have spoken of those of most importance, I will treat of the others more
briefly under these qualityes that a Prince is to beware, as in part is
above-said, and that he fly those things which cause him to be odious or
vile: and when ever he shall avoid this, he shall fully have plaid his
part, and in the other disgraces he shall find no danger at all. There
is nothing makes him so odious, as I said, as his extortion of his
subjects goods, and abuse of their women, from which he ought to
forbear; and so long as he wrongs not his whole people, neither in their
goods, nor honors, they live content, and he hath only to strive with
the Ambition of some few: which many waies and easily too, is
restrain'd. To be held various, light, effeminate, faint-hearted,
unresolv'd, these make him be contemnd and thought base, which a Prince
should shun like rocks, and take a care that in all his actions there
appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and valor; and that in all the
private affairs of his subjects, he orders it so, that his word stand
irrevocable: and maintain himself in such repute, that no man may think
either to deceive or wind and turn him about: that Prince that gives
such an opinion of himself, is much esteemed, and against him who is so
well esteemed, hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects, or by
forreiners any invasion, when once notice is taken of his worth, and how
much he is reverenced by his subjects: For a Prince ought to have two
fears, the one from within, in regard of his subjects; the other from
abroad, in regard of his mighty neighbors; from these he defends himself
by good armes and good friends; and alwayes he shall have good friends,
if he have good armes; and all things shall alwaies stand sure at home,
when those abroad are firme, in case some conspiracy have not disturbed
them; and however the forrein matters stand but ticklishly; yet if he
have taken such courses at home, and liv'd as we have prescribed, he
shall never be able (in case he forsake not himself) to resist all
possibility, force and violence, as I said Nabis the Spartan did: but
touching his subjects, even when his affairs abroad are setled, it is to
be fear'd they may conspire privily; from which a Prince sufficiently
secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned, and keeping himself
in his peoples good opinion, which it is necessary for him to compass,
as formerly we treated at large. And one of the powerfullest remedies a
Prince can have against conspiracies, is, not to be hated nor dispised
by the universality; for alwaies he that conspires, beleeves the Princes
death is acceptable to the subject: but when he thinks it displeases
them, he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter; for the
difficulties that are on the conspirators side, are infinite. By
experience it is plain, that many times plots have been laid, but few of
them have succeeded luckily; for he that conspires, cannot be alone, nor
can he take the company of any, but of those, who he beleeves are
malecontents; and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a
malecontent, thou givest him means to work his own content: for by
revealing thy treason, he may well hope for all manner of favour: so
that seeing his gain certain of one side; and on the other, finding only
doubt and danger, either he had need be a rare friend, or that he be an
exceeding obstinate enemy to the Prince, if he keeps his word with thee.
And to reduce this matter into short termes: I say, there is nothing but
jealousie, fear, and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to
affright him; but on the Princes part, there is the majesty of the
principality, the laws, the defences of his friends and the State, which
do so guard him, that to all these things the peoples good wills being
added, it is unpossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire;
for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his
mischiefe, in this case he is also to feare afterwards, having the
people for his enemy when the fact is commited, and therefore for this
cause, not being able to hope for any refuge. Touching this matter, many
examples might be brought; but I will content my selfe to name one which
fell out in the memory of our Fathers. Annibal Bentivolii, grand Father
of this Annibal who now lives, that was Prince in Bolonia, being slaine
by the Canneschi that conspir'd against him, none of his race being
left, but this John, who was then in swadling clouts; presently the
people rose upon this murder, and slew all the Canneschi which proceeded
from the popular affection, which the family of the Bentivolii held then
in Bolonia: which was so great, that being there remain'd not any, now
Anniball was dead, that was able to manage the State; and having notice
that in Florence there was one borne of the Bentivolii, who till then
was taken for a Smiths sonne: the citizens of Bolonia went to Florence
for him, and gave the government of their City to him, which was rul'd
by him, untill John was of fit yeares to governe. I conclude then, that
a Prince ought to make small account of treasons, whiles he hath the
people to friend: but if they be his enemies and hate him, he may well
feare every thing, and every one. And well ordered States, and discreet
Princes have taken care withall diligence, not to cause their great men
to fall into desperation, and to content the people, and so to maintaine
them: for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a
Prince. Among the Kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our
dayes, is that of France, and therein are found exceeding many good
orders, whereupon the Kings liberty and security depends: of which the
chiefe is the Parliament, and the authority thereof: for he that founded
that Kingdome, knowing the great mens ambition and insolence; and
judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to curbe them; and on the
other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones,
grounded upon feare, intending to secure them, would not lay this care
wholly upon the King, but take this trouble from him, which he might
have with the great men, in case he favourd the Commonalty; or with the
Commonalty, in case he favourd the great men; and thereupon set up a
third judge, which was that, to the end it should keep under the great
ones, and favour the meaner sort, without any imputation to the King. It
was not possible to take a better, nor wiser course then this; nor a
surer way to secure the King, and the Kingdome. From whence we may draw
another conclusion worthie of note, that Princes ought to cause others
to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation; and upon
themselves to take only those of grace and favour. Here againe I
conclude, that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his Nobility; but
not thereby to incur the Commons hatred: It would seeme perhaps to many,
considering the life and death of many Romane Emperours, that they were
examples contrary to my opinion, finding that some have liv'd worthily,
and shewd many rare vertues of the minde, and yet have lost the Empire,
and been put to death by their owne subjects, conspiring against them.
