THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]: COMMERCE WARFARE
Interdiction of enemy trade has always been the great weapon of
sea power; and hence, though mines, submarines, and the menace
of the High Seas Fleet itself made a close blockade of the German
coast impossible, Great Britain in the World War steadily extended
her efforts to cut off Germany's intercourse with the overseas
world. Germany, on the other hand, while unwilling or unable to
take the risks of a contest for surface control of the sea, waged
cruiser warfare on British and Allied commerce, first by surface
vessels, and, when these were destroyed, by submarines. In the
policies adopted by each belligerent there is an evident analogy to
the British blockade and the French commerce destroying campaigns
of the Napoleonic Wars. And just as in the earlier conflict British
sea power impelled Napoleon to a ruinous struggle for the domination
of Europe, so in the World War, though in a somewhat different
fashion, the blockade worked disaster for Germany.
"The consequences of the blockade," writes the German General von
Freytag-Loringhoven, "showed themselves at once. Although we succeeded
in establishing our war economics by our internal strength, yet
the unfavorable state of the world economic situation was felt by
us throughout the war. That alone explains why our enemies found
ever fresh possibilities of resistance, because the sea stood open
to them, and why victories which would otherwise have been absolutely
decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, did not bring us
nearer peace."
For each group of belligerents, indeed, the enemy's commerce warfare
assumed a vital significance. "No German success on land," declares
the conservative British Annual Register for 1919, "could have
ruined or even very gravely injured the English-speaking powers.
The success of the submarine campaign, on the other hand, would
have left the United States isolated and have placed the Berlin
Government in a position to dominate most of the rest of the world."
"The war is won for us," declared General von Hindenburg on July 2,
1917, "if we can withstand the enemy attacks until the submarine
has done its work."
Commerce warfare at once involves a third party, the neutral; and
it therefore appears desirable, before tracing the progress of
this warfare, to outline briefly the principles of international
law which, by a slow and tortuous process, have grown up defining
the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents in naval war.
_Blockade_ is among the most fundamental of these rights accorded
to the belligerent, upon the conditions that the blockade shall be
limited to enemy ports or coasts, confined within specified limits,
and made so effective as to create evident danger to traffic. It
assumes control of the sea by the blockading navy, and, before the
days of mines and submarines, it was enforced by a cordon of ships
off the enemy coast. A blockade stops direct trade or intercourse
of any kind.
Whether or not a blockade is established, a belligerent has the
right to attempt the prevention of _trade in contraband_. A neutral
nation is under no obligation whatever to restrain its citizens from
engaging in this trade. In preventing it, however, a belligerent
warship may stop, visit, and search any merchant vessel on the
high seas. If examination of the ship's papers and search show
fraud, contraband cargo, offense in respect to blockade, enemy
ownership or service, the vessel may be taken as a prize, subject
to adjudication in the belligerent's prize courts. The right of
merchant vessels to carry defensive armament is well established;
but resistance justifies destruction. Under certain circumstances
prizes may be destroyed at sea, after removal of the ship's papers
and full provision for the safety of passengers and crew.
The Declaration of London,[1] drawn up in 1909, was an attempt to
restate and secure general acceptance of these principles, with
notable modifications. Lists were drawn up of _absolute_ contraband
(munitions, etc., adapted obviously if not exclusively for use in
war), _conditional_ contraband (including foodstuffs, clothing,
rolling stock, etc., susceptible of use in war but having non-warlike
uses as well), and free goods (including raw cotton and wool, hides,
and ores). The most significant provision of the Declaration was that
the doctrine of _continuous voyage_ should apply only to absolute
contraband. This doctrine, established by Great Britain in the
French wars and expanded by the United States in the American Civil
War, holds that the ultimate enemy destination of a cargo determines
its character, regardless of transshipment in a neutral port and
subsequent carriage by sea or land. The Declaration of London was
never ratified by Great Britain, and was observed for only a brief
period in the first months of the war. Had it been ratified and
observed, Germany would have been free to import all necessary
supplies, other than munitions, through neutral states on her frontiers.
[Footnote 1: Printed in full in INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS of the
U. S. Naval War College, 1910, p. 169 ff.]
_The Blockade of Germany_
Unable to establish a close blockade, and not venturing at once to
advance the idea of a "long range" blockade, England was nevertheless
able to impose severe restrictions upon Germany by extending the
lists of contraband, applying the doctrine of continuous voyage
to both absolute and conditional contraband, and throwing upon the
owners of cargoes the burden of proof as to destination. Cotton
still for a time entered Germany, and some exports were permitted.
