cannot wholly be attributed either to Fortune or Vertue, I think not fit
to let them passe me: howbeit the one of them may be more largely
discoursed upon, where the Republicks are treated of. These are, when by
some wicked and unlawfull meanes a man rises to the Principality; or
when a private person by the favour of his fellow Citizens becomes
Prince of his countrey. And speaking of the first manner, it shall be
made evident by two Examples, the one ancient, the other moderne,
without entring otherwise into the justice or merit of this part; for I
take it that these are sufficient for any body that is forc'd to follow
them. Agathocles the Sicilian, not of a private man onely, but from a
base and abject fortune, got to be King of Siracusa. This man borne but
of a Potter, continued alwayes a wicked life throughout all the degrees
of this fortune: neverthelesse he accompanied his lewdnesse with such a
courage and resolution, that applying himselfe to military affaires, by
the degrees thereof he attained to bee Prætour of Siracusa, and being
setled in that degree, and having determined that he would become
Prince, and hold that by violence and without obligation to any other,
which by consent had been granted him: and to this purpose haveing had
some private intelligence touching his designe with Amilcar the
Carthaginian, who was imployd with his army in Sicily, one morining
gatherd the people together and the Senate of Syracusa, as if he had
some what to advise with them of matters belonging to the Commonwealth,
and upon a signe given, caus'd his souldiers to kill his Senatours, and
the richest of the people; who being slaine, he usurp'd the Principality
of that City without any civill strife: and however he was twice broken
by the Carthaginians, and at last besieged, was able not onely to defend
his own City, but leaving part of his own army at the defence thereof,
with the other invaded Affrique, and in a short time freed Siracusa from
the siege, and brought the Carthaginians into extreme necessity, who
were constraind to accord with him, be contented with the possession of
Affrique, and quitt Sicily to Agathocles. He then that should consider
the actions and valour of this man, would not see any, or very few
things to be attributed unto Fortune; seeing that as is formerly sayd,
not by any ones favour, but by the degrees of service in warre with many
sufferings and dangers, to which he had risen, he came to the
Principality; and that hee maintained afterwards with so many resolute
and hazardous undertakings. Yet cannot this be term'd vertue or valour
to slay his own Citizens, betray his friends, to be without faith,
without pitty, without religion, which wayes are of force to gaine
dominion, but not glory: for if Agathocles his valour bee well weighd,
in his enturing upon, and comming off from dangers, and the greatnesse
of his courage, in supporting and mastering of adversities, no man can
see why he should be thought any way inferiour even to the ablest
Captaines. Notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with
innumerable wickednesses, allow not that he should be celebrated among
the most excellent men. That cannot then be attributed to Fortune or
Vertue, which without the one or the other was attaind to by him. In our
dayes, while Alexander the sixth held the sea, Oliverotte of Fermo, who
some few yeeres before had been left young by his parents, was brought
up under the care of an uncle of his on the mothers side, called John
Foliani, and in the beginning of his youth given, by him to serve in the
warres under Paulo Vitelli: to the end that being well instructed in
that discipline, he might rise to some worthy degree in the warrs.
