satisfy the incontestable demands of our safety, was found in the
opposition of the inhabitants themselves, who did not wish to be
separated from France. It is not my duty here to inquire into the
causes which made it possible for a thoroughly German community to
become so deeply attached to a country speaking a different tongue and
possessing a government which was not always kind and considerate. To
a great extent this may have been due to the fact that all those
qualities which distinguish the Germans from the French are found to
such a high degree in Alsace-Lorraine, that the inhabitants of this
country formed--I may say it without fear of seeming presumption--an
aristocracy in France as regards proficiency and exactness. They were
better qualified for service, and more reliable in office. The
substitutes in the army, the gendarmes, and the civil officers were
from Alsace-Lorraine in numbers entirely out of proportion to the
population of these provinces. There were one and one half million
Germans who knew how to make use of these virtues among a people who
have other virtues but who are lacking in these particular ones.
Thanks to their excellence they enjoyed a favored position, which made
them unmindful of many legal iniquities. It is, moreover,
characteristic of the Germans that every tribe lays claim to some kind
of superiority, especially over its immediate neighbors. As long as
the people of Alsace and Lorraine were French, Paris with its splendor
and the grandeur of a united France stood behind them; they could meet
their fellow Germans with the consciousness that Paris was theirs, and
thus find a reason for their sense of exclusive superiority. I do not
wish to discuss further the reasons why everyone attaches himself more
readily to a big political system which gives scope to his abilities,
than to a divided, albeit related, nation, such as existed formerly on
this side of the Rhine, in so far as the Alsatians were concerned. The
fact is that such disinclination existed, and that it is our duty to
overcome it by patience. We have, it seems to me, many means at our
disposal. We Germans are accustomed to govern more benevolently,
sometimes more awkwardly--but in the long tun really more benevolently
and humanely, than the French statesmen. This is a merit of the German
character which will soon appeal to the Alsatian heart and become
manifest. We are, moreover, able to grant the inhabitants a far
greater degree of communal and individual freedom than the French
institutions and traditions ever permitted.
If we watch the present movement in Paris (the Commune), we shall
find, what is true of every movement possessing the least endurance,
that it contains at bottom a grain of sense in spite of all the
unreasonable motives which attach to it, influencing its individual
partisans. Without this no movement can attain even that degree of
force which the Commune exercises at present. This grain of sense--I
do not know how many people believe in it, but surely the most
intelligent and best who at present are fighting against their
countrymen do believe in it--is, to put it briefly, the German
municipal government. If the Commune possessed this, then the better
element of its supporters--I do not say all--would be satisfied. We
must differentiate according to the facts. The militia of the usurpers
consists largely of people who have nothing to lose. There are in a
city of two million inhabitants many so-called "_repris de justice_,"
or as we should say "people under police supervision," who are
spending in Paris the interval between two terms in prison. They are
congregating in the city in considerable numbers and are ready to
serve disorder and pillage wherever it may be. It is these people who
gave to the movement, before we had scrutinized its theoretical aims,
the occasionally prominent character which seemed to threaten
civilization, and which, in the interest of humanity, I now hope has
been overcome. It is, of course, quite possible that it may recur.
In addition to this flotsam, which is found in large masses in every
big city, the militia which I mentioned consists of many adherents of
an international European republic. I have been told the figures with
which the foreign nations are there represented, but I remember only
that almost eight thousand Englishmen are said to be in Paris for the
sake of seeing the realization of their plans. I assume that these
so-called Englishmen are largely Irish Fenians. And then there are
many Belgians, Poles, adherents of Garibaldi, and Italians. They
are people who really do not care much for the "Commune" and French
liberty. They expect something else, and they were, of course, not
meant, when I said that there is a grain of sense in every movement.
The needs and wishes of the large French communities are thoroughly
justified, considering not only their own political past, which grants
them a very moderate amount of freedom, but also the tradition of the
French statesmen who are offering to the cities their very best
possible compromise with municipal freedom. The inhabitants of Alsace
and Lorraine have felt these needs most forcefully owing to their
German character, which is stronger than the French character in its
demands for individual and municipal independence. Personally I am
convinced that we can grant the people of Alsace and Lorraine, at the
very start, a freer scope in self government without endangering the
empire as a whole. Gradually this will be broadened until it
approaches the ideal, when every individual and every community
possesses as much freedom as is at all compatible with the order of
the State as a whole. I consider it the duty of reasonable
statesmanship to try to reach this goal or to come as near to it as
possible. And this is much easier, with our present German
institutions, than it will ever be in France with the French character
and the French centralized system of government. I believe, therefore,
that, with German patience and benevolence, we shall succeed in
winning the men of Alsace and Lorraine--perhaps in a briefer space of
time than people today expect.
