III.

Seest thou then in what mire wickedness wallows, and how clearly honesty

shineth? By which it is manifest that the good are never without

rewards, nor the evil without punishments. For in all things that are

done that for which anything is done may deservedly seem the reward of

that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crown for which he

runneth is proposed as a reward. But we have showed that blessedness is

the selfsame goodness for which all things are done. Wherefore this

goodness is proposed as a common reward for all human actions, and this

cannot be separated from those who are good. For he shall not rightly be

any longer called good, who wanteth goodness; wherefore virtuous manners

are not left without their due rewards. And how much so ever the evil do

rage, yet the wise man's crown will not fade nor wither. For others'

wickedness depriveth not virtuous minds of their proper glory. But if he

should rejoice at anything which he hath from others, either he who gave

it, or any other might take it away. But because every man's virtue is

the cause of it, then only he shall want his reward when he leaveth to

be virtuous. Lastly, since every reward is therefore desired because it

is thought to be good, who can judge him to be devoid of reward, which

hath goodness for his possession? But what reward hath he? The most

beautiful and the greatest that can be. For remember that

_corollarium_ [147] which I presented thee with a little before, as

with a rare and precious jewel, and infer thus: Since that goodness

itself is happiness, it is manifest that all good men even by being good

are made happy. But we agreed that happy men are gods. Wherefore the

reward of good men, which no time can waste, no man's power diminish, no

man's wickedness obscure, is to become gods. Which things being so, no

wise man can any way doubt of the inseparable punishment of the evil.

For since goodness and evil, punishment and reward, are opposite the one

to the other, those things which we see fall out in the reward of

goodness must needs be answerable in a contrary manner in the punishment

of evil. Wherefore as to honest men honesty itself is a reward, so to

the wicked their very wickedness is a punishment. And he that is

punished doubteth not but that he is afflicted with the evil. Wherefore

if they would truly consider their own estate, can they think themselves

free from punishment, whom wickedness, the worst of all evils, doth not

only touch but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment which

accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the virtuous.

For thou learnedst not long before that whatsoever is at all is one, and

that unity is goodness, by which it followeth that whatsoever is must

also be good. And in this manner, whatsoever falleth from goodness

ceaseth to be, by which it followeth that evil men leave to be that

which they were, but the shape of men, which they still retain, showeth

them to have been men: wherefore by embracing wickedness they have lost

the nature of men. But since virtue alone can exalt us above men,

wickedness must needs cast those under the desert of men, which it hath

bereaved of that condition. Wherefore thou canst not account him a man

whom thou seest transformed by vices. Is the violent extorter of other

men's goods carried away with his covetous desire? Thou mayest liken him

to a wolf. Is the angry and unquiet man always contending and brawling?

Thou mayest compare him to a dog. Doth the treacherous fellow rejoice

that he hath deceived others with his hidden frauds? Let him be

accounted no better than a fox. Doth the outrageous fret and fume? Let

him be thought to have a lion's mind. Is the fearful and timorous afraid

without cause? Let him be esteemed like to hares and deer. Is the slow

and stupid always idle? He liveth an ass's life. Doth the light and

unconstant change his courses? He is nothing different from the birds.

Is he drowned in filthy and unclean lusts? He is entangled in the

pleasure of a stinking sow. So that he who, leaving virtue, ceaseth to

be a man, since he cannot be partaker of the divine condition, is turned

into a beast.

[147] _Vide supra, p. 270._

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