Adhikara/n/a I refutes the Sâ@nkhya objection that the acceptation of
the Vedânta system involves the rejection of the Sâ@nkhya doctrine which
after all constitutes a part of Sm/ri/ti, and as such has claims on
consideration.--To accept the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, the Vedântin replies,
would compel us to reject other Sm/ri/tis, such as the Manu-sm/ri/ti,
which are opposed to the Sâ@nkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of
Sm/ri/tis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can
be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, but
rather those Sm/ri/tis which teach the origination of the world from an
intelligent primary cause.
Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the
Yoga-sm/ri/ti.
Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of
intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material
world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world
when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience
teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the
qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their
causes--as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted and thereby
become simple gold again--do not continue to exist in those
causes.--Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the
Sâ@nkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various
imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal
substance participating in the same characteristics.
Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the
preceding adhikara/n/a is valid also against other theories, such as the
atomistic doctrine.
The one Sûtra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to
/S/a@nkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of
fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account
identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in
ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual
things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom
waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more
nor less than sea-water.--The /S/rî-bhâshya gives a totally different
interpretation of the Sûtra, according to which the latter has nothing
whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and
objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Râmânuja's view, the
Sûtra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the
individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord
himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by
instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be
maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to
which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it
follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially
different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we
reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject
to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself
an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain
which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Râmânuja
puts on the Sûtra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sûtra or
to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier
authority appears from a quotation made by Râmànuja from the
Drami/d/abhâshyakâra[13].
Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the
cause; a Vedânta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the
Vai/s/eshikas according to whom the effect is something different from
the cause.--The divergent views of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja on this
important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch
of the two systems.
Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages
insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it
follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of
evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise
Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sûtrakîra
remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e.
other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being
distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sûtras
constituting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/a@nkara on the one hand
and Râmânuja on the other is characteristic. Râmânuja throughout simply
follows the words of the Sûtras, of which Sûtra 21 formulates the
objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sûtra 22 replies
that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly
declared by Scripture. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself
obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in
Sûtra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting
adjuncts.
Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material
and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by
their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by
itself turns into curds.
Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of
Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world,
and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and
undivided. This is possible, according to /S/a@nkara, because the world
is unreal; according to Râmânuja, because the creation is merely the
visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman
in a subtle imperceptible condition.
Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of
instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the
manifold powers which it possesses.
Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly
expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in
the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.
Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and
cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of
position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal
suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a
view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted
from all eternity.
Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that
all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to
capacitate it for the creation of the world.