preparation, he has jotted down a few words with his inspired
quill-pen. Occasionally he looks at his notes, while he is speaking,
rocking himself very slowly to and fro, and twisting his thumbs. He
often hesitates, almost stutters, and sometimes even makes a slip of
the tongue. He seems to be wrestling with his thoughts, while his
words seem to ascend against their wish, for he makes a very brief
pause after every two or three words.... He speaks without gestures,
pathos or intonation, and without emphasizing any of his words. Is
this the man who as early as 1847 was the leader of the nobility in
the old Diet and their quickest man at repartee; who, in 1849 and 1850
as a member of the Second House and the United Parliament of Erfurt,
whipped the liberal majority to a frenzy of fury with his bitter and
poignant speeches; who as the President of the Ministry since 1862 has
faced, almost alone, the solid phalanx of the Liberals, replying to
their ebullitions of pride and confidence in their own strain, and
answering on the spot and with brilliant presence of mind their
sarcastic and malicious attacks, yes even challenging them with witty
impromptus, and hurting his opponents to the core? Yes, he is the same
man, and occasionally he can be as witty and bitter as he used to be.
But since his great victories he has shown the more serious demeanor
of a statesman. He is calmly objective and conciliatory, as befits his
greatness, which is today universally recognized. The longer he
speaks the more the peculiar attractions of his way of speaking become
manifest. His expression is original and fresh, pithy and robust,
honest and straightforward."
Bismarck did not write out his speeches, and the published accounts of
what he said are copied from the official stenographic reports.
Logically Bismarck never left a sentence incomplete, but grammatically
he often did so when the wealth of ideas qualifying his main thought
had grown to greater proportions than he had anticipated. His diction
was at all times precise, which led to a multiplicity of
qualifications--adjectives, appositions, adverbs, parentheses, and the
like. Desirous of convincing his hearers, he often felt the need of
repeating the same thought in various ways until he at last hammered
it in, as it were, with one big blow--with one phrase easily
remembered and readily quoted. It is these phrases which have given
the names to many of his speeches, namely: "The Honest Broker,"
"Practical Christianity," or "We shall never go to Canossa."
He himself readily quoted from the sayings and writings of other great
men; and was in this respect wholly admirable both for the catholicity
of his taste and the singular appropriateness of his citations. He was
apparently as familiar with the great authors of antiquity as with the
modern German, French and English writers. Nor was he afraid of using
a foreign tongue when no German phrase occurred to him to match the
exact meaning of his thought.
The reader will realize, even more than the hearer, that it was not
the form of Bismarck's speeches which swept his audiences off their
feet, and often changed a hostile Reichstag or Diet into an assembly
of men eager to do his bidding, but that it was his firm grasp on the
realities of life and his supreme command of everything which makes
for true statesmanship. His policies were not based on snap judgments,
they were the result of serious thought. All this showed in his
speeches, and made him one of the most powerfully effective speakers
of all times.
* * * * *
_SPEECHES OF PRINCE BISMARCK_
* * * * *
PROFESSORIAL POLITICS
December 21, 1863
TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON HACK, PH.D.
[In the Prussian Diet the representative, Johann Ludwig Tellkampf,
professor of economics and political science in the University of
Breslau, had attacked the policy of Bismarck in regard to
Schleswig-Holstein. Bismarck replied as follows:]
The conception which the previous speaker has of the politics of
Europe reminds me of a man from the plains who is on his first journey
to the mountains. When he sees a huge elevation loom up before him,
nothing seems easier than to climb it. He does not even think that he
will need a guide, for the mountain is in plain sight, and the road to
it apparently without obstacles. But when he starts, he soon comes
upon ravines and crevasses which not even the best of speeches will
help him to cross. The gentleman comforted us concerning similar
obstacles in the path of politics by saying things like these: "It is
well known that Russia can do nothing at present; it does not appear
that Austria will take a contrary step; England knows very well that
her interests are counselling peace; and finally, France will not act
against her national principles." If we should believe these
assurances, and think more highly of the estimate which the gentleman
has made of the politics of Europe than of our own official judgment,
and should thereby drive Prussia to an isolated and humiliating
position, could we then excuse ourselves by saying, "We could see the
danger coming, but we trusted the speaker, thinking he knew probably
more than we?" If this is impossible how can we attach to the remarks
of the speaker the weight which he wishes us to attach to them!
For all official positions, those of the judges for instance and even
those of the subalterns in the army, we require examinations and a
practical knowledge--difficult examinations. But high politics--oh,
any one can practise them who feels himself called upon to do so.
