Concerning the udgîtha it is said (Ch. Up. I, 10, 9), 'Prastot/ri/, that
deity which belongs to the prastâva, &c.,' and, further on (I, 11, 4;
5), 'Which then is that deity? He said: Breath. For all these beings
merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise. This is the deity
belonging to the prastâva.' With reference to this passage doubt and
decision are to be considered as analogous to those stated under the
preceding Sûtra. For while in some passages--as, for instance, 'For
indeed, my son, mind is fastened to prâ/n/a,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2; and,
'the prâ/n/a of prâ/n/a,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18--the word 'breath' is
seen to denote Brahman, its use in the sense of a certain modification
of air is better established in common as well as in Vedic language.
Hence there arises a doubt whether in the passage under discussion the
word prâ/n/a denotes Brahman or (ordinary) breath. In favour of which
meaning have we then to decide?
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the word must be held to denote the
fivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar modification of wind (or
air); because, as has been remarked already, that sense of the word
prâ/n/a is the better established one.--But no, an objector will say,
just as in the case of the preceding Sûtra, so here also Brahman is
meant, on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also
a complementary passage gives us to understand that all beings spring
from and merge into prâ/n/a; a process which can take place in connexion
with the highest Lord only.--This objection, the pûrvapakshin replies,
is futile, since we see that the beings enter into and proceed from the
principal vital air also. For Scripture makes the following statement
(Sat. Br. X, 3, 3, 6), 'When man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech
merges, into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind;
when he awakes then they spring again from breath alone.' What the Veda
here states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during sleep,
while the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly, the activity of
the sense organs is interrupted and again becomes manifest at the time
of awaking only. And as the sense organs are the essence of all material
beings, the complementary passage which speaks of the merging and
emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the principal vital air
also. Moreover, subsequently to prâ/n/a being mentioned as the divinity
of the prastâva the sun and food are designated as the divinities of the
udgitha and the pratibâra. Now as they are not Brahman, the prâ/n/a
also, by parity of reasoning, cannot be Brahman.
To this argumentation the author of the Sûtras replies: For the same
reason prâ/n/a--that means: on account of the presence of characteristic
marks--which constituted the reason stated in the preceding Sûtra--the
word prâ/n/a also must be held to denote Brahman. For Scripture says of
prâ/n/a also, that it is connected with marks characteristic of Brahman.
The sentence, 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath
they arise,' which declares that the origination and retractation of all
beings depend on prâ/n/a, clearly shows prâ/n/a to be Brahman. In reply
to the assertion that the origination and retractation of all beings can
be reconciled equally well with the assumption of prâ/n/a denoting the
chief vital air, because origination and retractation take place in the
state of waking and of sleep also, we remark that in those two states
only the senses are merged into, and emerge from, the chief vital air,
while, according to the scriptural passage, 'For all these beings, &c.,'
all beings whatever into which a living Self has entered, together with
their senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. And even if the word
'beings' were taken (not in the sense of animated beings, but) in the
sense of material elements in general, there would be nothing in the way
of interpreting the passage as referring to Brahman.--But, it may be
said, that the senses together with their objects do, during sleep,
enter into prâ/n/a, and again issue from it at the time of waking, we
distinctly learn from another scriptural passage, viz. Kau. Up. III, 3,
'When a man being thus asleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one
with that prâ/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names,'
&c.--True, we reply, but there also the word prâ/n/a denotes (not the
vital air) but Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks of
Brahman being mentioned. The objection, again, that the word prâ/n/a
cannot denote Brahman because it occurs in proximity to the words 'food'
and 'sun' (which do not refer to Brahman), is altogether baseless; for
proximity is of no avail against the force of the complementary passage
which intimates that prâ/n/a is Brahman. That argument, finally, which
rests on the fact that the word prâ/n/a commonly denotes the vital air
with its five modifications, is to be refuted in the same way as the
parallel argument which the pûrvapakshin brought forward with reference
to the word 'ether.' From all this it follows that the prâ/n/a, which is
the deity of the prastâva, is Brahman.
Some (commentators)[121] quote under the present Sûtra the following
passages, 'the prâ/n/a of prâ/n/a' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18), and 'for to
prâ/n/a mind is fastened' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2). But that is wrong since
these two passages offer no opportunity for any discussion, the former
on account of the separation of the words, the latter on account of the
general topic. When we meet with a phrase such as 'the father of the
father' we understand at once that the genitive denotes a father
different from the father denoted by the nominative. Analogously we
infer from the separation of words contained in the phrase, 'the breath
of breath,' that the 'breath of breath' is different from the ordinary
breath (denoted by the genitive 'of breath'). For one and the same thing
cannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated of--and thus distinguished
from--itself. Concerning the second passage we remark that, if the
matter constituting the general topic of some chapter is referred to in
that chapter under a different name, we yet conclude, from the general
topic, that that special matter is meant. For instance, when we meet in
the section which treats of the jyotish/t/oma sacrifice with the
passage, 'in every spring he is to offer the jyotis sacrifice,' we at
once understand that the word denotes the jyotish/t/oma. If we therefore
meet with the clause 'to prâ/n/a mind is fastened' in a section of which
the highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a moment suppose that
the word prâ/n/a should there denote the ordinary breath which is a mere
modification of air. The two passages thus do not offer any matter for
discussion, and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for the
Sûtra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the passage about the
prâ/n/a, which is the deity of the prastâva, allows room for doubt,
pûrvapaksha and final decision.
24. The 'light' (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet (in a
passage which is connected with the passage about the light).
