PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND PARTY GOVERNMENT
"Parties form and re-form themselves; they come together, dissolve, and
again come together; but in this flux and reflux a stability reigns such
as we observe amid similar phenomena in the course of nature; and indeed
it is the course of nature, only working in the world of politics
instead of the world of physics."--LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITH
"To think in programmes is Egyptian bondage, and works the sterilization
of the political intellect."--AUGUSTINE BIRRELL
Hitherto the objection most often urged against proportional
representation has been that it is impracticable; the successful
working, however, of the single transferable vote in Tasmania, in the
elections of the South African Senate and in the Transvaal Municipal
elections, and of list systems in Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden,
Würtemberg and Finland has furnished a complete answer to this
objection. Manhood suffrage obtains in Belgium, adult suffrage in
Tasmania and Finland, and if, in countries possessing a franchise so
democratic, proportional systems have proved successful, it is no longer
possible to declare that proportional representation is impracticable.
Indeed, the practicability of proportional representation is now
generally admitted, and its critics prefer to lay stress upon objections
of another character. They even complain, as does Professor Jenks, that
"the supporters of the movement appear to be concentrating all their
arguments on the feasibility of their project, quietly assuming that its
desirability is axiomatic."[1] It does seem axiomatic that it is
desirable that representative institutions should reflect the views of
those represented, but it is now alleged that the representative
principle is merely "a means of getting things done," that the chief
function of the House of Commons is to provide the country with a strong
Government, and that proportional representation would render these
things impossible "because there would be no permanent majority strong
enough to get its own way."
_Proportional representation and the two-party system._
This fear of a weakened executive doubtless explains why many others who
admit the justice and practicability of proportional representation,
still hesitate to support a reform the effects of which may greatly
modify existing parliamentary conditions. "We have still," said _The
Westminster Gazette,_[2] "to be convinced that we shall do well to make
still more difficult the maintenance of the two-party system, and that
it seems to us would almost certainly be the effect of proportional
representation." Ten years ago some professed supporters of proportional
representation took up the extraordinary position of allowing it only in
respect of two great parties within a State,[3] and quoted in support of
their views the words of Professor Paul Reinsch in his work on _World
Politics:_ "It is still as true as when Burke wrote his famous defence
of party, in his _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_,
that, for the realization of political freedom, the organization of the
electorate into regular and permanent parties is necessary.
Parliamentary government has attained its highest success only in those
countries where political power is held alternately by two great
national parties." Is no allowance to be made for the fluidity of
progressive democracy? Is it imagined that active political thought can
be compelled to follow stereotyped channels? Too profound a respect for
a system designed to meet former conditions led the Royal Commission on
Electoral Methods to the conclusion that, "reviewing the whole of the
evidence, and duly considering the gravity of the change involved, we
are unable to report that a case has been made out before us for the
adoption of the transferable vote here and now for elections to the
House of Commons."[4] The Commission proceed "to emphasize the exact
nature and limitations of this conclusion," which ultimately amounts to
no more than a suggestion for the postponement of an inevitable
change.[5] But the fact remains that the Royal Commission accepted the
theory of government placed before it by those who desire to maintain
the existing party system and who are of opinion that that system can
only be maintained by single-member constituencies and the majority
method of election. "On the question," says the Commission, "whether the
representation of all parties in proportion to their voting strength is
in itself desirable, we may point out that it is not a fair argument
against the present system that it fails to produce such a result,
because it does not profess to do so. A General Election is, in fact,
considered by a large portion of the electorate of this country as
practically a referendum on the question which of two governments shall
be returned to power."[6] " ... The case of those who hold that the
transferable vote is not capable of application in this country rests
only to a very slight extent on its mechanical difficulties.... The most
potent arguments are a theory of representation on the one hand and a
theory of government on the other."[7] It is evident that the most
important objection which advocates of proportional representation have
to meet concerns its probable effect upon party organization and upon
party government, and it is therefore necessary to consider this
objection in detail.