Intending then to answer these objections, I shall discourse upon the
qualities of some Emperours, declaring the occasions of their ruine, not
disagreeing from that which I have alledgd; and part thereof I will
bestow on the consideration of these things, which are worthy to be
noted by him that reads the actions of those times: and it shall suffice
me to take all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire from Marcus
the Philosopher to Maximinus, who were Mercus and Commodus his sonne,
Pertinax, Julian, Severus, Antonius, Caracalla his sonne, Macrinus,
Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximin. And first it is to be noted, that
where in the other Principalities, they are to contend only with the
ambition of the Nobles, and the insolence of the people; the Romane
Emperours had a third difficulty, having to support the cruelty and
covetousnesse of the souldiers, which was so hard a thing, that it
caused the ruine of many, being hard to satisfy the souldiers, and the
people; for the people love their quiet, and therefore affect modest
Princes; and the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage, that is
insolent, cruell, and plucking from every one: which things they would
have them exercise upon the people, whereby they might be able to double
their stipends, and satisfie their avarice and cruelty: whence it
proceeds, that those Emperours who either by Nature or by Art, had not
such a reputation, as therewith they could curbe the one and the other,
were alwayes ruind: and the most of them, specially those who as new men
came to the principality, finding the difficulty of those two different
humours, applyed themselves to content the souldiers, making small
account of wronging the people, which was a course then necessary; for
the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one, ought
first endeavour that they incurre not the hatred of any whole
universality; and when they cannot attaine thereunto, they are to
provide with all industry, to avoyd the hatred of those universalities
that are the most mighty. And therefore those Emperors, who because they
were but newly call'd to the Empire, had need of extraordinary favours,
more willingly stuck to the soldiers, than to the people; which
neverthelesse turnd to their advantage, or otherwise, according as that
Prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them. From these causes
aforesayd proceeded it, that Marcus Pertinax, and Alexander, though all
living modestly, being lovers of justice, and enemies of cruelty,
courteous and bountifull, had all from Marcus on ward, miserable ends;
Marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured: for he came to the
Empire by inheritance, and was not to acknowledge it either from the
soldiers, nor from the people: afterwards being accompanyed with many
vertues, which made him venerable, he held alwayes whilst he liv'd the
one and the other order within their limits, and was never either hated,
or contemnd. But Pertinax was created Emperour against the soldiers
wills, who being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could
not endure that honest course that Pertinax sought to reduce them to:
Whereupon having gotten himself hatred, and to this hatred added
contempt, in that he was old, was ruind in the very beginning of his
government. Whence it ought to be observed, that hatred is gaind as well
by good deeds as bad; and therefore as I formerly said, when a Prince
would maintaine the State, he is often forced not to be good: for when
that generality, whether it be the people, or soldiers, or Nobility,
whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee, is
corrupted, it behoves thee to follow their humour, and content them, and
then all good deeds are thy adversaries. But let us come to Alexander
who was of that goodnesse, that among the prayses given him, had this
for one, that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire, he never put
any man to death, but by course of justice; neverthelesse being held
effeminate, and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his mother,
and thereupon fallen into contempt, the army conspird against him. Now
on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of Commodus, Severus,
Antonius, Caracalla, and Maximinus, you shall find them exceeding
cruell, and ravinous, who to satisfie their soldiers, forbeare no kinde
of injury that could be done upon the people; and all of them, except
Severus, came to evill ends: for in Severus, there was such
extraordinary valour, that while he held the soldiers his freinds,
however the people were much burthend by him, he might alwayes reigne
happily: for his valour rendred him so admirable in the souldiers and
peoples sights; that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd, and
those others reverencing and honoring him. And because the actions of
this man were exceeding great, being in a new Prince, I will briefly
shew how well he knew to act the Foxes and the Lions parts; the
conditions of which two, I say, as before, are very necessary for a
Prince to imitate. Severus having had experience of Julian the Emperours
sloth, perswaded his army (whereof he was commander in Sclavonia) that
they should doe well to goe to Rome to revenge Pertinax his death, who
was put to death by the Imperiall guard; and under this pretence, not
making any shew that he aspird unto the Empire, set his army in march
directly towards Rome, and was sooner come into Italy, than it was
knowne he had mov'd from his station. Being ariv'd at Rome, he was by
the Senate chosen Emperour for feare, and Julian slaine. After this