Scripture says (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines above
this heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, in the highest
worlds beyond which there are no other worlds that is the same light
which is within man.' Here the doubt presents itself whether the word
'light' denotes the light of the sun and the like, or the highest Self.
Under the preceding Sûtras we had shown that some words which ordinarily
have different meanings yet in certain passages denote Brahman, since
characteristic marks of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has
to be discussed whether, in connexion with the passage quoted,
characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned or not.
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes nothing else
but the light of the sun and the like, since that is the ordinary
well-established meaning of the term. The common use of language, he
says, teaches us that the two words 'light' and 'darkness' denote
mutually opposite things, darkness being the term for whatever
interferes with the function of the sense of sight, as, for instance,
the gloom of the night, while sunshine and whatever else favours the
action of the eye is called light. The word 'shines' also, which the
text exhibits, is known ordinarily to refer to the sun and similar
sources of light; while of Brahman, which is devoid of colour, it cannot
be said, in the primary sense of the word, that it 'shines.' Further,
the word jyotis must here denote light because it is said to be bounded
by the sky ('that light which shines above this heaven'). For while it
is impossible to consider the sky as being the boundary of Brahman,
which is the Self of all and the source of all things movable or
immovable, the sky may be looked upon as forming the boundary of light,
which is a mere product and as such limited; accordingly the text says,
'the light beyond heaven.'--But light, although a mere product, is
perceived everywhere; it would therefore be wrong to declare that it is
bounded by the sky!--Well, then, the pûrvapakshin replies, let us assume
that the light meant is the first-born (original) light which has not
yet become tripartite[122]. This explanation again cannot be admitted,
because the non-tripartite light does not serve any purpose.--But, the
pûrvapakshin resumes, Why should its purpose not be found therein that
it is the object of devout meditation?--That cannot be, we reply; for we
see that only such things are represented as objects of devotion as have
some other independent use of their own; so, for instance, the sun
(which dispels darkness and so on). Moreover the scriptural passage,
'Let me make each of these three (fire, water, and earth) tripartite,'
does not indicate any difference[123]. And even of the non-tripartite
light it is not known that the sky constitutes its boundary.--Well, then
(the pûrvapakshin resumes, dropping the idea of the non-tripartite
light), let us assume that the light of which the text speaks is the
tripartite (ordinary) light. The objection that light is seen to exist
also beneath the sky, viz. in the form of fire and the like, we
invalidate by the remark that there is nothing contrary to reason in
assigning a special locality to fire, although the latter is observed
everywhere; while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which the
idea of place does not apply at all, would be most unsuitable. Moreover,
the clause 'higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which
there are no other worlds,' which indicates a multiplicity of abodes,
agrees much better with light, which is a mere product (than with
Brahman). There is moreover that other clause, also, 'That is the same
light which is within man,' in which the highest light is identified
with the gastric fire (the fire within man). Now such identifications
can be made only where there is a certain similarity of nature; as is
seen, for instance, in the passage, 'Of that person Bhû/h/ is the head,
for the head is one and that syllable is one' (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 3). But
that the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly appears from
the passage, 'Of this we have visible and audible proof' (Ch. Up. III,
13, 7; 8), which declares that the fire is characterised by the noise it
makes, and by heat; and likewise from the following passage, 'Let a man
meditate on this as that which is seen and heard.' The same conclusion
may be drawn from the passage, 'He who knows this becomes conspicuous
and celebrated,' which proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to
the devout meditation on Brahman a high reward would have to be
allotted. Nor is there mentioned in the entire passage about the light
any other characteristic mark of Brahman, while such marks are set forth
in the passages (discussed above) which refer to prâ/n/a and the ether.
Nor, again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding section, 'the Gâyatrî
is everything whatsoever exists,' &c. (III, 12); for that passage makes
a statement about the Gâyatrî metre only. And even if that section did
refer to Brahman, still Brahman would not be recognised in the passage
at present under discussion; for there (in the section referred to) it
is declared in the clause, 'Three feet of it are the Immortal in
heaven'--that heaven constitutes the abode; while in our passage the
words 'the light above heaven' declare heaven to be a boundary. For all
these reasons the word jyotis is here to be taken in its ordinary
meaning, viz. light.
To this we make the following reply. The word jyotis must be held to
denote Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) being mentioned.
In a preceding passage Brahman had been spoken of as having four feet
(quarters). 'Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person
(purusha). One foot of it are all the beings, three feet of it are the
Immortal in heaven.' That which in this passage is said to constitute
the three-quarter part, immortal and connected with heaven, of Brahman,
which altogether comprises four quarters; this very same entity we
recognise as again referred to in the passage under discussion, because
there also it is said to be connected with heaven. If therefore we
should set it aside in our interpretation of the passage and assume the
latter to refer to the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of
dropping, without need, the topic started and introducing a new subject.
Brahman, in fact, continues to form the subject-matter, not only of the
passage about the light, but likewise of the subsequent section, the
so-called Sâ/nd/ilya-vidyâ (Ch. Up. III, 14). Hence we conclude that in
our passage the word 'light' must be held to denote Brahman. The
objection (raised above) that from common use the words 'light' and 'to
shine' are known to denote effected (physical) light is without force;
for as it is known from the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is
meant, those two words do not necessarily denote physical light only to
the exclusion of Brahman[124], but may also denote Brahman itself, in so
far as it is characterised by the physical shining light which is its
effect. Analogously another mantra declares, 'that by which the sun
shines kindled with heat' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7). Or else we may
suppose that the word jyotis here does not denote at all that light on
which the function of the eye depends. For we see that in other passages
it has altogether different meanings; so, for instance, B/ri/. Up. IV,
3, 5, 'With speech only as light man sits,' and Taitt. Sa. I, 6, 3, 3,
'May the mind, the light, accept,' &c. It thus appears that whatever
illuminates (in the different senses of the word) something else may be
spoken of as 'light.' Hence to Brahman also, whose nature is
intelligence, the term 'light' may be applied; for it gives light to the
entire world. Similarly, other scriptural passages say, 'Him the shining
one, everything shines after; by his light all this is lighted' (Kau.
