which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon, and considered in
some part the reasons of their well and ill being, and shewd the waies
whereby many have sought to gain, and hold them, it remains now that I
speak in general of the offences and defences, that may chance in each
of the forenamed. We have formerly said that it is necessary for a
Prince to have good foundations laid; otherwise it must needs be that he
go to wrack. The Principal foundations that all States have, as well
new, as old, or mixt, are good laws, and good armes; and because there
cannot be good laws, where there are not good armes; and where there are
good armes, there must needs be good laws, I will omit to discourse of
the laws, and speak of armes. I say then that the armes, wherewithall a
Prince defends his State, either are his own, or mercenary, or
auxiliary, or mixt. Those that are mercenary and auxiliar, are
unprofitable, and dangerous, and if any one holds his State founded upon
mercenary armes, he shall never be quiet, nor secure, because they are
never well united, ambitious, and without discipline, treacherous, among
their friends stour, among their enemies cowardly; they have no fear of
God, nor keep any faith with men; and so long only defer they the doing
of mischief, till the enemy comes to assul thee; and in time of peace
thou art despoyled by them, in war by thy enemies: the reason hereof is,
because they have no other love, nor other cause to keep them in the
field, but only a small stipend, which is not of force to make them
willing to hazard their lives for thee: they are willing indeed to be
thy soldiers, till thou goest to fight; but then they fly, or run away;
which thing would cost me but small pains to perswade; for the ruine of
Italy hath not had any other cause now a dayes, than for that it hath
these many years rely'd upon mercenary armes; which a good while since
perhaps may have done some man some service, and among themselves they
may have been thought valiant: but so soon as any forrein enemy
appeared, they quickly shewed what they were. Whereupon Charles the King
of France, without opposition, made himself master of all Italy: and he
that said, that the causes thereof were our faults, said true; but these
were not those they beleeved, but what I have told; and because they
were the Princes faults, they also have suffered the punishment. I will
fuller shew the infelicity of these armes. The mercenary Captains are
either very able men, or not: if they be, thou canst not repose any
trust in them: for they will alwaies aspire unto their own proper
advancements, either by suppressing of thee that art their Lord, or by
suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose: but if the
Captain be not valorous, he ordinarily ruines thee: and in case it be
answered, that whoever shall have his armes in his hands, whether
mercenary or not, will do so: I would reply, that armes are to be
imployed either by a Prince, or Common-wealth. The Prince ought to go in
person, and performe the office of a commander: the Republick is to send
forth her Citizens: and when she sends forth one that proves not of
abilities, she ought to change him then; and when he does prove
valorous, to bridle him so by the laws, that he exceed not his
commission. And by experience we see, that Princes and Republiques of
themselves alone, make very great conquests; but that mercenary armes
never do other than harme; and more hardly falls a Republick armed with
her own armes under the obedience of one of her own Citizens, than one
that is armed by forrein armes. Rome and Sparta subsisted many ages
armed and free. The Swissers are exceedingly well armed, and yet very
free. Touching mercenary armes that were of old, we have an example of
the Carthagians, who near upon were oppress'd by their own mercenary
soldiers, when the first war with the Romans was finished; however the
Carthagians had their own Citizens for their Captains. Philip of Macedon
was made by the Thebans after Epaminondas his death, General of their
Armies; and after the victory, he took from them liberty. The Milaneses
when Duke Philip was dead, entertaind Francis Sforza into their pay
against the Venetians, who having vanquisht their enemie at Caravaggio,
afterwards joyned with them, where by to usurp upon the Milaneses his
Masters. Sforza his father, being in Joan the Queen of Naples pay, left
her on a sudden disarmed; whereupon she, to save her Kingdom, was
constraind to cast her self into the King of Arrragon's bosome. And in
case the Venetians and the Florentines have formerly augmented their
State with these kind of armes, and their own Captains, and yet none of
them have ever made themselves their Princes, but rather defended them:
I answer, that the Florentines in this case have had fortune much their
friend: for of valorous Captains, which they might any way fear, some
have not been victors, some have had opposition, and others have laid
the aim of their ambitions another way. He who overcame not, was John
Aouto, of whose faith there could no proof be made, being he vanquisht
not; but every one will acknowledge, that, had he vanquisht, the
Florentines were at his discretion. Sforza had alwaies the Bracceschi
for his adversaries, so that they were as a guard one upon another.