beginning, two difficulties yet remaind to Severus, before he could make
himselfe Lord of the whole State; the one in Asia, where Niger the
Generall of those armies had gotten the title of Emperour, the other in
the West with Albinus, who also aspird to the Empire: and because he
thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them
both, he purposed to set upon Niger, and cozen Albinus, to whom he writ,
that being elected Emperour by the Senate, he would willingly
communicate it with him; and thereupon sent him the title of Cæsar, and
by resolution of the Senate, tooke him to him for his Colleague; which
things were taken by Albinus in true meaning. But afterwards when
Severus had overcome and slaine Niger, and pacified the affaires and in
the East, being returned to Rome, he complaind in the Senate of Albinus,
how little weighing the benefits received from him, he had sought to
slay him by treason, and therefore was he forc'd to goe punish his
ingratitude: afterwards he went into France, where he bereft him both of
his State and life, whoever then shall in particular examine his
actions, shall finde he was a very cruell Lion, and as crafty a Fox: and
shall see that he was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by every one, and by
the armies not hated; and shall nothing marvell that he being a new man,
was able to hold together such a great Empire: for his extraordinary
reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred, which the people for
his extortions might have conceiv'd against him. But Antonius his sonne,
was also an exceeding brave man, and endued with most excellent
qualities, which causd him to be admird by the people, and acceptable to
the souldiers, because he was a warlike man, enduring all kind of
travell and paines, despising all delicate food, and all kinde of
effeminacy, which gaind him the love of all the armies: neverthelesse
his fiercenesse and cruelty were such, and so hideous, having upon many
particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of Rome,
and all those of Alexandria, that he grew odious to the world, and began
to be feard by those also that were neare about him; so that he was
slaine by a Centurion in the very midst of his army. Where it is to be
noted, that these kinde of deaths, which follow upon the deliberation of
a resolv'd and obstinate minde, cannot by a Prince be avoyded: for every
one that feares not to dye, is able to doe it; but a Prince ought to be
lesse afraid of it because it very seldome falls out. Only should he
beware not to doe any extreame injury to any of those of whom he serves
himself, or that he hath near about him in any imployment of his
Principality, as Antonius did: who had reproachfully slaine a brother of
that Centurion; also threatned him every day, and neverthelesse
entertaind him still as one of the guards of his body, which was a rash
course taken, and the way to destruction, as befell him. But let us come
to Commodus for whom it was very easie to hold the Empire, by reason it
descended upon him by inheritance, being Marcus his sonne, and it had
been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps, and then had he
contented both the people and the soldiers: but being of a cruell and
savage disposition, whereby to exercise his actions upon the people, he
gave himselfe to entertaine armies, and those in all licentiousnesse. On
the other part not maintaining his dignity, but often descending upon
the stages to combate with fencers, and doing such other like base
things, little worthy of the Imperiall majesty, he became contemptible
in the soldiers sight; and being hated of one part, and despisd of the
other, he was conspird against, and slaine. It remaines now, that we
declare Maximinus his conditions, who was a very warlike man; and the
armies loathing Alexanders effeminacy, whereof I spake before, when they
had slain him, chose this man Emperour, who not long continued so,
because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt;
the one because he was very base, having kept cattell in Thrace, which
was well knowne to every one, and made them to scorne him; the other,
because in the beginning of his Principality having delayd to goe to
Rome, and enter into possession of the Imperiall throne, he had gaind
the infamy of being thought exceeding cruell, having by his Prefects in
Rome, and in every place of the Empire, exercisd many cruelties,
insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for
the basenesse of his blood; on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd
against him for feare of his crulty; first Affrica, afterwards the
Senate, with all the people of Rome and all Italy, conspired against
him, with whom his own army took part; which incamping before Aquileya,
and finding some difficulty to take the town, being weary of his
cruelties, and because they saw he had so many enemies, fearing him the
lesse, slew him. I purpose not to say any thing either of Heliogabalus,
Macrinus, or Julian, who because they were throughly base, were sudenly
extinguished: but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse; and I
say, that the Princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to
satisfie the Soldiers extraordinarily in their government; for
notwithstanding that there be some considerations to be had of them, yet
presently are those armies dissolved, because none of these Princes do
use to maintaine any armies together, which are annex'd and inveterated
with the governments of the provinces, as were the armies of the Romane
Empire. And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the