Up. II, 5, 15); and 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as the
immortal' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 16). Against the further objection that the
omnipresent Brahman cannot be viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that
the assignment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to
reason because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor does
it avail anything to say that it is impossible to assign any place to
Brahman because Brahman is out of connexion with all place. For it is
possible to make such an assumption, because Brahman is connected with
certain limiting adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different
kinds of devout meditation on Brahman as specially connected with
certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart. For the same
reason it is also possible to attribute to Brahman a multiplicity of
abodes, as is done in the clause (quoted above) 'higher than all.' The
further objection that the light beyond heaven is the mere physical
light because it is identified with the gastric fire, which itself is a
mere effect and is inferred from perceptible marks such as the heat of
the body and a certain sound, is equally devoid of force; for the
gastric fire may be viewed as the outward appearance (or symbol) of
Brahman, just as Brahman's name is a mere outward symbol. Similarly in
the passage, 'Let a man meditate on it (the gastric light) as seen and
heard,' the visibility and audibility (here implicitly ascribed to
Brahman) must be considered as rendered possible through the gastric
fire being the outward appearance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in
the objection that Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions an
inconsiderable reward only; for there is no reason compelling us to have
recourse to Brahman for the purpose of such and such a reward only, and
not for the purpose of such and such another reward. Wherever the text
represents the highest Brahman--which is free from all connexion with
distinguishing attributes--as the universal Self, it is understood that
the result of that instruction is one only, viz. final release.
Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman is taught to be connected with
distinguishing attributes or outward symbols, there, we see, all the
various rewards which this world can offer are spoken of; cp. for
instance, B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 24, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver
of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth.' Although in the passage
itself which treats of the light no characteristic mark of Brahman is
mentioned, yet, as the Sûtra intimates, the mark stated in a preceding
passage (viz. the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it,' &c.) has to be
taken in connexion with the passage about the light as well. The
question how the mere circumstance of Brahman being mentioned in a not
distant passage can have the power of divorcing from its natural object
and transferring to another object the direct statement about light
implied in the word 'light,' may be answered without difficulty. The
passage under discussion runs[125], 'which above this heaven, the
light.' The relative pronoun with which this clause begins intimates,
according to its grammatical force[126], the same Brahman which was
mentioned in the previous passage, and which is here recognised (as
being the same which was mentioned before) through its connexion with
heaven; hence the word jyotis also--which stands in grammatical
co-ordination to 'which'--must have Brahman for its object. From all
this it follows that the word 'light' here denotes Brahman.
25. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus (i.e. by means of
the metre) the direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus
it is seen (in other passages also).
We now address ourselves to the refutation of the assertion (made in the
pûrvapaksha of the preceding Sûtra) that in the previous passage also
Brahman is not referred to, because in the sentence, 'Gâyatrî is
everything whatsoever here exists,' the metre called Gâyatrî is spoken
of.--How (we ask the pûrvapakshin) can it be maintained that, on account
of the metre being spoken of, Brahman is not denoted, while yet the
mantra 'such is the greatness of it,' &c., clearly sets forth Brahman
with its four quarters?--You are mistaken (the pûrvapakshin replies).
The sentence, 'Gâyatrî is everything,' starts the discussion of Gâyatrî.
The same Gâyatrî is thereupon described under the various forms of all
beings, earth, body, heart, speech, breath; to which there refers also
the verse, 'that Gâyatrî has four feet and is sixfold.' After that we
meet with the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it.' &c. How then, we
ask, should this mantra, which evidently is quoted with reference to the
Gâyatrî (metre) as described in the preceding clauses, all at once
denote Brahman with its four quarters? Since therefore the metre Gâyatrî
is the subject-matter of the entire chapter, the term 'Brahman' which
occurs in a subsequent passage ('the Brahman which has thus been
described') must also denote the metre. This is analogous to a previous
passage (Ch. Up. III, 11, 3, 'He who thus knows this Brahma-upanishad'),
where the word Brahma-upanishad is explained to mean Veda-upanishad. As
therefore the preceding passage refers (not to Brahman, but) to the
Gâyatrî metre, Brahman does not constitute the topic of the entire
section.
This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our position.
'Because thus direction of the mind is declared,' i.e. because the
Brahma/n/a passage, 'Gâyatrî indeed is all this,' intimates that by
means of the metre Gâyatrî the mind is to be directed on Brahman which
is connected with that metre. Of the metre Gâyatrî, which is nothing but
a certain special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be
said that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to understand
the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as the cause of the world,
is connected with that product also whose name is Gâyatrî, is 'all
this;' in accordance with that other passage which directly says, 'All
this indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1). That the effect is in
reality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on, under
Sûtra II, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain
effects (of Brahman) is seen to be mentioned in other passages also, so,
for instance, Ait. Âr. III, 2, 3, 12, 'For the Bahv/rik/as consider him
in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas
in the Mahâvrata ceremony.' Although, therefore, the previous passage
speaks of the metre, Brahman is what is meant, and the same Brahman is
again referred to in the passage about the light, whose purport it is to
enjoin another form of devout meditation.
