it would be very well to be accounted liberall: neverthelesse,
liberality used in such a manner, as to make thee be accounted so,
wrongs thee: for in case it be used vertuously, and as it ought to be,
it shall never come to be taken notice of, so as to free thee from the
infamie of its contrary. And therefore for one to hold the name of
liberal among men, it were needfull not to omit any sumptuous quality,
insomuch that a Prince alwayes so dispos'd, shall waste all his
revenues, and at the end shall be forc'd, if he will still maintaine
that reputation of liberality, heavily to burthen his subjects, and
become a great exactour; and put in practise all those things that can
be done to get mony: Which begins to make him hatefull to his subjects,
and fall into every ones contempt, growing necessitous: so that having
with this liberality wrong'd many, and imparted of his bounty but to a
few; he feels every first mischance, and runs a hazard of every first
danger: Which he knowing, and desiring to withdraw himself from, incurs
presently the disgrace of being termed miserable. A Prince therefore not
being able to use this vertue of liberality, without his own damage, in
such a sort, that it may be taken notice of, ought, if he be wise, not
to regard the name of Miserable; for in time he shall alwaies be
esteemed the more liberal, seeing that by his parsimony his own revenues
are sufficient for him; as also he can defend himself against whoever
makes war against him, and can do some exploits without grieving his
subjects: so that he comes to use his liberality to all those, from whom
he takes nothing, who are infinite in number; and his miserableness
towards those to whom he gives nothing, who are but a few. In our dayes
we have not seen any, but those who have been held miserable, do any
great matters; but the others all quite ruin'd. Pope Julius the second,
however he serv'd himself of the name of Liberal, to get the Papacy, yet
never intended he to continue it, to the end he might be able to make
war against the King of France: and he made so many wars without
imposing any extraordinary tax, because his long thrift supplyed his
large expences. This present King of Spain could never have undertaken,
nor gone through with so many exploits, had he been accounted liberal.
Wherefore a Prince ought little to regard (that he may not be driven to
pillage his subjects, that he may be able to defend himself, that he may
not fall into poverty and contempt, that he be not forced to become an
extortioner) though he incurre the name of miserable; for this is one of
those vices, which does not pluck him from his throne. And if any one
should say, Cæsar by his liberality obtained the Empire, and many others
(because they both were, and were esteemd liberal) attaind to exceeding
great dignities. I answer, either thou art already come to be a Prince,
or thou art in the way to it; in the first case, this liberality is
hurtful; in the second, it is necessary to be accounted so; and Cæsar
was one of those that aspired to the Principality of Rome. But if after
he had gotten it, he had survived, and not forborne those expences, he
would quite have ruined that Empire. And if any one should reply; many
have been Princes, and with their armies have done great exploits, who
have been held very liberal. I answer, either the Prince spends of his
own and his subjects, or that which belongs to others: in the first, he
ought to be sparing; in the second, he should not omit any part of
liberality. And that Prince that goes abroad with his army, and feeds
upon prey, and spoyle, and tributes, and hath the disposing of that
which belongs to others, necessarily should use this liberality;
otherwise would his soldiers never follow him; and of that which is
neither thine, nor thy subjects, thou mayest well be a free giver, as
were Cyrus, Cæsar and Alexander; for the spending of that which is
anothers, takes not away thy reputation, but rather adds to it, only the
wasting of that which is thine own hurts thee; nor is there any thing
consumes itself so much as liberality, which whilest thou usest, thou
losest the means to make use of it, and becomest poore and abject; or to
avoid this poverty, an extortioner and hatefull person. And among all
those things which a Prince ought to beware of is, to be dispised, and
odious; to one and the other of which, liberality brings thee. Wherefore
there is more discretion to hold the stile of Miserable, which begets an
infamy without hatred, than to desire that of Liberal, whereby to
incurre the necessity of being thought an extortioner, which procures an
infamy with hatred.
CHAP. XVII
Of Cruelty, and Clemency, and whether it is better to be belov'd, or
feard.
