Apparently, the occasion that called
forth the will was the urgent need of a loan of 10,000,000 francs which
the Congo State pressed the Belgian Government to make on behalf of the
Congo railway. Thus, on the very eve of the summoning of the European
Conference at Brussels, the Congo Government (that is, King Leopold)
had appealed, not to the Great Powers, but to the Belgian Government,
and had sought to facilitate the grant of the desired loan by the
prospect of the ultimate transfer of his sovereign rights to Belgium.
Unquestionably the King had acted very generously in the past toward the
Congo Association and State. It has even been affirmed that his loans
often amounted to the sum of 40,000,000 francs a year; but, even so,
that did not confer the right to will away to any one State the results
of an international enterprise. As a matter of fact, however, the Congo
State was at that time nearly bankrupt; and in this circumstance,
doubtless, may be found an explanation of the apathy of the Powers in
presence of an infraction of the terms of the Berlin Act of 1885.
We are now in a position to understand more clearly the meaning of the
Convention of July 3, 1890, between the Congo Free State and the Belgian
Government. By its terms the latter pledged itself to advance a loan of
25,000,000 francs to the Congo State in the course of ten years, without
interest, on condition that at the close of six months after the
expiration of that time Belgium should have the right of annexing the
Free State with all its possessions and liabilities.
Into the heated discussions which took place in the Belgian Parliament
in the spring and summer of 1901 respecting the Convention of July 3,
1890, we cannot enter. The King interfered so as to prevent the
acceptance of a reasonable compromise proposed by the Belgian Prime
Minister, M. Beernaert; and ultimately matters were arranged by a decree
of August 7, 1901, which will probably lead to the transference of King
Leopold's sovereign rights to Belgium at his death. In the meantime, the
entire executive and legislative control is vested in him, and in a
Colonial Minister and Council of four members, who are responsible
solely to him, though the Minister has a seat in the Belgian
Parliament[467]. To King Leopold, therefore, belongs the ultimate
responsibility for all that is done in the Congo Free State. As M.
Cattier phrased it in the year 1898: "Belgium has no more right to
intervene in the internal affairs of the Congo than the Congo State has
to intervene in Belgian affairs. As regards the Congo Government,
Belgium has no right either of intervention, direction, or
control[468]."
[Footnote 467: H.R. Fox-Bourne, _Civilisation in Congoland_ p. 277.]
[Footnote 468: M. Cattier, _op. cit._ p. 88.]
Very many Belgians object strongly to the building up of an _imperium in
imperio _in their land; and the wealth which the ivory and rubber of the
Congo brings into their midst (not to speak of the stock-jobbing and
company-promoting which go on at Brussels and Antwerp), does not blind
them to the moral responsibility which the Belgian people has indirectly
incurred. It is true that Belgium has no legal responsibility, but the
State which has lent a large sum to the Congo Government, besides
providing the great majority of the officials and exploiters of that
territory, cannot escape some amount of responsibility. M. Vandervelde,
leader of the Labour Party in Belgium, has boldly and persistently
asserted the right of the Belgian people to a share in the control of
its eventual inheritance, but hitherto all the efforts of his colleagues
have failed before the groups of capitalists who have acquired great
monopolist rights in Congoland.
Having now traced the steps by which the Congolese Government reached
its present anomalous position, we will proceed to give a short account
of its material progress and administration.
No one can deny that much has been done in the way of engineering. A
light railway has been constructed from near Vivi on the Lower Congo to
Stanley Pool, another from Boma into the districts north of that
important river port. Others have been planned, or are already being
constructed, between Stanley Falls and the northern end of Lake
Tanganyika, with a branch to the Albert Nyanza. Another line will
connect the upper part of the River Congo with the westernmost affluent
of the River Kasai, thus taking the base of the arc instead of the
immense curve of the main stream. By the year 1903, 480 kilometres of
railway were open for traffic, while 1600 more were in course of
construction or were being planned. It seems that the first 400
kilometres, in the hilly region near the seaboard, cost 75,000,000
francs in place of the 25,000,000 francs first estimated[469].
Road-making has also been pushed on in many directions. A flotilla of
steamers plies on the great river and its chief affluents. In 1885 there
were but five; the number now exceeds a hundred. As many as 1532
kilometres of telegraphs are now open. The exports advanced from
1,980,441 francs in 1885-86 to 50,488,394 francs in 1901-02, mainly
owing to the immense trade in rubber, of which more anon; the imports
from 9,175,103 francs in 1893 to 23,102,064 in 19O1-O2[470].
[Footnote 469: _L'Afrique nouvelle,_ by E. Descamps (1903), chap. xv.
Much of the credit of the early railway-making was due to Colonel Thys.]
[Footnote 470: _Ibid_. pp. 589-590.]
Far more important is the moral gain which has resulted from the
suppression of the slave-trade over a large part of the State. On this
point we may quote the testimony of Mr. Roger Casement, British Consul
at Boma, in an official report founded on observations taken during a
long tour up the Congo. He writes: "The open selling of slaves and the
canoe convoys which once navigated the Upper Congo have everywhere
disappeared. No act of the Congo State Government has perhaps produced
more laudable results than the vigorous suppression of this widespread
evil[471]."
