OBJECTIONS TO PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
"The party agents and political men opposed to the very last the
introduction of a system of proportional representation."--COUNT GOBLET
D'ALVIELLA
_The question of practicality._
Although the fear lest proportional representation should weaken the
party system is now the most serious obstacle in the way of its
acceptance by the practical politician, yet there are others who warmly
approve of the principle, who regard proportional representation as the
ideal, but still entertain some doubts as to its practicability, and
therefore shrink from a whole-hearted advocacy of the reform. Nor are
these doubts entirely removed by the conclusion arrived at by the Royal
Commission on Electoral Systems--that the three systems of proportional
representation examined by the Commission are quite feasible. The
sceptics need to be convinced that the intelligence of the ordinary
English elector and the capacity of the English returning officer are
equal to the requirements of the new system; its practicability has in
fact to be demonstrated afresh. It is granted that the more complete
adaptation of the machinery of elections to the true representation of
the electors must involve some departure from the simplicity of present
methods, and in order to gauge the value of the objection that the
change proposed is so great as to render its introduction impracticable,
it will be well to consider once more the character of the tasks which
the new system will throw upon the elector and the returning officer.
_The elector's task._ In criticizing the mechanism of the
single transferable vote a Member of Parliament, at a public meeting in
his constituency, declared that the act of voting ought to be made so
simple as to be intelligible to a child of the second standard in a
public elementary school. The reply might very well be made that such
children are capable of indicating a choice amongst those things in
which they are interested. But this assertion raises the question
whether the method of voting for the purpose of selecting the members of
an assembly, to which the affairs of an empire, a nation or a city, are
to be entrusted, can only be regarded as practicable if it is adapted to
the capacity of the least intelligent of the electors. Must a nation
continue to suffer all the evils which arise from an imperfect electoral
system because some of its citizens may be so unintelligent as to be
unable to make use of an improved method? A secretary of the Liberal
Unionist Association has declared that in some constituencies hundreds
of electors are so ignorant as not to know the name of the Prime
Minister, and has even advanced this fact in order to show that it is
unnecessary to trouble about the true representation of the electors.
Even were this statement not exaggerated it would but furnish an
additional argument in favour of proportional representation. The votes
of such ignorant electors, not being given for political reasons, are
far too easily bought by that indirect corruption which takes the form
of subscriptions, charitable donations, gifts of coals and of blankets;
and yet, with the present system, these votes may decide the result of
an election and completely nullify the votes of intelligent citizens.
With the single transferable vote all that an elector is asked to do is
to number candidates in the order of his preference. He need do no more
than place the figure 1 against the name of his first choice. It is
desirable that, he should proceed further, but abundant assistance, if
he needs it, will be forthcoming from the party organizations and the
press. But is there any considerable section of the English electorate
that cannot perform this new duty? When being examined before the Select
Committee of the House of Lords on the Municipal Representation Bill,
Mr. J. J. Stephenson, a member of the Executive Committee of the Labour
Party, was asked, "Do you think that the system of voting proposed in
the Bill would offer any difficulties to working men?" His reply was
emphatic. "No. I have had some experience of working men, and I have
never found them any slower in intelligence than any other part of the
community--there are few working men who could not tell in order of
merit the men they wanted to vote for. That is my personal experience
gained after some years of work." Apart from this expression of opinion,
we have this convincing testimony to the capacity of working men
electors that they have been among the first to put improved electoral
methods into practice. The Northumberland miners and Canadian Trades
Unions are familiar with the use of the single transferable vote in the
election of their officers; the Labour Party in Victoria has made use of
preferential voting in the selection of its parliamentary candidates.
Moreover, the daily work of artizans enables them readily and quickly to
grasp the fundamental idea of proportional representation--the
representation of parties in _proportion_ to their strength--and the
discussions on this question in Labour organizations have been at least
as keen as, if not keener than, those in other political associations.
The doubts entertained as to the capacity of the electorate are not
shared by those who have been officially responsible for the conduct of
elections. Mr. S. R. Ginn, Clerk of the Peace for Cambridgeshire, in
giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems,
declared that "after one or two elections proportional representation
ought to work as easily as the ballot. When the county electors got the
extended franchise we had some difficulty with the ballot, but now it is
simple, and proportional representation would be much the same."
Speaking of the elaborate precautions taken in the organization of
elections he expressed the opinion that the voters were more to be
trusted than our machinery trusts them. It is difficult in the face of
such evidence to understand on what grounds the English electors should
be regarded as so greatly inferior to the electors of other countries
that they cannot be trusted to make proper use of an improved electoral
method. The charge of incapacity can only apply to the least intelligent
section of the electorate, and it is astonishing that those who are so
anxious to preserve the electoral privileges of the unintelligent voters
should be supremely indifferent to the representation of the abler
sections of the electorate. At present at every election the votes of
thousands of intelligent citizens count for nothing. The electors who
voted for Conservative candidates in Wales at the General Election in
1906 might have saved themselves the trouble. Their voting papers,
although not spoiled in the technical sense, had no value. Proportional
representation would have given a value to all these votes, and even if
its introduction should result in an increase in the number of spoiled
papers, this would be as nothing compared with the number of votes to
which, for the first time, a value would be given. The Australian
advocates of proportional representation aptly describe the reform as
"effective voting." The elector knows that his vote will count, and thus
every inducement is offered to him to take part in the choice of a
representative. The vote becomes a more valuable possession to the
elector under proportional representation than under the
single-member system.
