non-intelligent pradhâna, the fiction of the Sâ@nkhyas; because it is
not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e.
thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch.
Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the
beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw),
may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that
this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by
the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of
that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or
'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having
thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this
was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He
thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait.
Âr. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its
antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the
person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Prâ/n/a.' By
'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sûtra) is not meant
that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense;
just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering.
Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an
all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as,
for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows
all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that
Brahman, name and form and food.'
The argumentation of the Sâ@nkhyas that the pradhâna may be called
all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the
gu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhâna-condition the
three gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality
of Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation
that the pradhâna is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for
all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we
term the pradhâna all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge
residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with
reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and
Darkness.
Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a
witnessing (observing) principle (sâkshin) is not called knowledge, and
the non-intelligent pradhâna is destitute of such a principle. It is
therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhâna all-knowingness. The
case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under
consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an
excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].--Well then
(say those Sâ@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us
assume that the pradhâna possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the
witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is
imparted to an iron ball by fire.--No, we reply; for if this were so, it
would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the
pradhâna having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary
Brahman itself is the cause of the world.
The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense
cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent,
Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we
refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sâ@nkhya, is Brahman's
all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To
maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light
on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge
were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he
would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not
all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's
knowledge to be permanent.--But, it may be objected, on this latter
alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with
reference to the act of knowing.--Why not? we reply; the sun also,
although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as
independent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93].'--But, it will
again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he
stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman,
on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no
relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not
parallel.--This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter
of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even
without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman
also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,'
&c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an
object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb
while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman
will fit all the better.--What then is that object to which the
knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the
world?--Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being
identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to
be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-/s/âstra assume, the
Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through
the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the
eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the
creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that
Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think
because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for
Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition--as the sun's nature is
eternal luminousness--can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of
knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa/m/sârin) indeed, which is under
the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge
may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments
of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does
not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions.
'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like
unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent,
acting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping without hands, hasting without
feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be
known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person'
(/S/v. Up. VI, 8; III, 19).
But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul
different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for
/S/ruti expressly declares that 'there is no other seer but he; there is
no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23). How then can it be said
that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on
a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?--True, we
reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the
Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts,
consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether
to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars,
pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of
the latter kind such conceptions and terms as 'the hollow (space) of a
jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not
really different from universal space, and just as in consequence
thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are
different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails
likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are
different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal)
connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the
body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence,
imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like which are
Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong
conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception.
And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the
transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.
The averment that the pradhâna, because consisting of several elements,
can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while
the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the
pradhâna not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to
establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the
pradhâna and similar principles, the Sûtrakâra will set forth in the
second Adhyâya (II, 1, 4, &c.).
Here the Sâ@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty
stated by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhâna cannot be
the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the
sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground
that non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as
intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a
river-bank about to fall, 'the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),'
and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed
intelligence. So the pradhâna also, although non-intelligent, may, when
about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in
ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined,
and formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village,
necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhâna also acts by
the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the
so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may
therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.--But what reason
have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word 'thought' and
for taking it in a figurative sense?--The observation, the Sâ@nkhya
replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as
intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, 'That fire
thought; that water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). We therefrom
conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there also
where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter
where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense[94].
To this argumentation of the Sâdkhya the next Sûtra replies:
6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we
deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of
the world).
Your assertion that the term 'Being' denotes the non-intelligent
pradhâna, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only,
as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On account of the term
'Self.' For the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2, which begins 'Being only, my
dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of
fire, water, and earth ('it thought,' &c.; 'it sent forth fire,' &c.),
goes on--denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter
treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the
term--'divinities'--as follows, 'That divinity thought: Let me now enter
those three divinities with this living Self (jîva. âtman) and evolve
names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent
pradhâna is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to
assume that the same pradhâna--as once constituting the subject-matter
of the chapter--is referred to by the term 'that divinity.' But in that
case the divinity would not speak of the jîva as 'Self.' For by the term
'Jîva' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the
etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the
body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self
of the non-intelligent pradhâna? By 'Self' we understand (a being's) own
nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Jîva cannot constitute the
nature of the non-intelligent pradhâna. If, on the other hand, we refer
the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to which thought in its
primary sense belongs, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the
Jîva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, 'That
which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is
the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O /S/vetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
7, &c.). Here the clause 'It is the Self' designates the Being of which
the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word 'Self,' and
the concluding clause, 'that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' declares the
intelligent /S/vetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water,
on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the
mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of
names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for
ascribing to them thought in its primary sense--while the employment of
the word 'Self' furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat--the
thought attributed to them must be explained in a figurative sense, like
the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of
fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled
over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on
account of the word 'Self,' not to be understood in a figurative
sense.[95]
Here the Sâ@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The word 'Self,'
he says, may be applied to the pradhâna, although unintelligent, because
it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects
all purposes of another;' as, for instance, a king applies the word
'Self' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions,
'Bhadrasena is my (other) Self.' For the pradhâna, which effects the
enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the
same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war.
