HOW SUBSTANCES CAN BE GOOD IN VIRTUE OF THEIR EXISTENCE WITHOUT BEING
ABSOLUTE GOODS
You ask me to state and explain somewhat more clearly that obscure
question in my _Hebdomads_[32] concerning the manner in which
substances can be good in virtue of existence without being absolute
goods.[33] You urge that this demonstration is necessary because the
method of this kind of treatise is not clear to all. I can bear witness
with what eagerness you have already attacked the subject. But I confess
I like to expound my _Hebdomads_ to myself, and would rather bury
my speculations in my own memory than share them with any of those pert
and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is
made amusing. Wherefore do not you take objection to the obscurity that
waits on brevity; for obscurity is the sure treasure-house of secret
doctrine and has the further advantage that it speaks a language
understood only of those who deserve to understand. I have therefore
followed the example of the mathematical[34] and cognate sciences and
laid down bounds and rules according to which I shall develop all that
follows.
I. A common conception is a statement generally accepted as soon as it
is made. Of these there are two kinds. One is universally intelligible;
as, for instance, "if equals be taken from equals the remainders are
equal." Nobody who grasps that proposition will deny it. The other kind
is intelligible only to the learned, but it is derived from the same
class of common conceptions; as "Incorporeals cannot occupy space," and
the like. This is obvious to the learned but not to the common herd.
II. Being and a concrete thing[35] are different. Simple Being awaits
manifestation, but a thing is and exists[36] as soon as it has received
the form which gives it Being.
III. A concrete thing can participate in something else; but absolute
Being can in no wise participate in anything. For participation is
effected when a thing already is; but it is something after it has
acquired Being.
IV. That which exists can possess something besides itself. But absolute
Being has no admixture of aught besides Itself.
V. Merely to be something and to be something absolutely are different;
the former implies accidents, the latter connotes a substance.
VI. Everything that is participates in absolute Being[37] through the
fact that it exists. In order to be something it participates in
something else. Hence that which exists participates in absolute Being
through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate
in something else.
VII. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its
particular Being.
VIII. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one
and the same.
IX. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something
outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it
seeks.
These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose. The intelligent
interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to
each point.
Now the problem is this. Things which are, are good. For all the learned
are agreed that every existing thing tends to good and everything tends
to its like. Therefore things which tend to good are good. We must,
however, inquire how they are good--by participation or by substance. If
by participation, they are in no wise good in themselves; for a thing
which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by
virtue of absolute Being. So with all other qualities. If then they are
good by participation, they are not good in themselves; therefore they
do not tend to good. But we have agreed that they do. Therefore they are
good not by participation but by substance. But those things whose
substance is good are substantially good. But they owe their actual
Being to absolute Being. Their absolute Being therefore is good;
therefore the absolute Being of all things is good. But if their Being
is good, things which exist are good through the fact that they exist
and their absolute Being is the same as that of the Good. Therefore they
are substantial goods, since they do not merely participate in goodness.
But if their absolute Being is good, there is no doubt but that, since
they are substantial goods, they are like the First Good and therefore
they will have to be that Good. For nothing is like It save Itself.
Hence all things that are, are God--an impious assertion. Wherefore
things are not substantial goods, and so the essence of the Good does
not reside in them. Therefore they are not good through the fact that
they exist. But neither do they receive good by participation, for they
would in no wise tend to good. Therefore they are in no wise good.[38]
This problem admits of the following solution.[39] There are many things
which can be separated by a mental process, though they cannot be
separated in fact. No one, for instance, can actually separate a
triangle or other mathematical figure from the underlying matter; but
mentally one can consider a triangle and its properties apart from
matter. Let us, therefore, remove from our minds for a moment the
presence of the Prime Good, whose Being is admitted by the universal
consensus of learned and unlearned opinion and can be deduced from the
religious beliefs of savage races. The Prime Good having been thus for a
moment put aside, let us postulate as good all things that are, and let
us consider how they could possibly be good if they did not derive from
the Prime Good. This process leads me to perceive that their Goodness
and their existence are two different things. For let me suppose that
one and the same substance is good, white, heavy, and round. Then it
must be admitted that its substance, roundness, colour, and goodness are
all different things. For if each of these qualities were the same as
its substance, weight would be the same thing as colour or goodness, and
goodness would be the same as colour; which is contrary to nature. Their
Being then in that case would be one thing, their quality another, and
they would be good, but they would not have their absolute Being good.