_The returning officer's task._
With regard to the duties of returning officers, which in England fall
upon the sheriffs of counties and the mayors of boroughs, it should be
remembered that in the performance of these duties they are invariably
assisted by an expert staff, and in judging of the difficulties which
would attend the introduction of a new system, the fact that this expert
staff would be available for the purpose of carrying out the details of
an election must be taken into consideration. There would probably be
no more difficulty in the introduction of a system of proportional
representation than was experienced in introducing the greater change
associated with the Ballot Act. On that occasion instructions as to
their new duties were issued to returning officers, and similar
instructions would no doubt be issued as to the practical organization
of elections under a system of proportional representation. In Belgium a
department of the Ministry of the Interior is set apart for the
administration of electoral affairs. Complete instructions are issued
from this department to the returning officers throughout the country,
and the supervision which the department exercises over the conduct of
elections doubtless contributes to the facility with which returning
officers have carried out their duties under the proportional system.
The fears expressed lest returning officers should not be equal to the
duties which would fall upon them under the system of the single
transferable vote are not shared by the returning officers themselves.
Mr. H. R. Poole, Under Sheriff for Somerset, who has had thirty years'
experience in the conduct of elections, stated, in evidence before the
Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, that were Somersetshire treated
as a single constituency under the system of the single transferable
vote he would be able to make the necessary arrangements for the
counting of the votes with a staff of the same class of men as had
assisted him hitherto. Speaking on behalf of the Under Sheriffs'
Association, he added that "they saw no difficulty in carrying out any
new electoral law which might be passed, and that they would always be
glad to give their assistance and work as loyally as they could in
support of anything which might be done." The officials of urban
constituencies are not less competent. Perhaps the largest urban
constituency which would be formed under a system of proportional
representation would be that of Glasgow, and Mr. Alexander Walker, the
Assessor of that city, who for twenty-four years was intimately
associated with the organization of elections, has, after a careful
examination of the details of the single transferable vote, stated that
there are no practical difficulties in the way of applying the system to
a constituency of the size of Glasgow.
The doubts as to the capacity of returning officers spring from an
inadequate acquaintance with the difficulties which they already
overcome in the conduct of elections. The duties which would devolve
upon these officers under the single transferable vote system are not
greater than have been undertaken and are undertaken in Great Britain
to-day in connexion with the use of the cumulative vote. The Scottish
School Boards are still elected under the latter system, and the
following particulars of the elections in Glasgow on 2 April 1909,
illustrate the admirable manner in which returning officers in this
country, as elsewhere, carry out the tasks assigned to them. The whole
city was polled as one constituency; fifteen members were to be elected,
and each elector had fifteen votes, which he could distribute or
cumulate as he pleased upon any of the twenty-one candidates nominated.
There were on the roll 157,194 electors, of whom 40,778 took part in the
election. The returning officer, in this case the Treasurer of the
Glasgow School Board, had therefore to deal with over 600,000 votes, but
he had to make provision for counting a much larger number of votes. Yet
he had no difficulty in accomplishing successfully and expeditiously
this gigantic task. He enlisted the services of over 250 clerks, and the
whole process of extracting the details of the ballot papers was
completed in the course of about five hours. Had the single transferable
vote been employed the number of votes to be dealt with would have been
40,778 only, and although the papers would have had to be counted more
than once, the task would not have been so large as that entailed by the
cumulative vote, nor would it have been necessary to have engaged so
large a staff. It is sometimes forgotten that returning officers take a
pride in the perfecting of their arrangements for counting the votes. In
introducing new methods into the counting of votes in the Glasgow
Municipal elections, Mr. Walker prepared and issued very complete
instructions to his staff, and took pains to see that the staff were
fully prepared for its work, and there is not the least doubt that the
town clerks and under-sheriffs would meet any changes in electoral
methods with the determination to carry out their part of the work as
successfully as possible. The first elections in Tasmania and the
Transvaal with the single transferable vote proceeded with perfect
smoothness, and this was due to the excellent preparations made by the
returning officers.