Another commentator[127] is of opinion that the term Gâyatrî (does not
denote Brahman in so far as viewed under the form of Gâyatrî, but)
directly denotes Brahman, on account of the equality of number; for just
as the Gâyatrî metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so
Brahman also has four feet, (i.e. quarters.) Similarly we see that in
other passages also the names of metres are used to denote other things
which resemble those metres in certain numerical relations; cp. for
instance, Ch. Up. IV, 3, 8, where it is said at first, 'Now these five
and the other five make ten and that is the K/ri/ta,' and after that
'these are again the Virâj which eats the food.' If we adopt this
interpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and the metre is not referred
to at all. In any case Brahman is the subject with which the previous
passage is concerned.
26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the subject of
the previous passage), because (thus only) the declaration as to the
beings, &c. being the feet is possible.
That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we must assume for
that reason also that the text designates the beings and so on as the
feet of Gâyatrî. For the text at first speaks of the beings, the earth,
the body, and the heart[128], and then goes on 'that Gâyatrî has four
feet and is sixfold.' For of the mere metre, without any reference to
Brahman, it would be impossible to say that the beings and so on are its
feet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for
the verse, 'Such is the greatness,' &c. For that verse clearly describes
Brahman in its own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent
the Gâyatrî as the Self of everything as is done in the words, 'One foot
of it are all the beings; three feet of it are what is immortal in
heaven.' The purusha-sûkta also (/Ri/k Sa/m/h. X, 90) exhibits the verse
with sole reference to Brahman. Sm/ri/ti likewise ascribes to Brahman a
like nature, 'I stand supporting all this world by a single portion of
myself' (Bha. Gîtâ X, 42). Our interpretation moreover enables us to
take the passage, 'that Brahman indeed which,' &c. (III, 12, 7), in its
primary sense, (i.e. to understand the word Brahman to denote nothing
but Brahman.) And, moreover, the passage, 'these are the five men of
Brahman' (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former passage about
the Gâyatrî is taken as referring to Brahman (for otherwise the
'Brahman' in 'men of Brahman' would not be connected with the previous
topic). Hence Brahman is to be considered as the subject-matter of the
previous passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is
referred to in the passage about the light where it is recognised (to be
the same) from its connexion with heaven, remains unshaken.
27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former passage cannot be
recognised in the latter) on account of the difference of designation,
is not valid because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary
(to the recognition).
The objection that in the former passage ('three feet of it are what is
immortal in heaven'), heaven is designated as the abode, while in the
latter passage ('that light which shines above this heaven'), heaven is
designated as the boundary, and that, on account of this difference of
designation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be
recognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we do by
remarking that in either designation nothing is contrary to the
recognition. Just as in ordinary language a falcon, although in contact
with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree but also
above the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here
referred to as being beyond heaven as well.
Another (commentator) explains: just as in ordinary language a falcon,
although not in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be
above the top of the tree but also on the top of the tree, so Brahman
also, which is in reality beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two
passages) said to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the
former passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it remains
therefore a settled conclusion that the word 'light' denotes Brahman.
28. Prâ/n/a (breath) is Brahman, that being understood from a connected
consideration (of the passages referring to prâ/n/a).
In the Kaushîtaki-brâhma/n/a-upanishad there is recorded a legend of
Indra and Pratardana which begins with the words, 'Pratardana, forsooth,
the son of Divodâsa came by means of fighting and strength to the
beloved abode of Indra' (Kau. Up. III, 1). In this legend we read: 'He
said: I am prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self (praj/ñ/âtman), meditate on me
as Life, as Immortality' (III, 2). And later on (III, 3), 'Prâ/n/a
alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body, makes it
rise up.' Then, again (III, 8), 'Let no man try to find out what speech
is, let him know the speaker.' And in the end (III, 8), 'That breath
indeed is the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal.'--Here
the doubt presents itself whether the word prâ/n/a denotes merely
breath, the modification of air, or the Self of some divinity, or the
individual soul, or the highest Brahman.--But, it will be said at the
outset, the Sûtra I, 1, 21 already has shown that the word prâ/n/a
refers to Brahman, and as here also we meet with characteristic marks of
Brahman, viz. the words 'bliss, imperishable, immortal,' what reason is
there for again raising the same doubt?--We reply: Because there are
observed here characteristic marks of different kinds. For in the legend
we meet not only with marks indicating Brahman, but also with marks
pointing to other beings Thus Indra's words, 'Know me only' (III, 1)
point to the Self of a divinity; the words, 'Having laid hold of this
body it makes it rise up,' point to the breath; the words, 'Let no man
try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' point to the
individual soul. There is thus room for doubt.
If, now, the pûrvapakshin maintains that the term prâ/n/a here denotes
the well-known modification of air, i.e. breath, we, on our side, assert
that the word prâ/n/a must be understood to denote Brahman.--For what
reason?--On account of such being the consecutive meaning of the
passages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire section which
treats of the prâ/n/a, we observe that all the single passages can be
construed into a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman.
At the beginning of the legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra
to choose a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he selects for
his boon, in the following words, 'Do you yourself choose that boon for
me which you deem most beneficial for a man.' Now, as later on prâ/n/a
is declared to be what is most beneficial for man, what should prâ/n/a
denote but the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that Self a
man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial for him, as many
scriptural passages declare. Compare, for instance, /S/ve. Up. III, 8,
'A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go.'