_Burke's view of party and party discipline._
In the first place, can Burke's definition of party be used in defence
of modern party organization and discipline? The character of these has
fundamentally changed since Burke's time. His conception of national
parties and also, perhaps, of the probable influence of a system of
proportional representation upon their formation may be gathered from
his own words. "Party," says Burke, "is a body of men united for
promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some
particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part I find it
impossible to conceive that any one believes in his own politics, or
thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of
having them reduced into practice. It is the business of the speculative
philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of
the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper
means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore
every honourable connexion will avow it is their first purpose to pursue
every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a
condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution,
with all the power and authority of the state." No advocate of
proportional representation would in the least quarrel with Burke's
definition of party or deny that sustained effort and efficient
organization are absolutely essential if practical effect is to be given
to political principles. Burke, however, did not contemplate a party
system in which complete submission to the programme of the party was
considered an essential condition of membership. Burke's definition of
party must be read in conjunction with his own interpretation of the
term. "In order," says he, "to throw an odium on political connexion,
these politicians suppose it a necessary incident to it that you are
blindly to follow the opinions of your party, when in direct opposition
to your own clear ideas; a degree of servitude that no worthy man could
bear the thought of submitting to; and such as, I believe, no connexions
(except some court factions) ever could be so senselessly tyrannical as
to impose. Men thinking freely will, in particular instances, think
differently. But still as the greater part of the measures which arise
in the course of public business are related to, or depend on, some
great leading general principles in government, a man must be peculiarly
unfortunate in the choice of his political company, if he does not agree
with them at least nine times in ten. If he does not concur in these
general principles upon which the party is founded, and which
necessarily draw on a concurrence in their application, he ought from
the beginning to have chosen some other, more conformable to his
opinions."[8] Burke does not limit the number of parties to two, and if
his authority is to be invoked in support of the maintenance of the
two-party system, it can only be invoked in support of the maintenance
of two parties which are based on such leading general principles as
will cover the whole field of politics, and the organization of which is
such as to leave to members of the party a considerable measure of
freedom in respect of individual questions. "We may be confident," says
Lord Courtney of Penwith, "that the two main divisions will survive, the
one pressing forward and the other cautiously holding back,"[9] and in
so far as it corresponds to the two main tendencies in human thought the
two-party system will doubtless survive any change in voting method. But
with the spread of political intelligence it cannot possibly survive the
rigidity of modern discipline--a rigidity which Burke would have been
the first to repudiate--nor can it survive the modern tendency towards
the formation of parties for the purpose of carrying specific reforms.
_Narrow basis fatal to a large party._
The complete transformation of the Conservative Party into a Tariff
Reform Party would considerably narrow its basis, and any narrowing of
the basis of one party must help to break down the two-party system. For
although Tariff Reform is a matter of great national interest, having
very far-reaching effects, it obviously does not cover the whole field
of politics. There is no fundamental and necessary relation between
Tariff Reform and Home Rule, the constitutional position of the House of
Lords, or the special problem of the place of religion in national
education. Nor does it necessarily or even naturally attract those
cautious intellects which are the typical supporters of Conservatism.
The strenuous efforts which have been made in recent years to exclude
from the Unionist Party all who are unwilling to accept the policy of
Tariff Reform have, it is true, been crowned with considerable success,
but there is a limit to the process of unification. Should the advocates
of this fiscal change, for example, have desired to make terms with the
Nationalist party for the purpose of carrying their policy, any attempt
to impose those terms upon all members of the party would have resulted
in a further and probably a more serious split. In such circumstances
parties necessarily give place to groups, and the fissiparous tendency
is most apparent where party discipline is most rigid. The solidarity of
the German Social Democratic Party will only be maintained by according
liberty of action in local matters to the South German Socialists.[10]
The formation of the French Unified Socialist Party was a work of
considerable difficulty, and its maintenance will only be possible if
its constituent parts can tolerate differences of opinion. The two
sections of the English Labour Party have been able to work together by
concentrating their efforts on reforms which are advocated by both,
whilst the troubles which have arisen within the smaller group, the
Independent Labour Party, have sprung from attempts to insist upon a
narrow interpretation of the term Independent. The narrower the basis on
which the parties are formed and the more rigid the discipline employed,
the more difficult will become the maintenance of the two-party system.
If, then, it is considered essential to the successful working of
parliamentary government that there should be but two parties, these
parties must be based on broad leading principles and must be so
organized as to allow for differences of opinion on minor matters. With
the increase in the number of questions of first-class importance it
will, however, be difficult to maintain even the semblance of the
two-party system, and in the absence of those more elastic political
conditions which a system of proportional representation provides,
absolutely impossible.
_Proportional representation and party discipline._
The argument in the preceding paragraphs can be illustrated from the
effect of proportional systems on party organization in those countries
in which they are at present in force. In Belgium the prophecy was
repeatedly made that the new law would result in the splitting of
parties into petty factions, rendering parliamentary government
impossible. Its real effect has been, if anything, of the contrary
character. There are still but three Belgian parties--Catholic, Liberal,
and Socialist. Their principles have tended to become more clearly
defined, but within each party there has arisen a considerable freedom
of opinion in respect to all political questions which do not spring
directly from the principles on which the parties are based. This was
clearly shown in the discussion on the proposals for the annexation of
the Congo. At the conference of Liberals held before the General
Election of 1908 it was decided that the annexation of the Congo should
be treated as a _question libre_. M. Vandervelde, at the same time,
expressed opinions on this subject which were contrary to those held by
the majority of Socialists, whilst several Catholics, who disapproved of
the terms on which the Congo was offered to the nation, did not hesitate
to say so. None of these expressions of opinion involved ostracism from
the party, and, although party discipline is strict, there is but little
doubt that this freedom of movement in respect to non-party questions
will continue to grow. The annexation of the Congo was voted in due
course, but the original draft of the Treaty received important
modifications which were due largely to the action and criticism of the
more independent Conservatives.
