X. The Shadowy World of International Finance

Strange, penumbral, characters roam the boardrooms of

banks in the countries in transition. Some of them pop

apparently from nowhere, others are very well connected

and equipped with the most excellent introductions. They

all peddle financial transactions which are too good to be

true and often are. In the unctuously perfumed propinquity

of their Mercedesed, Rolex waving entourage - the

polydipsic natives dissolve in their irresistible charm and

the temptations of the cash: mountainous returns on

capital, effulgent profits, no collaterals, track record, or

business plan required. Total security is cloyingly assured.

These Fausts roughly belong to four tribes:

The Shoppers

These are the shabby operators of the marginal shadows

of the world of finance. They broker financial deals with

meretricious sweat only to be rewarded their meagre,

humiliated fees. Most of their deals do not materialize.

The principle is very simple:

They approach a bank, a financial institution, or a

borrower and say: "We are connected to banks or

financial institutions in the West. We can bring you

money in the form of credits. But to do that - you must

first express interest in getting this money. You must

furnish us with a bank guarantee / promissory note / letter

of intent that indicates that you desire the credit and that

you are willing to provide a liquid financial instrument to

back it up.". Having obtained such instruments, the

shoppers begin to "shop around". They approach banks

and financial institutions (usually, in the West). This time,

they reverse their text: "We have an excellent client, a

good borrower. Are you willing to lend to it?" An

informal process of tendering ensues. Sometimes it ends

in a transaction and the shopper collects a small

commission (between one quarter of a percentage point

and two percentage points - depending on the amount).

Mostly it doesn't -and the Flying Dutchman resumes his

wanderings looking for more venal gulosity and less legal

probity.

The Con-Men

These are crooks who set up elaborate schemes ("sting

operations") to extract money from unsuspecting people

and financial institutions. They establish "front" or

"phantom" firms and offices throughout the world. They

tempt the gullible by offering them enormous, immediate,

tax-free, effort-free, profits. They let the victims profit in

the first round or two of the scam. Then, they sting: the

victims invest money and it evaporates together with the

dishonest operators. The "offices" are deserted, the fake

identities, the forged bank references, the falsified

guarantees are all exposed (often with the help of an

inside informant).

Probably the most famous and enduring scam is the

"Nigerian-type Connection". Letters - allegedly composed

by very influential and highly placed officials - are sent

out to unsuspecting businessmen. The latter are asked to

make their bank accounts available to the former, who

profess to need the third party bank accounts through

which to funnel the sweet fruits of corruption. The

account owners are promised huge financial rewards if

they collaborate and if they bear some minor-by-

comparison upfront costs. The con-men pocket these

"expenses" and vanish. Sometimes, they even empty the

accounts of their entire balance as they evaporate.

The Launderers

A lot of cash goes undeclared to tax authorities in

countries in transition. The informal economy (the

daughter of both criminal and legitimate parents)

comprises between 15% (Slovenia) and 50% (Russia,

Macedonia) of the official one. Some say these figures are

a deliberate and ferocious understatement. These are mind

boggling amounts, which circulate between financial

centres and off shore havens in the world: Cyprus, the

Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein (Vaduz), Panama and

dozens of aspiring laundrettes.

The money thus smuggled is kept in low-yielding cash

deposits. To escape the cruel fate of inflationary

corrosion, it has to be reinvested. It is stealthily re-

introduced to the very economy that it so sought to evade,

in the form of investment capital or other financial assets

(loans and credits). Its anxious owners are preoccupied

with legitimising their stillborn cash through the conduit

of tax-fearing enterprises, or with lending it to same. The

emphasis is on the word: "legitimate". The money surges

in through mysterious and anonymous foreign

corporations, via off-shore banking centres, even through

respectable financial institutions (the Bank of New York

we mentioned?). It is easy to recognize a laundering

operation. Its hallmark is a pronounced lack of selectivity.