Descending afterwards unto the other fore-alledged qualities, I say,
that every Prince should desire to be held pitiful, and not cruel.
Nevertheless ought he beware that he ill uses not this pitty. Cæsar
Borgia was accounted cruel, yet had his cruelty redrest the disorders in
Romania, setled it in union, and restored it to peace, and fidelity:
which, if it be well weighed, we shall see was an act of more pitty,
than that of the people of Florence, who to avoyd the terme of cruelty,
suffered Pistoya to fall to destruction. Wherefore a Prince ought not to
regard the infamy of cruelty, for to hold his subjects united and
faithfull: for by giving a very few proofes of himself the other way, he
shall be held more pittiful than they, who through their too much pitty,
suffer disorders to follow, from whence arise murthers and rapines: for
these are wont to hurt an intire universality, whereas the executions
practised by a Prince, hurt only some particular. And among all sorts of
Princes, it is impossible for a new Prince to avoyd the name of cruel,
because all new States are full of dangers: whereupon Virgil by the
mouth of Dido excuses the inhumanity of her Kingdom, saying,
_Res dura et Regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri et latè fines custode tenere._
My hard plight and new State force me to guard
My confines all about with watch and ward.
Nevertheless ought he to be judicious in his giving belief to any thing,
or moving himself thereat, nor make his people extreamly afraid of him;
but proceed in a moderate way with wisdome, and humanity, that his too
much confidence make him not unwary, and his too much distrust
intolerable; from hence arises a dispute, whether it is better to be
belov'd or feard: I answer, a man would wish he might be the one and the
other: but because hardly can they subsist both together, it is much
safer to be feard, than be loved; being that one of the two must needs
fail; for touching men, we may say this in general, they are unthankful,
unconstant, dissemblers, they avoyd dangers, and are covetous of gain;
and whilest thou doest them good, they are wholly thine; their blood,
their fortunes, lives and children are at thy service, as is said
before, when the danger is remote; but when it approaches, they revolt.
And that Prince who wholly relies upon their words, unfurnished of all
other preparations, goes to wrack: for the friendships that are gotten
with rewards, and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind, are
dearly bought indeed; but they will neither keep long, nor serve well in
time of need: and men do less regard to offend one that is supported by
love, than by fear. For love is held by a certainty of obligation, which
because men are mischievous, is broken upon any occasion of their own
profit. But fear restrains with a dread of punishment which never
forsakes a man. Yet ought a Prince cause himself to be belov'd in such a
manner, that if he gains not love, he may avoid hatred: for it may well
stand together, that a man may be feard and not hated; which shall never
fail, if he abstain from his subjects goods, and their wives; and
whensoever he should be forc'd to proceed against any of their lives, do
it when it is to be done upon a just cause, and apparent conviction; but
above all things forbeare to lay his hands on other mens goods; for men
forget sooner the death of their father, than the loss of their
patrimony. Moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods, do
never fail: and alwaies he that begins to live by rapine, finds occasion
to lay hold upon other mens goods: but against mens lives, they are
seldome found, and sooner fail. But where a Prince is abroad in the
field with his army, and hath a multitude of soldiers under his
government, then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it, though
he be termed cruel: for unless he be so, he shall never have his
soldiers live in accord one with another, nor ever well disposed to any
brave piece of service. Among Hannibals actions of mervail, this is
reckoned for one, that having a very huge army, gathered out of several
nations, and all led to serve in a strange countrey, there was never any
dissention neither amongst themselves, nor against their General, as
well in their bad fortune as their good. Which could not proceed from
any thing else than from that barbarous cruelty of his, which together
with his exceeding many vertues, rendred him to his soldiers both
venerable and terrible; without which, to that effect his other vertues
had served him to little purpose: and some writers though not of the
best advised, on one side admire these his worthy actions, and on the
otherside, condemn the principal causes thereof. And that it is true,
that his other vertues would not have suffic'd him, we may consider in
Scipio, the rarest man not only in the dayes he liv'd, but even in the
memory of man; from whom his army rebel'd in Spain: which grew only upon
his too much clemency, which had given way to his soldiers to become
more licentious, than was well tollerable by military discipline: for
which he was reprov'd by Fabius Maximus in the Senate, who termed him
the corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrensians having been
destroyed by a Lieutenant of Scipio's, were never reveng'd by him, nor
the insolence of that Lieutenant punisht; all this arising from his
easie nature: so that one desiring to excuse him in the Senate, said,
that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults,
than to correct the faults of other men: which disposition of his in
time would have wrong'd Scipio's reputation and glory, had he therewith
continu'd in his commands: but living under the government of the
Senate, this quality of his that would have disgrac'd him not only was
conceal'd, but prov'd to the advancement of his glory. I conclude then,
returning to the purpose of being feard, and belov'd; insomuch as men
love at their own pleasure, and to serve their own turne, and their fear
depends upon the Princes pleasure, every wise Prince ought to ground
upon that which is of himself, and not upon that which is of another:
only this, he ought to use his best wits to avoid hatred, as was said.