The question of free trade or protection does not, at the present time,
occupy a prominent place in Belgian politics, but should it do so, there
is no reason to assume that opinions either for or against free trade
would involve, as here, ostracism from any party. Such conditions admit
of a much more genuine discussion of public and of economic questions.
In England, with the system of single-member constituencies, Unionist
Free Traders have had the alternative placed before them of submitting
to the opinions of the majority of the party or of retiring from all
active participation in public life. In Belgium, on the other hand,
proportional representation has induced parties, while adhering to their
fundamental principles, to make their lists of candidates as inclusive
as possible. The list presented by the Catholics at Ghent in 1908
contained not only a free trader and a protectionist, but
representatives of different classes of interests within the
constituency, of agriculture, of landed proprietors, of workmen and of
masters of industry. Stress was laid upon the comprehensive character of
their list in the election address issued by the Catholics, and each
party endeavoured to make its list representative of the forces within
the party. Special efforts indeed are taken to accomplish this end; in
the preparation of the Liberal list members of the organization took
part in the preliminary selection of candidates, the final choice being
determined by a formal election. In reporting that the Belgian system of
proportional representation "is not favourable to small independent
parties, or, what is of greater interest to many observers in this
country, to small sections or wings of large parties," the Royal
Commission on Electoral Systems misinterpreted the working of the
Belgian system. It is true that the Christian Democrats form the only
small party in Belgium which has obtained direct representation, but the
Belgian system has certainly given representation to the wings of large
parties. Count Goblet d'Alviella, who was examined by the Commission,
has kindly furnished some observations upon the Commission's statement.
"Whenever there is room," he writes, "that is, where the seats are
numerous enough, the leaders take the greatest care to choose
representatives of the principal shades of opinion within their party
lines. At Brussels in 1910 the Catholics placed on their list not only
M. Colfs, who upset their order of precedence in the previous election,
but also M. Theodor, who, for the last three times,
headed--unsuccessfully--a separate list of the so-called Independent
Party. The Liberal list at Brussels has been formed by the joint action
of Moderates (Ligue libérale) and Radicals (Association libérale), each
of these two organizations trying to give satisfaction to their own
subdivisions (Flemish and Walloon, rural and urban, &c.). At Antwerp the
Liberal list has been formed by five Liberal organizations, each one
choosing its own representative." The M. Colfs referred to in Count
Goblet d'Alviella's letter strongly opposed the military proposals of
the Belgian Government, but he was, nevertheless, placed by the party
organization on the official list. Thus, in Belgium wings of parties
undoubtedly obtain their legitimate influence, and this renders the
formation of independent small parties superfluous. The number of broad
general principles on which political parties can be based is strictly
limited, and this explains why neither the Belgian nor any other system
of proportional representation will produce innumerable parties.
_"Free Questions" in Japan._
The electoral system in Japan, giving as it does great freedom for the
expression of political opinion, has resulted, as in Belgium, in the
separation of political questions into two types--party and free.
According to Mr. Kametaro Hayashida, the Secretary of the Japanese House
of Representatives, the measures before parliament are duly considered
at party meetings; after deliberation a decision is taken as to whether
the measure under discussion should be treated as a party question, or
whether freedom of action should be permitted to the individual members
of the party, and a communication, embodying the result of the party
meeting, is then sent to every member. Here then we get additional
evidence of the amelioration of party spirit, which follows the adoption
of a more elastic system of representation. Political debate must become
in such cases not only more real but infinitely more valuable. The
number of questions left to the discretion of the individual member is
by no means inconsiderable, as will be seen from the following figures
showing the attitude taken by the various parties towards public
questions in 1908:--
(1)--Laws
Party . . . . . Constitutionalist Progressive Conservative Radical
Party questions . 105 75 66 --
Free questions. . 2 32 41 107
(2)--Petitions
Party . . . . . Constitutionalist Progressive Conservative Radical
Party questions . 63 167 68 --
Free questions. . 119 15 114 182
"It should be noted," says Mr. Hayashida, "that the Radicals had no
party questions, but made all questions free. On the other hand, the
Constitutionalists, who supported the Government, made party questions
of practically all laws submitted. On the average, apart from the
Radicals, the three other parties treated 23 per cent. of the laws, and
37 per cent. of the petitions in the twenty-sixth session of the
Imperial Japanese Diet as free questions."
_The formation of groups._
Such evidence as we possess does not then warrant the assumption that a
proportional system leads to an increase in the number of political
parties. It makes them more elastic. On the other hand, it has been
demonstrated beyond any doubt that a system of single-member
constituencies has completely failed to maintain the two-party system.
In England the Labour Party forms within the House of Commons a distinct
camp by itself, the Nationalist Party still more jealously guards its
independence, and at the election of January, 1910, a smaller group of
Independent Nationalists was formed. The rise of the Labour Party in
Australia was not prevented by a system of single-member constituencies.