Nothing is easier than to make endless assertions in this field of
conjectures and to cast caution to the winds. You know that one must
write a whole book to controvert one erroneous thought, and he who
voiced the error remains unconvinced. It is a dangerous and far-spread
mistake which assumes that a naïve intuition will reveal to the
political dilettante what remains hidden from the wisdom of the
expert.
[Professor Tellkampf replied, in great excitement: "My whole life as a
professor of political science has been devoted to the study of
politics, and I should like to ask the president of the ministry,
whether he knew more of political science, when he began his political
career as a dike-master, than a professor of this science knows?" To
which Bismarck replied:]
I do not at all deny the familiarity of the previous speaker with
political theories. But he has wandered from the field of theory into
that of practice. He has announced with complete assurance to me and
to this assembly what each European cabinet will probably do in this
concrete case. These are the very things which, I believe, I must know
better than he. This belief I have expressed. The previous speaker has
referred to his activity in theoretical politics as a professor
through many years. If the gentleman had served even one year in
practical politics, possibly as a bureau chief in the ministry of
foreign affairs, he would not have said what he said today from the
speaker's desk. And his advice, after this one year of practical
training, would be of greater value to me than if he had been active,
even more years than he says, as a professor on the lecture platform.
* * * * *
SPEECH FROM THE THRONE
Written by Bismarck and delivered by William I., July 19, 1870
TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.
[Disturbed by the increasing bonds of union between the northern and
the southern German states, in which France saw a lessening of her own
prestige across the Rhine, the ministers of Napoleon III. had decided
on war against Prussia. They found a pretext in the candidacy of a
Hohenzollern prince for the throne of Spain. Contrary to diplomatic
usage, they requested the King of Prussia to force the withdrawal of
the prince, and even when the father of the prince announced the
withdrawal of his son, they were not satisfied, but instructed
Benedetti, the French ambassador, to secure from the King of Prussia a
humiliating promise for the future. The King indignantly refused, and
Bismarck published the occurrence in the famous "Despatch of Ems,"
July 13, 1870. Thereupon the French cabinet declared war, on July 15,
1870. The formal notice was served on Bismarck, July 19, and on the
same day the King of Prussia opened a special session of the Reichstag
with the following address, which had been prepared by Bismarck.]
GENTLEMEN OF THE REICHSTAG OF THE NORTH GERMAN FEDERATION:
When I welcomed you here at your last assembly, it was with joy and
gratitude because God had crowned my efforts with success. I could
announce to you that every disturbance of peace had been avoided, in
response to the wishes of the people and the demands of civilization.
If now the allied governments have been compelled by treats of war and
its danger to summon you to a special session, you will feel not less
convinced than we that it was the wish of the North German Federation
to develop the forces of the German people as a support of universal
peace, and not as a possible source of danger to it. If we call upon
these forces today for the protection of our independence, we are
doing nothing but what honor and duty demand.
The candidacy of a German prince for the Spanish throne, with which
the allied governments had nothing to do--neither when it was pressed
nor when it was withdrawn--and which interested the North German
Federation only in so far as the government of a friendly nation
seemed to expect of it the assurance of a peaceful and orderly
government for its much harassed land--this candidacy offered to the
emperor of France the pretense of seeing in it a cause for war,
contrary to the long established custom of diplomacy. When the
pretense no longer existed, he kept to his views in utter disregard of
the rights which our people have to the blessings of peace--views
which find their analogy in the history of former rulers of France.
When in earlier centuries Germany suffered in silence such attacks on
her rights and her honor, she did so because she was divided and did
not know her strength. Today when the bonds of the spiritual and
political union, which began with the War of Liberation, are knitting
the German races more closely together as time advances, and when our
armor no longer offers an opening to the enemy, Germany carries in her
bosom the will and the strength to defend herself against renewed
French violence.
It is not presumption which dictates these words. The allied
governments and I myself--we are fully conscious of the fact that
victory and defeat rest with the Lord of battles. We have measured
with clear vision the responsibility which attaches, before God and
men, to him who drives two peace-loving peoples in the heart of Europe
to war. The German and the French people, enjoying in equal measure
the blessings of Christian morals and o growing prosperity, are meant
for a more wholesome contest than the bloody contest of war.
[Illustration: PRINCE BISMARCK FRANZ VON LENBACH]
The rulers of France, however, have known how to exploit by calculated
deception, the just, although excitable, pride of the great French
nation in furtherance of their own interests and for the gratification
of their own passions.