Or else, it may be said, the one word 'Self' may refer to
non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that
such expressions as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the
senses,' are made use of, and as the one word 'light' (jyotis) denotes a
certain sacrifice (the jyotish/t/oma) as well as a flame. How then does
it follow from the word 'Self' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause
of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense?
To this last argumentation the Sûtrakâra replies:
7. (The pradhâna cannot be designated by the term 'Self') because
release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).
The non-intelligent pradhâna cannot be the object of the term 'Self'
because in the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2 ff., where the subtle Sat which is
under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, 'That is the
Self,' and where the subsequent clause, 'That art thou, O /S/vetaketu,'
declares the intelligent /S/vetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a
passage subsequent to the two quoted (viz. 'a man who has a teacher
obtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not
delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the
non-intelligent pradhâna were denoted by the term 'Sat' and did
comprehend--by means of the phrase 'That art thou'--persons desirous of
final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be
'Thou art non-intelligent;' so that Scripture would virtually make
contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus
cease to be a means of right knowledge. But to assume that the faultless
/s/âstra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason.
And if the /s/âstra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should
point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a
non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he would--comparable to the blind
man who had caught hold of the ox's tail[96]--cling to the view of that
being the Self, and thus never be able to reach the real Self different
from the false Self pointed out to him; hence he would be debarred from
what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore
conclude that, just as the /s/âstra teaches the agnihotra and similar
performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of
the heavenly world, so the passage 'that is the Self, that art thou, O
/S/vetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that
condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means
of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man
grasping the heated axe (Ch. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the
doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only,
the cognition founded on the passage 'that art thou' would be of the
nature of a fanciful combination only[97], like the knowledge derived
from the passage, 'I am the hymn' (Ait. Âr. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead
to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey
the doctrine of release. Therefore the word 'Self' is applied to the
subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful
servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self' can--in such phrases as
'Bhadrasena is my Self'--be taken in a figurative sense, because the
difference between master and servant is well established by perception.
Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in
figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of
those things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means
of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that
nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that
the word 'Self' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well
as what is intelligent, just as the word 'jyotis' signifies a certain
sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to
attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume
that) the word 'Self' in its primary meaning refers to what is
intelligent only and is then, by a figurative attribution of
intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such
phrases as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses.' And
even if we assume that the word 'Self' primarily signifies both classes
of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two
meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading
under which it stands, or some determinative attributive word. But in
the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word
refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat
distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and /S/vetaketu,
i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity.
That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with /S/vetaketu, who
possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances
determine the object of the word 'Self' here to be something
intelligent. The word 'jyotis' does moreover not furnish an appropriate
example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of
'light' only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of
the arthavâda assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.
A different explanation of the Sûtra is also possible. The preceding
Sûtra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word 'Self'
having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sûtra is to be
explained as containing an independent reason, proving that the doctrine
of the pradhâna being the general cause is untenable.
Hence the non-intelligent pradhâna is not denoted by the word 'Self.'
This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.
8. And (the pradhâna cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') because there
is no statement of its having to be set aside.
If the pradhâna which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term 'Being'
(Sat), and if the passage 'That is the Self, that art thou, O
/S/vetaketu,' referred to the pradhâna; the teacher whose wish it is to
impart instruction about the true Brahman would subsequently declare
that the pradhâna is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be
considered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction
about the pradhâna, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it
as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a
friend the (small) star Arundhatî at first directs his attention to a
big neighbouring star, saying 'that is Arundhatî,' although it is really
not so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out
the real Arundhatî. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his
pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end
definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhâna. But
no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapâ/th/aka arrives at a
conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is
(the Sat).
The word 'and' (in the Sûtra) is meant to notify that the contradiction
of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected
interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a
contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhâna is
to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapâ/th/aka it is
intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes
known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked
for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we
perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be
known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all
that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being
a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it
is clay merely,' &c. Now if the term 'Sat' denoted the pradhâna, which
is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its
knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never
lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the
latter is not an effect of the pradhâna. Therefore the pradhâna is not
denoted by the term 'Sat.'--For this the Sûtrakâra gives a further
reason.
9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self
cannot be the pradhâna).
With reference to the cause denoted by the word 'Sat,' Scripture says,
'When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat,
he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, "he sleeps"
(svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apîta).' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
1.) This passage explains the well-known verb 'to sleep,' with reference
to the soul. The word, 'his own,' denotes the Self which had before been
denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e.
into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i,
which means 'to be resolved into.' The individual soul (jîva) is called
awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by
means of the modifications of the mind--which thus constitute limiting
adjuncts of the soul--it apprehends those external objects, and
identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external
objects[98]. When, modified by the impressions which the external
objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind[99].'
