The rumors concerning the demise of maritime piracy
back in the 19th century were a tad premature. The
scourge has so resurged that the International Maritime
Board (IMB), founded by the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) in 1981, is forced to broadcast daily
piracy reports to all shipping companies by satellite from
its Kuala Lumpur Piracy Reporting Center, established in
1992 and partly funded by maritime insurers. The reports
carry this alarming disclaimer:
"For statistical purposes, the IMB defines piracy and
armed robbery as: An act of boarding or attempting to
board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or
any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability
to use force in the furtherance of that act. This definition
thus covers actual or attempted attacks whether the ship is
berthed, at anchor or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded,
unless the thieves are armed".
The 1994 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea defines piracy as "any illegal acts of violence or
detention, or any act of depredation, committed by
individuals (borne aboard a pirate vessel) for private ends
against a private ship or aircraft (the victim vessel)".
When no "pirate vessel" is involved - for instance, when
criminals embark on a ship and capture it - the legal term
is hijacking.
On July 8, 2002 seven pirates, armed with long knives
attacked an officer of a cargo ship berthed in Chittagong
port in Bangladesh, snatched his gold chain and watch and
dislocated his arm. This was the third such attack since the
ship dropped anchor in this minacious port.
Three days earlier, in Indonesia, similarly-armed pirates
escaped with the crew's valuables, having tied the hands
of the duty officer. Pirates in small boats stole anodes
from the stern of a bulk carrier in Bangladesh. Others, in
Indonesia, absconded with a life raft.
The pirates of Guyana are either unlucky or untrained.
They were consistently scared off by flares hurled at them
and alarms set by vigilant hands on deck. A Colombian
band, riding a high speed boat, attempted to board a
container ship. Warring parties in Somalia hijacked yet
another ship in June 2002.
A particularly egregious case - and signs of growing
sophistication and coordinated action - is described in the
July 1-8, 2002 report of the IMB:
"Six armed pirates boarded a chemical tanker from a
small boat and stole ship's stores. Another group of pirates
broke in to engine room and stole spare parts. Thefts took
place in spite of the ship engaging three shore security
watchmen." Piracy incidents have been reported in India,
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, the Red Sea,
the Gulf of Aden, Nigeria, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela.
According to the ICC Year 2001 Piracy Report, more than
330 attacks on seafaring vessels were reported in 2001 -
down by a quarter compared to 2000 but 10 percent
higher than 1999 and four times the 1991 figure. Piracy
rose 40 percent between 1998 and 1999 alone.
Sixteen ships - double the number in 2000 - were captured
and taken over in 2001. Eighty seven attacks were
reported during the first quarter of 2002 - up from 68 in
the corresponding period the year before. Seven of these
were hijackings - compared to only 1 in the first quarter of
2001. Nine of every 10 hijacked ships are ultimately
recovered, often with the help of the IMB.
Many masters and shipowners do not report piracy for
fear of delays due to protracted investigations, increased
insurance premiums, bad publicity, and stifling red tape.
The number of unreported attacks in 1999 was estimated
by the World Maritime Piracy Report to be 130.
According to "The Economist", the IMO believes that half
of all incidents remain untold. Still, increased patrols and
international collaboration among law enforcement
agencies dented the clear upward trend in maritime crime
- even in the piracy capital, Indonesia.
The number of incidents in the pirate-infested Malacca
Straits dropped from 75 in 2000 to 17 in 2001 - though the
number of crew "kidnap and ransom" operations,
especially in Aceh, has increased. Owners usually pay the
"reasonable" amounts demanded - c. $100,000 per ship.
Contrary to folklore, most ships are attacked while at
anchor.