Francis converted all his ambition against Lombardy. Braccio against the
Church, and the Kingdome of Naples. But let us come to that which
followed a while agoe. The Florentines made Paul Vitelli their General,
a throughly advis'd man, and who from a private fortune had rose to very
great reputation: had he taken Pisa, no man will deny but that the
Florentines must have held fast with him; for had he been entertained in
their enemies pay, they had no remedy; and they themselves holding of
him, of force were to obey him. The Venetians, if we consider their
proceedings, we shall see wrought both warily and gloriously, while
themselves made war, which was before their undertakings by land, where
the gentlemen with their own Commons in armes behav'd themselves
bravely: but when they began to fight by land, they lost their valor,
and follow'd the customes of Italy; and in the beginning of their
enlargement by land, because they had not much territory, and yet were
of great reputation, they had not much cause to fear their Captains; but
as they began to extend their bounds, which was under their Commander
Carminiola, they had a taste of this error: for perceiving he was
exceeding valorous, having under his conduct beaten the Duke of Milan;
and knowing on the other side, how he was cold in the war, they judg'd
that they could not make any great conquest with him; and because they
neither would, nor could cashier him, that they might not lose what they
had gotten, they were forced for their own safeties to put him to death.
Since they have had for their General Bartholomew of Berganio, Robert of
St. Severin, the Count of Petilian, and such like: whereby they were to
fear their losses, as well as to hope for gain: as it fell out
afterwards at Vayla, where in one day they lost that, which with so much
pains they had gotten in eight hundred years: for from these kind of
armes grow slack and slow and weak gains; but sudden and wonderfull
losses: And because I am now come with these examples into Italy, which
now these many years, have been governd by mercenary armes, I will
search deeper into them, to the end that their course and progress being
better discoverd, they may be the better amended. You have to
understand, that so soon as in these later times the yoak of the Italian
Empire began to be shaken off, and the Pope had gotten reputation in the
temporality, Italy was divided into several States: for many of the
great cities took armes against their Nobility; who under the Emperors
protection had held them in oppression; and the Pope favored these,
whereby he might get himself reputation, in the temporality; of many
others, their Citizens became Princes, so that hereupon Italy being come
into the Churches hands as it were, and some few Republicks, those
Priests and Citizens not accustomed to the use of armes, began to take
strangers to their pay. The first that gave reputation to these soldiers
was Alberick of Como in Romania. From his discipline among others
descended Brachio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbitres of
Italy; after these followed all others, who even till our dayes have
commanded the armes of Italy; and the success of their valor hath been,
that it was overrun by Charles, pillaged by Lewis, forc'd by Ferdinand,
and disgrac'd by the Swissers. The order which they have held, hath
been, first whereby to give reputation to their own armes to take away
the credit of the Infantry. This they did, because they having no State
of their own, but living upon their industry, their few foot gave them
no reputation, and many they were not able to maintain; whereupon they
reduc'd themselves to cavalery, and so with a supportable number they
were entertained and honored: and matters were brought to such termes,
that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers you should not find two
thousand foot. They had moreover us'd all industry to free themselves
and their soldiers of all pains and fear, in their skirmishes, not
killing, but taking one another prisoners, and without ransome for their
freedom; they repaired not all to their tents by night, nor made
palizado or trench thereabout, nor lay in the field in the summer: and
all these things were thus contrived and agreed of among them in their
military orders, whereby (as is said) to avoid pains and dangers,
insomuch as they have brought Italy into slavery and disgrace.
CHAP. XIII
Of Auxiliary Soldiers, mixt, and native.