But there will always be some residuary elements, rooted with every
personal memory in France and too old to be transplanted, or
necessarily connected with France by material interests. For them
there will be no compensation for the broken French bonds, or at least
none for some time to come. We must, therefore, not permit ourselves
to believe that the goal is in sight, and that Alsace will soon be as
intensely German in feeling as Thuringia. On the other hand, we need
not give up the hope of living to see the realization of our plans
provided we fulfill the time generally allotted to man.
The problem of how to approach this task, gentlemen, will now
primarily concern you. What should be the form of our immediate
procedure? for it should surely not bind us irrevocably for all the
future. I would ask you not to deliberate as if you were to create
something that will hold good for eternity. Do not endeavor to form a
definite idea of the future as you may think it should be after the
lapse of several decades. No man's foresight, I hold, can reach as far
as that. The conditions are abnormal; they had to be so--our entire
task was so--not only as regards the mode of taking possession of
Alsace, but also as regards the present owners. An alliance of
sovereign princes and free cities making a conquest which it is
compelled to keep for its own protection, and which is, therefore,
held in joint possession, is very rare in history. It is in fact, I
believe, unique, if we disregard a few ventures by some Swiss cantons,
which after all did not intend to assimilate the countries which they
had jointly conquered, but rather to manage them as common provinces
in the interest of the conquerors. Considering, therefore, the
abnormal conditions and our abnormal task, we are most especially
called upon to guard against overestimating the perspicacity in human
affairs of even the most far sighted politicians. I for one do not
feel capable of foretelling with certainty what the conditions in
Alsace-Lorraine will be three years hence. To do this one would need
an eye capable of piercing the future. Everything depends on factors
whose development, conduct, and good will are beyond our power of
regulation. What we are proposing to you is merely an attempt to find
the right beginning of a road, the end of which we shall know only
when we have been taught the necessary lessons by actual experience
with the conditions of the future. Let me ask you, therefore, to
follow at first the same empirical road which the governments have
followed, and to take conditions as they are, and not as we may wish
they should be. If one has nothing better to put in the place of
something that one does not entirely like, one had better, I believe,
let matters take their own course, and rest satisfied at first with
conditions as they are. As a matter of fact the allied governments
have jointly taken these countries, while their common possession and
common administration, although constituting an established premise,
may be modified in future by our own necessities and the needs of the
people of Alsace and Lorraine. As regards the definite form which the
proposition may take some day, I sincerely urge you to follow the lead
of the governments and to defer your judgment. If you are bolder than
we are in prejudging what will happen, we shall gladly meet your
wishes, since we must work together. The caution with which I have
announced to you the convictions of the allied governments, and with
which these governments have formed their convictions, is an
indication to you of our willingness to be set right, if you should
offer us a better plan, especially if experience--even a short
experience--should have proved it to be a better plan.
When I announce to you our willingness to work hand in hand with you,
you are, I am sure, equally ready to join us in exercising German
patience and German love toward all, and especially toward our new
countrymen, and in endeavoring to discover, and finally to reach, the
right goal.
WE SHALL NEVER GO TO CANOSSA!
May 14, 1872
TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.
[Early in 1872 the German government tried to bring about a peaceful
understanding with the ultramontane (i. e., Catholic) party by
courteous advances made to the pope. The cardinal prince
Hohenlohe-Schillings-fürst was designated as ambassador to His
Holiness the Pope who was asked whether the prince would be
acceptable. The pope replied in the negative, and thereby deeply hurt
the emperor. When the expenses of this post in the budget were under
discussion in the Reichstag, Mr. von Bennigsen expressed the hope that
they would be struck from the budget in future, to which Bismarck
replied as follows:]
I can readily understand how the idea may arise that the expenses for
this embassy have become unnecessary, because there is no longer a
question here of protecting German subjects in those parts. I am,
nevertheless, glad that no motion has been made to abolish this
position, for it would have been unwelcome to the government.
The duties of an embassy are in part, it is true, the protection of
its countrymen, but in part also the mediation of the political
relations which the government of the empire happens to maintain with
the court where the ambassador is accredited. There is no foreign
sovereign authorized by the present state of our legislation to
exercise as extensive rights within the German empire as the pope.
While these rights are almost those of a sovereign, they are not
guarded by any constitutional responsibility. Considerable importance,
therefore, attaches to the kind of diplomatic relations which the
German empire is able to maintain with the head of the Roman Church,
who exerts such a remarkably strong and, for a foreign sovereign,
unusual influence among us. Considering the prevailing tendencies of
the Catholic Church at the present time, I scarcely believe that any
ambassador of the German empire would succeed in inducing His Holiness
the Pope, by the most skilful diplomacy and by persuasion, to modify
the position which he has taken, on principle, in all secular affairs.
