A COMPARISON OF LIST SYSTEMS WITH THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE
"Les partis sont une institution de la vie politiquo actuelle. Ils sont
une partie, non écrite, de la Constitution."--P. G. LA CHESNAIS
_Influence of previous conditions_.]
List methods of proportional representation have been favoured on the
Continent, the transferable vote in English-speaking countries, and the
question naturally arises, whence this difference? It would appear from
the history of proportional representation that advocates of the reform
have always kept in mind local customs, and have adapted their proposals
to them. Thus a list system of proportional representation was adopted
in Switzerland because such a system was more easily grafted upon
previous electoral conditions. This is the explanation given by Ernest
Naville, who for more than forty years was the leading advocate of
electoral reform in Switzerland, in a letter[1] addressed to the late
Miss Spence of Adelaide, South Australia. "The Swiss Cantons," said he,
"have adopted the system of competing lists. I do not think the system
is the best, but, as it involved the least departure from customary
practices, it was the system for which acceptance could be more easily
obtained. My ideal is a system which leaves the electors face to face
with the candidates without the intervention of lists presented by
parties; that is to say, that the method of voting indicated at the end
of the pamphlet[2] forwarded by you has my preference. It is the system
which I, inspired by the works of Mr. Hare, first proposed in Geneva,
but, in order to obtain a practical result, account has to be taken of
the habits and prejudices of the public to which the appeal is made, and
the best must often be renounced in order to obtain what is possible in
certain given circumstances." In a further letter Professor Naville was
even more emphatic. "I consider," said he, "the Hare system preferable
to that of competing lists. I have always thought so. I have always said
so. But our Swiss people are so accustomed to the _scrutin de liste_, or
multiple vote, that we could not obtain from them the profound
modification which would have been necessary to pass to the
Hare-Spence system."
_Partly the basis of representation in a list system._
The long familiarity of the Belgian electors with the _scrutin de liste_
also paved the way for the adoption of the list system of proportional
representation, but there is an additional reason why list systems have
found favour on the Continent. Some continental writers consider that
parties as such are alone entitled to representation in Parliament, and
are not enamoured of any scheme which makes personal representation
possible. This view is also taken by Mr. J. Ramsay Macdonald, who,
speaking of the Belgian scheme, says that "it makes party grouping the
most important consideration in forming the legislative order, and is
therefore much truer to the facts of Government than any other
proportional representation scheme."[3] The Royal Commission on
Electoral Systems also seems to have accepted the continental theory,
that "in political elections it is the balance of parties which is of
primary importance." In England, however, representation has never
theoretically been based upon party. The limited vote, the cumulative
vote, the double vote in double-member constituencies, have all allowed
the elector complete freedom of action to follow party instructions, or
to act independently. The electoral method has not been chosen to suit
the convenience of party organizations; parties have had to adapt
themselves to the system of voting. The single transferable vote in
accordance with these traditions bases representation upon electors, and
preserves to them freedom to vote as they please. So much is this the
case that some critics consider it unsuitable for a system of
proportional representation, and although Mill evidently regarded the
Hare scheme not only as a system of personal representation, but as a
plan for securing the representation of majorities and minorities in due
proportion, the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems took the view that
the transferable vote "was not originally invented as a system of
proportional representation, but as a system of personal representation
to secure the return of men as men, not as party units." Again,
Professor Commons says that "the Hare system is advocated by those who,
in a too doctrinaire fashion, wish to abolish political parties."[4] But
in making this statement Professor Commons himself supplies the answer.
"They apparently do not realize," says he, "the impossibility of acting
in politics without large groups of individuals, nor do they perceive
that the Hare system itself, though apparently a system of personal
representation, would nevertheless result in party representation." The
more complete organization of parties is a direct consequence of the
more democratic franchise now existing. Political action in modern times
without organization is impossible. The Johannesburg municipal elections
in November 1909, despite the success of two independent candidates,
showed that the most effective way of conducting elections with the
transferable vote is that of organizations presenting lists of
candidates. Indeed, so great a part does organization take in the
political life of to-day that it is desirable, if possible, to have some
counteracting influence. The transferable vote supplies this by securing
for the elector the utmost measure of freedom of action.