Twenty one people, including passengers, were killed in
2001 - and 210 taken hostage. Assaults involving guns
were up 50 percent to 73 - those involving mere knives
down by a quarter to 105. Piracy seems to ebb and flow
with the business cycles of the host economies. The Asian
crisis, triggered by the freefall of the Thai baht in 1997-8,
gave a boost to East Asian maritime robbers. So did the
debt crises of Latin America a decade earlier. Drug
transporters - armed with light aircraft and high speed
motorboats - sometimes double as pirates during the dry
season of crop growth.
Pirates endanger ship and crew. But they often cause
collateral damage as well. Pirates have been known to
dump noxious cargo into the sea, or tie up the crew and let
an oil tanker steam ahead, its navigational aides smashed,
or tamper with substances dangerous to themselves and to
others, or cast crew and passengers adrift in tiny rafts with
little food and water.
Many shipowners resorted to installing on-board satellite
tracking systems, such as Shiploc, and aircraft-like "black
boxes". A bulletproof life vest, replete with an integral
jagged edged knife, was on display in the millennium
exhibition at the Millennium Dome two years ago. The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is considering
to compel shipowners to tag their vessels with visibly
embossed numbers in compliance with the Safety of Life
at Sea Convention.
The IMB also advises shipping companies to closely
examine the papers of crew and masters, thousands of
whom carry forged documents. In 54 maritime
administrations surveyed in 2001 by the Seafarers'
International Research Centre, Cardiff University in
Wales, more than 12,000 cases of forged certificates of
competency were unearthed.
Many issuing authorities are either careless or venal or
both. The IMB accused the Coast Guard Office of Puerto
Rico for issuing 500 such "suspicious" certificates. The
Chinese customs and navy - especially along the southern
coast - have often been decried for working hand in glove
with pirates.
False documents are an integral - and crucial - part of
maritime piracy. The IMB says:
"Many of the phantom ships that set off to sea with a
cargo and then disappear are sailed by crewmen with false
passports and competency certificates. They usually
escape detection by the port authorities. In a recent case of
a vessel located and arrested in South-East Asia further to
IMB investigations, it has emerged that all the senior
officers had false passports. The ship's registry documents
were also false".
As documents go electronic and integrated in proprietary
or common cargo tracking systems, such forgery will
wane. Bolero - an international digital bill of lading ledger
- is backed by the European Union, banks, shipping and
insurance companies. The IMO is a proponent of a
technology to apply encrypted "digital signatures" to
electronic bills of lading. Still, the industry is highly
fragmented and many ships and ports don't even possess
rudimentary information technology. The protection
afforded by the likes of Bolero is at least five years away.
Pirates sometimes work hand in hand with conspiring
crew members (or, less often, stowaways). In many
countries - in East Asia, Latin America, and Africa -
Coast Guard operatives, corrupt drug agents, and other
law enforcement officials, moonlight as pirates. Renegade
members of British trained Indonesian anti-piracy squads
are still roaming the Malacca Straits.
Pirates also enjoy the support of an insidious and vast
network of suborned judges and bureaucrats. Local
villagers along the coasts of Indonesia and Malaysia - and
Africa - welcome pirate business and provide the
perpetrators with food and shelter.
Moreover, large tankers, container ships, and cargo
vessels are largely computerized and their crew members
few. The value of an average vessel's freight has increased
dramatically with improvements in container and oil
storage technologies. "Flag of convenience" registration
has assumed monstrous proportions, allowing ship owners
and managers to conceal their identity effectively. Belize,
Honduras, and Panama are the most notorious, no
questions asked, havens.
Piracy has matured into a branch of organized crime.
Hijacking requires money, equipment, weapons, planning,
experience and contacts with corrupt officials. The loot
per vessel ranges from $8 million to $200 million.
Pottengal Mukundan, Director of ICC's Commercial
Crime Services states in an IMB press release:
"(Piracy) typically involves a mother ship from which to
launch the attacks, a supply of automatic weapons, false
identity papers for the crew and vessel, fake cargo
documents, and a broker network to sell the stolen goods
illegally. Individual pirates don't have these resources.