But on March 1, 1915, in retaliation for Germany's declaration
of a "war area" around the British Isles, Great Britain asserted
her purpose to establish what amounted to a complete embargo on
German trade, holding herself free, in the words of Premier Asquith,
"to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed
enemy destination, ownership, or origin." In a note of protest on
March 30, the United States virtually recognized the legitimacy of a
long-range blockade--an innovation of seemingly wide possibilities--and
confined its objections to British interference with lawful trade
between neutrals, amounting in effect to a blockade of neutral
ports.
As a matter of fact, in spite of British efforts, there had been an
immense increase of indirect trade with Germany through neutrals.
While American exports to Germany in 1915 were $154,000,000 less
than in 1913, and in fact practically ceased altogether, American
exports to Holland and the Scandinavian states increased by
$158,000,000. This trade continued up to the time when the United
States entered the war, after which all the restrictions which
England had employed were given a sharper application. By a simple
process of substitution, European neutrals had been able to import
commodities for home use, and export their own products to Germany.
Now, in order to secure supplies at all, they were forced to sign
agreements which put them on rations and gave the Western Powers
complete control of their exports to Germany.
The effect of the Allied blockade upon Germany is suggested by the
accompanying chart. In the later stages of the war it created a
dearth of important raw materials, crippled war industries, brought
the country to the verge of starvation, and caused a marked lowering
of national efficiency and morale.
Germany protested vigorously to the United States for allowing
her foodstuffs to be shut out of Germany while at the same time
shipping to England vast quantities of munitions. Throughout the
controversy, however, Great Britain profited by the fact that while
her methods caused only financial injury to neutrals, those employed
by Germany destroyed or imperiled human lives.
_The Submarine Campaign_
[Illustration: From _The Blockade of Germany_, Alonzo E. Taylor,
WORLD'S WORK, Oct. 1919.
EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY
Decreased supply of commodities in successive years of the war.]
The German submarine campaign may be dated from February 18, 1915,
when Germany, citing as a precedent Great Britain's establishment
of a military area in the North Sea, proclaimed a _war zone_ "in
the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole
English Channel," within which enemy merchant vessels would be sunk
without assurance of safety to passengers or crew. Furthermore, as
a means of keeping neutrals out of British waters, Germany declared
she would assume no responsibility for destruction of neutral ships
within this zone. What this meant was to all intents and purposes a
"paper" submarine blockade of the British Isles. Its illegitimacy
arose from the fact that it was conducted surreptitiously over a
vast area, and was only in the slightest degree effective, causing
a destruction each month of less than one percent of the traffic.
Had it been restricted to narrow limits, it would have been still
less effective, owing to the facility of countermeasures in a small
area.
Determined, however, upon a spectacular demonstration of its
possibilities, Germany first published danger notices in American
newspapers, and then, on May 7, 1915, sank the unarmed Cunard liner
_Lusitania_ off the Irish coast, with a loss of 1198 lives, including
102 Americans. In spite of divided American sentiment and a strong
desire for peace, this act came little short of bringing the United
States into the war. Having already declared its intention to hold
Germany to "strict accountability," the United States Government
now stated that a second offense would be regarded as "deliberately
unfriendly," and after a lengthy interchange of notes secured the
pledge that "liners will not be sunk without warning and without
safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do
not try to escape or offer resistance." Violations of this pledge,
further controversies, and increased friction with neutrals marked the
next year or more, during which, however, sinkings did not greatly
exceed the level of about 150,000 tons a month already attained.
During this period Allied countermeasures were chiefly of a defensive
character, including patrol of coastal areas, diversion of traffic
from customary routes, and arming of merchantmen. This last measure,
making surface approach and preliminary warning a highly dangerous
procedure for the submarine, led Germany to the announcement that,
after March 1, 1916, all armed merchant vessels would be torpedoed
without warning. But how were U-boat commanders to distinguish
between enemy and neutral vessels? Between vessels with or without
guns? The difficulty brings out clearly the fact that while the
submarines made good pirates, they were hampered in warfare on
legitimate lines.