This freedom of action is greatly appreciated by electors. A voter,
asked after the Johannesburg elections to give his impressions of the
new method of voting, stated that "the new system had put him on his
mettle. He had never experienced so much pleasure in the act of voting;
he had had to use his intelligence in discriminating between the claims
of the various candidates." Voting with the single transferable vote
ceases to be a purely mechanical operation, the voter becomes conscious
of the fact that in voting he is selecting a representative. It is of
little value to ask electors to exercise their intelligence if on the
day of the poll they have no means of doing so. There was some complaint
in Sweden after the first proportional representation elections because
the new system compelled an elector, if he wished to use his vote with
effect, to act rigidly with his party. With the transferable vote party
action has sufficient play. Electors can freely combine and vote as
parties, and effective organization will reap its legitimate reward. But
the elector will not be constrained to act against his wishes. He will
play an effective part in the election. In view of the great freedom
conferred by the single transferable vote on electors, it is not
surprising that the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems reported that
the "Belgian system is foredoomed to rejection by English public
opinion," and Mr. J. R. Macdonald states that "the British mind would
not submit to this (the Belgian) simplest and most efficient form of
proportional representation."
_The freedom of the elector within the party._
Even when representation is based, as in the list systems, upon parties
as such, it becomes necessary to determine the degree of liberty that
shall be allowed to the individual elector in the exercise of the
franchise. If a party has obtained five seats and the party has
nominated seven candidates, how are the five successful ones to be
selected, and what part is the elector to take in the selection? There
is considerable dissatisfaction in Belgium with that part of the system
which enables the party organizations to arrange the order in which the
names shall appear upon the ballot paper, although this order may have
been arrived at by a preliminary election among members of the party. In
the election of 1910 there was a considerable increase in the number of
voters who exercised their right of giving a vote of preference to
individual candidates. The extensive use of this right resulted at
Brussels in the alteration of the order of election as determined by the
party organizations, and Count Goblet d'Alviella points out that this
will demand the consideration of the political parties.[5] Some device
such as that of making the vote transferable within the list will be
required in order to ensure that the majority within the party shall
obtain its full share of the representation. As stated in the previous
chapter, the French Parliamentary Committee felt it necessary to provide
for the elector a greater freedom of action than is possible under the
Belgian system. In the report issued by this Committee in 1905 the use
of the limited vote was recommended; in the report of 1907 the
cumulative vote, which confers still greater freedom upon the elector,
was proposed. In the Swedish system electors not only have full power to
strike out, to add to or to vary the order in which candidates' names
appear upon the ballot papers issued by the party organizations, but
they have the opportunity of presenting a non-party list. The Finnish
electoral law was deliberately framed so as not to interfere with or to
check the liberty of the voter in making up the lists.[6] This law not
only allows the names of candidates to figure on more than one list, but
permits the voter to prepare a list of his own composed of any three of
the candidates who have been duly nominated. In a list system two
problems, the allotment of seats to parties and the selection of the
successful candidates, have to be solved and the solution must in each
case respect the personal freedom of the elector. With the single
transferable vote the same mechanism solves both problems; it gives to
each party its due proportion of seats, it determines in the most
satisfactory way which of the candidates nominated by a party shall be
declared elected, and it does not encroach in any way upon the elector's
freedom of action. There is one point in which the single transferable
vote differs essentially from the list systems. With the former the vote
never passes out of the control of the voter, and the returning officer
can only transfer the vote to some candidate whom the elector has named.
