We will now begin a careful consideration of each several point, as far
as they can be grasped and understood; for it has been wisely said,[12]
in my opinion, that it is a scholar's duty to formulate his belief about
anything according to its real nature.
Speculative Science may be divided into three kinds[13]: Physics,
Mathematics, and Theology. Physics deals with motion and is not abstract
or separable (i.e. [Greek: anupexairetos]); for it is concerned with the
forms of bodies together with their constituent matter, which forms
cannot be separated in reality from their bodies.[14] As the bodies are
in motion--the earth, for instance, tending downwards, and fire tending
upwards, form takes on the movement of the particular thing to which it
is annexed.
Mathematics does not deal with motion and is not abstract, for it
investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, and therefore apart from
movement, which forms, however, being connected with matter cannot be
really separated from bodies.
Theology does not deal with motion and is abstract and separable, for
the Divine Substance is without either matter or motion. In Physics,
then, we are bound to use scientific, in Mathematics, systematical, in
Theology, intellectual concepts; and in Theology we will not let
ourselves be diverted to play with imaginations, but will simply
apprehend that Form which is pure form and no image, which is very Being
and the source of Being. For everything owes its being to Form. Thus a
statue is not a statue on account of the brass which is its matter, but
on account of the form whereby the likeness of a living thing is
impressed upon it: the brass itself is not brass because of the earth
which is its matter, but because of its form. Likewise earth is not
earth by reason of unqualified matter,[15] but by reason of dryness and
weight, which are forms. So nothing is said to be because it has matter,
but because it has a distinctive form. But the Divine Substance is Form
without matter, and is therefore One, and is its own essence. But other
things are not simply their own essences, for each thing has its being
from the things of which it is composed, that is, from its parts. It is
This _and_ That, i.e. it is the totality of its parts in
conjunction; it is not This _or_ That taken apart. Earthly man, for
instance, since he consists of soul and body, is soul _and_ body,
not soul _or_ body, separately; therefore he is not his own
essence. That on the other hand which does not consist of This and That,
but is only This, is really its own essence, and is altogether beautiful
and stable because it is not grounded in anything. Wherefore that is
truly One in which is no number, in which nothing is present except its
own essence. Nor can it become the substrate of anything, for it is pure
Form, and pure Forms cannot be substrates.[16] For if humanity, like
other forms, is a substrate for accidents, it does not receive accidents
through the fact that it exists, but through the fact that matter is
subjected to it. Humanity appears indeed to appropriate the accident
which in reality belongs to the matter underlying the conception
Humanity. But Form which is without matter cannot be a substrate, and
cannot have its essence in matter, else it would not be form but a
reflexion. For from those forms which are outside matter come the forms
which are in matter and produce bodies. We misname the entities that
reside in bodies when we call them forms; they are mere images; they
only resemble those forms which are not incorporate in matter. In Him,
then, is no difference, no plurality arising out of difference, no
multiplicity arising out of accidents, and accordingly no number.
[12] By Cicero (_Tusc_. v. 7. 19).
[13] Cf. the similar division of philosophy in _Isag. Porph_. ed. Brandt,
pp. 7 ff.
[14] _Sb_. though they may be separated in thought.
[15] [Greek: Apoios hulae] = [Greek: to amorphon, to aeides] of
Aristotle. Cf. [Greek: oute gar hulae to eidos (hae men apoios, to de
poiotaes tis) oute ex hulaes] (Alexander Aphrod. _De Anima_, 17. 17);
[Greek: ei de touto, apoios de hae hulae, apoion an eiae soma] (id. _De
anima libri mantissa_, 124. 7).
[16] This is Realism. Cf. "Sed si rerum ueritatem atque integritatem
perpendas, non est dubium quin uerae sint. Nam cum res omnes quae uerae
sunt sine his quinque (i.e. genus species differentia propria
accidentia) esse non possint, has ipsas quinque res uere intellectas
esse non dubites." _Isag., Porph. ed, pr._ i. (M. _P.L._ lxiv. col. 19,
Brandt, pp. 26 ff.). The two passages show that Boethius is definitely
committed to the Realistic position, although in his _Comment. in
Porphyr. a se translatum_ he holds the scales between Plato and
Aristotle, "quorum diiudicare sententias aptum esse non duxi" (cp.
Hauréau, _Hist. de la philosophie scolastique_, i. 120). As a fact in
the _Comment. in Porph._ he merely postpones the question, which in the
_De Trin._ he settles. Boethius was ridiculed in the Middle Ages for his
caution.