CHAP. XVIII
In what manner Princes ought to keep their words.
How commendable in a Prince it is to keep his word, and live with
integrity, not making use of cunning and subtlety, every one knows well:
yet we see by experience in these our dayes, that those Princes have
effected great matters, who have made small reckoning of keeping their
words, and have known by their craft to turne and wind men about, and in
the end, have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth. You must
then know, there are two kinds of combating or fighting; the one by
right of the laws, the other meerly by force. That first way is proper
to men, the other is also common to beasts: but because the first many
times suffices not, there is a necessity to make recourse to the second;
wherefore it behooves a Prince to know how to make good use of that part
which belongs to a beast, as well as that which is proper to a man. This
part hath been covertly shew'd to Princes by ancient writers; who say
that Achilles and many others of those ancient Princes were intrusted to
Chiron the Senator, to be brought up under his discipline: the moral of
this, having for their teacher one that was half a beast and half a man,
was nothing else, but that it was needful for a Prince to understand how
to make his advantage of the one and the other nature, because neither
could subsist without the other. A Prince then being necessitated to
know how to make use of that part belonging to a beast, ought to serve
himself of the conditions of the Fox and the Lion; for the Lion cannot
keep himself from snares, nor the Fox defend himself against the Wolves.
He had need then be a Fox, that he may beware of the snares, and a Lion
that he may scare the wolves. Those that stand wholly upon the Lion,
understand not well themselves. And therefore a wise Prince cannot, nor
ought not keep his faith given when the observance thereof turnes to
disadvantage, and the occasions that made him promise, are past. For if
men were all good, this rule would not be allowable; but being they are
full of mischief, and would not make it good to thee, neither art thou
tyed to keep it with them: nor shall a Prince ever want lawfull
occasions to give colour to this breach. Very many modern examples
hereof might be alledg'd, wherein might be shewed how many peaces
concluded, and how many promises made, have been violated and broken by
the infidelity of Princes; and ordinarily things have best succeeded
with him that hath been nearest the Fox in condition. But it is
necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition,
and to be able to fain and dissemble throughly; and men are so simple,
and yeeld so much to the present necessities, that he who hath a mind to
deceive, shall alwaies find another that will be deceivd. I will not
conceal any one of the examples that have been of late. Alexander the
sixth, never did any thing else than deceive men, and never meant
otherwise, and alwaies found whom to work upon; yet never was there man
would protest more effectually, nor aver any thing with more solemn
oaths, and observe them less than he; nevertheless, his cousenages all
thriv'd well with him; for he knew how to play this part cunningly.