Again, the further passage, 'He who knows me thus by no deed of his is
his life harmed, not by theft, not by bhrû/n/ahatyâ' (III, 1), has a
meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object of knowledge. For,
that subsequently to the cognition of Brahman all works and their
effects entirely cease, is well known from scriptural passages, such as
the following, 'All works perish when he has been beheld who is the
higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, prâ/n/a can be
identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman. For the air
which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those
characteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding
passage (viz. those intimated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,'
'immortal') can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with
any being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following passages,
'He does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a bad action.
For he makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good
deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these
worlds do a bad deed;' and, 'He is the guardian of the world, he is the
king of the world, he is the Lord of the world' (Kau. Up. III, 8). All
this can be properly understood only if the highest Brahman is
acknowledged to be the subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the
vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word prâ/n/a denotes
Brahman.
29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the
speaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not valid)
because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the
interior Self.
An objection is raised against the assertion that prâ/n/a denotes
Brahman. The word prâ/n/a, it is said, does not denote the highest
Brahman, because the speaker designates himself. The speaker, who is a
certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal
himself to Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am prâ/n/a, the
intelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the prâ/n/a, which this latter
passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of
the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the
attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance,
B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on,
also, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number
of attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no
way belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvash/tri/; I
delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,' and so on. Indra
may be called prâ/n/a on account of his strength. Scripture says,
'Strength indeed is prâ/n/a,' and Indra is known as the god of strength;
and of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The
personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self;
for the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It thus being
a settled matter that some passages convey information about the
personal Self of some deity, the other passages also--as, for instance,
the one about what is most beneficial for man--must be interpreted as
well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence prâ/n/a does
not denote Brahman.
This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are
found a multitude of references to the interior Self. For the passage,
'As long as prâ/n/a dwells in this body so long surely there is life,'
declares that that prâ/n/a only which is the intelligent interior
Self--and not some particular outward deity--has power to bestow and to
take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the
prâ/n/as as founded on the existence of the prâ/n/a, it shows that that
prâ/n/a is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the
sense-organs.[129]
Of the same tendency is the passage, 'Prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self,
alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up;' and the passage
(which occurs in the passus, 'Let no man try to find out what speech
is,' &c.), 'For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the
spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the
subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the prâ/n/a. And that prâ/n/a
indeed is the Self of prâ/n/a, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' So also
the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as
it were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and
senses, sums up as follows, 'He is my Self, thus let it be known;' a
summing up which is appropriate only if prâ/n/a is meant to denote not
some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural
passage declares 'this Self is Brahman, omniscient'[130] (B/ri/. Up. II,
5, 19). We therefore arrive at the conclusion that, on account of the
multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains
information regarding Brahman, not regarding the Self of some
deity.--How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring
to himself be explained?
30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one
with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture,
as in the case of Vâmadeva.
The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of
/ri/shi-like intuition[131]--the existence of which is vouched for by
Scripture--its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs
Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words 'Know me
only.'
By intuition of the same kind the /ri/shi Vâmadeva reached the knowledge
expressed in the words, 'I was Manu and Sûrya;' in accordance with the
passage, 'Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed
became that' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the
pûrvapaksha of the preceding Sûtra) that Indra after saying, 'Know me
only,' glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son
and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of
Tvash/tri/'s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of
glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge--in which case the sense of
the passage would be, 'Because I accomplished such and such deeds,
therefore know me'--but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the
highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the
slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and the like, goes on in the clause next
following to exalt knowledge, 'And not one hair of me is harmed there.
He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed.'--(But how
does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)--Because, we reply, its
meaning is as follows: 'Although I do such cruel deeds, yet not even a
hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life
of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of
his.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else
but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am prâ/n/a,
the intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.
31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of
characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air
(being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout
meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of
(the meaning advocated by us) being accepted (elsewhere); and on account
of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the passage
under discussion).
Although we admit, the pûrvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the
prâ/n/a does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity,
since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still
we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.--For what reason?--Because it
mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand,
and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 'Let no man
try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' mentions a
characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held
to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules
and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On
the other hand, we have the passage, 'But prâ/n/a alone, the intelligent
Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to
the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it
sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs
(Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 'Then
prâ/n/a (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived;
I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those,
again, who in the passage quoted above read 'this one (masc.), the
body[132]' must give the following explanation, Prâ/n/a having laid hold
of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the
sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the
chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for
the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although
non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other prâ/n/as, viz. the
sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if
the word prâ/n/a be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the
chief vital air, the prâ/n/a and the intelligent Self may be spoken of
in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual
concomitance, or as being different on account of their (essentially
different) individual character; and in these two different ways they
are actually spoken of in the two following passages, 'What is prâ/n/a
that is praj/ñ/â, what is praj/ñ/â that is prâ/n/a;' and, 'For together
do these two live in the body and together do they depart.' If, on the
other hand, prâ/n/a denoted Brahman, what then could be different from
what? For these reasons prâ/n/a does not denote Brahman, but either the
individual soul or the chief vital air or both.
All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the
threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would involve
the assumption of devout meditation of three different kinds, viz. on
the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is
inappropriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds
of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the prâ/n/a really
constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the
beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause
'Know me only,' followed by 'I am prâ/n/a, the intelligent Self,
meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, 'And
that prâ/n/a indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable,
immortal.' The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be
similar, and we therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the
same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as
to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten
subjects (subjective powers)[133] cannot rest on anything but Brahman.