When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and
the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modifications due
to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self
as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A
similar etymology of the word 'h/ri/daya' is given by /s/ruti, 'That
Self abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he
is in the heart (h/ri/di ayam).' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words
a/s/anâya and udanyâ are similarly etymologised: 'water is carrying away
what has been eaten by him;' 'fire carries away what has been drunk by
him' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the
resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 'Sat,' by
means of the etymology of the word 'sleep.' But the intelligent Self can
clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhâna. If, again,
it were said that the pradhâna is denoted by the word 'own,' because
belonging to the Self (as being the Self's own), there would remain the
same absurd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a
non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. 'embraced
by the intelligent--praj/ñ/a--Self he knows nothing that is without,
nothing that is within,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in
the condition of dreamless sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity.
Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an
intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word 'Sat,' and not the
pradhâna.--A further reason for the pradhâna not being the cause is
subjoined.
10. On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedânta-texts, Brahman
is to be considered the cause).
If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedânta-texts
also, there were set forth different views concerning the nature of the
cause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being
the cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhâna doctrine,
and others again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps
be possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the
cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in
with the pradhâna theory. But the stated condition is absent since all
the Vedânta-texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the
intelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, 'As from a burning fire
sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the prâ/n/as
proceed each towards its place; from the prâ/n/as the gods, from the
gods the worlds' (Kau. Up. III, 3). And 'from that Self sprang ether'
(Taitt. Up. II, 1). And 'all this springs from the Self' (Ch. Up. VII,
26, 1). And 'this prâ/n/a is born from the Self' (Pr. Up. III, 3); all
which passages declare the Self to be the cause. That the word 'Self'
denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.
And that all the Vedânta-texts advocate the same view as to an
intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be
considered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims
of the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a
uniform character regarding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman
is therefore to be considered the cause of the world, 'on account of the
uniformity of view (of the Vedânta-texts).'--A further reason for this
conclusion is advanced.
11. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the
all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).
That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in
a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the
following passage of the mantropanishad of the /S/vetâ/s/vataras (VI, 9)
where the word 'he' refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord,
'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of
him neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore finally settled that the
all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent
pradhâna or anything else.
In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate
arguments, that the Vedânta-texts exhibited under Sûtras I, 1-11, are
capable of proving that the all-knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause
of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have
explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view (I, 10),
that all Vedânta-texts whatever maintain an intelligent cause. The
question might therefore be asked, 'What reason is there for the
subsequent part of the Vedânta-sûtras?' (as the chief point is settled
already.)
To this question we reply as follows: Brahman is apprehended under two
forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to
the multiformity of the evolutions of name and form (i.e. the
multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the
opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatever.
Compare the following passages: B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15, 'For where there
is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only
is all this, how should he see another?' Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1, 'Where one
sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is
the greatest. Where one sees something else, hears something else,
understands something else, that is the little. The greatest is
immortal; the little is mortal;' Taitt. Up. III, 12, 7, 'The wise one,
who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the
things by their names[100]);' /S/v. Up. VI, 19, 'Who is without parts,
without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest
bridge of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' B/ri/.
Up. II, 3, 6, 'Not so, not so;' B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is neither
coarse nor fine, neither short nor long;' and 'defective is one place,
perfect the other.' All these passages, with many others, declare
Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either
of Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is the object of Nescience,
there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion,
and the like[101]. The different modes of devotion lead to different
results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to
success in works; those modes are distinct on account of the distinction
of the different qualities and limiting conditions[102]. And although
the one highest Self only, i.e. the Lord distinguished by those
different qualities constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits
(of devotion) are distinct, according as the devotion refers to
different qualities. Thus Scripture says, 'According as man worships
him, that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his thought is in this
world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14,
1). Sm/ri/ti also makes an analogous statement, 'Remembering whatever
form of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters,
being impressed with it through his constant meditation' (Bha. Gîtâ
VIII, 6).
Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well
as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds
which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares
that the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals
itself[103] in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of
various dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Âr. II, 3, 2, 1),
'He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him[104],' &c.
Similarly Sm/ri/ti remarks, 'Whatever being there is of power, splendour
or might, know it to have sprung from portions of my glory' (Bha. Gîtâ,
X, 41); a passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power
and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly here (i.e. in
the Sûtras) also the teacher will show that the golden person in the
disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on account of an indicating sign,
viz. the circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (Ved. Sû.
I, 1, 20); the same is to be observed with regard to I, 1, 22 and other
Sûtras. And, again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the
meaning of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached
concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instantaneous
release; for although that knowledge is conveyed by means of various
limiting conditions, yet no special connexion with limiting conditions
is intended to be intimated, in consequence of which there arises a
doubt whether it (the knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for
its object; so, for instance, in the case of Sûtra I, 1, 12[105]. From
all this it appears that the following part of the /S/âstra has a
special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedânta-texts teach, on
the one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming
an object of devotion, and on the other hand, as being free from the
connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge.
The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different from
Brahman, which in I, 1, 10 was based on the uniformity of the meaning of
the Vedânta-texts, will be further detailed by the Sûtrakâra, who, while
explaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude all
causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.
12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of
the repetition (of the word 'bliss,' as denoting the highest Self).
