And if in sentient bodies, although the qualities of outward objects do
move the organs of sense, and the passion of the body goeth before the
vigour of the active mind, provoking her action to itself and exciting
the inward forms which before lay quiet; if, I say, in perceiving these
corporal objects the mind taketh not her impression from passion, but by
her own force judgeth of the passion itself, which is objected to the
body; how much more do those powers exercise the action of their mind
and not only follow the outward objects in their judgment, which are
free from all affections of the body? Wherefore in this sort have
diverse and different substances knowledges of many kinds. For only
sense destitute of all other means of knowledge is in those living
creatures which are unmovable, as some shell-fish and other which stick
to stones and so are nourished; and imagination in movable beasts who
seem to have some power to covet and fly. But reason belongeth only to
mankind, as understanding to things divine. So that that knowledge is
most excellent which of itself doth not only know her own object, but
also those which belong to others. What then, if sense and imagination
repugn to discourse and reason, affirming that universality to be
nothing which reason thinketh herself to see? For that cannot be
universal, they argue, which is either sensible or imaginable; wherefore
either the judgment of reason must be true and nothing at all sensible,
or because they know that many things are subject to the senses and
imagination, the conceit of reason is vain, which considereth that which
is sensible and singular as if it were universal. Moreover if reason
should answer that she beholdeth in her universality all that which is
sensible or imaginable, but they cannot aspire to the knowledge of
universality, because their knowledge cannot surpass corporal figures
and shapes, and that we must give more credit to the firmer and more
perfect judgment about the knowledge of things, in this contention
should not we, who have the power of discoursing as well as of
imagination and sense, rather take reason's part? The very like
happeneth when human reason doth not think that the divine understanding
doth behold future things otherwise than she herself doth. For thus thou
arguest: If any things seem not to have certain and necessary events,
they cannot be certainly foreknown to be to come. Wherefore there is no
foreknowledge of these things, and if we think that there is any, there
shall be nothing which happeneth not of necessity. If, therefore, as we
are endued with reason, we could likewise have the judgment proper to
the divine mind, as we have judged that imagination and sense must yield
to reason, so likewise we would think it most reasonable and just that
human reason should submit herself to the divine mind. Wherefore let us
be lifted up as much as we can to that height of the highest mind; for
there reason shall see that which she cannot behold in herself. And that
is, how a certain and definite foreknowledge seeth even those things
which have no certain issue, and that this is no opinion, but rather the
simplicity of the highest knowledge enclosed within no bounds.