_Time required for counting votes._
One of the minor objections urged against proportional representation is
that a considerable time must elapse between the close of the poll and
the declaration of the result. It will not be possible to announce the
figures on the day of the election. It is doubtless desirable that the
result of an election should be ascertained without unnecessary delay,
but it is far better to wait a day in order to obtain a true result than
to adhere to an electoral system which gives a false result, and on
which a government may have to be based for a period of five years. With
most proportional systems only one day's delay occurs. The Under Sheriff
of Somerset has estimated that it might take him two days before he
could complete the return for that county, as it would probably take
half the first day to verify the contents of the ballot boxes. On this
point the verdict of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems is as
follows: "On the whole it is probably safe to say that in a constituency
where 60,000 or 70,000 votes are cast, such as would have to be
contemplated in this country, the results should be declared with
efficient arrangements in the course of the second day after the poll.
Where the constituency was compact, _e.g.,_ in the case of a large town
like Birmingham or Manchester, the count of first votes could be
finished on the night of the election, and the remaining operations of
elimination and transfer completed in a long day's work on the following
day; but a longer time would have to be allowed in the case of extensive
rural districts."[1] It has also been alleged that there may be a
greater number of petitions for the recounting of votes under the
transferable vote system. But neither Tasmanian nor South African
experience gives any ground for this statement, and as the Tasmanian
Agent-General has pointed out, there is as much difference between the
counting of votes under the improved system and under the existing rough
and ready method as there is between book-keeping by single and
book-keeping by double entry; the sorting of the votes is carefully
checked at each operation, and all errors in the counting of votes must
be rectified before any new stage in the process can be entered upon.
_ Fads and sectional interests._
The objection that a proportional system is too complex for English
electors and returning officers thus completely breaks down. But it
remains to consider whether the other objections which have been raised
against proportional representation are of sufficient weight as to
render its introduction undesirable. It is repeatedly asserted that
proportional representation will encourage the undue representation of
faddists and of sectional interests. For example, Professor Edward Jenks
alleges that, "If we had such a vast constituency as Manchester, or
Liverpool, under the proportional system we should certainly have a
member for teetotalism, a member for vegetarianism and the like, and
each of these, in all probability, would be instructed rigidly to oppose
everything inconsistent with the special ideal of its constituents."[2]
Now under a system of proportional representation a candidate in any
constituency, were it Liverpool, Manchester or Glasgow, would have to
secure about 10,000 votes before he could be sure of being returned, and
it is incredible that in any of these constituencies so large a number
of voters would support candidatures such as those described by
Professor Jenks, or that political feeling is so weak that Liberal,
Conservative, and Labour candidates would be set aside in favour of
candidates standing for a single interest only. The character of the
objection shows that the true working of a system of proportional
representation is completely misunderstood, for a proportional system
reduces fads and sectional interests to their proper proportions; it is
the existing system of single-member constituencies which confers
excessive power upon insignificant sections of the whole. Were there
10,000 electors in Manchester who, as suggested, would regard
vegetarianism as of greater importance than any other political
question, and were these electors scattered throughout the city, then
there would be an average of more than 1500 such electors in each of the
existing divisions. A body of 1500 voters in a division of Manchester
prepared to place their particular fad above all other political
questions have now the power of determining the result of the election
in that division; the 10,000 electors similarly minded would have the
power of extracting a pledge in support of their proposals, and probably
an effective pledge from the successful candidate in each division.
Under a system of proportional representation they might possibly secure
a few seats, but under the present system they can affect the election
in every constituency. It is well known that a large number of members
of Parliament pledge themselves at election time to the support of
movements with which they are not fully in accord. Probably their seat
depended upon the answer which they gave to the leaders of some small
body of electors holding the balance in the constituency.
Mr. Henry Vivian, M.P., thus refers to the pressure which small groups
of voters bring to bear upon parliamentary candidates: "One serious evil
which he hoped might be abolished by a change of system was the ragging
of constituencies by a comparatively small number of busybodies
interested in some particular fad. A large number of members of
Parliament really had to bend to some two or three hundred electors,
although there might be 20,000 in the whole constituency. He had the
misfortune to be elected by only a gross. It was strictly true that in
many cases a candidate was compelled to consent to support something
that he felt strongly against, merely because a certain percentage of
the electors insisted upon it. He was not suggesting that proportional
representation would entirely get rid of this evil, but he was satisfied
that proportional representation rested on a larger basis--that they
would have larger constituencies and a number of men from whom the
elector might make selection; and therefore there would be a possibility
of their lessening, if not altogether getting rid of, this most
intolerable evil. He was not at all sure that he would not at times
rather be out of political life than in it; it became so threatening
that he absolutely refused to reply to the letters at all, or to be
dictated to, in the way that these people attempted to do. He would
venture to say that with a system of proportional representation they
would be able to get rid of some at least, if not of most, of the
objectionable features of the present system."[3] The same feature of
our electoral system has been condemned in the strongest terms by Mr.
