"I observe it," quoth I, "and I acknowledge it to be as thou sayest. But
in this rank of coherent causes, have we any free-will, or doth the
fatal chain fasten also the motions of men's minds?" "We have," quoth
she, "for there can be no reasonable nature, unless it be endued with
free-will. For that which naturally hath the use of reason hath also
judgment by which it can discern of everything by itself, wherefore of
itself it distinguished betwixt those things which are to be avoided,
and those which are to be desired. Now every one seeketh for that which
he thinketh is to be desired, and escheweth that which in his judgment
is to be avoided. Wherefore, they which have reason in themselves have
freedom to will and nill. But yet I consider not this equal in all. For
the supreme and divine substances have both a perspicuous judgment and
an uncorrupted will, and an effectual power to obtain their desires. But
the minds of men must needs be more free when they conserve themselves
in the contemplation of God, and less when they come to their bodies,
and yet less when they are bound with earthly fetters. But their
greatest bondage is when, giving themselves to vices, they lose
possession of their own reason. For, having cast their eyes from the
light of the sovereign truth to inferior obscurities, forthwith they are
blinded with the cloud of ignorance, molested with hurtful affections,
by yielding and consenting to which they increase the bondage which they
laid upon themselves, and are, after a certain manner, captives by their
own freedom. Which notwithstanding that foresight of Providence which
beholdeth all things from eternity, foreseeth, and by predestination
disposeth of everything by their merits.