Germany redoubled U-boat activities to lend strength to her peace
proposals at the close of 1916, and when these failed she decided
to disregard altogether the cobwebs of legalism that had hitherto
hindered her submarine war. On February 1, 1917, she declared
unrestricted warfare in an immense barred zone within limits extending
from the Dutch coast through the middle of the North Sea to the
Faroe Islands and thence west and south to Cape Finisterre, and
including also the entire Mediterranean east of Spain. An American
ship was to be allowed to enter and leave Falmauth once a week,
and there was a crooked lane leading to Greece.
[Illustration: GERMAN BARRED ZONES
British mined area and North Sea mine barrage.]
In thus announcing her intention to sink all ships on sight in
European waters, Germany burned her bridges behind her. She staked
everything on this move. Fully anticipating the hostility of the
United States, she hoped to win the war before that country could
complete its preparations and give effective support to the Allies.
General von Hindenburg's statement has already been quoted. It meant
that the army was to assume the defensive, while the navy carried
out its attack on Allied communications. Admiral von Capelle, head
of the German Admiralty, declared that America's aid would be
"absolutely negligible." "My personal view," he added, "is that
the U-boat will bring peace within six months."
As it turned out, Germany's disregard of neutral rights in 1917,
like the violation of Belgium in 1914, reacted upon her and proved
the salvation of the Western Powers. After the defection of Russia,
France was in imperative need of men. Great Britain needed ships.
Neither of these needs could have been supplied save by America's
throwing her utmost energies into active participation in the war.
This was precisely the result of the proclamation of Feb. 1, 1917.
The United States at once broke off diplomatic relations, armed
her merchant vessels in March, and on April 6 declared a state
of war.
Having traced the development of submarine warfare to this critical
period, we may now turn to the methods and weapons employed by
both sides at a time when victory or defeat hinged on the outcome
of the war at sea.
Germany's submarine construction and losses appear in the following
table from official German sources, the columns showing first the
total number built up to the date given, next the total losses to
date, and finally the remainder with which Germany started out
at the beginning of each year.
After 1916 Germany devoted the facilities of her shipyards entirely
to submarine construction, and demoralized the surface fleet to
secure personnel. Of the entire number built, not more than a score
were over 850 tons. The U C boats were small mine-layers about 160
feet in length, with not more than two weeks' cruising period.
The U B'g were of various sizes, mostly small, and some of them
were built in sections for transportation by rail. The U boats
proper, which constituted the largest and most important class,
had a speed of about 16 knots on the surface and 9 knots submerged,
and could remain at sea for a period of 5 or 6 weeks, the duration
of the cruise depending chiefly upon the supply of torpedoes. In
addition there were a half dozen large submarine merchantmen of
the type of the _Deutschland_, which made two voyages to America
in 1916; and a similar number of big cruisers of 2000 tons or more
were completed in 1918, mounting two 6-inch guns and capable of
remaining at sea for several months. The 372 boats built totaled
209,000 tons and had a personnel of over 11,000 officers and men.
There were seldom more than 20 or 30 submarines in active operation
at one time. One third of the total number were always in port,
and the remainder in training.
-----------------------------------------------------------
| Boats | | Remainder
| built | Losses |(On Jan. 1 of year following)
------------|-------|--------|-----------------------------
End of 1914 | 31 | 5 | 26
1915 | 93 | 25 | 68
1916 | 188 | 50 | 138
1917 | 291 | 122 | 169
1918 | 372 | 202 | 170
-----------------------------------------------------------
It is evident from her limited supply of submarines at the outbreak
of war that Germany did not contemplate their use as commerce
destroyers. To the Allied navies also, in spite of warnings from
a few more far-sighted officers, their use for this purpose came
as a complete surprise. New methods had to be devised, new weapons
invented, new types of ship built and old ones put to uses for which
they were not intended--in short, a whole new system of warfare
inaugurated amidst the preoccupations of war. As usual in such
circumstances, the navy taking the aggressive with a new weapon
gained a temporary ascendancy, until effective counter-measures
could be contrived. It is easy to say that all this should have
been foreseen and provided for, but it is a question to what extent
preparations could profitably have been made before Germany began her
campaign. It has already been pointed out in the chapter preceding
that, had the German fleet been destroyed at Jutland, subsequent
operations on the German coast might have made the submarine campaign
impossible, and preparations unnecessary.
