The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments independent of
Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the
origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta view.--The first
adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, whose doctrine
had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places,
and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the
pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second
adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world
originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and
fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha
philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called
sarvâstitvavâdins, or bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an
external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed
against the vij/ñ/ânavâdins, according to whom ideas are the only
reality.--The last Sûtra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Râmânuja as
a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach
that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V
(33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI
(37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest
Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.
The last adhikara/n/a of the pâda (42-45) refers, according to the
unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the
Bhâgavatas or Pâ/ñk/arâtras. But /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja totally
disagree as to the drift of the Sûtrakâra's opinion regarding that
system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems
previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved
of.--Sûtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections
against the system; Sûtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that
from the highest being, called Vâsudeva, there is originated
Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those
scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's
eternity; and Sûtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarsha/n/a
there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.--The Sûtra on which the
difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs,
'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so
on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to
/S/a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so
on (on the part of Sa@nkarsha/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind,
&c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is
non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sûtra 42
against the Bhâgavata doctrine).'--According to Râmânuja, on the other
hand, the Sûtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is
noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/ñk/arâtra doctrine) on account of
their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being
Brahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarsha/n/a and so on are merely forms
of manifestation of Brahman, the Pâ/ñk/arâtra doctrine, according to
which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the
Sûtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two
interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the
explanations of the 'vâ' and of the 'tat,' implied in Râmânuja's
comment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/a@nkara's
interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the
polemical pâda with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of
objections--has to be viewed as the true one.