While the Sâ@nkhyas employ the term 'the Great one,' to denote the
first-born entity, which is mere existence[232] (? viz. the intellect),
the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its
being connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following,
'The great Self is beyond the Intellect' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); 'The great
omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'I know that great person' (/S/ve.
Up. III, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it
occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhâna.--The pradhâna is
therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.
8. (It cannot be maintained that ajâ means the pradhâna) because no
special characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.
Here the advocate of the pradhâna comes again forward and maintains that
the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhâna is not yet proved.
For, he says, we have the following mantra (/S/ve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is
one ajâ[233], red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the
same nature. There is one aja who loves her and lies by her; there is
another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.'--In this mantra the
words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black' denote the three constituent elements
of the pradhâna. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i.e.
influencing property; Goodness is called white, because it is of the
nature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and
obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent
elements, i.e. the pradhâna, is denoted by the attributes of its parts,
and is therefore called red-white-black. It is further called ajâ, i.e.
unborn, because it is acknowledged to be the fundamental matter out of
which everything springs, not a mere effect.--But has not the word ajâ
the settled meaning of she-goat?--True; but the ordinary meaning of the
word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the
general subject-matter.--That pradhâna produces many creatures
participating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves
her and lies by her, i.e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach
her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are
in a state of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory
existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative
knowledge, lose their attachment to prak/ri/ti, and leave her after
having enjoyed her, i.e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and
release.--On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the
followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhâna
hypothesis.
To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means
proves the Sâ@nkhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra,
taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any
doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms ajâ, &c.
can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the
special assertion that the Sâ@nkhya doctrine only is meant. The case is
analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 'There is a cup
having its mouth below and its bottom above' (B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 3). Just
as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by
itself what special cup is meant--it being possible to ascribe, somehow
or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup--so
here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible
to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhâna is meant by the
term ajâ, or something else.--But in connexion with the mantra about the
cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup
is meant, 'What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom
above is this head.'--Whence, however, can we learn what special being
is meant by the ajâ of the /S/vetâ/s/vatara-upanishad?--To this question
the next Sûtra replies.
9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term ajâ);
for some read so in their text.
By the term ajâ we have to understand the causal matter of the four
classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and
begins with light, i.e. comprises fire, water, and earth.--The word
'but' (in the Sûtra) gives emphasis to the assertion.--This ajâ is to be
considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting
of three gu/n/as in the Sâ@nkhya sense. We draw this conclusion from the
fact that one /s/âkhâ, after having related how fire, water, and earth
sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on.
'The red colour of burning fire (agni) is the colour of the elementary
fire (tejas), its white colour is the colour of water, its black
colour the colour of earth,' &c. Now those three elements--fire, water,
and earth--we recognise in the /S/vetâ/s/vatara passage, as the words
red, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words
primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sâ@nkhya
gu/n/as in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond
doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a
generally acknowledged rule. As we therefore find that in the
/S/vetâ/s/vatara--after the general topic has been started in I, 1, 'The
Brahman-students say, Is Brahman the cause?'--the text, previous to the
passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which
arranges the whole world ('the Sages devoted to meditation and
concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in
its own qualities'); and as further that same power is referred to in
two subsequent complementary passages ('Know then, Prak/ri/ti is Mâyâ,
and the great Lord he who is affected with Mâyâ;' 'who being one only
rules over every germ;' IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that
the mantra treating of the ajâ refers to some independent causal matter
called pradhâna. We rather assert, on the ground of the general
subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred
to in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and
which we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world
in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is
represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water,
and earth, have three distinct colours.--But how can we maintain, on the
ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal
matter is appropriately called a three-coloured ajâ? if we consider, on
the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus ajâ (i.e. goat) does
not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that
Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been produced, so that
the word ajâ cannot be taken in the sense 'non-produced[234].'--To this
question the next Sûtra replies.
10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor)
there is nothing contrary to reason (in ajâ denoting the causal matter);
just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.
The word ajâ neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the
goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning 'unborn;' it rather
expresses an assumption, i.e. it intimates the assumption of the source
of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being
compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be
partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats
resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by
her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her;
so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising
fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings
similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience,
while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true
knowledge.--Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual
souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that
reality of the multiplicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of
other philosophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to
intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of the
states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with
reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that
multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is
the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural
passages such as, 'He is the one God hidden in all beings,
all-pervading, the Self in all beings,' &c.--The words 'like the honey'
(in the Sûtra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is
represented as honey (Ch. Up. III, 1), and speech as a cow (B/ri/. Up.