Afterwards when Paulo was dead, he served under Vitellozzo his brother,
and in very short time, being ingenious, of a good personage, and brave
courage, he became one of the prime men among the troops he served in:
but thinking it but servile to depend upon another, he plotted by the
ayd of some Citizens of Fermo (who lik'd rather the thraldome of their
City than the liberty of it) and by the favour of the Vitelli, to make
himselfe master of Fermo; and writ to John Foliani, that having been
many yeeres from home, he had a mind to come and see him and the City,
and in some part take notice of his own patrimony; and because he had
not imployd himselfe but to purchase honour, to the end his Citizens
might perceive, that he had not vainely spent his time, he had a desire
to come in good equipage and accompanied with a hundred horse of his
friends and servants; and he intreated him that he would be pleasd so to
take order, that he might be honourably received by the inhabitants of
Fermo, which turnd as well to his honor that was his uncle, as his that
was the nephew. In this, John faild not in any office of courtesie due
to his nephew: and caused him to be well receivd by them of Fermo, and
lodged him in his own house: where having passed some dayes, and stayd
to put in order somewhat that was necessary for his intended villany, he
made a very solemne feast, whether he invited John Foliani, and all the
prime men of Fermo: and when all their chear was ended, and all their
other entertainments, as in such feasts it is customary, Oliverotto of
purpose mov'd some grave discourses; speaking of the greatnesse of Pope
Alexander, and Cæsar his son, and their undertakings; where unto John
and the others making answer, he of a sudden stood up, saying, that
those were things to be spoken of in a more secret place, and so retir'd
into a chamber, whether John and all the other Citizens followd him; nor
were they sooner set downe there, than from some secret place therein
camp forth diverse souldiers, who slew John and all the others: after
which homicide Oliverotto got a horsebacke and ravaged the whole towne,
and besieged the supreme Magistrate in the palace, so that for feare
they were all constraind to obey him, and to settle a government,
whereof hee made himselfe Prince; and they being all dead who, had they
been discontented with him, could have hurt him; he strengthned himselfe
with new civill and military orders, so that in the space of a yeer that
he held the Principality, he was not only secure in the City of Fermo,
but became fearefull to all his neighbours; and the conquest of him
would have prov'd difficult, as that of Agathocles, had he not let
himselfe been deceivd by Cæsar Borgia, when at Sinigallia, as before was
said, he took the Orsini and Vitelli: where he also being taken a yeere
after he had committed the parricide, was strangled together with
Vitellozzo (whome he had had for master both of his vertues and vices.)
Some man might doubt from whence it should proceed, that Agathocles, and
such like, after many treacheries and crueltyes, could possibly live
long secure in his own countrey, and defend himselfe from his forrein
enemies, and that never any of his own Citizens conspir'd against him,
seeing that by means of cruelty, many others have never been able even
in peaceable times to maintaine their States, much lesse in the
doubtfull times of warre. I beleeve that this proceeds from the well, or
ill using of those cruelties: they may bee termd well us'd (if it bee
lawfull to say well of evill) that are put in practice only once of
necessity for securities sake, not insisting therein afterwards; but
there is use made of them for the subjects profit, as much as may be.
But those that are ill us'd, are such as though they bee but few in the
beginning, yet they multiply rather in time, than diminish. They that
take that first way, may with the help of God, and mens care, find some
remedy for their State, as Agathocles did: for the others, it is
impossible they should continue. Whereupon it is to be noted, that in
the laying hold of a State, the usurper thereof ought to runne over and
execute all his cruelties at once, that he be not forced often to
returne to them, and that he may be able, by not renewing of them, to
give men some security, and gaine their affections by doing them some
courtesies. Hee that carries it otherwise, either for fearefullnesse, or
upon evill advice, is alwayes constraind to hold his sword drawne in his
hand; nor ever can hee rely upon his subjects, there being no
possibility for them, because of his daily and continuall injuries, to
live in any safety: for his injuries should bee done altogether, that
being seldomer tasted, they might lesse offend; his favours should bee
bestowd by little, and little to the end they might keep their taste the
better; and above all things a Prince must live with his subjects in
such sort, that no accident either of good or evill can make him vary:
for necessity comming upon him by reason of adversities, thou hast not
time given thee to make advantage of thy cruelties; and the favours
which then thou bestowest, will little help thee, being taken as if they
came from thee perforce, and so yeeld no returne of thanks.
CHAP. IX
Of the Civill Principality.