[Footnote 471: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. I (1904), p. 26.]
King Leopold has also striven hard to extend the bounds of the Congo
State. Not satisfied with his compact with France of April 1887, which
fixed the River Ubangi and its tributaries as the boundary of their
possessions, he pushed ahead to the north-east of those confines, and
early in the nineties established posts at Lado on the White Nile and in
the Bahr-el-Ghazal basin. Clearly his aim was to conquer the districts
which Egypt for the time had given up to the Mahdi. These efforts
brought about sharp friction between the Congolese authorities and
France and Great Britain. After long discussions the Cabinet of London
agreed to the convention of May 12, 1894, whereby the Congo State gained
the Bahr-el-Ghazal basin and the left bank of the Upper Nile, together
with a port on the Albert Nyanza. On his side, King Leopold recognised
the claims of England to the right bank of the Nile and to a strip of
land between the Albert Nyanza and Lake Tanganyika. Owing to the strong
protests of France and Germany this agreement was rescinded, and the
Cabinet of Paris finally compelled King Leopold to give up all claims to
the Bahr-el-Ghazal, though he acquired the right to lease the Lado
district below the Albert Nyanza. The importance of these questions in
the development of British policy in the Nile basin has been pointed out
in Chapter XVII.
The ostensible aim, however, of the founders of the Congo Free State
was, not the exploitation of the Upper Nile district, the making of
railways and the exportation of great quantities of ivory and rubber
from Congoland, but the civilising and uplifting of Central Africa. The
General Act of the Berlin Conference begins with an invocation to
Almighty God; and the Brussels Conference imitated its predecessor in
this particular. It is, therefore, as a civilising and moralising agency
that the Congo Government will always be judged at the bar of posterity.
The first essential of success in dealing with backward races is
sympathy with their most cherished notions. Yet from the very outset one
of these was violated. On July 1, 1885, a decree of the Congo Free State
asserted that all vacant lands were the property of the Government, that
is, virtually of the King himself. Further, on June 30, 1887, an
ordinance was decreed, claiming the right to let or sell domains, and to
grant mining or wood-cutting rights on any land, "the ownership of which
is not recognised as appertaining to any one." These decrees, we may
remark, were for some time kept secret, until their effects
became obvious.
All who know anything of the land systems of primitive peoples will see
that they contravened the customs which the savage holds dear. The plots
actually held and tilled by the natives are infinitesimally small when
compared with the vast tracts over which their tribes claim hunting,
pasturage, and other rights. The land system of the savage is everywhere
communal. Individual ownership in the European sense is a comparatively
late development. The Congolese authorities must have known this; for
nearly all troubles with native races have arisen from the profound
differences in the ideas of the European and the savage on the subject
of land-holding.
Yet, in face of the experience of former times, the Congo State put
forward a claim which has led, or will lead, to the confiscation of all
tribal or communal land-rights in that huge area. Such confiscation may,
perhaps, be defended in the case of the United States, where the
new-comers enormously outnumbered the Red Indians, and tilled land that
previously lay waste. It is indefensible in the tropics, where the white
settlers will always remain the units as compared with the millions whom
they elevate or exploit[472]. The savage holds strongly to certain
rudimentary ideas of justice, especially to the right, which he and his
tribe have always claimed and exercised, of _using_ the tribal land for
the primary needs of life. When he is denied the right of hunting,
cutting timber, or pasturage, he feels "cribbed, cabined, and confined."
This, doubtless, is the chief source of the quarrels between the new
State and its _protégés_, also of the depression of spirits which Mr.
Casement found so prevalent. The best French authorities on colonial
development now admit that it is madness to interfere with the native
land tenures in tropical Africa.
The method used in the enlisting of men for public works and for the
army has also caused many troubles. This question is admittedly one of
great difficulty. Hard work must be done, and, in the tropics, the white
man can only direct it. Besides, where life is fairly easy, men will not
readily come forward to labour. Either the inducement offered must be
adequate, or some form of compulsory enlistment must be adopted. The
Belgian officials, in the plentiful lack of funds that has always
clogged their State, have tried compulsion, generally through the native
chiefs. These are induced, by the offer of cotton cloth or
bright-coloured handkerchiefs, to supply men from the tribe. If the
labourers are not forthcoming, the chief is punished, his village being
sometimes burned. By means, then, of gaudy handkerchiefs, or firebrands,
the labourers are obtained. They figure as "apprentices," under the law
of November 8, 1888, which accorded "special protection to the blacks."
[Footnote 472: The number of whites in Congoland is about 1700, of whom
1060 are Belgians; the blacks number about 29,000,000, according to
Stanley; the Belgian Governor-General, Wahis, thinks this below the
truth. See Wauters, _L'État indépendant du Congo,_ pp. 261, 432.]
The British Consul, Mr. Casement, in his report on the administration of
the Congo, stated that the majority of the government workmen at
Léopoldville were under some form of compulsion, but were, on the whole,
well cared for[473].