V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 9),
so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is
metaphorically represented as one. There is therefore nothing contrary
to reason in the circumstance of the term ajâ being used to denote the
aggregate of fire, water, and earth.
11. (The assertion that there is scriptural authority for the pradhâna,
&c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the
Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and
on account of the excess (over the number of those categories).
The attempt to base the Sâ@nkhya doctrine on the mantra speaking of the
ajâ having failed, the Sâ@nkhya again comes forward and points to
another mantra: 'He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest,
him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be
Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which
expresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word,
viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together
therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many
beings as the number twenty-five presupposes, just so many categories
the Sânkhya system counts. Cp. Sâ@nkhya Kârikâ, 3: 'The fundamental
causal substance (i.e. the pradhâna) is not an effect. Seven
(substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal
substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither
a causal substance nor an effect.' As therefore the number twenty-five,
which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the
twenty-five categories taught in the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, it follows that
the doctrine of the pradhâna, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.
To this reasoning we make the following reply.--It is impossible to base
the assertion that the pradhâna, &c. have Scripture in their favour on
the reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, 'on
account of the diversity of the Sâ@nkhya categories.' The Sâ@nkhya
categories have each their individual difference, and there are no
attributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the
number twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number
of individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into
smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for
such combination.--Here the Sâ@nkhya will perhaps rejoin that the
expression five (times) five is used only to denote the number
twenty-five which has five pentads for its constituent parts; just as
the poem says, 'five years and seven Indra did not rain,' meaning only
that there was no rain for twelve years.--But this explanation also is
not tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it
has recourse to indirect indication.[235] In the second place, the
second 'five' constitutes a compound with the word 'people,' the
Brâhma/n/a-accent showing that the two form one word only.[236] To the
same conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. Sa/m/h. I, 6,
2, 2, pa/ñk/ânâ/m/ tvâ pa/ñk/ajanânâm, &c.) where the two terms
constitute one word, have one accent and one case-termination. The word
thus being a compound there is neither a repetition of the word 'five,'
involving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the
mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another
word.--But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound
'five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the compound
will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the
expression 'five five-bundles' (pa/ñk/a pa/ñk/apulya/h/) conveys the
idea of twenty-five bundles.--The instance is not an analogous one, we
reply. The word 'pa/ñk/apûli' denotes a unity (i.e. one bundle made up
of five bundles) and hence when the question arises, 'How many such
bundles are there?' it can be qualified by the word 'five,' indicating
that there are five such bundles. The word pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/, on the other
hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct
things), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know
how many people there are, and hence no room for a further
qualification. And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it
can only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection
against which assumption has already been stated.--For all these reasons
the expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five
categories of the Sâ@nkhyas.--This is further not possible 'on account
of the excess.' For on the Sâ@nkhya interpretation there would be an
excess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the
ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as
the abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause 'Him I believe
to be the Self' being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent
clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sâ@nkhyas which is
already included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on
their interpretation of the passage, would here be mentioned once as
constituting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the
other hand, the soul were supposed not to be compiled in the twenty-five
categories, the Sâ@nkhya would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the
categories being twenty-five. The same remarks apply to the separate
mention made of the ether.--How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a
certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the
assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sâ@nkhya categories of
which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that
the word jana has not the settled meaning of category, and that the
number may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of
the passage.
How, then, the Sâ@nkhya will ask, do you interpret the phrase 'the five
five-people?'--On the ground, we reply, of the rule Pâ/n/ini II, 1, 50,
according to which certain compounds formed with numerals are mere
names. The word pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ thus is not meant to convey the idea of
the number five, but merely to denote certain classes of beings. Hence
the question may present itself, How many such classes are there? and to
this question an answer is given by the added numeral 'five.' There are
certain classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are
five. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven-/ri/shis, where again
the compound denotes a class of beings merely, not their number.--Who
then are those five-people?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
12. (The pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ are) the breath and so on, (as is seen) from the
complementary passage.
The mantra in which the pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ are mentioned is followed by
another one in which breath and four other things are mentioned for the
purpose of describing the nature of Brahman. 'They who know the breath
of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the
mind of mind[237].' Hence we conclude, on the ground of proximity, that
the five-people are the beings mentioned in this latter mantra.--But
how, the Sâ@nkhya asks, can the word 'people' be applied to the breath,
the eye, the ear, and so on?--How, we ask in return, can it be applied
to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word
'people' has to be disregarded; but in favour of our explanation is the
fact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a
complementary passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the
word 'people' because they are connected with people. Moreover, we find
the word 'person,' which means as much as 'people,' applied to the
prâ/n/as in the passage, 'These are the five persons of Brahman' (Ch.