But comming to the other part, when a principall Citizen, not by
villany, or any other insufferable violence, but by the favour of his
fellow-citizens becomes Prince of his native countrey: which we may
terme a Civill Principality; nor to attaine hereunto is Vertue wholly or
Fortune wholly necessary, but rather a fortunate cunning: I say, this
Principality is climb'd up to, either by the peoples help, or the great
mens. For, in every City we finde these two humours differ; and they
spring from this, that the people desire not to be commanded nor
oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are desirous to command
and oppresse the people: and from these two several appetites, arise in
the City one of these three effects, either a Principality, or Liberty,
or Tumultuary licentiousnesse. The Principality is caused either by the
people, or the great ones, according as the one or other of these
factions have the occasion offerd; for the great ones seeing themselves
not able to resist the people, begin to turne the whole reputation to
one among them, and make him Prince, whereby they may under his shadow
vent their spleenes. The people also, not being able to support the
great mens insolencies, converting the whole reputation to one man,
create him their Prince, to be protected by his authority. He that comes
to the Principality by the assistance of the great ones, subsists with
more difficulty, than he that attaines to it by the peoples favour; for
he being made Prince, hath many about him, who account themselves his
equalls, and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure.
But he that gaines the Principality by the peoples favor, finds himselfe
alone in his throne, and hath none or very few neare him that are not
very supple to bend: besides this, the great ones cannot upon easie
termes be satisfied, or without doing of wrong to others, where as a
small matter contents the people: for the end which the people propound
to themselves, is more honest than that of the great men, these desiring
to oppresse, they only not to be oppressed. To this may be added also,
that the Prince which is the peoples enemy, can never well secure
himselfe of them, because of their multitude; well may hee bee sure of
the Nobles, they being but a few. The worst that a Prince can look for
of the people become his enemy, is to be abandoned by them: but when the
great ones once grow his enemies, he is not only to feare their
abandoning of him, but their making of a party against him also: for
there being in them more forecast and craft, they alwayes take time by
the forelocks whereby to save themselves, and seeke credit with him who
they hope shall get the mastery. The Prince likewise is necessitated
alwayes to live with the same people, but can doe well enough without
the same great men; he being able to create new ones, and destroy them
again every day, and to take from them, and give them credit as he
pleases: and to cleare this part, I say, that great men ought to be
considerd two wayes principally, that is, if they take thy proceedings
so much to heart, as to engage their fortunes wholly in thine, in case
they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle, they ought to be well honourd
and esteem'd: those that bind themselves not to thy fortune, are to be
considerd also two wayes; either they doe it for lack of courage, and
naturall want of spirit, and then shouldst thou serve thy selfe of them,
and of them especially that are men of good advice; for if thy affaires
prosper, thou dost thy selfe honour thereby; if crost, thou needst not
feare them: but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose, and
upon occasion of ambition, it is a signe they think more of themselves
than of thee: and of these the Prince ought to beware, and account of
them as his discoverd enemyes: for alwayes in thy adversity they will
give a hand too to ruine thee. Therefore ought hee that comes to be
Prince by the peoples favour, keepe them his friends: which he may
easily doe, they desiring only to live free from oppression: but he that
becomes Prince by the great mens favour, against the will of the people,
ought above all things to gaine the people to him, which he may easily
effect, when he takes upon him their protection: And because men when
they find good, where they look for evill, are thereby more endered to
their benefactour, therefore growes the people so pliant in their
subjection to him, as if by their favours he had attaind his dignity.