Balfour. "Everybody," said he, "who has watched the actual course of a
contested election in a constituency where parties were fairly evenly
balanced, knows perfectly well the monstrous power which is given to a
very small minority to exact a pledge from the candidate, not that he
should support this or that great policy, but that he should help their
small and particular interest. I know nothing which is more corrupting,
both to the electors or to the elected, than that process; and although
I have fully seen the difficulties which attach to what is commonly
known as minority representation, it surely is an extraordinary
criticism upon our existing system that, while a small handful of
interested people can turn an election one way or the other on their own
personal issue, huge minorities, like the minority of the Unionists in
Scotland, are utterly and grossly unrepresented. We give every privilege
to the little knot of people in the individual constituencies; we ignore
the great mass who under our existing system find no representation at
all comparable either to their numerical strength or to their public
spirit, or to any other quality which makes them useful, able and
independent citizens."[4]
The organizations of different branches of the Civil Service have, in
furtherance of their interests, sought to bring pressure to bear upon
members of Parliament, and in consequence of this action it has been
suggested that civil servants should be disfranchised. In other words,
it is proposed to meet an evil encouraged by defective electoral methods
by inflicting a gross injustice upon a large body of citizens, the
majority of whom, like other citizens, consider political problems
purely from the point of view of national advantage. The true remedy for
the unfair pressure of small sections must be sought in such a change in
the method of election as will allow the country to appraise them at
their true value. Direct representation, by means of which sectional
interests can, if necessary, be defended or advanced within the House of
Commons, is far less injurious to the State than a system which allows
such interests to bring unfair pressure to bear upon a considerable
number of members of Parliament, or to enforce their demands upon the
nation by linking themselves to a national party. There is, however, but
little danger of any large number of members being returned in support
of single interests only. The results under systems of proportional
representation show that the members elected are returned upon political
grounds, and when any question has attained such importance as to
command the support of 10,000 votes in any constituency, doubtless that
question has become ripe for discussion in Parliament, and can no longer
fairly be described as a fad.
It is, however, said that the direct representation of sectional
interests will enable these to exercise in Parliament the same pressure
that they at present exercise in the constituencies. This statement also
is based upon a misconception of the changed conditions which would
result from a system of proportional representation. A small body of
electors can at present exercise pressure in the constituency, because
the result of the election is in their hands. A small group of members
could only exercise the same influence in the House of Commons if the
large parties were willing to bid for their support and were, at the
same time, able to enforce upon their followers the observance of any
agreement entered into. The great difference in the new conditions of
party discipline will here come into play. Members of a party who have
been able to win elections in spite of the opposition of sectional
interests, would be able to withstand pressure in Parliament. They would
know that they could appeal with confidence to their supporters in the
constituency to endorse their action, and, indeed, they would much more
likely lose their seat if they acted contrary to the wishes of those who
had returned them. Any sacrifice of principle by a party for the sake of
conciliating a small faction would cause a loss of support greater than
the gain. When proportional representation is established such grouping
as may take place within the House of Commons will be based upon
political affinities.
_The representation of localities._
Another objection which is often brought against proportional
representation is that it will destroy the intimate relation which
exists at present between a constituency and its representative in
Parliament. Here the arguments used are not only as a rule
self-destructive, but they are obviously in conflict with the suggestion
that proportional representation would give undue weight to sectional
interests. "Parliament," said Burke, "is a deliberate assembly of one
nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where not local purpose,
not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting
from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed, but
when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a
member of Parliament. If the local constituent should have interest, or
should form a hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the
rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far as
any other from any endeavour to give it effect."[5] Were the primary
duty of a member for any constituency to consider the special needs of
that constituency, local considerations would outweigh national
interests.
Yet Burke's declaration is not intended to relieve the representative of
a constituency from the duty of attending to its administrative
necessities. "Only members of Parliament," said Mr. Gulland, M.P.,
"appreciate how largely their time is taken up with local matters. They
have to approach the different Government Departments upon an endless
variety of topics." But Mr. Gulland proceeds: "These matters as a rule
have no reference to existing Parliamentary divisions, and in a city it
would be very much better if a man were member for the whole city rather
than for a division. And in the case of a county, including burghs, it
would be better that the general interests of the county should be
attended to by members representing the county as a whole than by a
member who is only the representative of the burgh."[6] It is also
possible that the interests of some division of the city or county might
be opposed to the interests of the city as a whole, and this is an
additional reason against the subdivision of such constituencies for the
purpose of parliamentary representation. An admirable illustration
occurs in a speech made in the Canadian House of Commons by Mr. F. D.
Monk, K.C. "In a very large constituency," said he, "say of the size of
the entire island of Montreal, it would be impossible to resort to the
promise of a great many small public works, which by the admission of
everybody are not at present advantageous, when we have such large
problems to solve in connexion, for instance, with the problem of
transportation. Nobody in a constituency such as I have just indicated
could advocate the construction of a small wharf or a small public
building, but would be obliged to consider the relation of such a large
territory as the island and city of Montreal to the all-important
question of transportation. He would be obliged to lay before the
electors, not promises of small and very often useless, though
comparatively costly improvements, but the necessity of carrying out
such a plan of transportation as was laid before the country and the
Government some years ago by a commission composed of very experienced
men, who after considerable labour had in my opinion solved that very
vital question in every part of the country."[7] If local representation
is necessary it would therefore appear to be most desirable that the
representatives should be able to speak in the name of the whole of the
town or of the county, as the case may be, and that is the kind of local
representation which a system of proportional representation provides.