Up. III, 13, 6); and another passage runs, 'Breath is father, breath is
mother,' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of
composition, there is no objection to the compound being taken in its
settled conventional meaning[238].--But how can the conventional meaning
be had recourse to, if there is no previous use of the word in that
meaning?--That may be done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and
similar words[239]. We often infer that a word of unknown meaning refers
to some known thing because it is used in connexion with the latter. So,
for instance, in the case of the following words: 'He is to sacrifice
with the udbhid; he cuts the yûpa; he makes the vedi.' Analogously we
conclude that the term pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/, which, from the grammatical rule
quoted, is known to be a name, and which therefore demands a thing of
which it is the name, denotes the breath, the eye, and so on, which are
connected with it through their being mentioned in a complementary
passage.--Some commentators explain the word pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ to mean the
Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others,
again, think that the four castes together with the Nishâdas are meant.
Again, some scriptural passage (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. VIII, 53, 7) speaks
of the tribe of 'the five-people,' meaning thereby the created beings in
general; and this latter explanation also might be applied to the
passage under discussion. The teacher (the Sûtrakâra), on the other
hand, aiming at showing that the passage does not refer to the
twenty-five categories of the Sâ@nkhyas, declares that on the ground of
the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be understood.
Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in the
Mâdhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text mentions food also (and
so makes up the number five). But how shall we interpret the
Kâ/n/va-text which does not mention food (and thus altogether speaks of
four things only)?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Kâ/n/vas) where food is not
mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the
preceding mantra).
The Kâ/n/va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up the full number
five, by the light mentioned in the mantra preceding that in which the
five-people are spoken of. That mantra describes the nature of Brahman
by saying, 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights.'--If it be
asked how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both texts
equally is in one text to be employed for the explanation of the
five-people, and not in the other text; we reply that the reason lies in
the difference of the requirements. As the Mâdhyandinas meet in one and
the same mantra with breath and four other entities enabling them to
interpret the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the light
mentioned in another mantra. The Kâ/n/vas, on the other hand, cannot do
without the light. The case is analogous to that of the
Sho/d/a/s/in-cup, which, according to different passages, is either to
be offered or not to be offered at the atirâtra-sacrifice.
We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine
of the pradhâna. That this doctrine cannot be proved either by Sm/ri/ti
or by ratiocination will be shown later on.
14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedânta-passages with regard to
the things created, such as) ether and so on; (there is no such conflict
with regard to the Lord) on account of his being represented (in one
passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the
world).
In the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has
been established; it has been shown that all the Vedânta-texts have
Brahman for their common topic; and it has been proved that there is no
scriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhâna.--But now a new
objection presents itself.
It is not possible--our opponent says--to prove either that Brahman is
the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedânta-texts
refer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedânta-texts contradict
one another. All the Vedânta-passages which treat of the creation
enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality
speak of different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self
there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, 1); in another place that the
creation began with fire (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); in another place, again,
that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up. VI, 4); in
another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water
(above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the
earth) (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). There no order is stated at all.
Somewhere else it is said that the creation originated from the
Non-existent. 'In the beginning this was non-existent; from it was born
what exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); and, 'In the beginning this was
non-existent; it became existent; it grew' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1). In
another place, again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the
antecedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent mentioned in
its stead. 'Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is
not; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born
of that which is not?' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place,
again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place
spontaneously, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed
by form and name' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7).--As therefore manifold
discrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of
an accomplished matter[240], the Vedânta-passages cannot be accepted as
authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather
accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of
Sm/ri/ti and Reasoning.
To this we make the following reply.--Although the Vedânta-passages may
be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as
ether and so on, they do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on
account of his being represented as described.' That means: such as the
creator is described in any one Vedânta-passage, viz. as all-knowing,
the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented
in all other Vedânta-passages also. Let us consider, for instance, the
description of Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 ff.). There it is said
at first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the word
'knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman
desired (II, 6), intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence.
Further, the text declares[241] that the cause of the world is the
general Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It
further applies to the cause of the world the term 'Self' (II, 1), and
it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths beginning with
the gross body; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all
beings. Again--in the passage, 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--it
tells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is
non-different from the created effects. And--in the passage, 'He created
all this whatever there is'--it represents the creator as the Cause of
the entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second
previously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above
passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we
find to be predicated of it in other passages also, so, for instance,
'Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a
second. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire'
(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 3), and 'In the beginning all this was Self, one
only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I
send forth worlds?' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1; 2.) The Vedânta-passages
which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus
in harmony throughout.--On the other hand, there are found conflicting
statements concerning the world, the creation being in some places said
to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the
first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements
concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e.