The more conscious the allied governments are of having done
everything permitted by their honor and their dignity to preserve for
Europe the blessings of peace, and the more apparent it is to
everybody that the sword has been forced upon us, the greater is the
confidence with which we rely on the unanimous decision of the German
governments of the South as well as of the North, and appeal to the
patriotism and self-sacrifice of the German people, calling them to
the defense of their honor and their independence.
We shall fight, as our fathers did, against the violence of foreign
conquerors, and for our freedom and our right. And in this fight, in
which we have no other aim than that of securing for Europe lasting
peace, God will be with us as He was with our fathers.
ALSACE-LORRAINE A GLACIS AGAINST FRANCE
May 2,1871
TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.
[After the war France had been obliged to return to Germany the two
provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, which she had attached to herself in
the times of Germany's weakness. It might have been better to unite
these provinces with one of the German states, but it was feared that
so valuable an increase in territory of one of the twenty-five states
that had just been federated in the empire, might lead to renewed
dissension. The suggestion, therefore, was made to administer the two
provinces, for the present, as common property, and to leave the final
arrangements to the future. A bill concerning the immediate
disposition of Alsace and Lorraine was submitted to the Reichstag on
May 2, 1871; when Prince Bismarck opened the discussion with the
following speech.]
In introducing the pending bill I shall have to say only a few words,
for the debate will offer me the opportunity of elucidating the
various details. The underlying principles are, I believe, not subject
to a difference of opinion; I mean the question whether Alsace and
Lorraine should be incorporated in the German empire. The form in
which this should be done, and especially what steps should first be
taken, will be the subject of your deliberations. You will, moreover,
find the allied governments ready to weigh carefully all suggestions
different from our own which may be made in this connection.
I believe that there will be no difference of opinion concerning the
principle itself, because there was none a year ago, nor has any
appeared during this year of the war. If we imagine ourselves back one
year--or more accurately ten months--we can say to ourselves that all
Germany was agreed in her love of peace. There was not a German who
did not wish to be at peace with France, as long as this was honorably
possible. Those morbid exceptions which possibly desired war in the
hope of seeing their own country defeated--they are not worthy of
their name, I do not count them among the Germans!
I insist, the Germans were unanimous in their desire for peace. But
when war was forced upon them, and they were compelled to take to
arms, then the Germans were fully as unanimous in their determination
to look for assurances against the likelihood of another similar war,
provided God were to give them the victory in this one which they were
resolved to wage manfully. If, however, another such war should occur
in the future, they intended to see to it now, that our defence then
would be easier. Everyone remembered that there probably had not been
a generation of our fathers, for three hundred years, which had not
been forced to draw the sword against France, and everybody knew the
reason why Germany had previously missed the opportunity of securing
for herself a better protection against an attack from the west, even
at those times when she had happened to be among the conquerors of
France. It was because the victories had been won in company with
allies whose interests were not ours. Everybody therefore was
determined that if we should conquer this time, independently and
solely by our own might and right, we should strive to make the future
more secure for our children.
In the course of centuries the wars against France had resulted almost
always to our disadvantage, because Germany had been divided. This had
created a geographical and strategic frontier which was full of
temptations for France and of menace for Germany. I cannot describe
our condition before the last war, and especially that of South
Germany, more strikingly than with the words of a thoughtful South
German sovereign. When Germany was urged to take the part of the
western powers in the oriental war, although her governments were not
convinced that this was in their interest, this sovereign--there is
no reason why I should not name him, it was the late King William of
Würtemberg--said to me: "I share your view, that we have no call to
mix in this war, and that no German interests are at stake of
sufficient worth to spill a drop of German blood for them. But what
will happen if we should quarrel with the western powers on this
account? You may count on my vote in the Bundestag until war is at
hand. Then conditions will be altered. I am as ready as the next man
to fulfil my obligations. But take care lest you judge people
differently from what they are. Give us Strassburg, and we shall be
with you at all hazards. As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an
ever armed force, I must fear that my country will be inundated by
foreign troops before the North German Alliance can come to my
assistance. Personally I shall not hesitate a moment to eat the hard
bread of exile in your camp, but my people, weighed down by
contributions, will write to me urging a change of policy upon me. I
do not know what I shall do, nor whether all will remain sufficiently
firm. The crux of the situation is Strassburg, for as long as it is
not German, it will prevent South Germany from giving herself
unreservedly to German unity and to a national German policy. As long
as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever ready army of from 100,000
to 150,000 men, Germany will find herself unable to appear on the
upper Rhine with an equally large army on time--the French will always
be here first."
I believe this instance taken from an actual occurrence says
everything. I need not add one word.