And the Prince is able to gaine them to his side by many wayes, which
because they vary according to the subject, no certaine rule can be
given thereupon; wherefore we shall let them passe I will only conclude,
that it is necessary for a Prince to have the people his friend;
otherwise in his adversities he hath no helpe. Nabis Prince of the
Spartans supported the siege of all Greece, and an exceeding victorious
army of the Romans, and against those defended his native countrey and
State, and this suffic'd him alone, that as the danger came upon him, he
secur'd himself of a fewer; whereas if the people had been his enemy,
this had nothing availd him. And let no man think to overthrow this my
opinion with that common proverb, that He who relyes upon the people,
layes his foundation in the dirt; for that is true where a private
Citizen grounds upon them, making his account that the people shall free
him, when either his enemyes or the Magistrates oppresse him: In this
case he should find himself often deceiv'd, as it befell the Gracchyes
in Rome, and in Florence George Scali: but he being a Prince that
grounds thereupon, who can command, and is a man of courage, who hath
his wits about him in his adversityes, and wants not other preparations,
and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and
orders, shall not prove deceiv'd by them, and shall find he hath layd
good foundations. These Principalityes are wont to be upon the point of
falling when they goe about to skip from the civil order to the
absolute: for these Princes either command of themselves, or by the
Magistrate; in this last case their State is more weak and dangerous,
because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these Citizens,
who then are set over the Magistrates, who especially in adverse times
are able with facility to take their State from them either by rising up
against them, or by not obeying them; and then the Prince is not at hand
in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him: for the
Citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from
the Magistrates, are not like in those fractions to obey his: and in
doubtfull times he shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom he may
trust; for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in
peaceable times, when the Citizens have need of the State; for then
every one runs, and every one promises, and every one will venture his
life for him, where there is no danger neare; but in times of hazzard,
when the State hath need of Citizens, there are but few of them then,
and so much the more is this experience dangerous, in that it can be but
once made. Therefore a prudent Prince ought to devise a way whereby his
Citizens alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of
his government, and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to him.
CHAP. X
In what manner the Forces of all Principalities ought to be measured.
It is requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities, to
have another consideration of them, that is, if a Prince have such
dominions, that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself,
or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend him. And to
cleer this point the better, I judge them able to stand of themselves,
who are of power either for their multitudes of men, or quantity of
money, to bring into the field a compleat armie, and joyn battel with
whoever comes to assail them: and so I think those alwaies to stand in
need of others help, who are not able to appear in the field against the
enemy, but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them.
Touching the first case, we have treated already, and shall adde somwhat
thereto as occasion shall require. In the second case, we cannot say
other, save only to encourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their
own Capital city, and of the countrey about, not to hold much account;
and whoever shall have well fortified that town, and touching other
matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects,
as hath been formerly said, and hereafter shall be, shall never be
assaild but with great regard; for men willingly undertake not
enterprises, where they see difficulty to work them through; nor can
much facility be there found, where one assails him, who hath his town
strong and wel guarded, and is not hated of his people. The cities of
Germany are very free; they have but very little of the countrey about
them belonging to them; and they obey the Emperor, when they please, and
they stand not in fear, neither of him nor any other Potentate about
them: for they are in such a manner fortified, that every one thinks the
siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious: for all of them have
ditches, and rampires, and good store of Artillery, and alwaies have
their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a
yeer: besides this, whereby to feed the common people, and without any
loss to the publick, they have alwaies in common whereby they are able
for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the
sinews and the life of that city, and of that industry whereby the
commons ordinarily supported themselves: they hold up also the military
exercises in repute, and hereupon have they many orders to maintain
them. A Prince then that is master of a good strong city, and causeth
not himself to be hated, cannot be assaulted; and in case he were, he
that should assail him, would be fain to quit him with shame: for the
affairs of the world are so various, that it is almost impossible that
an army can lie incampt before a town for the space of a whole yeer: and
if any should reply, that the people having their possessions abroad, in
case they should see them a fire, would not have patience, and the
tedious siege and their love to themselves would make them forget their
Prince: I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious, will easily
master those difficulties, now giving his subjects hope, that the
mischief will not be of durance; sometimes affright them with the
cruelty of their enemies, and other whiles cunningly securing himself of
those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy. Besides this by
ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey, upon
his arrival, and at those times while mens minds are yet warme, and
resolute in their defence: and therefore so much the less ought a Prince
doubt: for after some few dayes, that their courages grow coole, the
dammages are all done, and mischiefs received, and there is no help for
it, and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince,
thinking he is now more bound to them, their houses having for his
defence been fired, and their possessions wasted; and mens nature is as
well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do, as for those
they receive; whereupon if all be well weigh'd, a wise Prince shall not
find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his Citizens hearts at
the beginning and latter end of the siege, when he hath no want of
provision for food and ammunition.