Brahman, in which all the Vedânta-texts are seen to agree--for that
would be an altogether unfounded generalization;--and, in the second
place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those conflicting
passages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more
thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world would not even
matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are
not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor
are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters
in any way; nor have we the right to assume such a thing; because we
conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the passages
about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of
passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages setting forth the
creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture
itself declares; compare Ch. Up. VI, 8, 4, 'As food too is an offshoot,
seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek
after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after
its root, viz. the True.' We, moreover, understand that by means of
comparisons such as that of the clay (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4) the creation is
described merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not
really different from the cause. Analogously it is said by those who
know the sacred tradition, 'If creation is represented by means of (the
similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things; that is only a means
for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference
whatever' (Gau/d/ap. Kâ. III, 15).--On the other hand, Scripture
expressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, 'He
who knows Brahman obtains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He who knows
the Self overcomes grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'A man who knows him
passes over death' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). That fruit is, moreover,
apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon as, by means of the
doctrine, 'That art thou,' a man has arrived at the knowledge that the
Self is non-transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.
It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as 'Non-being
this was in the beginning' contain conflicting statements about the
nature of the cause. This is done in the next Sûtra.
15. On account of the connexion (with passages treating of Brahman, the
passages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute
Non-existence).
The passage 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II,
7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely
Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding
sections of the Upanishad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the
Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is ('He who knows the
Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows the
Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing'); it is further, by
means of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c.,
represented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again
referred to in the clause, 'He wished, may I be many;' is declared to
have originated the entire creation; and is finally referred to in the
clause, 'Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text goes
on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of
discussion, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, Non-being indeed was
this in the beginning,' &c.--If here the term 'Non-being' denoted the
absolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken; for while
ostensibly referring to one matter the passage would in reality treat of
a second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude
that, while the term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which is
differentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being' denotes the same
substance previous to its differentiation, i.e. that Brahman is, in a
secondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the
origination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to
the passage 'Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1);
for that passage also is connected with another passage which runs, 'It
became being;' whence it is evident that the 'Non-being' of the former
passage cannot mean absolute Non-existence. And in the passage, 'Others
say, Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1), the
reference to the opinion of 'others' does not mean that the doctrine
referred, to (according to which the world was originally absolutely
non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda; for option is
possible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The
passage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of
primitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some
teachers of inferior intelligence; a refutation undertaken for the
purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from
that which is.--The following passage again, 'Now this was then
undeveloped,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert
that the evolution of the world took place without a ruler; as we
conclude from the circumstance of its being connected with another
passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into the evolved
world of effects, 'He entered thither to the very tips of the
finger-nails' &c. If it were supposed that the evolution of the world
takes place without a ruler, to whom could the subsequent pronoun 'he'
refer (in the passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected
with something previously intimated? And as Scripture declares that the
Self, after having entered into the body, is of the nature of
intelligence ('when seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when
thinking, mind by name'), it follows that it is intelligent at the time
of its entering also.--We, moreover, must assume that the world was
evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at
present seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the
rulership of an intelligent creator; for we have no right to make
assumptions contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another
scriptural passage also declares that the evolution of the world took
place under the superintendence of a ruler, 'Let me now enter these
beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms'
(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). The intransitive expression 'It developed itself'
(vyâkriyata; it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to
the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought about that
evolution. Analogously it is said, for instance, that 'the cornfield
reaps itself' (i.e. is reaped with the greatest ease), although there is
the reaper sufficient (to account for the work being done).--Or else we
may look on the form vyâkriyata as having reference to a necessarily
implied agent; as is the case in such phrases as 'the village is being
approached' (where we necessarily have to supply 'by Devadatta or
somebody else').
16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the 'work') denotes the
world.
In the Kaushîtaki-brâhma/n/a, in the dialogue of Bâlâki and
Ajàta/s/atru, we read, 'O Bâlâki, he who is the maker of those persons,
he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19).
The question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object
of knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the
highest Self.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant. For, in the
first place, he says, the clause 'of whom this is the work' points to
the activity of motion, and that activity rests on the vital air. In the
second place, we meet with the word 'prâ/n/a' in a complementary passage
('Then he becomes one with that prâ/n/a alone'), and that word is well
known to denote the vital air. In the third place, prâ/n/a is the maker
of all the persons, the person in the sun, the person in the moon, &c.,
who in the preceding part of the dialogue had been enumerated by Bâlâki;
for that the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of
prâ/n/a we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'Who is that one
god (in whom all the other gods are contained)? Prâ/n/a and he is
Brahman, and they call him That' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 9).--Or else, the
pûrvapakshin continues, the passage under discussion represents the
individual soul as the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can
be said that 'this is the work,' if we understand by 'this' all
meritorious and non-meritorious actions; and the soul also, in so far as
it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker of the persons enumerated
in so far as they are instrumental to the soul's fruition. The
complementary passage, moreover, contains an inferential mark of the
individual soul. For Ajâta/s/atru, in order to instruct Bâlâki about the
'maker of the persons' who had been proposed as the object of knowledge,
calls a sleeping man by various names and convinces Bâlâki, by the
circumstance that the sleeper does not hear his shouts, that the prâ/n/a
and so on are not the enjoyers; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by
pushing him with his stick, and so makes Bâlâki comprehend that the
being capable of fruition is the individual soul which is distinct from
the prâ/n/a. A subsequent passage also contains an inferential mark of
the individual soul, viz. 'And as the master feeds with his people, nay,
as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed
with the other Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious Self' (Kau.
Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the support of the prâ/n/a,
it may itself be called prâ/n/a.--We thus conclude that the passage
under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief
vital air; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks
whatever.
To this we make the following reply.--The Lord only can be the maker of
the persons enumerated, on account of the force of the introductory part
of the section. Bâlâki begins his colloquy with Ajâta/s/atru with the
offer, 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' Thereupon he enumerates some
individual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on, which
participate in the sight of the secondary Brahman, and in the end
becomes silent. Ajâta/s/atru then sets aside Bâlâki's doctrine as not
referring to the chief Brahman--with the words, 'Vainly did you
challenge me, saying, Shall I tell you Brahman,' &c.--and proposes the
maker of all those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If now
that maker also were merely a soul participating in the sight of the
secondary Brahman, the introductory statement which speaks of Brahman
would be futile. Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is
meant.--None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being the
maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely
independent.--Further, the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not
refer either to the activity of motion nor to meritorious and
non-meritorious actions; for neither of those two is the topic of
discussion or has been mentioned previously. Nor can the term 'work'
denote the enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned
separately--in the clause, 'He who is the maker of those persons'--and
as inferential marks (viz. the neuter gender and the singular number of
the word karman, work) contradict that assumption. Nor, again, can the
term 'work' denote either the activity whose object the persons are, or
the result of that activity, since those two are already implied in the
mention of the agent (in the clause, 'He who is the maker'). Thus there
remains no other alternative than to take the pronoun 'this' (in 'He of
whom this is the work') as denoting the perceptible world and to
understand the same world--as that which is made--by the term
'work.'--We may indeed admit that the world also is not the previous
topic of discussion and has not been mentioned before; still, as no
specification is mentioned, we conclude that the term 'work' has to be
understood in a general sense, and thus denotes what first presents
itself to the mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is,
moreover, not true that the world is not the previous topic of
discussion; we are rather entitled to conclude from the circumstance
that the various persons (in the sun, the moon, &c.) which constitute a
part of the world had been specially mentioned before, that the passage
in question is concerned with the whole world in general. The
conjunction 'or' (in 'or he of whom,' &c.) is meant to exclude the idea
of limited makership; so that the whole passage has to be interpreted as
follows, 'He who is the maker of those persons forming a part of the
world, or rather--to do away with this limitation--he of whom this
entire world without any exception is the work.' The special mention
made of the persons having been created has for its purpose to show that
those persons whom Bâlâki had proclaimed to be Brahman are not Brahman.
The passage therefore sets forth the maker of the world in a double
aspect, at first as the creator of a special part of the world and
thereupon as the creator of the whole remaining part of the world; a way
of speaking analogous to such every-day forms of expression as, 'The
wandering mendicants are to be fed, and then the Brâhma/n/as[242].' And
that the maker of the world is the highest Lord is affirmed in all
Vedânta-texts.
17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential
marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that that
has already been explained.
It remains for us to refute the objection that on account of the
inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air, which
are met with in the complementary passage, either the one or the other
must be meant in the passage under discussion, and not the highest
Lord.--We therefore remark that that objection has already been disposed
of under I, 1, 31. There it was shown that from an interpretation
similar to the one here proposed by the pûrvapakshin there would result
a threefold meditation one having Brahman for its object, a second one
directed on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the
chief vital air. Now the same result would present itself in our case,
and that would be unacceptable as we must infer from the introductory as
well as the concluding clauses, that the passage under discussion refers
to Brahman. With reference to the introductory clause this has been
already proved; that the concluding passage also refers to Brahman, we
infer from the fact of there being stated in it a pre-eminently high
reward, 'Warding off all evil he who knows this obtains pre-eminence
among all beings, sovereignty, supremacy.'--But if this is so, the sense
of the passage under discussion is already settled by the discussion of
the passage about Pratarda/n/a (I, 1, 31); why, then, the present
Sûtra?--No, we reply; the sense of our passage is not yet settled, since
under I, 1, 31 it has not been proved that the clause, 'Or he whose work
is this,' refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in connexion with
the present passage, a doubt whether the individual soul and the chief
vital air may not be meant, and that doubt has again to be refuted.--The
word prâ/n/a occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the
passage, 'The mind settles down on prâ/n/a' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2).--The
inferential marks of the individual soul also have, on account of the
introductory and concluding clauses referring to Brahman, to be
explained so as not to give rise to any discrepancy.