There can, of course, be no question here of forceful actions, such as
may occur between two secular powers. In view of the recently
promulgated doctrines of the Catholic Church, I deem it impossible for
any secular power to reach a concordat without effacing itself to a
degree and in a way which, to the German empire at least, is
unacceptable. You need not be afraid, we shall never go to Canossa,
either actually or in spirit.
Nevertheless, I cannot deny that the position of the empire as regards
its religious peace is somewhat shaken. It is not my duty here to
investigate motives, or to ask which one of the two parties is at
fault, but to defend an item of the budget. The united governments of
the German empire are searching eagerly and, in justice to their
Catholic and their Evangelical subjects, diligently for means which
will secure a more agreeable state of affairs than the present, and
which will do so as peacefully as possible, and without unnecessarily
disturbing the religious relations of the empire. I doubt whether this
can be done except by legislation--I mean general and national
legislation, for which the governments will have to ask for the
assistance of the Reichstag.
But you will agree with me that this legislation should proceed with
great moderation and delicacy, and with due regard for every one's
freedom of conscience. The governments must be careful to avoid
anything which will render their task more difficult, such as errors
of information or ignorance of the proper forms, and must strive to
readjust their internal peace with tender regard for religious
sensibilities, even those which are not shared by all. In this
connection it is, of course, necessary that the Holy See should be at
all times well informed of the intentions of the German governments,
certainly more so than has been the case heretofore. One of the chief
causes of the present disturbance in religious matters is, I believe,
the misinformation which has reached His Holiness the Pope concerning
the conditions in Germany and the intentions of the German
governments, and which has been due either to excitement or to the
wrong color given it by evil motives.
I had hoped that the choice of an ambassador, who possessed the full
confidence of both parties, would be welcome in Rome, of a man who
loves truth and deserves confidence, and whose character and bearing
are conciliatory; in short, of a man like the well known prince of the
Church whom His Majesty the Emperor had appointed to this post. I had
hoped that this choice would be regarded as a pledge of our peaceful
attitude and willingness to make advances, and would serve as a bridge
to a mutual understanding. I had hoped that it would give the
assurance that we should never ask anything of His Holiness the Pope
but what a prince of the Church, allied to him by the most intimate
ties, could present and convey to him, and that the forms would always
be in keeping with those which characterize the intercourse of one
prince of the Church with another. This would have avoided all
unnecessary friction in a case which is difficult enough.
Many fears were expressed both by the Protestants and the liberals
concerning this appointment, based, I believe, on an erroneous
interpretation of the position of an envoy or an ambassador. An
ambassador really is a vessel which reaches its full value only when
it is filled with the instructions of its master. In such delicate
matters as these, however, it is desirable that the vessel should be
agreeable and acceptable, and that it should be incapable of
containing poisons or potions without immediately revealing them, as
people used to say of ancient crystals. Unfortunately, and for
reasons which have not yet been given, these intentions of the
Imperial Government could not be carried out because they met with a
curt refusal on the part of the Holy See. I can truly say that such a
case does not often happen. When a sovereign has made his choice of an
ambassador, it is customary for him to inquire, from courtesy, whether
the ambassador will be _persona grata_ with the sovereign to whom he
will be accredited, but the receipt of a negative reply is most
unusual, for it necessitates the repeal of an appointment already
made. What the emperor can do toward the appointment he does before
asking the question. In other words he has made the appointment before
he asks the question. The negative reply, therefore, is a demand that
a step once taken shall be repealed, a declaration which says: "You
have made a wrong choice!"
I have been foreign minister for about ten years, and have been
engaged in questions of higher diplomacy for twenty-one years, and I
am not mistaken, I believe, when I say that this is the first and only
case in my experience where such a question has been answered in the
negative. I have known more than once of doubts expressed concerning
ambassadors who had served for some time, and of courts confidentially
conveying their wish that a change be made in the person accredited to
them. In every case, however, the court had had the experience of
diplomatic relations with the particular person through several years,
and was convinced that he was not qualified to safeguard the good
relations which it wished to maintain with us. It explained,
therefore, in a most confidential and delicate way, generally by means
of an autograph letter from one sovereign to the other, why it had
taken this step. Such requests are rarely, if ever, made
unconditionally. In recent times, as you know, a few cases have
occurred, one of which at least was a very flagrant one, when the
recall of an ambassador was demanded; but as I have said, I do not
remember another instance where an ambassador was refused when he was
to be newly appointed. My regrets at this refusal are exceedingly
keen, but I am not justified in translating these regrets into a
feeling of vexation, for in justice to our Catholic fellow-citizens
the Government should not relax its exertions in trying to find ways
and means of regulating the dividing line between the spiritual and
the secular powers. Such a division is absolutely necessary in the
interest of our internal peace, and it should be brought about in the
most delicate manner, and in a way which will give least offence to
either confession. I shall, therefore, not be discouraged by what has
happened, but shall continue to use my influence with his Majesty the
Emperor to the end that a representative of the empire may be found
for Rome who enjoys the confidence of both powers, if not in equal
measure, at least in measure sufficient for his duties. I cannot, of
course, deny that our task has been rendered decidedly more difficult
by what has happened.