The Auxiliary forces, being the other kind of unprofitable armes, are,
when any puissant one is called in, who with his forces comes to assist
and defend thee; such as in these later times did Pope Julius use, who
having seen the evil proof of his mercenary soldiers in the enterprize
of Ferrara, applied himself to the Auxiliaries, and agreed with
Ferdinand King of Spain, that with his Forces he should aid him. These
armes may be profitable and advantagious for themselves; but for him
that calls them in, hurtfull; because in losing, thou art left defeated;
and conquering, thou becomest their prisoner. And however that of these
examples the ancient stories are full fraught; yet will I not part from
this of Pope Julius the second, which is as yet fresh: whose course
could not have been more inconsiderate, for the desire he had to get
Ferrara, putting himself wholly into strangers hands: but his good
fortune caused another cause to arise, that hindred him from receiving
the fruit of his evil choice; for his Auxiliaries being broken at
Ravenna, and the Swissers thereupon arriving, who put the Conquerors to
flight beyond all opinion, even their own and others, he chanced not to
remain his enemies prisoner, they being put to flight, nor prisoner to
his Auxiliaries, having vanquished by other forces than theirs. The
Florentines being wholly disarmed, brought ten thousand French to Pisa
for to take it: by which course they ran more hazzard, than in any time
of their troubles. The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppress his
neighbors, brought into Greece ten thousand Turks, who when the war was
ended, could not be got out thence, which was the beginning of Greeces
servitude under the Infidels. He then that will in no case be able to
overcome, let him serve himself of these armes; for they are much more
dangerous than the mercenaries; for by those thy ruine is more suddenly
executed; for they are all united, and all bent to the obedience of
another. But for the mercenaries to hurt thee, when they have
vanquished, there is no more need of time, and greater occasion, they
not being all united in a body, and being found out and paid by thee,
wherein a third that thou mak'st their head, cannot suddenly gaine so
great authority, that he can endammage thee. In summe, in the
mercenaries their sloth and lazinesse to fight is more dangerous: in the
auxiliaries their valour. Wherefore a wise Prince hath alwayes avoyded
these kind of armes, and betaken himselfe to his owne, and desired
rather to loss with his owne, than conquer with anothers, accounting
that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes. I will not
doubt to alleadge Cæsar Borgia, and his actions. This Duke entred into
Romania with auxiliarie armes, bringing with him all French souldiers:
but afterwards not accounting those armes secure, bent himselfe to
mercenaries, judging lesse danger to be in those, and tooke in pay the
Orsini and the Vitelli, which afterwards in the proof of them, finding
wavering, unfaithful, and dangerous, he extinguishd, and betook himselfe
to his owne; and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is
between the one and the other of these armes, considering the difference
that was between the Dukes reputation, when he had the French men alone,
and when he had the Orsini and Vitelli; but when he remaind with his
own, and stood of himselfe, we shall find it was much augmented: nor
ever was it of grate esteeme, but when every one saw, that he wholly
possessed his owne armes. I thought not to have parted from the Italian
examples of late memory; but that I must not let passe that of Hiero the
Siracusan, being one of those I formerly nam'd. This man (as I said
before) being made general of the Siracusans forces, knew presently that
mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were
hirelings, as our Italians are; and finding no way either to hold, or
cashier them made them all bee cut to peeces, and afterwards waged warre
with his owne men, and none others. I will also call to memory a figure
of the old Testament serving just to this purpose. When David presented
himselfe before Saul to goe to fight with Goliah the Philistins
Champion, Saul to encourage him, clad him with his owne armes, which
David when he had them upon back, refused, saying, he was not able to
make any proofe of himself therein, and therefore would goe meet the
enemy with his own sling and sword. In summe, others armes either fall
from thy shoulders, or cumber or streighten thee. Charls the seventh,
Father of Lewis the eleventh, having by his good fortune and valour set
France at liberty from the English, knew well this necessity of being
arm'd with his owne armes, and settled in his Kingdome the ordinances of
men at armes, and infantry. Afterwards King Lewis his sonne abolisht
those of the infantry, and began to take the Swissers to pay; which
errour follow'd by the others, is (as now indeed it appeares) the cause
of that Kingdomes dangers. For having given reputation to the Swissers,
they have renderd all their own armes contemptible; for this hath wholly
ruind their foot, and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes: for
being accustomed to serve with the Swissers, they think they are not
able to overcome without them. From whence it comes that the French are
not of force against the Swissers, and without them also against others
they use not to adventure. Therefore are the French armies mixt, part
mercenaries, and part natives, which armes are farre better than the
simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries, and much inferiour to the
natives; and let the said example suffice for that: for the Kingdome of
France would have been unconquerable, if Charles his order had been
augmented and maintaind: but men in their small wisdome begin a thing,
which then because it hath some favour of good, discovers not the poyson
that lurkes thereunder, as I before said of the hectick feavers.