The Taittirîya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enumerated the Self
consisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self
consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says,
'Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner
Self which consists of bliss.' Here the doubt arises whether the phrase,
'that which consists of bliss,' denotes the highest Brahman of which it
had been said previously, that 'It is true Being, Knowledge, without
end,' or something different from Brahman, just as the Self consisting
of food, &c., is different from it.--The pûrvapakshin maintains that the
Self consisting of bliss is a secondary (not the principal) Self, and
something different from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of
Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the
principal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of
bliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be
the innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because
the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and
because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary
Self, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text expressly says
'Joy is its head;' and about its being embodied we read, 'Of that former
one this one is the embodied Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that
former Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self.
And of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be
prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the
transmigrating Soul.
To this reasoning we make the following reply:--By the Self consisting
of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, 'on account of
repetition.' For the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest
Self. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause 'That is
flavour'--which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and
declares it to be of the nature of flavour--we read, 'For only after
having perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could
breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether
(of the heart)? For he alone causes blessedness;' and again, II, 8, 'Now
this is an examination of Bliss;' 'He reaches that Self consisting of
Bliss;' and again, II, 9, 'He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears
nothing;' and in addition, 'He understood that Bliss is Brahman' (III,
6). And in another scriptural passage also (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28),
'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman,' we see the word 'bliss' applied just
to Brahman. As, therefore, the word 'bliss' is repeatedly used with
reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is
Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only
denote the secondary Self (the Sa/m/sârin), because it forms a link in a
series of secondary Selfs, beginning with the one consisting of food, is
of no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the
innermost of all. The /S/âstra, wishing to convey information about the
primary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first
refers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is
by very obtuse people identified with it; it then proceeds from the body
to another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just
as the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten
brass had been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first
representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier
comprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self[106],
which consists of bliss, is the real Self. Just as when a man, desirous
of pointing out the star Arundhatî to another man, at first points to
several stars which are not Arundhatî as being Arundhatî, while only the
star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhatî; so here also the Self
consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of its being the
innermost (i.e. the last). Nor can any weight be allowed to the
objection that the attribution of joy and so on, as head, &c., cannot
possibly refer to the real Self; for this attribution is due to the
immediately preceding limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of
understanding, the so-called vij/ñ/ânakosa), and does not really belong
to the real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to
the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain
of bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and is not
ascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is predicated of the
transmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of bliss is the highest
Brahman.
13. If (it be objected that the term ânandamaya, consisting of bliss,
can) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word
denoting a modification (or product); (we declare the objection to be)
not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed
by the affix maya.)
Here the pûrvapakshin raises the objection that the word ânandamaya
(consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest Self.--Why?--Because the
word ânandamaya is understood to denote something different from the
original word (i.e. the word ânanda without the derivative affix maya),
viz. a modification; according to the received sense of the affix maya.
'Ânandamaya' therefore denotes a modification, just as annamaya
(consisting of food) and similar words do.
This objection is, however, not valid, because 'maya' is also used in
the sense of abundance, i.e. denotes that where there is abundance of
what the original word expresses. So, for instance, the phrase 'the
sacrifice is annamaya' means 'the sacrifice is abounding in food' (not
'is some modification or product of food'). Thus here Brahman also, as
abounding in bliss, is called ânandamaya. That Brahman does abound in
bliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 8), where, after the
bliss of each of the different classes of beings, beginning with man,
has been declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the
immediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed
to be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance.
14. And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i.e. of bliss;
therefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.)
Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason also that
Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, 'For he alone
causes bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For he who causes bliss must himself
abound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who
enriches others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, therefore,
maya may be taken to mean 'abundant,' the Self consisting of bliss is
the highest Self.
15. Moreover (the ânandamaya is Brahman because) the same (Brahman)
which had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i.e. proclaimed in
the Brâhma/n/a passage as the ânandamaya.)
The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the following
reason also[107]. On the introductory words 'he who knows Brahman
attains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), there follows a mantra
proclaiming that Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter,
possesses the qualities of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after
that it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and
then all other moving and non-moving things, and that, entering into the
beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all;
thereupon, for its better comprehension, the series of the different
Selfs ('different from this is the inner Self,' &c.) are enumerated, and
then finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed, is again
proclaimed in the passage under discussion, 'different from this is the
other inner Self, which consists of bliss.' To assume that a mantra and
the Brâhma/n/a passage belonging to it have the same sense is only
proper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which results
therefrom); for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome inference
that the text drops the topic once started, and turns to an altogether
new subject.
Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the Self
consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self consisting of food,
&c.[108] On the same (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded,
'This same knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a; he understood that bliss
is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss
is the highest Self.
16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the other
(i.e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the
latter assumption).
And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the
highest Self only, not the other, i.e. the one which is other than the
Lord, i.e. the transmigrating individual soul. The personal soul cannot
be denoted by the term 'the one consisting of bliss.' Why? On account of
the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self
consisting of bliss, 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He
brooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever
there is.' Here, the desire arising before the origination of a body,
&c., the non-separation of the effects created from the creator, and the
creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self
different from the highest Self.
17. And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, the
ânandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul).