soldiers than the people, it was because the soldiers were more
powerfull than the people: now is it more necessary for all Princes,
(except the Turk and the Souldan) to satisfie their people than their
soldiers, because the people are more mighty than they; wherein I except
the Turk, he alwayes maintaining about his person 12000 foot, and 15000
horse, upon which depends the safety and strength of his Kingdome; and
it is necessary that laying aside all other regard of his people, he
maintaine these his friends. The Souldans Kingdome is like hereunto,
which being wholy in the souldiers power, he must also without respect
of his people keep them his friends. And you are to consider, that this
State of the Souldans differs much from all the other Principalities:
For it is very like the Papacy, which cannot be termd an hereditary
Principality: nor a new Principality: for the sons of the deceasd Prince
are not heires and Lords thereof, but he that is chosen receives that
dignity from those who have the authority in them. And this order being
of antiquity, cannot be termd a new Principality, because therein are
none of those difficulties that are in new ones: for though the Prince
be new, yet are the orders of that state ancient, and ordaind to receive
him, as if he were their hereditary Prince. But let us returne to our
matter; whosoever shall consider our discourse before, shall perceive
that either hatred, or contempt have caus'd the ruine of the afore-named
Emperors; and shall know also, from it came that part of them proceeding
one way, and part a contrary; yet in any of them the one had a happy
success, and the others unhappy: for it was of no availe, but rather
hurtful for Pertinax and Alexander, because they were new Princes, to
desire to imitate Marcus, who by inheritance came to the Principality:
and in like manner it was a wrong to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximus,
to imitate Severus, because none of them were endued with so great valor
as to follow his steps therein. Wherefore a new Prince in his
Principality cannot well imitate Marcus his actions; nor yet is it
necessary to follow those of Severus: but he ought make choyce of those
parts in Severus which are necessary for the founding of a State; and to
take from Marcus those that are fit and glorious to preserve a State
which is already established and setled.
CHAP. XX
Whether the Citadels and many other things which Princes often make use
of, are profitable or dammageable.
Some Princes, whereby they might safely keep their State, have disarmed
their subjects; some others have held the towns under their dominion,
divided into factions; others have maintain'd enmities against
themselves; others have appli'd themselves to gain them, where they have
suspected at their entrance into the government; others have built
Fortresses; and others again have ruined and demolished them: and
however that upon all these things, a man cannot well pass a determinate
sentence, unless one comes to the particulars of these States, where
some such like determinations were to be taken; yet I shall speak of
them in so large a manner, as the matter of it self will bear. It was
never then that a new Prince would disarme his own subjects; but rather
when he hath found them disarmed, he hath alwaies arm'd them. For being
belov'd, those armes become thine; those become faithful, which thou
hadst in suspicion; and those which were faithful, are maintaind so; and
thy subjects are made thy partisans; and because all thy subjects cannot
be put in armes, when thou bestowest favors on those thou armest, with
the others thou canst deal more for thy safety; and that difference of
proceeding which they know among them, obliges them to thee; those
others excuse thee, judgeing it necessary that they have deservd more,
who have undergone more danger, and so have greater obligation: but when
thou disarmst them, thou beginst to offend them, that thou distrustest
them, either for cowardise, or small faith; and the one or the other of
those two opinions provokes their hatred against thee; and because thou
canst not stand disarmed, thou must then turn thy self to mercenary
Soldiery, whereof we have formerly spoken what it is, and when it is
good; it can never be so much as to defend thee from powerful enemies,
and suspected subjects; therefore as I have said, a new Prince in a new
Principality hath alwaies ordaind them armes. Of examples to this
purpose, Histories are full. But when a Prince gains a new State, which
as a member he adds to his ancient dominions, then it is necessary to
disarme that State, unless it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have
assisted thee in the conquest thereof; and these also in time and upon
occasions, it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate, and so
order them, that all the arms of thy State be in the hands of thy own
Soldiers, who live in thy ancient State near unto thee. Our ancestors
and they that were accounted Sages, were wont to say that it was
necessary to hold Pistoya in factions, and Pisa with Fortresses; and for
this cause maintaind some towns subject to them in differences, whereby
to hold it more easily. This, at what time Italy was ballanc'd in a
certain manner, might be well done; but mee thinks it cannot now a dayes
be well given for a precept; for I do not beleeve, that divisions made
can do any good; rather it must needs be, that when the enemy approaches
them, Cities divided are presently lost; for alwaies the weaker part
will cleave to the forrein power, and the other not be able to subsist.