18. But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has
another purport, on account of the question and answer; and thus some
also (read in their text).
Whether the passage under discussion is concerned with the individual
soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of the teacher Jaimini, no
matter for dispute, since the reference to the individual soul has a
different purport, i.e. aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his
opinion on a question and a reply met with in the text. After
Ajâta/s/atru has taught Bâlâki, by waking the sleeping man, that the
soul is different from the vital air, he asks the following question,
'Bâlâki, where did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he
thus back?' This question clearly refers to something different from the
individual soul. And so likewise does the reply, 'When sleeping he sees
no dream, then he becomes one with that prâ/n/a alone;' and, 'From that
Self all prâ/n/as proceed, each towards its place, from the prâ/n/as the
gods, from the gods the worlds.'--Now it is the general Vedânta doctrine
that at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the highest
Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds,
inclusive of prâ/n/a, and so on. When Scripture therefore represents as
the object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep sleep
of the soul, characterised by absence of consciousness and utter
tranquillity, i.e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions which
are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, and from which the
soul returns when the sleep is broken; we understand that the highest
Self is meant.--Moreover, the Vâjasaneyi/s/âkhâ, which likewise contains
the colloquy of Bâlâki and Ajâta/s/atru, clearly refers to the
individual soul by means of the term, 'the person consisting of
cognition' (vij/ñ/ânamaya), and distinguishes from it the highest Self
('Where was then the person consisting of cognition? and from whence did
he thus come back?' B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 16); and later on, in the reply to
the above question, declares that 'the person consisting of cognition
lies in the ether within the heart.' Now we know that the word 'ether'
may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in the passage
about the small ether within the lotus of the heart (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,
1). Further on the B/ri/. Up. says, 'All the Selfs came forth from that
Self;' by which statement of the coming forth of all the conditioned
Selfs it intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause.--The
doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping person, viz. that the
individual soul is different from the vital air, furnishes at the same
time a further argument against the opinion that the passage under
discussion refers to the vital air.
19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on
account of the connected meaning of the sentences.
We read in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka, in the Maitreyî-brâhma/n/a the
following passage, 'Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the
husband, &c. &c.; verily, everything is not dear that you may love
everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear.
Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be
marked, O Maitreyî! When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and
known, then all this is known' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6).--Here the doubt
arises whether that which is represented as the object to be seen, to be
heard, and so on, is the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the
highest Self.--But whence the doubt?--Because, we reply, the Self is, on
the one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on,
indicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the passage refers to
the individual soul; and because, on the other hand, the declaration
that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points
to the highest Self.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to the individual
soul, on account of the strength of the initial statement. The text
declares at the outset that all the objects of enjoyment found in this
world, such as husband, wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of
the Self, and thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i.e. the
individual) Self is meant; if thereupon it refers to the Self as the
object of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than the same
individual Self?--A subsequent passage also (viz. 'Thus does this great
Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise
from out of these elements, and vanish again after them. When he has
departed there is no more knowledge'), which describes how the great
Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the
elements, shows that the object of sight is no other than the
cognitional Self, i.e. the individual soul. The concluding clause
finally, 'How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' shows, by means of
the term 'knower,' which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is
meant. The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything
becomes known must therefore not be interpreted in the literal sense,
but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is
known through its relation to the enjoying soul.
To this we make the following reply.--The passage makes a statement
about the highest Self, on account of the connected meaning of the
entire section. If we consider the different passages in their mutual
connexion, we find that they all refer to the highest Self. After
Maitreyî has heard from Yâj/ñ/avalkya that there is no hope of
immortality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in the
words, 'What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal?
What my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon Yâj/ñ/avalkya
expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as
Sm/ri/ti declares that immortality is not to be reached but through the
knowledge of the highest Self.--The statement further that through the
knowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its
direct literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest
cause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the pûrvapakshin
proposes) is inadmissible, on account of the explanation given of that
statement in a subsequent passage, viz. 'Whosoever looks for the Brahman
class elsewhere than in the Self, is abandoned by the Brahman class.'