The members for the larger area can and do take a wider view than the
member for the smaller electorate.
But what kind of local representation does a system of single-member
constituencies provide? A large number of constituencies are represented
by members who have no connexion with the locality other than that of
being its spokesman in Parliament. Mr. Winston Churchill, defeated in a
division of Manchester, is elected member for Dundee, a Scottish
constituency. In what sense is the local representation of Dundee
preserved? What were the special qualifications possessed by Mr.
Churchill for giving utterance to the needs of a Scottish constituency?
Doubtless Mr. Churchill made every effort to become acquainted with the
local conditions of Dundee, and the necessity of doing so must have made
considerable demands upon his time and energy. Yet it is more than
doubtful whether Mr. Churchill can ever be an ideal representative from
the standpoint of locality of a constituency to whose local life he is a
stranger. Mr. Churchill's experience is in no sense singular. Mr.
Gladstone found it necessary to leave Greenwich for Midlothian; Lord
Morley to leave Newcastle for Forfarshire; Sir William Harcourt to leave
Derby for Monmouthshire; Mr. Balfour to leave Manchester for the City of
London, and, however honoured the new constituencies might be by the
distinction of their members, it cannot be said that the intimate
relation between the representative and the constituency was maintained.
Under proportional representation the representation of localities
becomes much more real. Excellent examples can be seen in the working of
the system in Belgium. Before the introduction of the new methods
leaders of political parties in Belgium were compelled, as in England,
to leave the towns with which they were identified and to seek election
for constituencies, in which, comparatively speaking, they were unknown.
Here the cause was not the subdivision of constituencies but the absence
of any provision for the representation of minorities. M. Anseele, the
leader of the Socialists in Ghent, and intimately acquainted with the
life of that city, had to seek entrance into the Chamber of Deputies as
one of the Socialist representatives of Liège. Similarly, M.
Vandervelde, whose activities had always been identified with Brussels,
had to proceed to Charleroi in order to secure election. But on the
introduction of the proportional system, M. Vandervelde returned to
Brussels and was immediately elected as one of the Socialist members of
the constituency, of whose special requirements he could, if need be,
speak with effect in Parliament. M. Anseele returned to Ghent and was
elected as one of the members for the city with which the whole of his
life had been associated. He was relieved from the double burden of
continuing his work in Ghent and of acting as the representative of a
constituency in another part of the country. It is abundantly clear, if
it is desired to maintain the local character of representation, that a
proportional system secures such representation in its most
efficient form.
So flimsy and contradictory are some of the arguments brought against
proportional representation that it is not surprising that certain
critics, impressed by such facts as are recorded in the previous
paragraph, have alleged that the system will so favour the
representation of localities that no one but a local candidate will ever
have any chance of success. The conclusion is drawn that proportional
representation will militate against the return of eminent politicians,
and is, for this reason, undesirable. But the facts cited as to Belgium
bear no such interpretation. It is true that under all electoral systems
the local candidate has, other things being equal, an advantage, and
rightly so, over candidates who are not directly connected with the
constituency, but it is also true that under all systems local
candidates give way, if necessary, to distinguished statesmen. In
Belgium the Socialists of Liège and Charleroi willingly accepted as
their representatives M. Anseele and M. Vandervelde when these failed to
secure representation in their own towns. So welcome are eminent
politicians that there can be no ground for supposing that they will
suffer from a proportional system. Indeed, large constituencies
returning several members give to these a much surer foothold in
Parliament than they can possibly secure with single-member areas. The
distinguished candidate can appeal almost with certainty of success for
the "quota" of votes which is sufficient to secure his election. The
only change that will be made by the proportional system is that he will
be able to retain his seat in the constituency with which he is really
identified; he will no longer be compelled to wander from place to place
with every swing of the pendulum.
_The member and his constituents._
There is perhaps one other aspect of the representation of localities
which deserves attention. The fictions are still maintained that a
member of Parliament represents and is intimately associated with all
his constituents. As regards the latter, it is obvious that only in a
very small constituency can a member become personally acquainted with
the electors. This might have been feasible in the days of the
restricted franchise prior to 1867, but in modern constituencies which,
on an average, contain some 11,000 voters it is impossible. Further, in
respect of representation, since votes, save those of ignorant and
corrupt electors, are given more and more on political grounds, an
elector can derive but little consolation from the fact that he is
"represented" in Parliament by the candidate whom he did his best to
defeat, nor does such an elector, should he take a considerable interest
in political work, care to approach the member in any cause; he prefers
to seek help of a member of his own party who is the representative of
another constituency. If a member of Parliament is elected to defend
Free Trade he cannot possibly represent the political convictions of
constituents who believe that Free Trade is disastrous to the country.