In Germany and France single-member constituencies have not arrested the
development of groups with national, religious, or sectional programmes.
When, therefore, it is contended that proportional representation will
lead to the formation of groups, the obvious answer is that it is the
present system which is producing groups; and should the representation
obtained by these groups, as in France and Germany and in Australia,
give no clear indication of public opinion, then the instability which
has been a characteristic of French and for a time of Australian
parliamentary conditions may become characteristic of the House
of Commons.
Nor do those advocates of proportional representation, who desire to
maintain the two-party system by artificial means, offer any machinery
adequate for the purpose. In an article written before the first
elections for the Commonwealth parliament, Mr. Deakin wrote as
follows:--
"By the very circumstances of the case the tariff issue cannot but
dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the first
ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second thoughts
or for suspension of judgment. The first choice of the people will be
final on this head. The first parliament must be either protectionist or
anti-protectionist, and its first great work an Australian tariff. That
is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a proportion of the
representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as the electors as a
whole may not realise all that is at stake or make the necessary
sacrifices or opinion and preferences to express themselves emphatically
on this point."
In commenting upon this declaration the supporters of so-called
two-party proportional representation[11] said:
"The only way to avoid the risk indicated is to take this one definite
issue as the basis of proportional representation. Each State should be
divided on it, and should elect its proportional number of Free-trade
and Protectionist representatives." But how are all the electors to be
constrained into accepting the dictates of party leaders as to the lines
upon which elections shall be fought? The Labour Party in Australia
apparently considered the special principles for which they stood of
more importance than either Free Trade or Protection. The English Labour
Party would doubtless adopt the same point of view, whilst the
Nationalists regard the Tariff question as of little importance as
compared with Home Rule. "The rude and crude division," said Mr.
Asquith, "which used to correspond more or less accurately with the
facts of a representative assembly of two parties, had perhaps become
everywhere more or less a thing of the past."[12] There are no means
available for restoring the earlier conditions, and certainly the
existing electoral system of single-member constituencies affords no
guarantee that in the future any one party will obtain a permanent
majority strong enough to get its own way. The maintenance in form of
the two-party system during the parliament of 1906-10 was merely due to
the accident of the phenomenal election of 1906, when the Liberal Party
was returned in such numbers as to exceed the combined forces of all
other groups. At the General Election of January, 1910, five parties
entered the field, and as a result of this election no party obtained
an absolute majority. In the important parliamentary debates which arose
immediately after the election each of these groups took part, as such,
for the purpose of emphasizing their independence, and when, consequent
upon the death of King Edward, a conference on the constitutional
question was arranged between the leaders of the Conservative and
Liberal parties, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, in commenting upon the
conference, made this statement: "He regretted that there was going to
be any conference at all, but if there was going to be one he, as a
member of the Labour Party, denied the right of the two front benches to
settle it. They no longer represented the House of Commons or the
opinion of the country. There were other benches."[13] Obviously, if
other benches are to be taken into consideration in the solution of
constitutional questions, it is a matter of importance to know the true
strength that lies behind those occupying them. The difference--an
extremely important difference--that a proportional system would produce
in the composition of the House of Commons is that the representation
obtained by these groups would give a much more accurate clue to public
opinion and, as in the long-run the strength of an executive depends
upon its capacity to interpret the will of the people, the position of
the executive would be rendered much more stable. This is the
justification of Mr. Asquith's statement: "Let them have a House of
Commons which fully reflected every strain of opinion; that was what
made democratic government in the long-run not only safer and more free,
but more stable."
But does parliamentary government, as the Royal Commission on Electoral
Systems suggests, really depend for its working upon the maintenance of
a system of election which admittedly distorts the real wishes of the
people? This argument had been anticipated and effectively dealt with by
M. Ostrogorski in his _Democracy and Political Parties_. "There arises,"
says he, "the old question of the Duke of Wellington, frightened by the
prospect of the abolition of the rotten boroughs: How will the King's
government be carried out? How will parliamentary government work? In
reality the catastrophe will not be more than that which so alarmed the
hero of Waterloo; now, as then, it will be nothing more nor less than
the destruction of something rotten."[14] The King's government has been
improved by the abolition of the rotten boroughs, and will be still
further improved if opinion within the House of Commons is brought into
more direct relation with opinion outside. The view taken by the
Commission was not shared by one of its members, Lord Lochee, who in a
note appended to the Report says: "I am not concerned to dispute that
the introduction of proportional representation might involve important
changes in parliamentary government. That, in my view, is not a question
for the Commission. I shall, therefore, only say that I do not believe
that the cause of good government is bound up with the maintenance of a
distorted representation, or that British statesmanship would be unable
to cope with the problems which a better system might bring in
its train."
_The formation of an executive_.