Here it is said that whoever erroneously views this world with its
Brahmans and so on, as having an independent existence apart from the
Self, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an erroneous
view; whereby the view that there exists any difference is refuted. And
the immediately subsequent clause, 'This everything is the Self,' gives
us to understand that the entire aggregate of existing things is
non-different from the Self; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes
of the drum and so on.--By explaining further that the Self about which
he had been speaking is the cause of the universe of names, forms, and
works ('There has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have
as /Ri/gveda,' &c.) Yâj/ñ/avalkya again shows that it is the highest
Self.--To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in the paragraph
which treats of the natural centres of things, that the Self is the
centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind,
that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of
knowledge.--From all this it follows that what the text represents as
the object of sight and so on is the highest Self.
We now turn to the remark made by the pûrvapakshin that the passage
teaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, because it is, in
the early part of the chapter denoted as something dear.
20. (The circumstance of the soul being represented as the object of
sight) indicates the fulfilment of the promissory statement; so
Â/s/marathya thinks.
The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that Self which
is denoted as something, dear indicates the fulfilment of the promise
made in the passages, 'When the Self is known all this is known,' 'All
this is that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from the
highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not imply the knowledge
of the former, and thus the promise that through the knowledge of one
thing everything is to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the
initial statement aims at representing the individual Self and the
highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise
made.--This is the opinion of the teacher Â/s/marathya[243].
21. (The initial statement identifies the individual soul and the
highest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the body) is
such (i.e. one with the highest Self); thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.
The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its
different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind (mano-buddhi),
attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on,
a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at
some future time out of the body, to become one with the highest Self;
hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different
from the highest Self. This is the opinion of the teacher
Au/d/ulomi.--Thus Scripture says, 'That serene being arising from this
body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest
light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).--In another place Scripture intimates, by
means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the
individual soul, 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having
lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form
goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III,
2, 8). I.e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them
disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and
form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the
latter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows
from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two
members of the comparison[244].
22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in
the condition (of the individual soul); so Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks.
Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual
soul, therefore, the teacher Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks, the initial
statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is
possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the
individual soul, is evident from the Brâhma/n/a-passage, 'Let me enter
into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms,' and similar
passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, 'The
wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling
the things by their names' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7)[245]. And where
Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does
not at the same time relate a separate creation of the individual soul;
we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the
highest Self, different from the latter.--In the opinion of the teacher
Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual
soul, not anything else. Â/s/marathya, although meaning to say that the
soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates
by the expression, 'On account of the fulfilment of the promise'--which
declares a certain mutual dependence--that there does exist a certain
relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual
soul[246]. The opinion of Au/d/ulomi again clearly implies that the
difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of
condition[247]. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by
Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all
the Vedânta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, 'That art thou') aim
at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna immortality can
be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be
impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification
(product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being
merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form
cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of
the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are
ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same
reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture
speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the
fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.
The last three Sûtras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish
replies to the second of the pûrvapakshin's arguments, viz. that the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka passage represents as the object of sight the
individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be
seen arises from out of these elements. 'There is an indication of the
fulfilment of the promise; so Â/s/marathya thinks.' The promise is made
in the two passages, 'When the Self is known, all this is known,' and
'All this is that Self.' That the Self is everything, is proved by the
declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from
one being, and is merged in one being[248]; and by its being
demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that
effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is,
then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being
rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements;
thus the teacher Â/s/marathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest
Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one
everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment.--'Because the soul
when it will depart is such; thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.' The statement as
to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the
declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the
soul when--after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on--it will
depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self.
This is Au/d/ulomi's opinion.--'Because it exists in the condition of
the soul; thus Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself
is that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the
non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the
teacher Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna.
But, an objection may be raised, the passage, 'Rising from out of these
elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no
more knowledge,' intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its
identity with the highest Self!--By no means, we reply. The passage
means to say only that on the soul departing from the body all specific
cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection
being raised--in the passage, 'Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when
thou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge'. Scripture
itself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self,
'I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is
imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place
non-connexion with the mâtrâs.' That means: The eternally unchanging
Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by
means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the
mâtrâs, i.e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of
Nescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which
depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that
'When he has departed there is no more knowledge.'
The third argument also of the pûrvapakshin, viz. that the word
'knower'--which occurs in the concluding passage, 'How should he know
the knower?'--denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual
soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of
Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna.--Moreover, the text after having enumerated--in the
passage, 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the
other,' &c.--all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the
sphere of Nescience declares--in the subsequent passage, 'But when the
Self only is all this, how should he see another?'--that in the sphere
of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is
absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence
of objects the knower might not know himself, Yâj/ñ/avalkya goes on,
'How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter
passage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we
have to conclude that the word 'knower' is here used to denote that
being which is knowledge, i.e. the Self.--That the view of
Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is
so, all the adherents of the Vedânta must admit that the difference of
the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting
adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and
form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation
from Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in
the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self is
all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II,
2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is
no other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that
sees but it' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11).--It is likewise confirmed by
Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, 'Vâsudeva is all this' (Bha. Gî. VII,
19); 'Know me, O Bhârata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. Gî. XIII,
2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures'
(Bha. Gî. XIII, 27).--The same conclusion is supported by those passages
which deny all difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is
one and I another; he does not know' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death
to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19).