The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating
soul, for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of
bliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly
represented as different; Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'It (i.e. the Self
consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour
can this (soul) perceive bliss.' For he who perceives cannot be that
which is perceived.--But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or
attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the
following /S/ruti- and Smr/ri/ti-passages, 'The Self is to be sought;'
'Nothing higher is known than the attainment of the Self[109]?'--This
objection, we reply, is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute
truth). Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is
never anything but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the
truth, identified with the Non-Self, i.e. the body and so on; whereby it
becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far as it is identified with
the body, and so on, as something not searched for but to be searched
for, not heard but to be heard, not seized but to be seized, not
perceived but to be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like.
Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as 'there is no
other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), that there is in reality any
seer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it
be said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal
individual soul; for)[110] the Lord differs from the soul
(vij/ñ/ânâtman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product
of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the
ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a
shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; or as the
free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is
determined by its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With reference to
this fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual Self,
the two last Sûtras have been propounded.
18. And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to the
ânandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i.e. to the
pradhâna inferred by the Sâ@nkhyas.)
Since in the passage 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,'
which occurs in the chapter treating of the ânandamaya (Taitt. Up. II,
6), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred,
i.e. the non-intelligent pradhâna assumed by the Sâ@nkhyas, cannot be
regarded as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the
world. Although the opinion that the pradhâna is the cause of the world,
has already been refuted in the Sûtra I, 1, 5, it is here, where a
favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the
basis of the scriptural passage about the cause of the world feeling
desire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all
scriptural passages).
19. And, moreover, it (i.e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i.e.
the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on
that (being fully known).
And for the following reason also the term, 'the Self consisting of
bliss,' cannot denote either the pradhâna or the individual soul.
Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge
is joined, i.e. identified, with the Self of bliss under discussion,
i.e. obtains final release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up.
II, 7), 'When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which is
invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the
fearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is
fear for him.' That means, if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss
even a small difference in the form of non-identity, then he finds no
release from the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means
of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self
consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory
existence. But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we
understand by the Self consisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not
either the pradhâna or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the
Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.
But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made concerning the
true meaning of the word 'ânandamaya[111].' On what grounds, we ask, can
it be maintained that the affix 'maya' after having, in the series of
compounds beginning with annamaya and ending with vij/ñ/ânamaya, denoted
mere modifications, should all at once, in the word ânandamaya, which
belongs to the same series, denote abundance, so that ânandamaya would
refer to Brahman? If it should be said that the assumption is made on
account of the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the
mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt. Up. II), we
reply that therefrom it would follow that also the Selfs consisting of
food, breath, &c., denote Brahman (because the governing influence of
the mantra extends to them also).--The advocate of the former
interpretation will here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use
of above, viz. as follows: To assume that the Selfs consisting of food,
and so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because after each of them
an inner Self is mentioned. After the Self of bliss, on the other hand,
no further inner Self is mentioned, and hence it must be considered to
be Brahman itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping
the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed out by the
mantra), and taking up a new topic.--But to this we reply that, although
unlike the case of the Selfs consisting of food, &c., no inner Self is
mentioned after the Self consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be
considered as Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of
bliss Scripture declares, 'Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its right
arm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its trunk. Brahman is
its tail, its support.' Now, here the very same Brahman which, in the
mantra, had been introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called
the tail, the support; while the five involucra, extending from the
involucrum of food up to the involucrum of bliss, are merely introduced
for the purpose of setting forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then,
can it be maintained that our interpretation implies the needless
dropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction of a new
topic?--But, it may again be objected, Brahman is called the tail, i.e.
a member of the Self consisting of bliss; analogously to those passages
in which a tail and other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting
of food and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know that
Brahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i.e. a subordinate matter)
is in reality the chief matter referred to?--From the fact, we reply, of
Brahman being the general subject-matter of the chapter.--But, it will
again be said, that interpretation also according to which Brahman is
cognised as a mere member of the ânandamaya does not involve a dropping
of the subject-matter, since the ânandamaya himself is Brahman.--But, we
reply, in that case one and the same Brahman would at first appear as
the whole, viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere
part, viz. as the tail; which is absurd. And as one of the two
alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appropriate to refer to
Brahman the clause 'Brahman is the tail' which contains the word
'Brahman,' and not the sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman
is not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation of the phrase,
'Brahman is the tail, the support,' goes on, 'On this there is also the
following /s/loka: He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes
himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we know
himself as existing.' As this /s/loka, without any reference to the Self
of bliss, states the advantage and disadvantage connected with the
knowledge of the being and non-being of Brahman only, we conclude that
the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' represents Brahman as
the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter). About the being
or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the other hand, a doubt is not
well possible, since the Self of bliss distinguished by joy,
satisfaction, &c., is well known to every one.--But if Brahman is the
principal matter, how can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self
of bliss ('Brahman is the tail, the support')?--Its being called so, we
reply, forms no objection; for the word tail here denotes that which is
of the nature of a tail, so that we have to understand that the bliss of
Brahman is not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or
abode, the one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously
another scriptural passage declares, 'All other creatures live on a
small portion of that bliss' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further, if by the
Self consisting of bliss we were to understand Brahman we should have to
assume that the Brahman meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities
(savi/s/esha), because it is said to have joy and the like for its
members. But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary passage
(II, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object neither of mind nor
speech, and so shows that the Brahman meant is the (absolute) Brahman
(devoid of qualities), 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns
away unable to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears
nothing.' Moreover, if we speak of something as 'abounding in
bliss[112],' we thereby imply the co-existence of pain; for the word
'abundance' in its ordinary sense implies the existence of a small
measure of what is opposed to the thing whereof there is abundance. But
the passage so understood would be in conflict with another passage (Ch.
