Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of
in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, 'The
maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman' (Mu. Up. III,
1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu.
Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word 'source' denotes the material cause is
well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance,
is called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word
yoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the
mantra, 'A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (/Ri/k.
Sa/m/h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means 'source'
follows from a complementary passage, 'As the spider sends forth and
draws in its threads,' &c.--It is thus proved that Brahman is the
material cause of the world.--Of the objection, finally, that in
ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as
potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the
remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through
inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it.
For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture
altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that
Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the
same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject
will, moreover, be discussed more fully later on.
28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which
are opposed to the Vedânta) are explained, are explained.
The doctrine according to which the pradhâna is the cause of the world
has, in the Sûtras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought
forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to
that doctrine is that the Vedânta-texts contain some passages which, to
people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain
inferential marks pointing to it. The doctrine, moreover, stands
somewhat near to the Vedânta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits
the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been
accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sûtras, such as Devala,
and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute
the pradhâna doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and
other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be
refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the
general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are
referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sûtrakâra formally
extends, in the above Sûtra, the refutation already accomplished of the
pradhâna doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished
in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhâna doctrine, has been
so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any
scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by
various Vedic passages.--The repetition of the phrase 'are explained' is
meant to intimate that the end of the adhyâya has been reached.
Notes:
[Footnote 228: The Great one is the technical Sâ@nkhya-term for buddhi,
avyakta is a common designation of pradhâna or prak/ri/ti, and purusha
is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, Sâ@nkhya Kâr.
2, 3.]
[Footnote 229: Sa/m/kalpavikalparûpamanana/s/aktyâ haira/n/yagarbhî
buddhir manas tasyâ/h/ vyash/t/imana/h/su samash/t/itayâ vyâptim âha
mahân iti. Sa/m/kalpâdi/s/ktitayâ tarhi sa/m/dehâtmatva/m/ tatrâha matir
iti. Mahatvam upapâdayati brahmeti. Bhogyajâtâdhâratvam âha pûr iti.
Ni/sk/ayâtmakatvam âha buddhir iti. Kîrti/s/aktimattvam âha khyâtir iti.
Niyamana/s/aktimatvam aha î/s/vara iti. Loke yat prak/ri/sh/t/a/m/
j/ñ/ânam tatosnatirekam âha praj/ñ/eti. Tatphalam api tato
nârthântaravishayam ity âha sa/m/vid iti. /K/itpradhânatvam âha /k/itir
iti. J/ñ/atasarvârtbânusa/m/dhâna/s/aktim âha sm/ri/tis /k/eti. Ânanda
Giri.]
[Footnote 230: Nanu na bîja/s/aktir vidyayâ dahyate vastutvâd âtmavan
nety âha avidyeti. Ke/k/it tu pratijîvam avidya/s/aktibhedam i/kkh/anti
tan na avyaktâvyâk/ri/tâdi/s/abdâyâs tasyâ bhedakâbhâvâd ekatvexpi
sva/s/aktyâ vi/k/itrakâryakaratvâd ity âha avyakteti. Na /k/a tasyâ
jîvâ/s/rayatva/m/ jîva/s/abdavâ/k/yasya kalpitatvâd avidyârûpatvât
ta/kkh/abdalakshyasya brahmâvyatirekâd ity âha parame/s/vareti.
Mâyâvidyayor bhedâd î/s/varasya mâyâ/s/rayatva/m/ jîvânâm
avidyâ/s/rayateti vadanta/m/ pratyâha mâyâmayîti. Yathâ mâyâvino mâyâ
paratantrâ tathaishâpîty artha/h/. Pratîtau tasyâ/s/ /k/etanâpekshâm âha
mahâsuptir iti. Ânanda Giri.]
[Footnote 231: Sûtradvayasya v/ri/ttik/ri/dvyâkhyânam utthâpayati. Go.
Ân. Â/k/âryade/s/îyamatam utthâpayati. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 232: The commentators give different explanations of the
Sattâmâtra of the text.--Sattâmâtre sattvapradhânaprak/ri/ter
âdyapari/n/âme. Go. Ân.--Bhogâpavargapurushârthasya
maha/kkh/abditabuddhikâryatvât purushâpekshitaphalakâra/n/a/m/ sad
u/k/yate tatra bhâvapratyayos'pi svarûpârtho na sâmânyavâ/k/î
kâryânumeya/m/ mahan na pratyaksham iti mâtra/s/abda/h/. Ânanda Giri.]