But under a proportional system Free Traders and Tariff Reformers would
each have their own representatives, and whilst all the members would be
able to speak for the constituency when its local interests were
concerned, the various parties within the constituency would find
expression given to their views when the question of Free Trade or of
Tariff Reform was under discussion. So far as modern conditions permit,
the relations between the member and his constituents would be of an
intimate character, and at least there would be that bond of sympathy
which springs from identity of purpose and of political faith.
_Objections of party agents._
Count Goblet d'Alviella has stated that the most strenuous and
persistent opposition to the introduction of proportional representation
in Belgium came from party agents and from the political men, that is,
from the extreme partizans. It is perhaps only natural to expect that
party agents should object to a system which would introduce a
considerable change in the method of party organization and in the
conduct of elections, but a good many of their fears are based upon
misapprehensions. It is true that political organizations might not
control nominations as much as they do now, but the work of organizers
would perhaps be even in greater demand than now. Thus, in Belgium,
before the introduction of proportional representation, many
constituencies were uncontested, some not for twenty years, and the
political organizations of the minority in these constituencies fell
into decay, in many places being completely abandoned. Similarly in
England, it is often extremely difficult to maintain political
organizations in those constituencies in which the position of the
minority is hopeless. The new electoral methods have been followed in
Belgium with a great increase of political activity; no constituency is
now uncontested, and each of the parties maintains an active
organization in every district.
The objections generally advanced by party agents are the increased
inconvenience and cost which would result from the enlargement of the
constituencies. It is alleged that it would be impossible for candidates
in country areas to make themselves known to the electors. But to what
extent does this objection hold good? Prior to 1885 many of the
constituencies were much larger than they are to-day. The county of
Northumberland, which is now divided into six divisions, was then
divided into two. With the more rapid means of communications and of
transit now available a candidate can cover a county constituency with
much more ease than was possible a generation ago. The decrease in the
size of constituencies since 1885 has not given any greater leisure to
the candidates during the period of his candidature. Every moment of his
time is filled up and, indeed, there is often an unnecessary expenditure
of time and energy upon public meetings, the number of which, owing to
an insane competition, has been multiplied to an absurd degree.
Candidates are now expected to address meetings at the breakfast hour,
meetings at the luncheon hour, and meetings in the evening; if
constituencies were enlarged the time of the candidate would doubtless
be carefully mapped out to meet the new conditions. Moreover, the
constituencies required by a system of proportional representation in
the United Kingdom would still be small compared with the constituencies
in the Colonies, and even though large electoral areas may have some
disadvantages the benefits to be gained from a true system of
representation completely outweigh them.
_Alleged difficulties in the organization of elections._
Some valuable lessons were learned during the course of the Johannesburg
municipal elections in 1909, as to the organization of contests under
the system of the single transferable vote. There was no previous
experience to guide either the candidate or their agents. The methods
pursued differed according to the rigidity of the discipline existing
within the party. A committee representative of commercial and other
interests, presided over by the Hon. W. A. Martin, M.L.C., selected the
names of ten candidates--there were ten vacancies--and this committee
asked the citizens of Johannesburg to vote for the candidates whose
names figured upon this ticket--the "ticket of the ten good men," as it
was called. The committee did not attempt to instruct the electors as to
the order in which preferences should be expressed for these candidates.
The electors were asked to place them in such order as they pleased.[8]
The candidature of the ticket, as such, was in some respects also
loosely organized. The various candidates gave separate and special
attention to the districts with which they were most closely identified,
but they also appeared in twos and threes on the same platform at public
meetings. In every district the names of all ten candidates appeared
upon the posters, but special prominence was given to the name of some
one candidate--the candidate associated with the district. The final
appeal to the public, in the form of a specimen ballot paper, had all
the ten names printed in bold type. In this way the committee was
enabled to appeal to the town to support the ticket as a whole, whilst
the individual members of the ticket were free to solicit first
preferences in the districts and circles in which they were best known.
Such an arrangement shows how easily the difficulties of candidature
under the new system can be overcome. If the arrangements outlined above
were adopted by party organizers the difficulties of an electoral
campaign would be no greater than with a system of single-member
constituencies. Each candidate on the ticket would canvass a portion of
the constituency--which would be no larger than a single-member
area--whilst at convenient centres the members of the ticket would
appear upon a common platform. The campaign of the Labour Party was more
rigidly organized. The leaders nominated a ticket of three candidates,
but instead of leaving their supporters free, instructed them to vote
for the candidates on the ticket in a definite order, although this
order was varied in different wards. In the official instructions the
elector is asked to vote by placing the figure 1 opposite the name of
the candidate he likes best, and some risk is run by an organization
which advises its supporters to express their first preference for some
candidate who is not the party's true first choice. It is sufficient for
organizers to advise their supporters to record preferences for all the
candidates of the party, leaving the elector free to decide the order in
which those preferences should be given.