With the list systems adopted in Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden and
Finland, or with that recommended by the French Parliamentary Committee,
a vote given for any one candidate is also a vote for the party which
has nominated the candidate, and the vote may contribute to the success
of some candidate of this party whose election the voter did not desire
to advance. This fact explains the difficulties which have been
associated with the formation of cartels in Belgium. A cartel is an
agreement between two parties to present a common list, and if, as has
taken place in some of the Belgian constituencies, Socialists and
Liberals present a combined list, a Liberal by voting for one of the
Liberal candidates of the cartel may contribute to the success of one of
the Socialist candidates. The Socialist voter may, on the other hand,
contribute to the return of a Liberal candidate. For this reason some
Liberals and some Socialists refuse to support cartels. In Sweden it is
possible that the elector's vote may, if he make use of a party ticket,
contribute to the return of some candidate whom he may have struck off
the list. If two parties agree to place the same motto at the head of
their respective lists, which may be quite distinct, a member of one
party may help to elect an additional candidate of the other party. Yet
a list system affords no way by which votes can be transferred from one
party to an allied party save by a cartel; if transferred at all they
must be transferred _en bloc_ from one party to another party, and not
from one candidate to another candidate, in accordance with the
expressed wishes of the elector. Mr. J. R. Macdonald states that
"proportional representation seeks to prevent the intermingling of
opinion on the margins of parties and sections of parties which is
essential to ordered and organic social progress." The statement is in
no sense true of the single transferable vote which affords every
facility for the intermingling of opinion on the margins of parties and
sections of parties, whilst even in Belgium groups within a party have
always presented a common list.
_Comparative accuracy._
Considerable discussion has taken place as to which of the list systems
yield the most accurate results. It is obvious that as electors do not
divide themselves into groups which are exactly one-fourth, one-fifth,
or one-sixth of the whole, the utmost that a system of proportional
representation can do in the allotment of seats is to approximate as
closely as possible to the proportions in which the electors are
divided. There is very little difference in the results obtained by the
various list systems and by the single transferable vote. The Belgian
(d'Hondt) rule slightly favours the larger party; this rule allots seats
to parties according to the number of times the party total contains the
common divisor, the votes remaining over being ignored. For this reason
other advocates of list systems prefer the simple rule-of-three or
_méthode rationelle._[7] With this system the total number of votes
polled is divided by the number of seats. The totals gained by the
respective lists are then divided by the quotient thus obtained and the
seats allotted to the lists accordingly. If after the allotment of seats
to the different lists there remain some seats not allotted, these are
awarded to the lists with the largest numbers of votes not utilized. The
transferable vote in practice, if not in theory, also awards seats to
the various parties according to the number of times the party total
contains the quota. If there is a seat not allotted it does not
necessarily fall to the party having the largest number of votes not
utilized. All the votes not utilized are taken into consideration, and
the smaller remainders may, by combination, win the odd seat. For
example, suppose that in a six-member constituency five seats have been
allotted and three candidates remain in competition for the last seat
with votes as follows:--
Candidate A 4,000
" B 3,000
" C 2,000
Then if the supporters of candidate C prefer B to A and have indicated
this fact on the ballot papers, the votes given to C would be
transferred to B, who would be elected to fill the last seat. With the
d'Hondt rule remainders are ignored; with the "rational method" the
largest remainders are favoured; with the single transferable vote the
last seat is awarded to the majority of the electors not otherwise
represented. The transferable vote therefore gives a result at least as
accurate as any of the rules devised in connexion with the list systems.
But in the majority of cases all three rules will yield the same result.
_Panachage._
In the previous chapter reference has been made to the possible abuse of
_panachage_. In order to prevent such practice the Belgian system
provides that the elector shall vote for a member on one list only. In
Switzerland the elector is permitted to vote for members of more than
one list, and any abuse of this privilege is prevented by allowing the
elector to cumulate as many as three votes upon any of his favourite
candidates. This provision assures the return of the favourite
candidates of each party. The problem hardly arises with the single
transferable vote; the favourites of each party will doubtless always
receive more votes than are sufficient to ensure their election. The
elector who desires to advance the interests of his own party as much as
possible must indicate his preferences among all the members of his own
party before recording any preference for a candidate of another.
_Applicability to non-political elections._
The single transferable vote possesses another advantage over list
systems. It is not only applicable to political elections, but to all
elections in which it is desired that the elected body should be
representative in character, but in which party lists are undesirable.
The British Medical Association has decided to conduct all its elections
so far as possible by the transferable vote; Trades Unions have made use
of it in the election of their committees; it has been used in Australia
by the Labour party for the selection of parliamentary candidates by
members of the party before the date of election. Thus the single
transferable vote would produce a much to be desired uniformity in
method in different elections.
_Bye-elections._
The list systems have an advantage over the transferable vote in the
simplicity of their solution of the problem of bye-elections. Under list
systems bye-elections are abolished. But the preliminary question,
whether it is desirable that they should be abolished, needs
consideration. The Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems
says: "Neither the single transferable vote nor list systems provide for
a solution of the problem of bye-elections which is both fitted to
English ideas and practically satisfactory." The Report continues:
"Bye-elections are generally regarded as valuable, if rough, tests of
public approval or disapproval of the proceedings of the Government, and
useful indications of the trend of political feeling. A system,
therefore, which would abolish or seriously hamper them is bound to
excite opposition."[8] If bye-elections are desirable because of the
indications which they give of the trend of political feeling, then the
large constituencies which the proportional system demands would add to
their value. The opinion of a larger number of electors would
be obtained.
Wherever the single transferable vote has been adopted bye-elections
have been retained. In Tasmania, whenever a vacancy occurs the whole
constituency is polled; the Transvaal Municipal Act allows single
vacancies to remain unfilled, but provides for bye-elections when two or
more seats become vacant. The Proportional Representation Society, in
view of the demand for the retention of bye-elections, suggests that
single vacancies should be immediately filled by a bye-election when
they occur in a three-membered constituency, but that in larger areas no
bye-election should be held until two seats are vacated. But is not the
importance of bye-elections overrated? In many respects they are the
least satisfactory feature of English elections, and it is noticeable
that the change of opinion registered in a bye-election has often not
been maintained when the same constituency is polled at a General
Election. A considerable proportion of bye-elections are consequent upon
the taking of office by members of Parliament, and it is generally
agreed that such bye-elections are not necessary. Further, the House of
Commons has already resolved that it is desirable to reduce the length
of parliaments to five years, which in practice would mean a working
life of four years. The shortening of parliaments would destroy what
little value bye-elections possess.
With a system of proportional representation bye-elections may produce
results which are unfair to the minority. If, for example, at a General
Election a constituency returned four Conservatives, two Liberals, and
one Socialist, and the Socialist member died or retired during the
lifetime of the parliament, the largest party would at a bye-election be
able to gain another member at the expense of the smallest party in the
constituency. This possible injustice is avoided in the list systems by
the abolition of bye-elections. Supplementary members are chosen at the
time of the General Election, and these are called upon to fill
vacancies in the order of their election. The party character of
representation remains unchanged from one election to another. When the
cumulative vote was used for School Board elections casual vacancies
were filled by co-option, and the party in whose ranks the vacancy
occurred was usually allowed to nominate his successor by consent of the
whole Board. Doubtless were bye-elections abolished there would be a
similar willingness to act fairly towards the smaller parties, but if it
was felt desirable to bring the transferable vote into agreement with
the practice followed in the list systems the necessary arrangements
could be made. On the death or retirement of a member the quota of
ballot papers by which he was elected, kept meanwhile under official
seal, could be re-examined, and the candidate who had secured a majority
of the highest preferences recorded on the papers could be called upon
to fill the vacancy.