Changes will doubtless take place in the method of carrying on the
King's government, but they will take place very gradually, and will be
evolved out of present conditions. It would be essential, as now, that
the government should possess the confidence of the House of Commons and
of the country, and, in order to obtain this confidence it would not be
sufficient to secure a majority by means of bargainings between groups
which involved important sacrifices of principle. Even with such rigid
party discipline as now obtains it would be difficult and perhaps
impossible to effect an alliance between Unionist Tariff Reformers and
Nationalists for the purpose of carrying out a double policy of Tariff
Reform and Home Rule. It is certain that under a system of proportional
representation such an arrangement would be useless as a basis for a
stable executive, for with the lessened rigidity in discipline party
leaders would have no means of enforcing the terms of such bargains upon
their followers. The composition of the House itself would give a clear
indication of the main policies which would meet with the approval of
the House and also of the Government which would command its confidence.
It is perhaps unwise to attempt to map out in any detail the probable
course of events, but there are some who are unwilling to take this step
forward in the perfecting of democratic institutions without some clear
conception of the way in which a good government might be formed under
the new conditions. Professor Nanson of Melbourne has endeavoured to
satisfy this anxiety by attempting to forecast the probable effect which
a system of proportional representation would have upon the formation of
governments in Australia, showing how such a system would enable a
really stable executive to be formed.
"To bring the matter vividly before us," says he, "consider the two
vital issues now before the Australian public. These are Protection and
the Labour platform. Every elector and every candidate at once falls
into one of four groups. For every one is either Protectionist or
anti-Protectionist, and every one is either Labour or non-Labour. Every
person is therefore either Protectionist and Labour, or Protectionist
and non-Labour, or anti-Protectionist and Labour, or anti-Protectionist
and non-Labour. Using the letters P, A, L, N to denote Protectionist,
Anti-protectionist, Labour, Non-labour, we have four groups which we may
denote by PL, PN, AL, AN.
"It is clear that if we can find out the number of voters in each group
we can at once declare the verdict of the country for or against
Protection, and for or against the Labour platform. Suppose, for the
sake of argument, that the percentage of voters are: Non-labour
Protectionist, 32; Non-labour Anti-protectionist, 28; Labour
Protectionist, 24; Labour Anti-protectionist, 16; as shown in the
following table:--
P A
N .... 32 28 60
L .... 24 16 40
_ _ __
56 44 100
"Then it is clear that there is a majority of 60 per cent, to 40 per
cent, against the Labour platform, and a majority of 56 per cent, to 44
per cent, in favour of protection. Under such circumstances the
distribution of members in a House of 75 would be as follows:--
P A
N .... 24 21 45
L .... 18 12 30
_ _ _
42 33 75
"In such a House there would be a majority of 45 to 30 against the
Labour platform, and a majority of 42 to 33 in favour of Protection. In
such a House the only possible Ministry would be a Non-labour
Protectionist. There would be a straight out Ministerial party of 24.
There would be a right Ministerial Labour Protectionist wing of 18 bound
to support the Ministry in its Protectionist policy. There would be a
left Ministerial Anti-protectionist Non-labour wing of 21 bound to
support the Ministry in its Non-labour policy. The straight out
Opposition would be 12. Such a House might well be left to elect a
Ministry. Every minister would, with a proper method of election, if
necessary, be a Non-labour Protectionist. For there would be an absolute
majority of the House against every Labour man and against every
Anti-protectionist. Every Minister would be heart and soul with the
Ministerial policy. There could then be no possibility of dirt eating or
of voting against one's convictions, as is alleged to be the case at
present."[15] The divisions between English political parties may not
be so clearly cut nor the composition of the Executive so homogeneous as
outlined in this forecast of Professor Nanson, but a proportional system
would certainly yield a true indication of the mind of the nation on at
least three, and probably more, of the important matters under
discussion in England--Tariff Reform, Home Rule, and the constitutional
position of the House of Lords. A clear expression of national opinion
on these issues would determine the policy which an executive resting
for authority upon the House of Commons would have to pursue, but, in
addition, the improved electoral methods would yield unmistakable
indications of the attitude of the nation towards those Labour and
Social questions which will more and more claim the attention of
Parliament. In brief, so far from proportional representation creating
conditions unfavourable to the formation of a strong executive, it will
furnish the only means by which in the future stable executives can be
formed. It will place within the hands of governments a new and more
delicate instrument with which to gauge public opinion, and it is on the
accurate interpretation of public opinion that the continued existence
of a government depends.