Wherefore that Prince which perceives not mischiefes, but as they grow
up, is not truely wise; and this is given but to few: and if we consider
the first ruine of the Romane Empire, we shall find it was from taking
the Goths first into their pay; for from that beginning the forces of
the Romane Empire began to grow weak, and all the valour that was taken
hence was given to them. I conclude then that without having armes of
their owne, no Principality can be secure, or rather is wholly oblig'd
to fortune, not having valour to shelter it in adversity. And it was
alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men, that nothing is so weak and
unsetled, as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne
proper forces: which are those that are composed of thy subjects, or
Citizens, or servants; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary; and the
manner how to order those well, is easie to find out, if those orders
above nam'd by me, shall be but run over, and if it shall be but
consider'd, how Philip Alexander the Great his Father, and in what
manner many Republicks and Princes have armd and appointed themselves,
to which appointments I referre my selfe wholly.
CHAP. XIV
What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline.
A prince then ought to have no other ayme, nor other thought, nor take
any thing else for his proper art, but warr, and the orders and
discipline thereof: for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that
commands, and is of so great excellency, that not only those that are
borne Princes, it maintains so; but many times raises men from a private
fortune to that dignity. And it is seene by the contrary, that when
Princes have given themselves more to their delights, than to the
warres, they have lost their States; and the first cause that makes thee
lose it, is the neglect of that arte; and the cause that makes thee
gaine it, is that thou art experienc'd and approvd in that arte. Francis
Sforza by being a man at armes, of a private man became Duke of Milan;
and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging
to those imployments of Princes, became private men. For among other
mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee, it causes thee to be
contemnd, which is one of those disgraces, from which a Prince ought to
keepe himselfe, as hereafter shall be sayd: for from one that is disarmd
to one that is armd there is no proportion; and reason will not, that he
who is in armes, should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is
unfurnishd of them, and that he that is disarmd should be in security
among his armed vassalls; for there being disdaine in the one, and
suspicion in the other, it is impossible these should ever well
cooperate. And therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienced in matter
of warre, besides the other infelicities belonging to him, as is said,
cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers, nor yet trust in them.
Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre,
and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre; which
he may be able to doe two wayes; the one practically, and in his labours
and recreations of his body, the other theoretically. And touching the
practick part, he ought besides the keeping of his own subjects well
traind up in the discipline and exercise of armes, give himselfe much to
the chase, whereby to accustome his body to paines, and partly to
understand the manner of situations, and to know how the mountaines
arise, which way the vallyes open themselves, and how the plaines are
distended flat abroad, and to conceive well the nature of the rivers,
and marrish ground, and herein to bestow very much care, which knowledge
is profitable in two kinds: first he learnes thereby to know his own
countrey, and is the better enabled to understand the defence thereof,
and afterwards by meanes of this knowledge and experience in these
situations, easily comprehends any other situation, which a new he hath
need to view, for the little hillocks, vallies, plaines, rivers, and
marrish places. For example, they in Tuscany are like unto those of
other countries: so that from the knowledge of the site of one country,
it is easie to attain to know that of others. And that Prince that wants
this skill, failes of the principall part a Commander should be furnisht
with; for this shows the way how to discover the enemy, to pitch the
camp, to lead their armies, to order their battells, and also to besiege
a town at thy best advantage, Philopomenes Prince of the Achayans, among
other praises Writers give him, they say, that in time of peace, he
thought not upon any thing so much as the practise of warre; and
whensoever he was abroad in the field to disport himselfe with his
friends, would often stand still, and discourse with them, in case the
enemies were upon the top of that hill, and we here with our army,
whether of us two should have the advantage, and how might we safely goe
to find them, keeping still our orders; and if we would retire our
selves, what course should we take if they retir'd, how should we follow
them? and thus on the way, propounded them all such accidents could
befall in any army; would heare their opinions, and tell his owne, and
confirme it by argument; so that by his continuall thought hereupon,
when ever he led any army no chance could happen, for which he had not a
remedy. But touching the exercise of the mind, a Prince ought to read
Histories, and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men, marke
how they have behav'd themselves in the warrs, examine the occasions of
their victories, and their losses; wherby they may be able to avoyd
these, and obtaine those; and above all, doe as formerly some excellent
man hath done, who hath taken upon him to imitate, if any one that hath
gone before him hath left his memory glorious; the course he took, and
kept alwaies near unto him the remembrances of his actions and worthy
deeds: as it is said, that Alexander the great imitated Achilles; Cæsar
Alexander, and Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus,
written by Xenophon, may easily perceive afterwards in Scipio's life how
much glory his imitation gaind him, and how much Scipio did conforme
himselfe in his chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality with
those things, that are written by Xenophon of Cyrus. Such like wayes
ought a wise Prince to take, nor ever be idle in quiet times, but by his
paines then, as it were provide himself of store, whereof he may make
some use in his adversity, the end that when the times change, he may be
able to resist the stormes of his hard fortune.