Moreover, prâ/n/a must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning)
being accepted,' i.e. because in the case of other passages where
characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word prâ/n/a is taken
in the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the passage
to refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage itself there
is 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance,
the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the
passage, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' contains a
characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the
function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can
figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No
mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes
down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5).
Nor does the indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur
in the passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know
the speaker,' preclude the view of prâ/n/a denoting Brahman. For, as the
passages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and others, prove, there is
in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from
Brahman, but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the
mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul,
agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz.
'let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,')
which, by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions,
aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the
individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That
the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears
from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is
not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know
as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the
statement about the difference of prâ/n/a and praj/ñ/â (contained in the
passage, 'Together they dwell in this body, together they depart') does
not agree with that interpretation according to which prâ/n/a is
Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the
respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and
constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of
as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by
those two adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may
be identified, as is done in the passage 'prâ/n/a is praj/ñ/â.'
The second part of the Sûtra is explained in a different manner
also[134], as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as
well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter
whose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of
devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout
meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect
of prâ/n/a, under the aspect of praj/ñ/â, and in itself. The passages,
'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is prâ/n/a,' and 'Having
laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it
alone as uktha,' refer to the prâ/n/a aspect. The introductory passage,
'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that praj/ñ/â,' and
the subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the
word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by praj/ñ/â taken
possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the
praj/ñ/â aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the
following passage, 'These ten objects have reference to praj/ñ/â, the
ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there
would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no
objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is
not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the
spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the
subjects and the subjects on the prâ/n/a.' Thus we see that the one
meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as
Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in
itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman
is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so,
for instance (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body
is prâ/n/a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three
aspects perfectly agrees with the prâ/n/a chapter[135]; as, on the one
hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses
we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and
as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of prâ/n/a,
praj/ñ/â, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled
conclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.
Notes:
[Footnote 32: The subject is the universal Self whose nature is
intelligence (/k/u); the object comprises whatever is of a
non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal
organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material
world.]
[Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of
the 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in
order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego.
Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam
âsmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
second person.]
[Footnote 34: Adhyâsa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of
(mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential
nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.]
[Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of
speech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have
existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]
[Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and
the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of
wrong knowledge.]
[Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children,
wealth, &c., belong to my Self.']
[Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form
of remembrance' is added, the Bhâmatî remarks, in order to exclude those
cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other
thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow
which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to
consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in
Pâ/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mâhishmatî. These are cases of
recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself
to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived
is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in
the case of adhyâsa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which
is at the time not present but remembered only.]
[Footnote 39: The so-called anyathâkhyâtivâdins maintain that in the act
of adhyâsa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are
superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place,
mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyâsa the
case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a
piece of silver). The âtmakhyâtivâdins maintain that in adhyâsa the
modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action
which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the
latter, from all eternity.]
[Footnote 40: This is the definition of the akhyâtivâdins.]
[Footnote 41: Some anyathâkhyâtivâdins and the Mâdhyamikas according to
Ânanda Giri.]
[Footnote 42: The pratyagâtman is in reality non-object, for it is
svayamprakâ/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all
cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as
it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of
Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross
bodies, i.e. in so far as it is jîva, individual or personal soul. Cp.
Bhâmatî, pp. 22, 23: '/k/idâtmaiva svayamprakâ/s/oszpi
buddhyâdivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/ât katha/mk/id asm
upratyayavishayoszha/m/kârâspada/m/ jîva iti /k/a jantur iti /k/a
ksheuajña iti /k/âkhyâyate.']
[Footnote 43: Translated according to the Bhâmatî. We deny, the objector
says, the possibility of adhyâsa in the case of the Self, not on the
ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may
be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the
ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by
itself or by anything else.--It is known or manifest, the Vedântin
replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvât), i.e.
on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ânanda Giri
construes the above clause in a different way:
asmatpratyayâvishayatveszpy aparokshatvâd ekântenâvishayatvâbbâvât
tasminn aha@nkârâdyadhyâsa ity artha/h/. Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id
âtmano nesh/t/am ity âsa@nkyâha pratyagâtmeti.]
[Footnote 44: Tatraiva/m/ sati evambhûtavastutattvâvadhâra/n/e sati.
Bhâ. Tasminn adhyâse uktarîtyâzvidyâvmake sati. Go. Yatrâtmani
buddhyâdau vâ yasya buddhyâder âtmano vâdhyâsa/h/ tena
buddhyâdi-nâsztmânâ va k/ri/tenâsz/s/anayâdidoshe/n/a /k/aitanyagu/n/ena
/k/âtmânâtmâ vâ vastuto na svalpenâpi yujyate. Ânanda Giri.]
[Footnote 45: Whether they belong to the karmakâ/nd/â, i.e. that part of
the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a, i.e.
that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.]
[Footnote 46: It being of course the function of the means of right
knowledge to determine Truth and Reality.]
[Footnote 47: The Bhâmatî takes adhish/th/ânam in the sense of
superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a
superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.]
[Footnote 48: If activity could proceed from the body itself,
non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.]
[Footnote 49: I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the
Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.]
[Footnote 50: The Mîmâ/m/sâ, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show
that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with
Brahman. This Mîmâ/m/sâ being an enquiry into the meaning of the
Vedânta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedânta mîmâ/m/sâ.]