_A check on partisan legislation._
But those who, with Professor Jenks, regard the representative principle
as being merely a means of getting things done, will perhaps want some
indication of the possibility, not only of forming an Executive under a
proportional regime but of carrying legislation. There are obviously two
aspects to this question. The power of initiating and of controlling
legislation is now so largely in the hands of the executive authority
that means are required not only of getting things done but of ensuring
that the privileged position possessed by the executive authority is not
abused. The present system enables a ministry in command of an
overwhelming but false majority to impose upon the nation legislation
with which the nation is not in accord. It is more than doubtful whether
the Education and Licensing measures carried by Mr. Balfour's
administration (1902-5) would have been acceptable to a House of Commons
which was truly representative, and as Mr. Balfour's government
dominated the House of Lords as completely as it controlled the House of
Commons, the only check which existed upon the action of the Ministry
was the fear of defeat when the time came for the inevitable appeal to
the country. Such a check has proved to be inadequate to prevent the
passage of partisan legislation, and the failure of the House of Commons
to protect the nation against legislation of an arbitrary nature has
given rise to the demand for checks of another character.
_Unlike the referendum, proportional representation will
strengthen the House of Commons._
Thus, it is now urged that the nation should, by means of the
referendum, be afforded the opportunity of exercising that control over
the executive which the House of Commons has lost. "Formerly," says
Professor Dicey, "when the King was the real and effective sovereign of
the country, and was responsible for its government, it was right that
he should have a veto. The nation is now the sovereign, and what I
propose is to place a veto in the hands of the nation.[16] Now, although
proportional representation is not inconsistent with the referendum, yet
these two reforms endeavour to cure the defects of representative
institutions in different ways. The referendum, by transferring
responsibility and authority from the House of Commons to the nation,
will tend to diminish the importance of the representative chamber.
Proportional representation, on the other hand, aims at strengthening
the House by making it more fully representative, and in consequence
more competent to discharge its true functions. Moreover, there are some
practical objections to the referendum. There must always be
considerable difficulty in framing the form in which a legislative
proposal should be submitted to the country. To be permitted to say
'yes' or 'no' to a complicated measure is not sufficient. It would have
been extremely difficult for most of the electors to have stated,
without any qualification, whether they approved of Mr. Asquith's
Licensing Bill of 1908. This measure was far too comprehensive to submit
as a whole, and an unfavourable verdict would have given no clear
indication as to the nation's wishes, and would have been open to
serious misinterpretation. The new licensing duties and the new land
taxes contained in the Finance Bill of 1909 had nothing in common, and
it would have been necessary to have submitted a Bill of this nature in
sections. Further, every time a measure which had passed the House of
Commons was rejected by the nation, the prestige of the House would be
impaired, and the conclusion is unavoidable that, were the referendum
adopted, the House could only retain an authoritative position by
introducing a system of proportional representation so as to bring it as
closely as possible into agreement with the nation. It is, moreover,
generally agreed that Finance Bills should not be the subject of a
referendum, but in a modern state these are of as much importance as
other legislation. The work of legislation demands special
qualifications. When we select a doctor or a lawyer, or any other agent,
we wish him to do his special work. The elector desires to have an
effective choice in the selection of his representative in parliament,
but having chosen a legislator with whom he is in sympathy entrusts the
details of legislation to him. Proportional representation would give
the elector this effective choice, and by restoring to members of
Parliament a greater measure of freedom would enable the House of
Commons to resume its proper function of controlling legislation. The
need for the referendum would disappear.
_Proportional Representation facilitates legislation desired
by the nation._
It may be said, however, that there is here no indication of the means
of getting things done, only of a check upon partisan action. But
proportional representation, in rendering more difficult the passing of
legislation conceived in a partisan spirit, will save the time and
energy of Parliament for legislation which is more in accordance with
the nation's will. The history of the numerous Education and Licensing
Bills which have been presented to Parliament during the two decades
1890-1910 furnish an excellent example of the way in which a rigid party
system results in the waste of parliamentary time. No wonder that the
legislative machine has broken down. Efforts are now being made to
increase the working capacity of the House of Commons, but if these are
to be permanently successful, there must be such an abatement of
partisan feeling as a system of proportional representation encourages.
The changes which have been introduced in recent years into the
procedure of the House of Commons are of a far-reaching character.
According to the rules adopted in 1907, all Bills, other than money
Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, are referred, after
the passing of the second reading, to Standing Committees of the House,
unless a resolution to the contrary is moved immediately and carried.