* * * * *
BISMARCK AS THE "HONEST BROKER"
February 19, 1878
TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.
[The complete victory which Russia had won in the Turkish war had
greatly disturbed the European powers, and in Germany much
apprehension was felt for the safety of Austria. England, too, was
much concerned, for she had been displeased at Bismarck's refusal to
intervene in the war. German public opinion was aroused, and the
representative von Bennigsen joined with four colleagues in the
following interpellation, which they made in the Reichstag on February
8: "Is the Chancellor willing to inform the Reichstag of the political
situation in the Orient, and of the position which the German empire
has taken or intends to take in regard to it?" The interpellation was
put on the calendar of February 19, and while Bismarck regarded it as
ill timed he was ready to reply, lest his silence be misunderstood.]
I first ask the indulgence of the Reichstag if I should not be able to
stand while I say everything I have to say. I am not so well as I
look.
With regard to the question, I cannot deny that I was in doubt, when I
first saw the interpellation, not whether I would answer it--for its
form gives me the right to answer it with a "No"--but whether I should
not have to say "No." Do not assume, gentlemen, as one generally does
in such cases, that the reason was because I had to suppress a good
deal which would compromise our policy or restrict it in an
undesirable manner. On the contrary, I have hardly enough to say in
addition to what is already generally known to induce me, of my own
initiative, to make a statement to the representatives of the empire.
The discussions in the English parliament have almost exhaustively
answered one part of the question "What is the political
situation in the Orient at the present time?" If, in spite of the
paucity of the information with which I am addressing you, I do not
say "No" it is because I fear the inference that I have much to
suppress, and because such an inference is always disquieting,
especially when it is coupled with the desire to make capital out of
my silence. I am the more pleased to address you with complete
frankness, because the interpellation and the way it was introduced
have given me the impression that if the German policy wishes to
correspond to the majority opinion of the Reichstag--in so far as I
may consider the recent comments an expression of this opinion--it has
only to continue along the path which it has thus far followed.
Regarding the present situation, I suspect that you already know
everything I can say about it. You know from the press and the English
parliamentary debates that at present one can say in the Orient, "The
arms are idle, and the storms of war are hushed"--God grant, for a
long while! The armistice which has been concluded grants the Russian
army an unbroken position from the Danube to the sea of Marmora, with
a base which it lacked formerly. I mean the fortresses near the
Danube. This fact, which is nowhere denied, seems to me to be the most
important of the whole armistice. There is excluded from the Russian
occupation, if I begin in the north, a quadrangular piece, with Varna
and Shumla, extending along the shore of the Black Sea to Battshila in
the north, and not quite to the Bay of Burgas in the south, thence
inland to about Rasgrad--a pretty exact quadrangle. Constantinople and
the peninsula of Gallipoli are also excluded, the very two points on
whose independence of Russia several interested powers are laying much
stress.
Certain peace preliminaries preceded the armistice, which at the risk
of telling you things you already know I shall nevertheless review
because they will answer the question whether German interests are at
stake in any one of them. There is, in the first place, the
establishment of Bulgaria "within the limits determined by the
majority of the Bulgarian population, and not smaller than indicated
by the conference of Constantinople."
The difference between these two designations is not of sufficient
importance, I believe, to constitute a reasonable danger to the peace
of Europe. The ethnographical information which we possess is, it is
true, not authentic nor without gaps, and the best we know has been
supplied by Germans in the maps by Kiepert. According to this the
national frontier--the frontier of the Bulgarian nationality--runs
down in the west just beyond Salonica, along a line where the races
are rather unmixed, and in the east with an increased admixture of
Turkish elements in the direction of the Black Sea. The frontier of
the conference, on the other hand, so far as it is possible to trace
it, runs--beginning at the sea--considerably farther north than the
national frontier, and two separate Bulgarian provinces are
contemplated. In the west it reaches somewhat farther than the
national frontier into the districts which have an admixture of
Albanian races. The constitution of Bulgaria according to the
preliminaries would be similar to that of Servia before the evacuation
of Belgrade and other strongholds; for this first paragraph of the
preliminaries closes with these words, "The Ottoman army will not
remain there," and, in parenthesis, "barring a few places subject to
mutual agreement."
It will, therefore, devolve upon the powers who signed the Paris
treaty of 1856 to discuss and define those sentences which were left
open and indefinite there, and to come to an agreement with Russia, if
this is possible, as I hope it may be.