[Footnote 473: Parl. Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1904), p. 27.]
According to a German resident in Congoland, the lot of the apprentices
differs little from that of slaves. Their position, as contrasted with
that of their former relation to the chief, is humorously defined by the
term _libérés_[474] The hardships of the labourers on the State railways
were such that the British Government refused to allow them to be
recruited from Sierra Leone or other British possessions.
[Footnote 474: A. Boshart, _Zehn Jahre Afrikanischen Lebens_ (1898),
quoted by Fox Bourne, _op. cit._ p. 77. For further details see the
article by Mr. Glave, once an official of the Congo Free State, in the
_Century Magazine_, vol. liii.; also his work, _Six Years in the
Congo_ (1892).]
However, now that a British Cabinet has allowed a great colony to make
use of indentured yellow labour in its mines, Great Britain cannot,
without glaring inconsistency, lodge any protest against the
infringement, in Congoland, of the Act of the Berlin Conference in the
matter of the treatment of hired labourers. If the lot of the Congolese
apprentices is to be bettered, the initiative must be taken at some
capital other than London.
Another subject which nearly concerns the welfare of the Congo State is
the recruiting and use of native troops. These are often raised from the
most barbarous tribes of the far interior; their pay is very small; and
too often the main inducement to serve under the blue banner with the
golden star, is the facility for feasting and plunder at the expense of
other natives who have not satisfied the authorities. As one of them
naïvely said to Mr. Casement, _he preferred to be with the hunters
rather than with the hunted._
It seems that grave abuses first crept in during the course of the
campaign for the extirpation of slavery and slave-raiding in the Stanley
Falls region. The Arab slave-raiders were rich, not only in slaves, but
in ivory--prizes which tempted the cupidity of the native troops, and
even, it is said, of their European officers. In any case, it is certain
that the liberating forces, hastily raised and imperfectly controlled,
perpetrated shocking outrages on the tribes for whose sake they were
waging war. The late Mr. Glave, in the article in the _Century Magazine_
above referred to, found reason for doubting whether the crusade did not
work almost as much harm as the evils it was sent to cure. His words
were these: "The black soldiers are bent on fighting and raiding; they
want no peaceful settlement. They have good rifles and ammunition,
realise their superiority over the natives with their bows and arrows,
and they want to shoot and kill and rob. Black delights to kill black,
whether the victim be man, woman, or child, and no matter how
defenceless." This deep-seated habit of mind is hard to eradicate; and
among certain of the less reputable of the Belgian officers it has
occasionally been used, in order to terrorise into obedience tribes that
kicked against the decrees of the Congo State.
Undoubtedly there is great difficulty in avoiding friction with native
tribes. All Governments have at certain times and places behaved more or
less culpably towards them. British annals have been fouled by many a
misdeed on the part of harsh officials and grasping pioneers, while
recent revelations as to the treatment of natives in Western Australia
show the need of close supervision of officials even in a popularly
governed colony. The record of German East Africa and the French Congo
is also very far from clean. Still, in the opinion of all who have
watched over the welfare of the aborigines--among whom we may name Sir
Charles Dilke and Mr. Fox Bourne--the treatment of the natives in a
large part of the Congo Free State has been worse than in the districts
named above[475]. There is also the further damning fact that the very
State which claimed to be a great philanthropic agency has, until very
recently, refused to institute any full inquiry into the alleged defects
of its administration.
[Footnote 475: Sir Charles Dilke stated this very forcibly in a speech
delivered at the Holborn Town Hall on June 7, 1905.]
Some of these defects may be traced to the bad system of payment of
officials. Not only are they underpaid, but they have no pension, such
as is given by the British, French, and Dutch Governments to their
employees. The result is that the Congolese officer looks on his term of
service in that unhealthy climate as a time when he must enrich himself
for life. Students of Roman History know that, when this feeling becomes
a tradition, it is apt to lead to grave abuses, the recital of which
adds an undying interest to the speech of Cicero against Verres. In the
case of the Congolese administrators the State provided (doubtless
unwittingly) an incentive to harshness. It frequently supplemented its
inadequate stipends by "gratifications," which are thus described and
criticised by M. Cattier: "The custom was introduced of paying to
officials prizes proportioned to the amount of produce of the 'private
domain' of the State, and of the taxes paid by the natives. That
amounted to the inciting, by the spur of personal interest, of officials
to severity and to rigour in the application of laws and regulations."
Truly, a more pernicious application of the plan of "payment by results"
cannot be conceived; and M. Cattier affirms that, though nominally
abolished, it existed in reality down to the year 1898.
Added to this are defects arising from the uncertainty of employment. An
official may be discharged at once by the Governor-General on the ground
of unfitness for service in Africa; and the man, when discharged, has no
means of gaining redress. The natural result is the growth of a habit of
almost slavish obedience to the authorities, not only in regard to the
written law, but also to private and semi-official intimations[476].
[Footnote 476: Cattier, _Droit et Administration . . . du Congo,_ pp.
243-245.]