The money is invested in anything and everything, as long

as it appears legitimate. Diversification is not sought by

these nouveau tycoons and they have no core investment

strategy. They spread their illicit funds among dozens of

disparate economic activities and show not the slightest

interest in the putative yields on their investments, the

maturity of their assets, the quality of their newly acquired

businesses, their history, or real value. Never the

sedulous, they pay exorbitantly for all manner of

prestidigital endeavours. The future prospects and other

normal investment criteria are beyond them. All they are

after is a mirage of lapidarity.

The Investors

This is the most intriguing group. Normative, law abiding,

businessmen, who stumbled across methods to secure

excessive yields on their capital and are looking to borrow

their way into increasing it. By cleverly participating in

bond tenders, by devising ingenious option strategies, or

by arbitraging - yields of up to 300% can be collected in

the immature markets of transition without the normally

associated risks. This sub-species can be found mainly in

Russia and in the Balkans.

Its members often buy sovereign bonds and notes at

discounts of up to 80% of their face value. Russian

obligations could be had for less in August 1998 and

Macedonian ones during the Kosovo crisis. In cahoots

with the issuing country's central bank, they then convert

the obligations to local currency at par (for 100% of their

face value). The difference makes, needless to add, for an

immediate and hefty profit, yet it is in (often worthless

and vicissitudinal) local currency. The latter is then

hurriedly disposed of (at a discount) and sold to

multinationals with operations in the country of issue,

which are in need of local tender. This fast becomes an

almost addictive avocation.

Intoxicated by this pecuniary nectar, the fortunate, those

privy to the secret, try to raise more capital by hunting for

financial instruments they can convert to cash in Western

banks. A bank guarantee, a promissory note, a confirmed

letter of credit, a note or a bond guaranteed by the Central

Bank - all will do as deposited collateral against which a

credit line is established and cash is drawn. The cash is

then invested in a new cycle of inebriation to yield

fantastic profits.

It is easy to identify these "investors". They eagerly seek

financial instruments from almost any local bank, no

matter how suspect. They offer to pay for these coveted

documents (bank guarantees, bankers' acceptances, letters

of credit) either in cash or by lending to the bank's clients

and this within a month or more from the date of their

issuance. They agree to "cancel" the locally issued

financial instruments by offering a "counter-financial-

instrument" (safe keeping receipt, contra-guarantee,

counter promissory note, etc.). This "counter-instrument"

is issued by the very Prime World or European Bank in

which the locally issued financial instruments are

deposited as collateral.

The Investors invariably confidently claim that the

financial instrument issued by the local bank will never be

presented or used (which is true) and that this is a risk free

transaction (which is not entirely so). If they are forced to

lend to the bank's clients, they often ignore the quality of

the credit takers, the yields, the maturities and other

considerations which normally tend to interest lenders

very much.

Whether a financial instrument cancelled by another is

still valid, presentable and should be honoured by its

issuer is still debated. In some cases it is clearly so. If

something goes horribly (and rarely, admittedly) wrong

with these transactions - the local bank stands to suffer,

too.

It all boils down to a terrible hunger, the kind of thirst that

can be quelled only by the denominated liquidity of lucre.

In the post nuclear landscape of this part of the world, a

fantasy is shared by both predators and prey. Circling

each other in marble temples, they switch their roles in

dizzying progression. Tycoons and politicians,

industrialists and bureaucrats all vie for the attention of

Mammon. The shifting coalitions of well groomed man in

back stabbed suits, an hallucinatory carousel of avarice

and guile. But every circus folds and every Luna park is

destined to shut down. The dying music, the frozen

accounts of the deceived, the bankrupt banks, the Jurassic

Park of skeletal industrial beasts - a muted testimony to a

wild age of mutual assured destruction and self deceit.

The future of Eastern and South Europe. The present of

Russia, Albania and Yugoslavia.

Financial Crime and Corruption · 第 16 / 74 题