The Venetians (as I think) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons, maintaind the
factions of the Guelfes and Gibellins, in their townes; and however they
never suffered them to spill one anothers blood, yet they nourish'd
these differences among them, to the end that the citizens imployd in
these quarrels, should not plot any thing against them: which as it
proved, never serv'd them to any great purpose: for being defeated at
Vayla, presently one of those two factions took courage and seizd upon
their whole State. Therefore such like waies argue the Princes weakness;
for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions; for
they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace, being they are able
by means thereof more easily to mannage their subjects: but war comming,
such like orders discover their fallacy. Without doubt, Princes become
great, when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made
against them; and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any
new Prince great, who hath more need to gain reputation than an
hereditary Prince, causes enemies to rise against him, and him to
undertake against them: to the end he may have occasion to master them,
and know that ladder, which his enemies have set him upon, whereby to
rise yet higher. And therefore many think, that a wise Prince when he
hath the occasion, ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the
suppressing thereof, his greatness may grow thereupon. Princes,
especially those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those
men, who in the beginning of their State, have been held suspected, than
in those who at their entrance have been their confidents. Pandulphus
Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governd his State, more with them that had
been suspected by him, than with the others. But of this matter we
cannot speak at large, because it varies according to the subject; I
will only say this, that those men, who in the beginning of a
Principality were once enemies, if they be of quality so that to
maintain themselves they have need of support, the Prince might alwaies
with the greatest facility gain for his; and they are the rather forced
to serve him faithfully, insomuch as they know it is more necessary for
them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion, which was once held
of them; and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage, than
from those, who serving him too supinely, neglect his affairs. And seing
the matter requires it, I will not omit to put a Prince in mind, who
hath anew made himself master of a State, by means of the inward helps
he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that
favor'd him to favor him, if it be not a natural affection towards him;
for if it be only because they were not content with their former
government, with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep
them long his friends, because it will be impossible for him to content
them. By these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern
affaires, searching into the cause hereof, we shall find it much more
easie to gain those men for friends, who formerly were contented with
the State, and therefore were his enemies: than those, who because they
were not contented therewith, became his fiends, and favor'd him in
getting the mastery of it. It hath been the custome of Princes, whereby
to hold their States more securely, to build Citadels, which might be
bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them,
and so to have a secure retreat from the first violences. I commend this
course, because it hath been used of old; notwithstanding Nicholas
Vitelli in our dayes hath been known to demolish two Citadels in the
town of Castello, the better to keep the State; Guidubaldo Duke of Urbin
being to return into his State, out of which he was driven by Cæsar
Borgia, raz'd all the Fortresses of that Countrey, and thought he should
hardlyer lose that State again without them. The Bentivolii returning
into Bolonia, used the like courses. Citadels then are profitable, or
not, according to the times; and if they advantage thee in one part,
they do thee harme in another; and this part may be argued thus. That
Prince who stands more in fear of his own people than of strangers,
ought to build Fortresses: but he that is more afraid of strangers than
of his people, should let them alone. Against the house of Sforza, the
Castle of Milan, which Francis Sforza built, hath and will make more
war, than any other disorder in that State: and therefore the best
Citadel that may be, is not to incurre the peoples hatred; for however
thou holdest a Fortress, and the people hate thee, thou canst hardly
scape them; for people, when once they have taken armes, never want the
help of strangers at their need to take ther parts. In our dayes we
never saw that they ever profited any Prince, unless it were the
Countess of Furli, when Count Hieronymo of Furli her husband was slain;
for by means thereof she escap'd the peoples rage, and attended aid from
Milan, and so recover'd her State: and then such were the times that the
stranger could not assist the people: but afterwards they serv'd her to
little purpose, when Cæsar Borgia assaild her, and that the people which
was her enemy, sided with the stranger. Therefore both then, and at
first, it would have been more for her safety, not to have been odious
to the people, than to have held the Fortresses. These things being well
weigh'd then, I will commend those that shall build up Fortresses, and
him also that shall not; and I will blame him, howsoever he be, that
relying upon those, shall make small account of being hated by his
people.
CHAP. XXI
How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation.