wrecked in the Crimean War--not through our fault. The German Union
has been destroyed by us, because the existence which we were granted
within it was unbearable in the long run for ourselves and the German
people as well. After the dissolution of the German Union and the war
of 1866, Prussia, as it was then, or North Germany, would have become
isolated, if we had been obliged to count with the fact that nobody
would be willing to pardon our new successes--the great successes
which we had won. No great power looks with favor on the successes of
its neighbors.
Our relations with Russia, however, were not disturbed by the
experience of 1866. In that year the memory of Count Buol's policy and
of the policy of Austria during the Crimean War was too fresh in
Russia to permit the rise of the thought that Russia could assist the
Austrian monarchy against the Prussian attack, or could renew the
campaign, which Emperor Nicholas had fought for Austria in 1849--ask
your pardon, if I sit down for a moment. I cannot stand so long.
Our most natural support, therefore, still remained with Russia, due
very properly to the policy of Emperor Alexander I. in this
century--not to speak of the last century at all. In 1813 he might
well have turned back at the Polish frontier, and have made peace, and
later he might have dropped Prussia. We certainly owed our
reëstablishment on the old basis at that time to the benevolence of
Emperor Alexander I.--or, if you wish to be sceptical, you may say to
the Russian policy, which was such as Prussia needed. Gratitude for
this dominated the reign of Frederick William III. The credit,
however, which Russia had in the Prussian accounts was used up by the
friendship, I may even say servility, of Prussia during the entire
reign of Emperor Nicholas, and was, I own, wiped out at Olmütz. There
Emperor Nicholas did not take the part of Prussia, nor did he keep us
from evil experiences or certain humiliations, for Emperor Nicholas
really preferred Austria to Prussia. The idea that we owed
Russia any thanks during his reign is a historical myth.
We did, nevertheless, not break our traditional relations with Russia
while he lived; and in the Crimean War we remained true, as I said
before, to our Russian duty, in spite of many threats and great
dangers. His Majesty, the late King, had no desire to play a decisive
part in the war by a great levy of troops, as I believe we could have
done. We had made certain treaties requiring us to put in the field
100,000 men after the lapse of a stated time; and I proposed to His
Majesty to levy not 100,000 but 200,000 men, and mounted at that, whom
we could use as well toward the right as toward the left, in which
case, I said, Your Majesty will be the arbiter of the Crimean War. But
the late King did not cherish warlike enterprises, and the people
ought to be grateful to him. I was younger then, and less experienced
than I am today. At any rate we harbored no resentment for Olmütz
during the Crimean War. We came out of this war as the friends of
Russia, and I was enabled to enjoy the fruit of this friendship, when
as ambassador I was most kindly received in St. Petersburg, both at
court and in society at large. Even our espousing the cause of Austria
in the Italian War, while not to the liking of the Russian cabinet,
showed no harmful effects. Our war of 1866 was regarded in Russia with
a certain amount of satisfaction, for the Russians were glad to see
Austria suffer. In our French war of 1870 we were fortunate enough to
be able to serve the Russian interests in the Black Sea at the same
time that we were successful in defending and guarding our own. The
contracting parties probably would not have removed their restrictions
from the Black Sea, if the victorious German troops had not been
standing near Paris. If we had been beaten, the London agreement in
the interest of Russia would not have been made so easily, I believe.
Thus also the war of 1870 carried in its train no disagreement between
us and Russia. I mention these matters in order to explain to you
the origin of our treaty with Austria, which was published a few days
ago, and to defend the policy of His Majesty against the reproach of
having enlarged the possibilities of war for the German empire, by
adding to them the chances which may befall Austria without any fault
of her own. I am, therefore, going to describe to you how it happened
that our traditional relations with Russia, which I had always and
very gladly fostered, became so altered that we were induced to
conclude the treaty published day before yesterday.
The first years after the French war passed in the best of friendship.
In 1875 there suddenly appeared the inclination of my Russian
colleague, Prince Gortschakoff, to work for popularity with France
rather than with us, and to make the world believe, by means of
certain artificially created events and an interpolated telegram, that
we had harbored the idea, however remote, of invading France, and that
his intercession alone had saved France from this danger. This
occasioned the first estrangement between us, and led to a serious
discussion between me and my former friend and later colleague. All
this time and subsequently we were still clinging to the task of
maintaining peace among the three emperors, and of continuing the
relationship begun by the visits of the emperors of Russia and Austria
here in Berlin in 1872, and the subsequent return visits. We were
succeeding in this, when in 1876, before the Turkish War, pressure was
brought to bear upon us to choose between Russia and Austria. This we
refused to do. I do not deem it advantageous to discuss the details.
They will be known some time. The result of our refusal was that
Russia turned to Vienna directly, and entered into an agreement with
Austria--I believe it was in January, 1877--concerning the
possibilities of an Oriental crisis, granting her, if The crisis
should take place, the occupation of Bosnia, etc. Then the war took
place, and we were very glad that the storm raged further south than
it had threatened at first. The war was definitely concluded here in
Berlin by the Congress, after the preliminaries had been settled by
the peace of San Stefano. The peace of San Stefano, I am convinced,
was not more risky for the anti-Russian powers nor much more favorable
for Russia than the subsequent congressional treaty. The stipulations
of San Stefano were realized, one may say, of their own accord later
on, when the little state of East Rumelia, with only 800,000 souls I
believe, joined Bulgaria and thereby reestablished on its own
responsibility the old San Stefano frontier, although not quite
exactly. The damage, therefore, which the Congress inflicted on the
agreements of San Stefano was not very considerable. Whether these
agreements were masterpieces of diplomacy I leave undecided. We had
then very little desire to mix in Oriental affairs, just as we have
today.
I was seriously ill in Friedrichsruh when I was officially notified of
the Russian wish to call a Congress of the great powers in Berlin for
the definite settlement of the war. I was at first not favorably
inclined, because I was physically incapacitated, and because I did
not wish to involve ourselves in these matters to the extent which the
presidency of a Congress necessitates. My final compliance was partly
due to the German sense of duty, which does anything in the interest
of peace, and partly to the grateful memory of the favors of Alexander
I., which I have always remembered, and which induced me to grant also
this request. I declared my willingness, provided we could secure the
acceptance of England and Austria. Russia undertook to secure the
consent of England, and I agreed to recommend the plan in Vienna. We
were successful, and the Congress took place.
During the Congress, I may well say, I played my part--without hurting
the interests of my country or of our friends--just as if I had been
the fourth Russian plenipotentiary--I may almost say the third, for I
can hardly accept Prince Gortschakoff as a representative of the
then Russian policy, which was more truly represented by Count
Schuwaloff.
During the whole course of the congressional deliberations I heard of
no Russian wish which I did not recommend and push through. Thanks to
the confidence which Lord Beaconsfield--unfortunately dead
now--reposed in me, I called at his sickbed in the middle of the night
during the most difficult and critical moments of the Congress, when
disruption seemed near, and obtained his consent. In short my behavior
in the Congress was such that I said to myself when it was over: "If
the highest Russian decoration set in diamonds had not been bestowed
upon me long ago, I should surely receive it now." I had the feeling
of having done something for a foreign power which is rarely
vouchsafed to a foreign minister to do.
What, then, were my surprise and natural disappointment, when
gradually a sort of newspaper campaign began in St. Petersburg,
attacking the German policy, and casting suspicion on my personal
intentions. These attacks increased in the following year to the
strong request, in 1879, for pressure to be exerted by us on Austria
in matters where we could not attack the Austrian rights as such. I
could not consent, for, if we should have been estranged from Austria,
we should necessarily have fallen into a dependence on Russia, unless
we were satisfied with standing entirely alone in Europe. Would such a
dependence have been bearable? Formerly I had believed it might be,
when I had said to myself: "We have no conflicting interests at all.
There is no reason why Russia should ever cancel our friendship." At
least I had never contradicted my Russian colleagues when they
expounded such theories to me. The Russian behavior concerning the
Congress disappointed me and told me that we were not protected from
being drawn into a conflict with Russia against our wishes, even if we
placed our policy (for a time) completely at her disposal. The
disagreement concerning instructions which we had given or had not
given to our representatives in the south grew, until threats
resulted, threats of war from the most authoritative quarter.
This is the origin of our Austrian Treaty. By these threats we were
compelled to choose between our two former friends, a decision which I
had avoided through several decades. At that time I negotiated in
Gastein and in Vienna the treaty which was published day before
yesterday and which is in force between us today.
The publication has been partly misunderstood in the newspapers, as I
read yesterday and the day before. People have wanted to see in it an
ultimatum, a warning, and a threat. A threat could not possibly be
contained in it, since the text of the treaty has been known to Russia
for a long while, and not only since November of last year. We
considered it due to the sincerity of so loyal a monarch as the
Emperor of Russia not to leave a doubt concerning the actual state of
affairs.
Personally I see no chance for us _not_ to have concluded this treaty.
If we had not done it, we should have to do it _now_. It possesses the
finest quality of an international treaty, in that it is the
expression of the lasting interests of both parties, Austria as well
as ourselves. No great power can for any length of time cling to the
wording of a treaty against the interests of its own people; it will
at last be forced to declare openly: "Times have changed; we can no
longer do this;" and will have to defend its action as best it can
before its own people and the other contracting party. But no power
will approve a course which leads its own people to destruction, for
the sake of the letter of a treaty signed under different conditions.
Nothing of this kind, however, is contained in these treaties. The
treaty concluded with Austria, as well as other similar ones existing
between us and other powers, notably some agreements into which we
have entered with Italy, are the expression of common interests in
mutual aspirations and dangers. Italy, like ourselves, has been
obliged to fight against Austria for her right to establish her
national union. At present both of us are living in peace with
Austria, sharing with her the wish to ward off the dangers which are
threatening all alike. Together we wish to preserve the peace, which
is as dear to the one as to the other, and to protect our
home--developments to which all of us are determined to devote
ourselves. It is these aims and the mutual confidence that the
treaties will be kept, and that no one will grow more dependent by
them than their own interests permit, which make these treaties firm,
durable and permanent!
The extent to which our treaty with Austria is the expression of our
mutual interests was shown at Nikolsburg, and in 1870. Already during
the negotiations of Nikolsburg we were of the opinion that we could
not do for any length of time without Austria in Europe--a strong and
vigorous Austria. In 1870, when the war between ourselves and France
broke out, many sensitive Austrians whom we had hurt were naturally
tempted to make use of this opportunity and to take revenge for 1866.
The thoughtful and far seeing diplomats, however, of the Austrian
cabinet had to ask themselves: "What will be the result? What will be
our position, if today we assist the French, and help them to beat
Prussia, or even Germany?" What would have been the result if France
with the help of Austria had been victorious over us? If Austria had
followed such a policy, she could have had no other aim than to resume
her former position in Germany: for this was really the only thing she
had given up in 1866. There had been no other important conditions,
and the pecuniary ones had been insignificant. Well then, what would
have been the position of Austria as the presiding power in the German
Union, if she had to confess that in alliance with France she had
taken from Germany the left bank of the Rhine, that she had reduced
the south German states to a renewed dependence on France in the shape
of a Rhenish Federation, and had condemned Prussia to an irrevocable
dependence on Russia, subject in future to Russian policies?
Such a position was unacceptable to all Austrian statesmen not
completely blinded by wrath and vengeance. The same is also true with
us in Germany. Imagine Austria struck from the map of Europe. Then we
and Italy would be isolated on the continent, hemmed in between Russia
and France, the two strongest military powers next to Germany, either
continually one against two--and this would be most probable--or
alternately dependent on one or the other. But this will not be the
case. It is impossible to imagine Austria away, for a State like
Austria does not disappear. It is estranged if it is jilted, as was
proposed in the Villafranca negotiations, and will be inclined to
offer the hand to him who, on his part, has been the opponent of an
unreliable friend.
In short, if we wish to avoid being isolated, which is especially
dangerous for Germany in our assailable position, we must have a
reliable friend. Thanks to the similarities of our interests, and this
treaty before you, we have two such friends. It is not love which
makes them reliable, for nations may make war one upon the other
because they hate, but it has never yet happened that one nation has
sacrificed itself for the other for mere love. Nor do they always
fight when they hate each other, for, if this were the case, France
would have to be fighting incessantly, not only with us, but also with
England and Italy. She hates all her neighbors. I also believe that
the Russian hatred of us, which has been artificially fanned, will not
last. We are united with our allies in love of peace, not only by
inclination and friendship, but also by the most cogent interests of a
European equilibrium and of our own future.
For these reasons I believe you will approve the Emperor's policy that
has concluded the published treaty, although it increases the
possibility of war.
There can be no doubt that the passage of the pending bill will add
much weight to the alliance which we have joined, and that the member
which is represented by the German empire will be immeasurably
strengthened. The bill gives us an increase of trained troops, a
possible increase of troops, which we need not summon, if we do not
need them. We can leave the men at home. But, having them in reserve,
we shall also have the arms for them, and this is the all-important
thing. I remember the old blunderbuses furnished in 1813 for our
_Landwehr_ by England, with which I was drilled in the _chasseurs_.
They were no weapons for war--such we cannot furnish at a moment's
notice. But, when once we have the proper weapons, this new bill means
an increase of the guarantees of peace, and as strong an increase of
the league of peace as if a fourth great power had joined it with
700,000 men, which as you know used to be the maximum figure of a
national army. This tremendous increase will also have a quieting
effect, I believe, on our own people, and will somewhat alleviate the
nervousness of our public opinion and of our bankers and editors. I
hope you will be relieved when you realize that after this increase,
and from the very moment this bill is signed and published, the men
will be ready. A scanty supply of arms for them might even now be at
hand, but we must secure better ones, for if we form an army of
triarians, of the best human material which we have among our people,
men over thirty years of age and fathers of families, then we must
have for them also the best arms that can be secured. We should not
send them into battle with arms which we do not deem good enough for
our regular troops. These staunch men, fathers of families, and
gigantic figures, as we remember them from the time when they held the
bridge of Versailles, should carry on their shoulders the best of
guns, and have the most complete armor and necessary clothing to ward
off the hardships of the weather and other ills. In such matters we
must not be saving.
After listening to the survey of forty years which I have just given
it is natural that our fellow-citizens should realize the ever-present
danger of a coalition against us and the possibility of a double
attack, in which I, to be sure, do not believe. The thought,
however, that in such a case we can have one million good soldiers for
our defense on either frontier will be most reassuring to them. In
addition, we can keep at home reserves of half a million and more, or
even a million, sending them to the front as they may be needed. I
have been told: "The result will be that the others will also increase
their strength." This they cannot do, for they long ago reached their
highest figure. We decreased our figures in 1867, because we believed
that we could take things easy, with the North German Alliance at our
disposal, and could release from service all men over thirty-two years
of age. Our neighbors subsequently adopted a longer period of service,
many one as long as twenty years. The minister of war will be able to
explain this to you more in detail, if he will address you. In figures
the others are as strong as we, but in quality they cannot equal us.
Courage is the same with all civilized nations, the Russian or the
Frenchman fights as bravely as the German; but our people, our 700,000
men, are experienced, _rompus au métier,_ trained soldiers who have
not forgotten anything.
In addition, no nation in the world can equal us in our material of
officers and subalterns to direct such a huge army. This means the
remarkable degree to which popular education has spread in Germany,
and which appears in no other country. The degree of education which
is needed to qualify an officer and a subaltern to command according
to what the soldiers expect of them, is found with us far more
extensively than elsewhere. We have more of the material out of which
officers, and more out of which subalterns are made, than any other
country, and we have a body of officers which no country in the world
can equal.
This, and the excellence of our subalterns, who are the pupils of our
officers, constitute our superiority. The other nations cannot equal
us in the amount of education which qualifies an officer to fulfil the
severe requirements of his station, and of good comradeship to bear
all the necessary privations, and at the same time to satisfy the
exceedingly difficult social demands which must be met, if the
feeling of good fellowship between officers and men, which thank God
exists in our army to a high and often stirring degree, is to be
established without detracting from the authority of the officers. The
relations existing, especially in war time, between our officers and
men are inimitable,--with few evil exceptions which only prove the
rule, for on the whole we may say: No German officer forsakes his men
under fire; he saves them at the risk of his life, and they do the
same; no German soldier forsakes his officer--we have experienced
this.
If other nations are obliged to furnish with officers and subalterns
equally large troops as we are intending to create by this bill, they
may be forced by circumstances to appoint officers who will not
succeed in guiding a company through a narrow gate, and even less in
meeting the heavy obligations of the officer who is to retain the
esteem and love of his men. The amount of education which is needed
for this, and the amount of _camaraderie_ and sense of honor which we
find among our officers, can be elicited from no other body of
officers anywhere in the world, either by rules or injunctions. In
this we are superior to everybody, and that is why they cannot imitate
us. I am, therefore, not at all afraid of it.
Then there is another advantage if this bill is passed. The very
strength at which we are aiming necessarily renders us pacific. This
sounds like a paradox, but it is not.
With the powerful engine into which we are transforming the German
army one does not make an attack. If I were to come before you today,
on the assumption that conditions were different from what I believe
they are, and said, "We are considerably menaced by France and Russia;
it is to be expected that we shall be attacked, and as a diplomat,
believing my military information in these matters to be correct, I am
convinced that it is better for us to have our defense consist of a
bold attack, and to strike the first blow now;" and if I added: "We
can more easily wage an aggressive war, and I, therefore, am asking
the Reichstag for an appropriation of a milliard, or half a milliard,
marks to engage in a war against our two neighbors,"--then I do not
know, gentlemen, whether you would have enough confidence in me to
grant my request, but I hope you would not have it.