Therefore is there no necessity for a Prince to be endued with all above
written qualities, but it behooveth well that he seem to be so; or
rather I will boldly say this, that having these qualities, and alwaies
regulating himself by them, they are hurtfull; but seeming to have them,
they are advantageous; as to seem pittiful, faithful, mild, religious,
and of integrity, and indeed to be so; provided withall thou beest of
such a composition, that if need require to use the contrary, thou
canst, and knowest how to apply thy self thereto. And it suffices to
conceive this, that a Prince, and especially a new Prince, cannot
observe all those things, for which men are held good; he being often
forc'd, for the maintenance of his State, to do contrary to his faith,
charity, humanity, and religion: and therefore it behooves him to have a
mind so disposd, as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and
fortunes; and as formerly I said, not forsake the good, while he can;
but to know how to make use of the evil upon necessity. A Prince then
ought to have a special care, that he never let fall any words, but what
are all season'd with the five above written qualities, and let him seem
to him that sees and hears him, all pitty, all faith, all integrity, all
humanity, all religion; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to
seem to have, than this last quality: for all men in general judge
thereof, rather by the sight, than by the touch; for every man may come
to the sight of him, few come to the touch and feeling of him; yvery man
may come to see what thou seemest, few come to perceive and understand
what thou art; and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who
have the majesty of State to protect them: And in all mens actions,
especially those of Princes wherein there is no judgement to appeale
unto men, forbeare to give their censures, till the events and ends of
things. Let a Prince therefore take the surest courses he can to
maintain his life and State: the means shall alwaies be thought
honorable, and commended by every one; for the vulgar is over-taken with
the appearance and event of a thing: and for the most part of people,
they are but the vulgar: the others that are but few, take place where
the vulgar have no subsisteance. A Prince there is in these dayes, whom
I shall not do well to name, that preaches nothing else but peace and
faith; but had he kept the one and the other, several times had they
taken from him his state and reputation.
In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth Chap, our Author
descends to particulars, perswading his Prince in his sixteenth
to such a suppleness of disposition, as that upon occasion he
can make use either of liberality or miserableness, as need
shall require. But that of liberality is to last no longer than
while he is in the way to some designe: which if he well weigh,
is not really a reward of vertue, how ere it seems; but a bait
and lure to bring birds to the net. In the seventeenth Chap, he
treats of clemency and cruelty, neither of which are to be
exercis'd by him as acts of mercy or justice; but as they may
serve to advantage his further purposes. And lest the Prince
should incline too much to clemency, our Author allows rather
the restraint by fear, than by love. The contrary to which all
stories shew us. I will say this only, cruelty may cut of the
power of some, but causes the hatred of all, and gives a will to
most to take the first occasion offerd for revenge. In the
eighteenth Chap, our Author discourses how Princes ought to
govern themselves in keeping their promises made: whereof he
sayes they ought to make such small reckoning, as that rather
they should know by their craft how to turne and wind men about,
whereby to take advantage of all winds and fortunes. To this I
would oppose that in the fifteenth Psal. v. 5. He that sweareth
to his neighbor, and disappointeth him not, though it were to
his own hindrance. It was a King that writ it, and me thinks the
rule he gave, should well befit both King and Subject: and
surely this perswades against all taking of advantages. A man
may reduce all the causes of faith-breaking to three heads. One
may be, because he that promised, had no intention to keep his
word; and this is a wicked and malitious way of dealing. A
second may bee, because hee that promisd, repents of his promise
made; and that is grounded on unconstancy, and lightness in that
he would not be well resolved before he entred into covenant.
The third may be, when it so falls out, that it lyes not in his
power that made the promise to performe it. In which case a man
ought to imitate the good debter, who having not wherewithall to
pay, hides not himself, but presents his person to his creditor,
willingly suffering imprisonment. The first and second are very
vitious and unworthy of a Prince: in the third, men might well
be directed by the examples of those two famous Romans, Regulus
and Posthumius. I shall close this with the answer of Charles
the fifth, when he was pressed to break his word with Luther for
his safe return from Wormes; _Fides rerum promissarum etsi toto
mundo exulet, tamen apud imperatorem cam consistere oportet_.
Though truth be banisht out of the whole world, yet should it
alwaies find harbour in an Emperors breast.
[Sidenote: _Gulielmus Xenocarus_ in vit. Car. Quinti.]
CHAP. XIX
That Princes should take a care, not to incurre contempt or hatred.