And, again, by those passages which negative all change on the part of
the Self; compare, for instance, 'This great unborn Self, undecaying,
undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV,
24).--Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those
who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of
irrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter
being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the
object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and
Scripture speaks of those, 'Who have well ascertained the object of the
knowledge of the Vedânta' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6). Compare also the passage,
'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that
unity?' (I/s/. Up. 7.)--And Sm/ri/ti also represents the mind of him who
contemplates the Self as steady (Bha. Gî. II, 54).
As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name
only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its
object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as
some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain that the individual
soul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the
individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names,
but it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is
real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1),
refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual
soul)[249]. And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we
know from a subsequent passage, viz. 'Having sent forth he entered into
it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into
the created beings.--Those who insist on the distinction of the
individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of
the Vedânta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which
is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be
something effected, and therefore non-eternal[250]. (And if they attempt
to show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve
themselves in a conflict with sound logic.
23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not
being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative
instances.
It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired
into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has
to be enquired into because it is the cause of absolute beatitude. And
Brahman has been defined as that from which there proceed the
origination, sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this
definition comprises alike the relation of substantial causality in
which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen
pots, and the relation of operative causality in which the potter and
the goldsmith stand to the things mentioned; a doubt arises to which of
these two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the operative cause
of the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be
preceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3; 4: 'He
reflected, he created prâ/n/a.' For observation shows that the action of
operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by
reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought
about by the concurrence of several factors[251]. It is therefore
appropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The
circumstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another
argument. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only
as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be
viewed as an operative cause only.--Further, the effect of the creator's
activity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be
non-intelligent and impure; we therefore must assume that its cause also
is of the same nature; for it is a matter of general observation that
cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman does not resemble
the world in nature, we know from many scriptural passages, such as 'It
is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without
taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but
to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of
the world of impure nature, such as is known from Sm/ri/ti[252], and to
limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative
causality.
To this we make the following reply.--Brahman is to be acknowledged as
the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter
view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the
illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the
following one, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that
which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived,
perceived; that which is not known, known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This
passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything
else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of
everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause,
since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other
hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we
know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is
different from the house he has built.--The illustrative example
referred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as by one
clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e.
the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while
the truth is that it is clay merely;' which passage again has reference
to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances
of similar nature, 'As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is
known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is
known.'--Similar promissory statements are made in other places also,
for instance, 'What is that through which if it is known everything else
becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is
given in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1,
7).--Compare also the promissory statement in B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6, 'When
the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is
known;' and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the
sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is
seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.'--Similar
promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found
in all Vedânta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that
Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also
in the passage, 'That from whence (yata/h/) these beings are born,' has
to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings,
according to the grammatical rule, Pâ/n/. I, 4, 30.--That Brahman is at
the same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from
the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily
material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are
dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on
extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside
Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the
material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to
creation Brahman was one without a second.--The absence of a guiding
principle other than the material cause can moreover be established by
means of the argument made use of in the Sûtra, viz. accordance with the
promissory statements and the illustrative examples. If there were
admitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would
follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby
the promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be
stultified.--The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no
other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other
substance from which the world could originate.
24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the
Self).
The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise
shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages
like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'He thought, may
I be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is
the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self's
reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause
also, since the words 'May I be many' intimate that the reflective
desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.
25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the
world) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their material
cause).
This Sûtra supplies a further argument for Brahman's being the general
material cause.--Brahman is the material cause of the world for that
reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world
is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their
material cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether and
return into the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some
other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of
that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the
material cause of rice, barley, and the like.--The word 'directly' (in
the Sûtra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all
this sprang from the ether only.--Observation further teaches that
effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material
causes.
26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making
itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.
Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture--in
the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 7)--represents
the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.--But how can the
Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be
made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the
action?--Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full
existence previously to the action, modifies itself into something
special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal
substances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of
modification, changed into their products.--The word 'itself' in the
passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but
the Self.
The word 'pari/n/âmât' (in the Sûtra) may also be taken as constituting
a separate Sûtra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the
material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text
speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as
co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and
undefined' (Taitt. Up. II, 6).