Up. VII, 24), 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else,
understands nothing else, that is the Infinite;' which declares that in
the Infinite, i.e. Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from it.
Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in each individual body, the Self
consisting of bliss also is a different one in each body. Brahman, on
the other hand, does not differ according to bodies; for the mantra at
the beginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge,
infinite, and another passage says, 'He is the one God, hidden in all
beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11).
Nor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent repetition of the word
'ânandamaya;' for merely the radical part of the compound (i.e. the word
ânanda without the affix maya) is repeated in all the following
passages; 'It is a flavour, for only after seizing flavour can any one
seize bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss
existed not in the ether? For he alone causes blessedness;' 'Now this is
an examination of bliss;' 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears
nothing;' 'He understood that bliss is Brahman.' If it were a settled
matter that Brahman is denoted by the term, 'the Self consisting of
bliss,' then we could assume that in the subsequent passages, where
merely the word 'bliss' is employed, the term 'consisting of bliss' is
meant to be repeated; but that the Self consisting of bliss is not
Brahman, we have already proved by means of the reason of joy being its
head, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage, viz. 'Brahman
is knowledge and bliss' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28), the mere word 'bliss'
denotes Brahman, we must conclude that also in such passages as, 'If
that bliss existed not in the ether,' the word bliss is used with
reference to Brahman, and is not meant to repeat the term 'consisting of
bliss.' The repetition of the full compound, 'consisting of bliss,'
which occurs in the passage, 'He reaches that Self consisting of bliss'
(Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not refer to Brahman, as it is contained in the
enumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the Self of food, &c., all of which
are mere effects, and all of which are represented as things to be
reached.--But, it may be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is
said to have to be reached, were not Brahman--just as the Selfs
consisting of food, &c. are not Brahman--then it would not be declared
(in the passage immediately following) that he who knows obtains for his
reward Brahman.--This objection we invalidate by the remark that the
text makes its declaration as to Brahman--which is the tail, the
support--being reached by him who knows, by the very means of the
declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss; as appears from
the passage, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, from which all speech
returns,' &c. With reference, again, to the passage, 'He desired: may I
be many, may I grow forth,' which is found in proximity to the mention
of the Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality
connected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which is
mentioned in the still nearer passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the
support,' and does therefore not intimate that the Self of bliss is
Brahman. And, on account of its referring to the passage last quoted
('it desired,' &c.), the later passage also, 'That is flavour,' &c., has
not the Self of bliss for its subject.--But, it may be objected, the
(neuter word) Brahman cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word
as you maintain is done in the passage, 'He desired,' &c.--In reply to
this objection we point to the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 1), 'From that
Self sprang ether,' where, likewise, the masculine word 'Self' can refer
to Brahman only, since the latter is the general topic of the chapter.
In the knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a finally ('he knew that bliss
is Brahman'), the word 'bliss' is rightly understood to denote Brahman,
since we there meet neither with the affix 'maya,' nor with any
statement as to joy being its head, and the like. To ascribe to Brahman
in itself joy, and so on, as its members, is impossible, unless we have
recourse to certain, however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman;
and that the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of the
qualified (savi/s/esha) Brahman is proved by the passage (quoted above),
which declares that Brahman transcends speech and mind. We therefore
must conclude that the affix maya, in the word ânandamaya, does not
denote abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in the
words annamaya and the subsequent similar compounds.
The Sûtras are therefore to be explained as follows. There arises the
question whether the passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' is to
be understood as intimating that Brahman is a mere member of the Self
consisting of bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said
that it must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, 'The Self
consisting of bliss on account of the repetition.' That means: Brahman,
which in the passage 'the Self consisting of bliss,' &c., is spoken of
as the tail, the support, is designated as the principal matter (not as
something subordinate). On account of the repetition; for in the
memorial /s/loka, 'he becomes himself non-existing,' Brahman alone is
reiterated. 'If not, on account of the word denoting a modification; not
so, on account of abundance.' In this Sûtra the word 'modification' is
meant to convey the sense of member. The objection that on account of
the word 'tail,' which denotes a mere member, Brahman cannot be taken as
the principal matter must be refuted. This we do by remarking that there
is no difficulty, since a word denoting a member may be introduced into
the passage on account of prâ/k/urya[113]. Prâ/k/urya here means a
phraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After the different
members, beginning with the head and ending with the tail, of the Selfs,
consisting of food, &c. have been enumerated, there are also mentioned
the head and the other limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added,
'Brahman is the tail, the support;' the intention being merely to
introduce some more terms denoting members, not to convey the meaning of
'member,' (an explanation which is impossible) because the preceding
Sûtra already has proved Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the
principal matter. 'And because he is declared to be the cause of it.'