[Footnote 233: As the meaning of the word ajâ is going to be discussed,
and as the author of the Sûtras and /S/a@nkara seem to disagree as to
its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in
this place.--/S/a@nkara reads--and explains,--in the mantra, sarûpâ/h/
(not sarûpâm) and bhuktabhogâm, not bhuktabhogyâm.]
[Footnote 234: Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the
views of the Sûtra writer and /S/a@nkara. Govindânanda notes that
according to the Bhâshyak/ri/t ajâ means simply mâyâ--which
interpretation is based on prakara/n/a--while, according to the
Sûtra-k/ri/t, who explains ajâ on the ground of the Chândogya-passage
treating of the three primary elements, ajâ denotes the aggregate of
those three elements constituting an avântaraprak/ri/ti.--On
/S/a@nkara's explanation the term ajâ presents no difficulties, for mâyâ
is ajâ, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sûtra
writer, however, ajâ cannot mean unborn, since the three primary
elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the rû/dh/i
signification of ajâ, according to which it means she-goat. But how can
the avântara-prak/ri/ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next
Sûtra replies.]
[Footnote 235: Indication (laksha/n/â, which consists in this case in
five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an
objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in
interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct
meaning.]
[Footnote 236: That pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ is only one word appears from its
having only one accent, viz. the udâtta on the last syllable, which
udâtta becomes anudâtta according to the rules laid down in the Bhâshika
Sûtra for the accentuation of the /S/atapatha-brâhma/n/a.]
[Footnote 237: So in the Mâdhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the
Kâ/n/va recension has not the clause 'the food of food.']
[Footnote 238: This in answer to the Sánkhya who objects to jana when
applied to the prâna, &c. being interpreted with the help of laksha/n/â;
while if referred to the pradhâna, &c. it may be explained to have a
direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhâna
being jana because it produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they
are produced). The Vedãntin points out that the compound pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/
has its own rû/dh/i-meaning, just as a/s/vakar/n/a, literally horse-ear,
which conventionally denotes a certain plant.]
[Footnote 239: We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because
it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that
the yûpa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.]
[Footnote 240: Option being possible only in the case of things to be
accomplished, i.e. actions.]
[Footnote 241: According to Go. Ân. in the passage, 'That made itself
its Self' (II, 7); according to Ân. Giri in the passage, 'He created
all' (II, 6).]
[Footnote 242: By the Brâhma/n/as being meant all those Brâhma/n/as who
are not at the same time wandering mendicants.]
[Footnote 243: The comment of the Bhâmatî on the Sûtra runs as follows:
As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the
fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the
other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in
that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from
each other; so the individual souls also--which are effects of
Brahman--are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would
mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely
non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be
distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with
Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any
instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from
Brahman and somehow non-different.--The technical name of the doctrine
here represented by Â/s/marathya is bhedâbhedavâda.]
[Footnote 244: Bhâmatî: The individual soul is absolutely different from
the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different
limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as
non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself
by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and
become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus
transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference
actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pâ/ñk/arâtrikas: 'Up to the
moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are
different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the
highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference.'--The
technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au/d/ulomi is
satyabhedavâda.]
[Footnote 245: Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under
I, 1, 11.]
[Footnote 246: And not the relation of absolute identity.]
[Footnote 247: I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.]
[Footnote 248: Upapâdita/m/ /k/eti, sarvasyâtmamâtratvam iti /s/esha/h/.
Upapâdanaprakâra/m/ sû/k/ayati eketi. Sa yathârdrendhanâgner
ityâdinaikaprasavatvam, yathâ sarvâsâm apâm ityâdinâ
/k/aikapralayatva/m/ sarvasyoktam. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 249: So according to Go. Ân. and Ân. Gi., although their
interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekâm of the
text.--Kâ/mk/id evaikâm iti jîvasthânâd anyâm ity artha/h/. Go.
Ân.--Jîvabhâvena pratibimbâdhârâtiriktâm ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 250: While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in
fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.]
[Footnote 251: I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause
are separate things.]
[Footnote 252: Viz. the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti.]