There is a growing opinion in favour of these committees, the value of
which is largely due to the greater sincerity in discussion which takes
place in them. When Mr. Asquith moved the resolution allocating the time
to be allowed for discussion on the Housing and Town Planning Bill, Lord
Robert Cecil expressed the opinion that the system of guillotining
debate was destructive of the legislative efficiency and the dignity of
the House of Commons.[17] "Personally he thought some remedy might
possibly be found in an extension of the Grand Committee system. He
began with a violent prejudice against them. He had now sat on several
of them, and he had come to the belief that, on the whole, they were by
far the best instrument they now possessed, inferior though it was to a
full and free discussion in the whole House for the consideration of
legislation. The most important characteristic of them was that only
those decided who heard the arguments. They did not have the disgusting
farce that went on in that Chamber of members trooping in from outside
who had not the slightest knowledge of the subject which had been
discussed, who had not taken the slightest interest in it, and who
merely asked the Whips at the door, 'Which side are we to-day?' and
voted 'Aye' or 'No' as they were told. The Prime Minister recognized
that the independence and dignity of the House were invaluable assets to
the country, and had shown on many occasions a genuine desire to
preserve the dignity of members of Parliament, and the self-respect of
the House." Mr. Asquith, in reply to this statement, also expressed his
opinion that by a larger and more elastic use of the system of
Committees it would be possible to avoid some of the evils arising from
the growing congestion of parliamentary business. "The Housing and Town
Planning Bill was," said he, "a very good illustration of the useful
purpose served by the Grand Committee. It was there for twenty-three
days; it was discussed under almost ideal conditions; the closure was
never moved from beginning to end; the Government Whips never sought to
exert their authority in any one of the divisions which took place; and
the discussion was conducted by men who were obliged to listen to the
arguments of those who were opposed to them. As regards Bills of this
character, it was perfectly certain that they got a much more accurate
discussion, and decisions were arrived at far less under the stress of
party prepossession than when a Bill was discussed in Committee of the
whole House."
Thus it seems that a lessening of party discipline and a greater freedom
and sincerity in discussion result in an acceleration of the rate of
legislation, and as a proportional system favours these conditions it
would materially assist the process of getting things done.
_Proportional Representation in Standing Committees._
But this important change in the procedure of the House of Commons--the
discussion of the details of legislation in Grand Committees instead of
committees of the whole House--furnishes from another point of view
cogent reasons for the adoption of a system of proportional
representation. In the composition of these committees strict care is
taken to allot representation to the various parties within the House in
proportion to their strength. Otherwise these committees would not
possess the confidence of the House. But if the composition of
committees on a proportionate basis is a condition of their success,
would not their work be even more successful if in the first instance
the strength of parties within the House corresponded to the number of
their supporters in the country? The House of Commons would enjoy the
confidence of the nation, and its standing committees would acquire
greater authority because they, in turn, would be fully representative.
One of the most important of these committees is the Scottish Grand
Committee, to which all Scottish Bills are referred. All Scottish
members are appointed to this committee, but in order that its
composition should conform to the rule--that committees should reflect
the strength of parties within the House--it has been found necessary to
add thereto a number of English Conservatives who often, if not usually,
have not the special qualifications necessary for dealing with the
details of Scottish questions. If the purpose for which the Scottish
Grand Committees have been constituted is to be fulfilled, it will be
necessary that the different political forces within each part of the
Kingdom should be represented in the House proportionately and that the
membership of the committees should be confined to Scottish members. It
is quite possible, under the present electoral system, that there might
be an overwhelming Conservative majority in England and a large Liberal
majority in Scotland. In such conditions the Scottish Grand Committee
would fail to work. It would be necessary to add so large a number of
English Conservatives that the Committee would lose its distinctively
Scottish character. There is often very little difference between
Scottish representatives on Scottish questions. A good instance of this
was shown in the discussion on the report stage of the House Letting
Bill (1909). The measure was opposed by the English Conservative
members of the Committee, whilst the Scottish Conservatives voted for
it. If the Scottish Conservatives were fully represented in the House of
Commons they would obtain adequate representation on the Committee; a
large addition of English Conservatives would not be necessary, and an
agreement between the members of the Committee would often be much more
quickly reached. Not only so, but a system of proportional
representation would greatly strengthen the personnel of the Committee.
Both the Scottish Law Officers of Mr. Balfour's Administration were
defeated in the General Election of 1906, and in consequence the
Scottish Conservatives, in their deliberations in Committee, were
deprived of the expert advice which these officers could have afforded.
Obviously, Scottish legislation can be dealt with best in a Scottish
Grand Committee, but the successful working of this Committee requires
the true representation thereon of the different sections of political
opinion in Scotland, and, in addition, the presentation of those
opinions by their most capable exponents.
Similarly, all members representing constituencies in Wales and Monmouth
are to be appointed to the Committee dealing with Bills relating
exclusively to that part of the country. Such Bills are not so numerous
as Bills relating to Scotland, but nevertheless it is most desirable
that in the discussion of a Welsh Bill minorities in Wales should be
represented not by members sitting for English constituencies, but by
representatives chosen by themselves who would be fully conversant with
Welsh conditions. In the absence of such representation there will
always remain the feeling that the minority has been unfairly treated,
and it is this sense of unfairness that so often calls forth opposition
of a partizan character, and such opposition is fatal to progress in
legislation.
Perhaps the South African National Convention affords the most striking
example of the capacity of a fully representative body to achieve
results of a satisfactory character and with little delay. Had this
Convention been packed either in the Boer or the British interest the
great task of South African Union would never have been accomplished.
The scrupulous care with which the rights of the minorities were
respected is the secret of the wonderful rapidity with which the
enormous difficulties involved in the task were overcome. Not only were
minorities awarded full representation on this Convention, but every
facility was afforded them in the choice of their delegates. The sense
of justice and the spirit of reasonableness go always hand in hand, and
the spirit of reasonableness alone makes possible the smooth and
efficient working of the legislative machine.