_Alleged increase of cost._
These elections threw some light on another difficulty urged against
proportional representation by party agents, namely, the increased
expenditure involved. Considerable sums of money were certainly spent in
the prosecution of the candidature of the "ten good men," but these
elections proved conclusively that excessive expenditure had much less
influence in determining the result than in our parliamentary and
municipal elections. The total expenses of the three Labour candidates
in Johannesburg were returned at £18, 5s., and even if there is added
thereto the expenditure incurred by the Labour Representation Committee,
amounting to £34, 3s. 6d., the total sum cannot be said to be excessive.
Two of these three candidates were successful. The expenditure of the
successful Labour candidate in Pretoria was practically nil. Further,
the Mayor of Johannesburg, who, relying upon his record of past work,
personally took no action beyond the issue of a manifesto to the
electors, was returned at the head of the poll.
Mr. Ramsay Macdonald also objects to proportional representation because
of the cost involved in contesting large areas.[9] Johannesburg, for the
purpose of its municipal election, was polled as one constituency, and
the evidence furnished by this election is, therefore, of considerable
value. Further, this evidence is confirmed by the experience of
Socialist parties in Belgium, in Finland and elsewhere, which apparently
find no difficulty in fighting large constituencies. The electoral
conditions in these countries doubtless differ from those in England,
but an analysis of the expenses incurred by Labour candidates at home
show that single-member constituencies and small expenditure do not go
together. The cost of these candidatures, even apart from returning
officers' expenses, usually exceeds £500, and sometimes £1000. Such sums
could be spent to much greater advantage in large areas in bringing all
the adherents of a party to the poll.
It has already been shown that the practice of "nursing" a constituency
is one of the indirect results of the single-member system. Indeed, no
system gives so great an advantage to the candidate with a long purse;
he can more easily influence those non-political electors whose votes
may decide the issue. A consideration of the working of the new system
will show that the cost of elections will in all probability be greatly
diminished. At present in a city returning seven members a party must
find seven candidates each with his separate organization and separate
expenses; with proportional representation there will be but one
organization for all candidates of the same party, and as no party can
hope to monopolize the representation, it is unlikely that any will run
as many as seven candidates. A well-organized party will get its due
share of representation without subscribing to clubs and flower shows.
The illegitimate power of money will be weakened, and the total amount
spent considerably reduced.
_The accuracy of representation._
A final criticism made against proportional systems of voting is that
they do not secure the exact representation of all the electors in a
country. Thus the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, whilst
admitting that the new method would generally produce more accurate
results, mathematically at least, than the existing method, qualified
their statement by saying that their success "in producing in Parliament
the 'scale map of the country,' which they held up as the ideal, can be
only partial"; and in another paragraph the Report contains this
remarkable statement: "On the assumption, however, that proportional
representation is desirable, can any system yet invented be guaranteed
or reasonably expected to ensure it? In our opinion, only in a limited
and generally unascertainable degree." No responsible advocate of
proportional representation has contended that proportional systems,
save when the country is treated as one constituency, will result in a
mathematically accurate representation of opinion. But the close
approximation to accuracy obtained in the practical application of
proportional systems is so pronounced that the statement of the
Commission is wholly misleading. The following figures of the Belgian
election of 1910 will show to what extent accuracy is obtained by a
proportional system, even when, as in this case, the mechanism slightly
favours the larger party:
BELGIAN ELECTION, 1910
Seats Seats in
Parties Votes. Actually Proportion
Obtained. to Votes.
Catholics . . . . . 676,939 49 47.0
Liberals and Socialists . 561,052 36 37.5
Christian Democrats . . 16,170 ---- 1.0
Independents . . . . 20,428 ---- 1.5
In Finland, where another system of proportional representation is in
operation, the result of the election of 1909 was as follows:--
FINLAND ELECTION, 1909
Seats Seats in
Parties Votes. Actually Proportion
Obtained. to Votes.
Social Democrat . . . . 337,685 84 80
Old Finn . . . . . . 199,920 48 47
Young Finn . . . . . 122,770 28 29
Swedish . . . . . . 104,191 25 25
Agrarian . . . . . . 56,943 14 13
Christian Labourers . . 23,259 1 6
The single transferable vote has yielded results which are remarkably
accurate. It has been used in Tasmania, with adult suffrage, in the
Transvaal, with the municipal franchise, and in the election of the
Senate for United South Africa, by members of Parliament. Each of the
five constituencies in Tasmania returned six members, and the total
result was as follows:--
TASMANIAN ELECTION, 1909
Seats Seats in
Parties Votes. Actually Proportion
Obtained. to Votes.