CHAP. XI
Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities.
There remains now only that we treat of the Ecclesiastical
Principalities, about which all the difficulties are before they are
gotten: for they are attained to either by vertue, or Fortune; and
without the one or the other they are held: for they are maintaind by
orders inveterated in the religion, all which are so powerfull and of
such nature, that they maintain their Princes in their dominions in what
manner soever they proceed and live. These only have an Estate and
defend it not; have subjects and govern them not; and yet their States
because undefended, are not taken from them; nor their subjects, though
not govern'd, care not, think not, neither are able to aliene themselves
from them. These Principalities then are only happy and secure: but they
being sustained by superior causes, whereunto humane understanding
reaches not, I will not meddle with them: for being set up and
maintained by God, it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man
to enter into discourse of them. Yet if any man should ask me whence it
proceeds, that the Church in temporal power hath attaind to such
greatness, seeing that till the time of Alexander the sixt, the Italian
Potentates, and not only they who are entituled the potentates, but
every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition in regard of the
temporality, made but small account of it; and now a King of France
trembles at the power thereof; and it hath been able to drive him out of
Italy, and ruine the Venetians; and however this be well known, me
thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory.
Before that Charles King of France past into Italy, this countrey was
under the rule of the Pope, Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of
Milan, and the Florentines. These Potentates took two things principally
to their care; the one, that no forreiner should invade Italy; the other
that no one of them should inlarge their State. They, against whom this
care was most taken, were the Pope and the Venetians; and to restrain
the Venetians, there needed the union of all the rest, as it was in the
defence of Ferrara; and to keep the Pope low, they served themselves of
the Barons of Rome, who being divided into two factions, the Orsini and
Colonnesi, there was alwaies occasion of offence between them, who
standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope, held
the Popedome weak and feeble: and however sometimes there arose a
couragious Pope, as was Sextus; yet either his fortune, or his wisdome
was not able to free him of these incommodities, and the brevity of
their lives was the cause thereof; for in ten years, which time, one
with another, Popes ordinarily liv'd, with much ado could they bring low
one of the factions. And if, as we may say, one had near put out the
Colonnesi, there arose another enemy to the Orsini, who made them grow
again, so that there was never time quite to root them out. This then
was the cause, why the Popes temporal power was of small esteem in
Italy; there arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixt, who of all the
Popes that ever were, shewed what a Pope was able to do with money and
forces: and he effected, by means of his instrument, Duke Valentine, and
by the ocasion of the French mens passage, all those things which I have
formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions: and however his purpose
was nothing at all to inlarge the Church dominions, but to make the Duke
great; yet what he did, turnd to the Churches advantage, which after his
death when the Duke was taken away, was the heir of all his pains.
Afterwards succeeded Pope Julius, and found the Church great, having all
Romania, and all the Barons of Rome being quite rooted out, and by
Alexanders persecutions, all their factions worne down; he found also
the way open for the heaping up of moneys, never practised before
Alexanders time; which things Julius not only follow'd, but augmented;
and thought to make himself master of Bolonia, and extinguish the
Venetians, and chase the French men out of Italy: and these designes of
his prov'd all lucky to him, and so much the more to his praise in that
he did all for the good of the Church, and in no private regard: he kept
also the factions of the Orsins and Colonnesi, in the same State he
found them: and though there were among them some head whereby to cause
an alteration; yet two things have held them quiet; the one the power of
the Church, which somewhat affrights them; the other because they have
no Cardinals of their factions, who are the primary causes of all the
troubles amongst them: nor shall these parties ever be at rest, while
they have Cardinals; because they nourish the factions both in Rome, and
abroad; and the Barons then are forced to undertake the defence of them:
and thus from the Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults
among the Barons. And now hath Pope Leo his Holiness found the Popedome
exceeding puissant, of whom it is hoped, that if they amplified it by
armes, he by his goodness, and infinite other vertues, will much more
advantage and dignifie it.
CHAP. XII
How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching Mercenary
soldiers.