_Taking off the Whips._
Proportional representation will therefore not only facilitate the
formation of a stable executive in the new political conditions, but it
will be of very great value in creating the atmosphere in which
legislation can most easily be passed. Even with the present system of
false representation progress might often be more rapid if debate was
less partisan in character. The executive might easily refrain from
driving so hard the members of the party on which it rests for support.
All political questions are not of the same importance, and a step in
the direction of freer and less partizan conditions would be taken if
opportunities were more often given to members to vote in accordance
with their own judgment. The experiment of taking off the official Whips
more frequently might yield valuable results. Sir Courtenay Ilbert says,
however, that "open questions are not popular; they compel a member to
think for himself, which is always troublesome."[18] But the advantage
which would arise from the increase of the spirit of reasonableness
would far outweigh such disadvantages as might befall the less
politically minded members of the House. Far less importance too need be
attached to snap divisions, and, as Sir William Anson has suggested, it
should be generally understood that the results of such divisions need
not entail the resignation of a government.
_New political conditions._
Must then the practical politician still reject proportional
representation? Sir Charles Dilke, in evidence before the Royal
Commission on Electoral Systems,[19] attached great importance to the
views of political leaders upon the party system, and doubtless
practical politicians are guided by their views. The recent utterances,
however, of two great party leaders show that the new political
conditions and their consequences are fully recognized and appreciated
by them. Mr. Balfour, in a speech before the Scottish Conservative
Club,[20] emphasized the importance of having every shade of opinion
represented in the House of Commons: "There is a section," he said, "an
important section of Socialist opinion in the country, and it is quite
right that they should find voice in the House of Commons if their
numbers in the country render that desirable. We cannot, we do not, lose
by having Socialist members in the House of Commons, if there are many
Socialists in the country. We do not lose, we gain by it." Does this
utterance of a great Conservative leader indicate any belief that the
two-party system is the final and unchangeable expression of national
feeling. Mr. Asquith has said that "the rude and crude divisions which
used to correspond more or less accurately with the fact of a
representative assembly of two parties only, the Whig and the Tory, the
Right and the Left, or by whatever other names they may have been
called, with strictly drawn lines of demarcation with no debatable or
intermediate territory, that perhaps has become everywhere, more or
less, a thing of the past." Such opinions so freely expressed must
prepare the way for the more serious consideration of proportional
representation by the practical politicians. It will in no sense involve
the abandonment of party organization, but it will render those
organizations, to use Mr. Asquith's words once more, "elastic, flexible,
always adapting itself to shifting conditions." Party organization of
such a character is undoubtedly a fundamental condition of the smooth
working of the parliamentary machine, but another condition equally
fundamental is that the strength of parties within the House should bear
a direct and true relation to the strength of parties in the country.
Both these requirements are supplied by a system of proportional
representation.
[Footnote 1: "Doubts of Proportional Representation," _The Albany
Review,_ November 1907.]
[Footnote 2: 12 September 1908.]
[Footnote 3: T. R. and H. P. C. Ashworth, _Proportional Representation
applied to Party Government_, 1901, p. 195.]
[Footnote 4: _Report of Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_ (Cd.
5163) par. 133.]
[Footnote 5: Ibid., par. 126.]
[Footnote 6: Ibid., par. 134.]
[Footnote 7: Ibid., par. 88.]
[Footnote 8: Burke, _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_.]
[Footnote 9: "The Regeneration of Parliaments," _Contemporary Review_,
June 1905.]
[Footnote 10: The Baden Socialists voted for the estimates in the Baden
Diet, and shortly after at the German Socialist Congress, Magdeburg, 21
September 1910, a motion was carried excluding from the party _ipso
facto_ any member who in future voted for the estimates. The South
German Socialists left the Congress House.--_Times_, 23 September 1910.]
[Footnote 11: T.R. and H.P.C. Ashworth, _Proportional Representation
Applied to Party Government: A New Electoral System_, 1901, p. 210.]
[Footnote 12: Address to members of the Russian Duma, House of Commons,
22 June 1909.]
[Footnote 13: _The Times_, 13 June 1910.]
[Footnote 14: M. Ostrogorski, _Democracy and the Organization of
Political Parties_. (Translation by F. Clarke, M.A.), vol. ii. p. 713.]
[Footnote 15: The Australian _Review of Reviews_, January 1906.]
[Footnote 16: _The Times_, 16 March 1909.]
[Footnote 17: _The Times_, 16 June 1909.]
[Footnote 18: Preface to _Parliamentary Procedure of the House of
Commons_, by Josef Redlich, p. xvii.]
[Footnote 19: _Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Electoral
Systems_ (Cd. 5152), Q. 1492.]
[Footnote 20: Glasgow, 22 October 1910.]