CHAP. XV
Of those things, in respect whereof, men, and especially Princes, are
praised, or dispraised.
It now remaines that we consider what the conditions of a Prince ought
to be, and his termes of government over his subjects, and towards his
friends. And because I know that many have written hereupon; I doubt,
lest I venturing also to treat thereof, may be branded with presumption,
especially seeing I am like enough to deliver an opinion different from
others. But my intent being to write for the advantage of him that
understands me, I thought it fitter to follow the effectuall truth of
the matter, than the imagination thereof; And many Principalities and
Republiques, have been in imagination, which neither have been seen nor
knowne to be indeed: for there is such a distance between how men doe
live, and how men ought to live; that he who leaves that which is done,
for that which ought to be done, learnes sooner his ruine than his
preservation; for that man who will professe honesty in all his actions,
must needs goe to ruine among so many that are dishonest. Whereupon it
is necessary for a Prince, desiring to preserve himselfe, to be able to
make use of that honestie, and to lay it aside againe, as need shall
require. Passing by then things that are only in imagination belonging
to a Prince, to discourse upon those that are really true; I say that
all men, whensoever mention is made of them, and especially Princes,
because they are placed aloft in the view of all, are taken notice of
for some of these qualities, which procure them either commendations or
blame: and this is that some one is held liberal, some miserable,
(miserable I say, nor covetous; for the covetous desire to have, though
it were by rapine; but a miserable man is he, that too much for bears to
make use of his owne) some free givers, others extortioners; some
cruell, others pitious; the one a Leaguebreaker, another faithfull; the
one effeminate and of small courage, the other fierce and couragious;
the one courteous, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other
chaste; the one of faire dealing, the other wily and crafty; the one
hard, the other easie; the one grave, the other light; the one
religious, the other incredulous, and such like. I know that every one
will confesse, it were exceedingly praise worthy for a Prince to be
adorned with all these above nam'd qualities that are good: but because
this is not possible, nor doe humane conditions admit such perfection in
vertues, it is necessary for him to be so discret, that he know how to
avoid the infamie of those vices which would thrust him out of his
State; and if it be possible, beware of those also which are not able to
remove him thence; but where it cannot be, let them passe with lesse
regard. And yet, let him not stand much upon it, though he incurre the
infamie of those vices, without which he can very hardly save his State:
for if all be throughly considerd, some thing we shall find which will
have the colour and very face of Vertue, and following them, they will
lead the to thy destruction; whereas some others that shall as much
seeme vice, if we take the course they lead us, shall discover unto us
the way to our safety and well-being.
The second blemish in this our Authours book, I find in his
fifteenth Chapter: where he instructs his Prince to use such an
ambidexterity as that he may serve himselfe either of vertue, or
vice, according to his advantage, which in true pollicy is
neither good in attaining the Principality nor in securing it
when it is attaind. For Politicks, presuppose Ethiques, which
will never allow this rule: as that a man might make this small
difference between vertue, and vice, that he may indifferently
lay aside, or take up the one or the other, and put it in
practise as best conduceth to the end he propounds himselfe. I
doubt our Authour would have blamd Davids regard to Saul when 1
Sam. 24. in the cave he cut off the lap of Sauls garment, and
spared his head; and afterwards in the 26. when he forbad
Abishai to strike him as he lay sleeping. Worthy of a Princes
consideration is that saying of Abigal to David 1 Sam. 25. 30.
'It shall come to passe when the Lord shall have done to my Lord
according to all that he hath spoken concerning thee, and shall
have appointed thee Ruler over Israel, that this shall be no
grief to thee, nor offence of heart unto my Lord, that thou hast
forborne to shed blood, etc.'
For surely the conscience of this evill ground whereupon they
have either built, or underpropped their tyranny, causes men, as
well _metus_ as _spes in longum projicere_, which sets them a
work on further mischiefe.
CHAP. XVI
Of Liberality, and Miserablenesse.