Hijackings are the work of organized crime rings".
The IMB describes the aftermath of a typical hijacking:
"The Global Mars has probably been given a new name
and repainted. Armed with false registration papers and
bills of lading, the pirates - or more likely the mafia
bosses pulling the strings - will then try to dispose of their
booty. The vessel has probably put in to a port where the
false identity of vessel and cargo may escape detection.
Even when identified, the gangs have been known to bribe
local officials to allow them to sell the cargo and leave the
port".
Such a ship is often "recycled" a few times. It earns its
operators an average of $40-50 million per "cycle",
according to "The Economist". The pirates contract with
sellers or shipping agents to load it with a legitimate
consignment of goods or commodities. The sellers and
agents are unaware of the true identity of the ship, or of its
unsavory "owners/managers".
The pirates invariably produce an authentic vessel
registration certificate that they acquired from crooked
officials - and provide the sellers or agents with a bill of
lading. The payload is then sold to networks of traders in
stolen merchandise or to gullible buyers in a different port
of destination - and the ship is ready for yet another
round.
In January 2002, the Indonesian Navy has permanently
stationed six battleships in the Malacca Straits, three of
them off the coast of the secessionist region of Aceh. A
further 20-30 ships and 10 aircraft conduct daily patrols of
the treacherous traffic lane. Some 200-600 ships cross the
Straits daily. A mere 50 ships or so are boarded and
searched every month.
The Greek government has gunboats patrolling the 2
miles wide Corfu Channel, where yachts frequently fall
prey to Albanian pirates. Brazil has imposed an unpopular
anti-piracy inspection fee on berthing vessels and used the
proceeds to finance a SWAT team to protect ships and
their crews while in port. Both India and Thailand have
similar units.
International cooperation is also on the rise. About one
third of the world's shipping traffic goes through the
South China Sea. A conference convened by Japan in
March 2000 - Japanese vessels have become favored
targets of piracy in the last few years - pushed for the
ratification of the International Maritime Organisation's
(IMO) 1988 Rome Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
by Asian and ASEAN countries.
The Convention makes piracy an extraterritorial crime
and, thus, removes the thorny issue of jurisdiction in cases
of piracy carried in another country's territorial waters or
out on the high seas. The Comite Maritime International -
the umbrella organization of national maritime law
associations - promulgated a model anti-piracy law last
year.
Though it rejected Japan's offer for collaboration, in a
sharp reversal of its previous policy, China started
handing down death sentences against murderous pirates.
The 13 marauders who seized the Cheung Son and
massacred its 23 Chinese sailors were executed five years
ago in the southern city of Shanwei. Another 25 people
received long prison sentences. The - declared - booty
amounted to a mere $300,000.
India and Iran - two emerging "pirates safe harbor"
destinations - have also tightened up sentencing and port
inspections. In the Alondra Rainbow hijacking, the Indian
Navy captured the Indonesian culprits in a cinematic
chase off Goa. They were later sentenced severely under
both the Indian Penal Code and international law. Even
the junta in Myanmar has taken tentative steps against
compatriots with piratical predilections.
Law enforcement does not tolerate a vacuum. "The
Economist" reports about two private military companies
- Marine Risk Management and Satellite Protection
Services (SPS) - which deploy airborne mercenaries to
deal with piracy. SPS has even suggested to station 2500
former Dutch marines in Subic Bay in the Philippines -
for a mere $2500 per day per combatant.
Shipowners are desperate. Quoted by "The Economist",
they "suggest that the region's governments negotiate the
right for navies to chase pirates across national
boundaries: the so-called 'right of hot pursuit'. So far, only
Singapore and Indonesia have negotiated limited rights.
Some suggest that the American navy should be invited
into territorial waters to combat piracy, a 'live' exercise it
might relish. At the very least, countries such as Indonesia
should advertise which bits of their territorial waters at
any time are patrolled and safe from pirates. No countries
currently do this".