That means: Brahman is declared to be the cause of the entire aggregate
of effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting of bliss, in the following
passage, 'He created all whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as
Brahman is the cause, it cannot at the same time be called the member,
in the literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing
but one of Brahman's effects. The other Sûtras also (which refer to the
Self of bliss[114]) are to be considered, as well as they may, as
conveying a knowledge of Brahman, which (Brahman) is referred to in the
passage about the tail.
20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), on
account of his qualities being declared[115].
The following passage is found in Scripture (Ch. Up. I, 6, 6 ff.), 'Now
that person bright as gold who is seen within the sun, with beard bright
as gold and hair bright as gold, bright as gold altogether to the very
tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus; his name is Ut, for
he has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above
all evil. So much with reference to the devas.' And further on, with
reference to the body, 'Now the person who is seen in the eye,' &c. Here
the following doubt presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the
object of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye, merely
some special individual soul, which, by means of a large measure of
knowledge and pious works, has raised itself to a position of eminence;
or do they refer to the eternally perfect highest Lord?
The pûrvapakshin takes the former view. An individual soul, he says, is
referred to, since Scripture speaks of a definite shape. To the person
in the sun special features are ascribed, such as the possession of a
beard as bright as gold and so on, and the same features manifestly
belong to the person in the eye also, since they are expressly
transferred to it in the passage, 'The shape of this person is the same
as the shape of that person.' That, on the other hand, no shape can be
ascribed to the highest Lord, follows from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3,
15), 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without
decay.' That an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact
that a definite abode is mentioned, 'He who is in the sun; he who is in
the eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no special abode, but abides
in his own glory, no similar statement can be made; compare, for
instance, the two following passages, 'Where does he rest? In his own
glory?' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); and 'like the ether he is omnipresent,
eternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied by the fact that
the might (of the being in question) is said to be limited; for the
passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beyond that, and of the wishes of the
devas,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in the sun;
and the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of the
wishes of men,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in
the eye. No limit, on the other hand, can be admitted of the might of
the highest Lord, as appears from the passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22),
'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all
things. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be
confounded;' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all
limiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye and
the sun cannot be the highest Lord.
To this reasoning the Sûtra replies, 'The one within, on account of his
qualities being declared.' The person referred to in the passages
concerning the person within the sun and the person within the eye is
not a transmigrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because his
qualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest Lord are
indicated in the text as follows. At first the name of the person within
the sun is mentioned--'his name is Ut'--and then this name is explained
on the ground of that person being free from all evil, 'He has risen
above all evil.' The same name thus explained is then transferred to the
person in the eye, in the clause, 'the name of the one is the name of
the other.' Now, entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to
the highest Self only; so, for instance (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), 'The Self
which is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is the passage, 'He is
/Ri/k, he is Sâman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman,' which declares the person in
the eye to be the Self of the /Ri/k, Sâman, and so on; which is possible
only if that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is to be
considered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text, after having stated
in succession /Ri/k and Sâman to have earth and fire for their Self with
reference to the Devas, and, again, speech and breath with reference to
the body, continues, '/Ri/k and Sâman are his joints,' with reference to
the Devas, and 'the joints of the one are the joints of the other,' with
reference to the body. Now this statement also can be made only with
regard to that which is the Self of all. Further, the passage,
'Therefore all who sing to the Vînâ sing him, and from him also they
obtain wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic of all
worldly songs; which again holds true of the highest Lord only. That
absolute command over the objects of worldly desires (as displayed, for
instance, in the bestowal of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord
is meant, appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad-gîtâ
(X, 41), 'Whatever being there is possessing power, glory, or strength,
know it to be produced from a portion of my energy[116].' To the
objection that the statements about bodily shape contained in the
clauses, 'With a beard bright as gold,' &c., cannot refer to the highest
Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a
bodily shape formed of Mâyâ, in order to gratify thereby his devout
worshippers. Thus Sm/ri/ti also says, 'That thou seest me, O Nârada, is
the Mâyâ emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with the
qualities of all beings.' We have further to note that expressions such
as, 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without
decay,' are made use of where instruction is given about the nature of
the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities; while
passages such as the following one, 'He to whom belong all works, all
desires, all sweet odours and tastes' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), which
represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion, speak of him, who
is the cause of everything, as possessing some of the qualities of his
effects. Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage under
discussion, as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With reference
to the objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because an abode
is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of devout meditation, a
special abode may be assigned to Brahman, although it abides in its own
glory only; for as Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be
viewed as being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally,
about the limitation of Brahman's might, which depends on the
distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the body, has
likewise reference to devout meditation only. From all this it follows
that the being which Scripture states to be within the eye and the sun
is the highest Lord.
21. And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the
individual souls animating the sun, &c.), on account of the declaration
of distinction.