_Relative simplicity of scrutiny._
Experience shows conclusively that proportional systems, even the most
complex, present no great difficulty to the voter, and therefore there
is little to choose between them. The work thrown upon the returning
officer varies considerably, but in every country the returning officers
have proved equal to their task. The author has been present at Belgian
elections and at Swedish elections; he has conducted model elections in
England, and has been present at elections in the Transvaal, and has
therefore had some opportunity of judging different systems from the
point of view of facility in the counting of votes. The conclusion
arrived at is that the different schemes may be arranged in the
following order:--
1. The single transferable vote when the surplus votes are taken from
the top of the successful candidate's heap;
2. The Belgian list system with its single vote;
3. The single transferable vote with the surplus votes distributed
proportionately to the next preferences, as prescribed in the Schedule
of Lord Courtney's Municipal Representation Bill.
4. List systems in which more than one vote is recorded. With these, the
counting increases in difficulty with the complexity of the scheme.
The reasons for this conclusion are briefly these: Whenever the ballot
paper (as in the Belgian system and with the single transferable vote)
represents but one vote only, the process of counting consists of
sorting papers according to the votes given, and then in counting the
heaps of papers so formed. Whenever there is more than one vote recorded
upon a ballot paper it becomes necessary to extract the particulars of
each paper upon recording sheets. This is the case in the London Borough
Council elections, when the _scrutin de liste_ in its simple form is
used, and when, as in the list system proposed by the committee of the
French Chamber, the elector may cumulate or distribute his votes as he
pleases, selecting candidates from any or all the lists, this process of
extracting the details of the ballot papers must involve considerable
labour. By comparison, the process of sorting and counting ballot papers
is extremely simple. The Belgian law makes provision for the employment
of two "professional calculators," who are responsible for the accuracy
of the arithmetical calculations, and if the more accurate form of the
single transferable vote is adopted, it will be desirable that the
returning officer should have two assistants whose special duty it
should be to verify the accuracy of each stage of the process.
In any comparison between the two main systems of proportional
representation there is no need to understate the advantages of either.
The results which have followed from the adoption of list systems on the
continent have shown how immeasurably superior these are to ordinary
electoral methods. Even in the most rigid of these systems--the
Belgian--there is within each party considerable freedom of opinion in
respect of all political questions which do not spring directly from the
principles on which the party is based. It is claimed, however, for the
single transferable vote that it is more elastic than the most complex
of list systems, that it more freely adapts itself to new political
conditions, and that in small constituencies returning, say, five or
seven members, it yields better results. Moreover, this system, based as
it is upon the direct representation of the electors, has appealed with
greater force to English-speaking peoples; it has its advocates in South
Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as in England, and as
a common electoral method for the British Empire is a desideratum in
itself, the balance of advantage, at least for English-speaking peoples,
would appear to be with the single transferable vote.
[Footnote 1: October 1894.]
[Footnote 2: An address given by Miss Spence at River House, Chelsea,
London.]
[Footnote 3: _Socialism and Government_, vol. i. p. 146.]
[Footnote 4: _Proportional Representation_, New Edition, p. 104.]
[Footnote 5: "Il serait désirable que nos associations politiques se
prononcent plus explicitement sur sa légitimité, si l'on ne veut pas que
ce genre de propagande reste une duperie pour les candidats les plus
scrupuleux." --_Nos Partis Politiques au lendemain du 22 Mai 1910_,
p. 10.]
[Footnote 6: _Cf_. pamphlet, _The Finnish Reform Bill_, Helsingfors,
1906.]
[Footnote 7: Readers who desire to follow the discussion as to the
comparative merits of the d'Hondt rule and the _méthode rationelle_,
should consult the following works:--
_Examen Critique des Divers Precédés de Répartition Proportionnelle en
Matière Electorale_, par M. E. Macquart; _Revue Scientifique_, 28
October 1905.
_La Représentation Proportionnelle et les Partis Politiques_, par M.
P.G. la Chesnais.
_La Vraie Représentation Proportionnelle_, par M. Gaston Moch.]
[Footnote 8: Ibid., par. 83.]