[Footnote 51: Nâdhikârârtha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyârtha/h/, kám
ayam atha/s/abdo brahmaj/ñ/âne/kkh/yâ/h/ kim vântar/n/îtavi/k/ârasya
athave/kkh/âvi/s/esha/n/aj/ñ/ânasyârambhârtha/h/. Nâdya/h/ tasyâ
mîmâ/m/sâpravartikâyâs tadapravartyatvâd anârabhyatvât tasyâ/s/
/k/ottaratra pratyadhikara/n/am apratipâdanât. Na
dvitîyoztha/s/abdenânantaryoktidvârâ vi/s/ish/t/âdhikâryasamarpa/n/e
sâdhana/k/atush/t/ayâsampannânâ/m/ brahmadhîtadvi/k/ârayor anarthitvâd
vi/k/ârânârambhân na /k/a vi/k/âravidhiva/s/âd adhikârî kalpya/h/
prârambhasyâpi tulyatvâd adhikâri/n/a/s/ /k/a vidhyapekshitopâdhitvân na
t/ri/tîya/h/ brahmaj/ñ/ânasyânandasâkshâtkâratvenâdhikâryatve z
pyaprâdhânyâd atha/s/abdâsambandhât tasmân nârambhârthateti. Ânanda
Giri.]
[Footnote 52: Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry
into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may
be comprised under the relation of ânantarya.]
[Footnote 53: He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then
from the breast.]
[Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for
instance, the offering of the prayâjas is to the
dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for
another as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apûr/n/amâsa
qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is
unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of
succession of the actions is in its right place.]
[Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are
discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering
(titikshâ), attention and concentration of the mind (samâdhâna), and
faith (/s/raddhâ).]
[Footnote 56: According to Pâ/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case
expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or
connected with, some other thing.]
[Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result
may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grâma/m/
ga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the
arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring
object and result coincide.]
[Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the
Brahma-mîmâ/m/sâ, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and
from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief
attributes.]
[Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the
Nyâya, the Sâ@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three
opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the
two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.]
[Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of
the essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in
the beginning,' &c.]
[Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to Ân. Gi. and
Go.; the Bhâ. proposes another less plausible division.]
[Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhâvavikârâ/h/ are:
origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.]
[Footnote 63: The pradhâna, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal
matter of the world in the /S/â@nkhya-system. It will be fully discussed
in later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhâna has
been left untranslated. Cp. Sâ@nkhya Kârikâ 3.]
[Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sâri/n/am evâgamâj
jagaddhetum â/k/akshate. Ânanada Giri.]
[Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.]
[Footnote 66: Âtmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ânanda Giri.]
[Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga),
syntactical connection (vâkya), &c., being the means of proof made use
of in the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ.]
[Footnote 68: The so-called sâkshâtkâra of Brahman. The &c. comprises
inference and so on.]
[Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial
post and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being
supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial
post.']
[Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/âstras were not of a different
nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/âstras;
if they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge
of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way
as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly
world and the like.]
[Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the
gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the
third that is independent of either.]
[Footnote 72: Ânanda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is:
p/ri/thagjij/ñ/âsâvishayatvâ/k/ /k/a dharmâdyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/
brahma/n/o yuktam ityâha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapâ/th/e dharmâdyasparse
karmaphalavailaksba/n/ya/m/ hetûk/ri/tam.--The above translation follows
Govindânanda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva
karmaphalavilaksha/n/atvâd ity artha/h/.]
[Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan nâmâlpe vastuny âlambane sâmânyena
kena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampâdanam. Ânanda Giri.]
[Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on
account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is
identified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief
object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality.
The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not
only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence
being common to both.]
[Footnote 75: Adhyâsa/h/ /s/âstratoitasmi/m/s taddhî/h/. Sampadi
sampâdyamânasya prâdhânyenânudhyânam, adhyâse tu âlambanasyeti
vi/s/esha/h/. Ânanda Giri.]
[Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are,
therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/
sa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vâyau prâ/n/e /k/a da/s/â/s/âgata/m/ jagad
dar/s/ayati yathâ jîvâtmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyayâ
brahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvâyaphalâyakalpata iti. Bhâmati.]
[Footnote 77: The butter used in the upâ/ms/uyâja is ceremonially
purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be
said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as
kart/ri/--agent--stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of
meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with
Brahman.]
[Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of
obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from
the two preceding hypotheses.]
[Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/
karoti), things to be obtained (grâma/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be
modified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be
ceremonially purified (vrîhîn prokshati).]
[Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided
like transitory things.]
[Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice
with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid
of sense.]
[Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages
conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the
objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing
information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a
purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of
which no purpose has been established?]
[Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural
motives--not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and
the like.]
[Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.]
[Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the
Veda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are
differently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara
endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer
to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin
action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might
be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for
instance, 'a Brâhma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as
enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the
one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean
'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brâhma/n/a is to be formed;' just
as we understand something positive by the expression 'a
non-Brâhma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To
this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word
'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to
which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words
denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire
absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded
to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the
heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the
non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as
intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The
question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed
in all treatises on the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ; see, for instance,
Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.]
[Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far
as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is
finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.]
[Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife,
children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self,
i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.]
[Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.]
[Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best
manuscripts.]
[Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose
state of equipoise constitutes the pradhâna.]
[Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant,
not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.]
[Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to
rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle
independent of Sattva.]
[Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktânupapatlim
nirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthâbhâvât pratyayârthâbhâvâd
vâ brahma/n/o sarvaj/ñ/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti.
Prathama/m/ pratyâha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvârâ viyz/rin/oti
anityatve hîti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/ñ/âneti. Svato nityasyâpi
j/ñ/ânasya tattadarthâva/kkh/innasya kâryatvât tatra svâtantryam
pratyayârtho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatîty âha.--The knowledge of Brahman is
eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but
it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the
verbal affix in 'jânâti' indicating the particularity of the act.]
[Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapâ/th/aka of the
Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to
fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the
third passage also where it occurs.]
[Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to
assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three
passages.]
[Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost
his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing
so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of
an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is
that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther
astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.]
[Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.]
[Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose
guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather
hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.]
[Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.]
[Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jîvâtman is
conversant with the names and forms of individual things.]
[Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of
the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are
one.]
[Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is
meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities--such as the
heart and the like--which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.]
[Footnote 103: Ânanda Giri reads âvish/t/asya for âvishk/ri/tasya.]
[Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of
the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying
different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones,
&c. only the sattâ, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants,
animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in
animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.]
[Footnote 105: Ânanda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus
here also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva
siddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sûtrak/ri/to api matam ity âha, evam iti,
/s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/âstre dvairûpyam brahma/n/o
bhavati; tatra sopâdhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmâdhikara/n/am
udâharati âdityeti; uktanyâya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasârayati evam iti;
sopâdhikopade/s/avan nirupâdhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityâdinâ,
âtmaj/ñ/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam âha
pareti; annamayâdyupâdhidvârokasya katham paravidyâvishayatva/m/ tatrâha
upâdhîti; nir/n/ayakramam âha vâkyeti, uktârtham adhikara/n/a/m/
kvâstîty âsa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.]
[Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.]
[Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument
which is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.]
[Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so
on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot,
therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are
likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.]
[Footnote 109: Yadi labdhâ na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramâtmano
vastutobhinnena jîvâtmanâ paramâtmâ labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhâmatî.]
[Footnote 110: Yathâ paramesvarâd bhinno jîvâtmâ drash/t/â na bhavaty
evam gîvâtmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti,
jîvasyânirvâ/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirvâ/k/ya/h/ syâd ity ata âha
parame/s/varas tv avidyâkalpitâd iti. Ananda Giri.]
[Footnote 111: The explanation of the ânandamaya given hitherto is here
recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is
attributed by Go. Ân. to the v/ri/ttikâra.]
[Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word ânandamaya must
be taken if understood to denote Brahman.]
[Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.]
[Footnote 114: See I, 1, 15-19. ]
[Footnote 115: The preceding adhikara/n/a had shown that the five Selfs
(consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates,
are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of
Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman itself
is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara/n/a undertakes to
show that the passage about the golden person represents the savi/s/esha
Brahman as the object of devout meditation.]
[Footnote 116: So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes
on poets and singers is Brahman.]
[Footnote 117: Or else 'that which is within forms and names.']
[Footnote 118: Viz. as intimating it. Thus Ân. Gi. and Go. Ân. against
the accent of /rik/á/h/. Sâya/n/a explains /rik/á/h/ as genitive.]
[Footnote 119: O/m/kârasya pratîkatvena vâ/k/akatvena lakshakatvena vâ
brahmatvam uktam, om iti, ka/m/ sukha/m/ tasyârthendriyayogajatva/m/
vârayitu/m/ kham iti, tasya bhûtâka/s/atva/m/ vyâseddhum purâ/n/am ity
uktam. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 120: The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be
decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that is not
possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new
chapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to be taken into
consideration.]
[Footnote 121: The v/ri/ttikâra, the commentators say.]
[Footnote 122: I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth,
according to Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was
entriely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the
latter.]
[Footnote 123: So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as
non-tripartite light exists at all.]
[Footnote 124: Brahma/n/o vyava/kkh/idya teja/h/samarpakatva/m/
vi/s/eshakatvam, tadabhâvozvi/s/eshakatvam. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 125: If we strictly follow the order of words in the
original.]
[Footnote 126: Svasâmarthyena sarvanâmna/h/
sannihitaparâmar/s/itvava/s/ena.]
[Footnote 127: The v/ri/ttikâra according to Go. Ân. in his /t/îkâ on
the bhâshya to the next Sûtra.]
[Footnote 128: Concerning the difficulty involved in this
interpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.]
[Footnote 129: The text runs, 'astitve /k/a prâ/n/ânâ/m/ ni/hs/reyasam,'
and Go. Ân. explains 'astitve prâ/n/asthitau prâ/n/ânâ/m/ indriyâ/n/âm
sthitir ity arthata/h/ /s/rutim âha.' He as well as Ân. Gi. quotes as
the text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athâto ni/hs/reyasâdânam
ity âdi.' But if instead of 'astitve /k/a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get
the concluding clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's
edition.].
[Footnote 130: Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the
Kau. Up. is Brahman.]
[Footnote 131: I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth,
rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.]
[Footnote 132: Ima/m/ /s/arîram instead of ida/m/ /s/arîram.]
[Footnote 133: Pa/ñk/a /s/abdâdaya/h/ pa/ñk/a p/ri/thivyâdaya/s/ /k/a
da/s/a bhûtamâtrâ/h/ pa/ñk/a buddhîndriyâ/n/i pa/ñk/a buddhaya iti
da/s/a praj/ñ/âmâtrâ/h/. Yadvâ j/ñ/ânendriyârthâ/h/ pa/ñk/a
karzmendriyârthâ/s/ /ka/ pa/ñk/eti da/s/a bhûtamâtrâ/h/
dvividhânîndriyâ/n/i praj/ñ/âmâtrâ da/s/eti bhâva/h/. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 134: Viz. by the v/ri/ttikâra.]
[Footnote 135: Ihâpi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogât' of the
Sûtra.]