There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual souls which animate
the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within; whose
distinction (from all individual souls) is proclaimed in the following
scriptural passage, 'He who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom
the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun
within; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (B/ri/. Up. III,
7, 9). Here the expression, 'He within the sun whom the sun does not
know,' clearly indicates that the Ruler within is distinct from that
cognising individual soul whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within
we have to identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet of
the sameness of purport of all Vedânta-texts. It thus remains a settled
conclusion that the passage under discussion conveys instruction about
the highest Lord.
22. The âkâ/s/a, i.e. ether (is Brahman) on account of characteristic
marks (of the latter being mentioned).
In the Chândogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with, 'What is the
origin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings take
their rise from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is
greater than these, ether is their rest.'--Here the following doubt
arises. Does the word 'ether' denote the highest Brahman or the
elemental ether?--Whence the doubt?--Because the word is seen to be used
in both senses. Its use in the sense of 'elemental ether' is well
established in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech; and, on the other
hand, we see that it is sometimes used to denote Brahman, viz. in cases
where we ascertain, either from some complementary sentence or from the
fact of special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant. So,
for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'If that bliss existed not in the
ether;' and Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'That which is called ether is the
revealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names
are[117] that is Brahman.' Hence the doubt.--Which sense is then to be
adopted in our case?--The sense of elemental ether, the pûrvapakshin
replies; because this sense belongs to the word more commonly, and
therefore presents itself to the mind more readily. The word 'ether'
cannot be taken in both senses equally, because that would involve a
(faulty) attribution of several meanings to one and the same word. Hence
the term 'ether' applies to Brahman in a secondary (metaphorical) sense
only; on account of Brahman being in many of its attributes, such as all
pervadingness and the like, similar to ether. The rule is, that when the
primary sense of a word is possible, the word must not be taken in a
secondary sense. And in the passage under discussion only the primary
sense of the word 'ether' is admissible. Should it be objected that, if
we refer the passage under discussion to the elemental ether, a
complementary passage ('for all these beings take their rise from the
ether only, &c.') cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; we reply that
the elemental ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air,
fire, &c. in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. Up. II,
1), 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, and so
on.' The qualities also of being greater and of being a place of rest
may be ascribed to the elemental ether, if we consider its relations to
all other beings. Therefore we conclude that the word 'ether' here
denotes the elemental ether.
To this we reply as follows:--The word ether must here be taken to
denote Brahman, on account of characteristic marks of the latter being
mentioned. For the sentence, 'All these beings take their rise from the
ether only,' clearly indicates the highest Brahman, since all
Vedânta-texts agree in definitely declaring that all beings spring from
the highest Brahman.--But, the opponent may say, we have shown that the
elemental ether also may be represented as the cause, viz. of air, fire,
and the other elements in due succession.--We admit this. But still
there remains the difficulty, that, unless we understand the word to
apply to the fundamental cause of all, viz. Brahman, the affirmation
contained in the word 'only' and the qualification expressed by the word
'all' (in 'all beings') would be out of place. Moreover, the clause,
'They return into the ether,' again points to Brahman, and so likewise
the phrase, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest;' for
absolute superiority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the
highest Self only; cp. Ch. Up. III, 14, 3, 'Greater than the earth,
greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these
worlds.' The quality of being a place of rest likewise agrees best with
the highest Brahman, on account of its being the highest cause. This is
confirmed by the following scriptural passage: 'Knowledge and bliss is
Brahman, it is the rest of him who gives gifts' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28).
Moreover, Jaivali finding fault with the doctrine of /S/âlâvatya, on
account of (his sâman) having an end (Ch. Up. I, 8, 8), and wishing to
proclaim something that has no end chooses the ether, and then, having
identified the ether with the Udgîtha, concludes, 'He is the Udgîtha
greater than great; he is without end.' Now this endlessness is a
characteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark that the sense of
'elemental ether' presents itself to the mind more readily, because it
is the better established sense of the word âkâ/s/a, we reply, that,
although it may present itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be
accepted, because we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the
complementary sentences. That the word âkâ/s/a is also used to denote
Brahman has been shown already; cp. such passages as, 'Ether is the
revealer of all names and forms.' We see, moreover, that various
synonyma of âkâ/s/a are employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance,
/Ri/k Sa/m/h. I, 164, 39, 'In which the Vedas are[118], in the
Imperishable one (i.e. Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on
which all gods have their seat.' And Taitt. Up. III, 6, 'This is the
knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a, founded on the highest ether
(vyoman).' And again, 'Om, ka is Brahman, ether (kha) is Brahman' (Ch.
Up. IV, 10, 5), and 'the old ether' (B/ri/. Up. V, 1)[119]. And other
similar passages. On account of the force of the complementary passage
we are justified in deciding that the word 'ether,' although occurring
in the beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman. The case is
analogous to that of the sentence, 'Agni (lit. the fire) studies a
chapter,' where the word agni, although occurring in the beginning, is
at once seen to denote a boy[120]. It is therefore settled that the word
'ether' denotes Brahman.