Labour . . . . . . 19,067 12 11.7
Non-Labour . . . . . 29,893 18 18.3
These figures speak for themselves. In the municipal elections in the
Transvaal each of the parties obtained its fair share of representation.
In Johannesburg the elections were fought by a commercial ticket of ten
candidates, a Labour ticket of three candidates, and ten Independent
candidates; the number of valid votes was 11,788, and the quota--that
is, the proportion of votes which would ensure the election of a
representative--amounted to 1072. The ticket of "ten good men" polled in
all some 6185 votes, or 247 votes short of six quotas, and the ticket
succeeded in returning six members. This result was strictly fair, for
the deficiency in votes was made up by those supporters of independent
candidates who, having failed to return their first choice, had
indicated members of this ticket as their next choice. The three Labour
candidates polled in all 2126 votes, or 18 votes short of two full
quotas, and the Labour Party was successful in securing two
representatives. The remaining two seats fell to two Independent
candidates, each of whom had a considerable personal following. In the
third test, the election of South African Senators, each of the parties
obtained representation in proportion to their force in the Parliaments
of the respective colonies. The details of the voting have not been
published,[10] but the returning officers have all borne testimony to
the satisfactory working of the system and absolute fairness of
the results.
In the light of these facts, what meaning can be attached to the
statement that proportional systems only secure proportional
representation in a limited and generally unascertainable degree? The
results of proportional systems are seen in a still more favourable
light if contrasted with the working of non-proportional methods. Thus
the Liberals of Surrey, Sussex, and Kent were without representation in
the Parliament of 1910. The Unionists of Wales were in the same plight
in the previous one. In the election of the Australian Senate (1910) the
Labour Party obtained eighteen seats, all other parties none. In the
same year, the Municipal Reformers elected all the aldermen of the
London County Council, the Progressives none. In the election of
Representative Peers of Scotland no Liberal peer is ever chosen.
_Summary of objections._
The various objections which have been raised from time to time against
proportional representation have been almost wholly disproved. Before it
was put into operation it was said to be impracticable; wherever the new
methods have been introduced the proceedings have in every case passed
off without a hitch. Proportional representation, it was said, would
result in unstable governments; now complaint is made that it has been
difficult in Belgium under the new system to effect a change of
government, the majority of the electors apparently being content with
things as they are. It was alleged that faddists would obtain undue
representation; it is now complained, under some misapprehension, that
independent political thought will fail to secure an adequate hearing.
Objections of a minor character are also raised; that proportional
representation will increase the difficulties of electioneering; that it
will increase the cost of elections--a conclusion not in accordance with
the experience of countries in which it has been applied; or that it
will destroy the sporting element in politics, as if the pursuit of
politics by itself was lacking in interest. Yet all the time the demand
for electoral reform is increasing, and whilst the figures in the
foregoing paragraphs show to what extent proportional systems secure
accuracy in representation, it can also be shown that proportional
representation will facilitate the solution of those other electoral
reforms which are also demanded upon the ground that they will add to
the representative character of the House of Commons.
[Footnote 1: _Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_ (Cd.
5163), par. 81.]
[Footnote 2: _The Albany Review_, October 1907.]
[Footnote 3: Annual Meeting of the Proportional Representation Society,
June 1910.--_Representation_, vol. iii. p. 79.]
[Footnote 4: Scottish Conservative Club, Glasgow, 5 October 1910.]
[Footnote 5: Speech to the Electors of Bristol, 3 November 1774.]
[Footnote 6: Minutes of Evidence: _Royal Commission on Electoral
Systems_ (Cd. 5352), p. 118.]
[Footnote 7: 15 March 1909.]
[Footnote 8: The following is taken from a letter sent to the press by
the Chairman of the Committee: "I am aware that many people are opposed
to the principle of a ticket on the ground that it savours of
'dictation,' &c. &c. We are exceedingly anxious that every voter should
be in a position to exercise his privilege of choice to the fullest
extent.... It is not reasonable to expect him, without advice, to
express an order of preference in the case of men he does not know. This
is exactly one of the strongest justifications for a representative
committee to come forward as we do, to say: 'We have carefully inquired
as to the character, capacity, and ability of all the candidates, and
having taken everything into consideration we recommend you to vote for
the ten whose names are on our ticket, _placing them in such order of
preference as you please_.'"]
[Footnote 9: Labour Party Conference, Leicester, February 1911.]
[Footnote 10: Owing to the small numbers taking part in the election,
the publication of the details might possibly have furnished a clue to
the votes of individual members of Parliament. For this reason the
returning officers and the scrutineers were pledged to secrecy. The
fairness of the results were fully recognized by the press, as the
following extracts show:
"The result has demonstrated the absolute fairness of the single
transferable vote."--_Bloemfontein Friend_.
"The system proved in practice as simple and accurate as it was
scrupulously fair in character."--_Bloemfontein Post_.]