Therefore if they really existed at all, they would not be from good nor
good, they would not be the same as good, but Being and Goodness would
be for them two different things. But if they were nothing else but good
substances, and were neither heavy, nor coloured, and possessed neither
spatial dimension nor quality, beyond that of goodness, they (or rather
it) would seem to be not things but the principle of things. For there
is one thing alone that is by nature good to the exclusion of every
other quality. But since they are not simple, they could not even exist
at all unless that which is the one sole Good willed them to be. They
are called good simply because their Being is derived from the Will of
the Good. For the Prime Good is essentially good in virtue of Being; the
secondary good is in its turn good because it derives from the good
whose absolute Being is good. But the absolute Being of all things
derives from the Prime Good which is such that of It Being and Goodness
are rightly predicated as identical. Their absolute Being therefore is
good; for thereby it resides in Him.
Thereby the problem is solved. For though things be good through the
fact that they exist, they are not like the Prime Good, for the simple
reason that their absolute Being is not good under all circumstances,
but that things can have no absolute Being unless it derive from the
Prime Being, that is, the Prime Good; their substance, therefore, is
good, and yet it is not like that from which it comes. For the Prime
Good is good through the fact that it exists, irrespective of all
conditions, for it is nothing else than good; but the second good if it
derived from any other source might be good, but could not be good
through the fact that it exists. For in that case it might possibly
participate in good, but their substantial Being, not deriving from the
Prime Good, could not have the element of good. Therefore when we have
put out of mind the Prime Good, these things, though they might be good,
would not be good through the fact that they exist, and since they could
not actually exist unless the true good had produced them, therefore
their Being is good, and yet that which springs from the substantial
Good is not like its source which produces it. And unless they had
derived from it, though they were good yet they could not be good
through the fact that they exist because they were apart from good and
not derived from good, since that very good is the Prime Good and is
substantial Being and substantial Good and essential Goodness. But we
need not say that white things are white through the fact that they
exist; for they drew their existence from the will of God, but not their
whiteness. For to be is one thing; to be white is another; and that
because He who gave them Being is good, but not white. It is therefore
in accordance with the will of the Good that they should be good through
the fact that they exist; but it is not in accordance with the will of
one who is not white that a thing have a certain property making it
white in virtue of its Being; for it was not the will of One who is
white that gave them Being. And so they are white simply because One who
was not white willed them to be white; but they are good through the
fact that they exist because One who was good willed them to be good.
Ought, then, by parity of reason, all things to be just because He is
just who willed them to be? That is not so either. For to be good
involves Being, to be just involves an act. For Him being and action are
identical; to be good and to be just are one and the same for Him. But
being and action are not identical for us, for we are not simple. For
us, then, goodness is not the same thing as justice, but we all have the
same sort of Being in virtue of our existence. Therefore all things are
good, but all things are not just. Finally, good is a general, but just
is a species, and this species does not apply to all. Wherefore some
things are just, others are something else, but all things are good.
[32] Similarly Porphyry divided the works of Plotinus into six
_Enneades_ or groups of nine.
[33] Cf. discussion on the nature of good in _Cons._ iii. m. 10 and pr.
11 (_infra_, pp. 274 ff.).
[34] On this mathematical method of exposition cf. _Cons._ iii. pr. 10
(_infra_, p. 270).
[35] _Esse_ = Aristotle's [Greek: to ti esti]; _id quod est_ = [Greek:
tode ti].
[36] _Consistere_ = [Greek: hypostaenai].
[37] _Id quod est esse_ = [Greek: to ti aen einai].
[38] Cf. the similar _reductio ad absurdum_ in _Tr._ 5 (_infra_, p. 98)
and in _Cons._ v. pr. 3 (_infra_, p. 374).
[39] _Vide supra_, p. 6, n. _b_.