The wedge which Alsace pushed into Germany near Weissenburg separated
South Germany from North Germany more effectively than the political
line of the Main. It needed a high degree of determination, national
enthusiasm, and devotion for our South German allies not to hesitate
one moment but to identify the danger of North Germany with their own
and to advance boldly in our company, in spite of that other danger in
their own immediate proximity to which a clever conduct of the war on
the part of France would have exposed them. That France in her
superior position had been ready to yield to the temptation, which
this advanced outpost of Strassburg offered her against Germany,
whenever her internal affairs made an excursion into foreign lands
desirable, we had seen for many decades. It is well known that the
French ambassador entered my office as late as August 6, 1866, with
the briefly worded ultimatum: "Either cede to France the city of
Mayence, or expect an immediate declaration of war." I was, of course,
not one moment in doubt about my reply. I said to him: "Well, then, it
is war." He proceeded with this reply to Paris. There they changed
their mind after a few days, and I was given to understand that this
instruction had been wrung from Emperor Napoleon during an attack of
illness. The further attempts on Luxembourg and the consequent issues
are known to you. I will not revert to them, nor do I believe that it
is necessary to prove that France did not always show a sufficiently
strong character to resist the temptations which the possession of
Alsace brought with it.
The question was, how to secure a guarantee against this. It had to be
of a territorial nature, because the guarantees of foreign powers were
not of much use to us, such guarantees having at times been subject to
supplementary and attenuating declarations. One might have thought
that all Europe would have felt the need of preventing the ever
recurring wars of two great and civilized peoples in the heart of
Europe, and that it would have been natural to assume that the
simplest way to do this was to strengthen the defences of that one of
the two participants who doubtless was the more pacific. I cannot,
however, say that at first this idea appeared convincing everywhere.
Other expedients were looked for, and the suggestion was often made
that we should be satisfied with an indemnity and the razing of the
French fortresses in Alsace and Lorraine. This I always opposed,
because I considered it an impracticable means of maintaining peace.
The establishment of an easement on foreign territory is very
oppressive and disagreeable to the sense of sovereignty and
independence of those who are affected by it. The cession of a
fortress is felt scarcely more bitterly than the injunction by
foreigners not to build on the territory which is under one's own
sovereignty. French passions have probably been excited more
frequently and more successfully by a reference to the razing of that
unimportant place of Hüningen than by the loss of any conquered
territory which France had to suffer in 1815. I placed, therefore, no
confidence in this means, especially since the geographical
configuration of this advanced outpost--as I took the liberty of
calling it--would have put the starting place for the French troops
just as near to Stuttgart and Munich as it had always been. It was
important to put it farther back.
Metz, moreover, is a place of such a topographical configuration, that
very little art is needed to transform it into a strong fortress. If
anyone should destroy these additions to nature--which would be a very
expensive undertaking--they could be quickly restored. Consequently I
looked also upon this suggestion as insufficient.
There might have been one other means--and one which the inhabitants
of Alsace and Lorraine favored--of founding there a neutral territory
similar to Belgium and Switzerland. There would then have been a chain
of neutral states from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps, which would
have made it impossible for us to attack France by land, because we
are accustomed to respect treaties and neutrality, and because we
should have been separated from France by this strip of land between
us. France would have received a protecting armor against us, but
nothing would have prevented her from occasionally sending her fleet
with troops to our coast--a plan she had under consideration during
the last war, although she did not execute it--or from landing her
armies with her allies, and entering Germany from there. France would
have received a protecting armor against us, but we should have been
without protection by sea, as long as our navy did not equal the
French. This was one objection, although one of only secondary
importance. The chief reason was that neutrality can only be
maintained when the inhabitants are determined to preserve an
independent and neutral position, and to defend it by force of arms,
if need be. That is what both Belgium and Switzerland have done. As
far as we were concerned in the last war no action on their part would
have been necessary, but it is a fact that both these countries
maintained their neutrality. Both are determined to remain neutral
commonwealths. This supposition would not have been true, in the
immediate future, for the neutrality newly to be established in Alsace
and Lorraine. On the contrary, it is to be expected that the strong
French elements, which are going to survive in the country for a long
while, and whose interests, sympathies, and memories are connected
with France, would have induced the people to unite with France in the
case of another Franco-German war, no matter who their sovereign might
be. The neutrality of Alsace-Lorraine, therefore, would have been
merely a sham, harmful to us and helpful to France. Nothing was left,
therefore, but to bring both these countries with their strong
fortresses completely under German control. It was our purpose to
establish them as a powerful glacis in Germany's defence against
France, and to move the starting point of a possible French attack
several days' marches farther back, if France, having regained her
strength or won allies, should again throw down the gauntlet to us.