[Illustration: U 71-80 OCEAN-GOING MINE-LAYERS
U B 48-149
U C 80 CLASS OF MINE-LAYERS
OCEAN-GOING TYPES U 30 TO U 39
OCEAN-GOING TYPES FROM ABOUT U 51 to U 70
OCEAN-GOING TYPES FROM U 19 TO U 28
OCEAN-GOING TYPES FROM ABOUT U 30 UP TO U 39
U 151-157 (OCEAN-GOING)
OCEAN-GOING TYPES OF GERMAN SUBMARINES]
_Anti-Submarine Tactics_
Of the general categories of anti-submarine tactics,--detection,
evasion, and destruction--it was naturally those of evasion that
were first employed. Among these may be included suspension of
sailings upon warning of a submarine in the vicinity, diversion
of traffic from customary routes, camouflage, and zigzag courses
to prevent the enemy from securing favorable position and aim.
The first method was effective only at the expense of a severe
reduction of traffic, amounting in the critical months of 1917
to 40 per cent of a total stoppage. The second sometimes actually
aided the submarine, for in confined areas such as the Mediterranean
it was likely to discover the new route and reap a rich harvest.
Camouflage was discarded as of slight value; but shifts of course were
employed to advantage by both merchant and naval vessels throughout
the war.
Methods of detection depended on both sight and sound. Efficient
lookout systems on shipboard, with men assigned to different sectors
so as to cover the entire horizon, made it possible frequently
to detect a periscope or torpedo wake in time to change course,
bring guns to bear, and escape destruction. According to a British
Admiralty estimate, in case a submarine were sighted the chances
of escape were seven to three, but otherwise only one to four.
Aircraft of all kinds proved of great value in detecting the presence
of U-boats, as well as in attacking them. Hydrophones and other
listening devices, though at first more highly perfected by the
enemy, were so developed during the war as to enable patrol vessels
to discover the presence and even determine the course and speed of
a submerged foe. Along with these devices, a system of information
was organized which, drawing information from a wide variety of
sources, enabled Allied authorities to trace the cruise of a U-boat,
anticipate its arrival in a given locality, and prophesy the duration
of its stay.
Among methods of destruction, the mounting of guns on merchantmen
was chiefly valuable, as already suggested, because of its effect
in forcing submarines to resort to illegal and barbarous methods
of warfare. Hitherto, submarines had been accustomed to operate an
the surface, board vessels, and sink them by bombs or gunfire. Visit
and search, essential in order to avoid injury to neutrals, was now
out of the question, for owing to the surface vulnerability of the
submarine it might be sent to the bottom by a single well-directed
shot. In brief, the guns on the merchant ship kept submarines beneath
the surface, forced them to draw upon their limited and costly
supply of torpedoes, and hindered them from securing good position
and aim for torpedo attack.
Much depended, of course, upon the range of the ship's guns and
the size and experience of the gun-crews. When the United States
began arming her ships in March, 1917, she was able to put enough
trained men aboard to maintain lookouts and man guns both night
and day. A dozen or more exciting duels ensued between ships and
U-boats before the latter learned that such encounters did not
repay the risks involved. On October 19, 1917, the steamer _J.
L. Luckenbach_ had a four-hour running battle with a submarine in
which the ship fired 202 rounds and the pursuer 225. The latter
scored nine hits, but was at last driven off by the appearance of
a destroyer. To cite another typical engagement, the _Navajo_, in
the English Channel, July 4, 1917, was attacked first by torpedo
and then by gunfire. The 27th shot from the ship hit the enemy's
conning tower and caused two explosions. "Men who were on deck
at the guns and had not jumped overboard ran aft. The submarine
canted forward at an angle of almost 40 degrees, and the propeller
could be plainly seen lashing the air."[1]
[Footnote 1: For more detailed narratives of this and other episodes
of the submarine campaign, see Ralph D. Payne, THE FIGHTING FLEETS,
1918.]
In coastal waters where traffic converged, large forces of destroyers
and other craft were employed for purposes of escort, mine sweeping,
and patrol. Yet, save as a means of keeping the enemy under water
and guarding merchant ships, these units had only a limited value
owing to the difficulty of making contact with the enemy. During
the later stages of the war destroyers depended chiefly upon the
depth bomb, an invention of the British navy, which by means of
the so-called "Y guns" could be dropped in large numbers around
the supposed location of the enemy. It was in this way that the
United States Destroyers _Fanning_ and _Nicholson_, while engaged
as convoy escorts, sank the _U-58_ and captured its crew.
The "mystery" or "Q" ships (well-armed vessels disguised as harmless
merchantmen) were of slight efficacy after submarines gave up surface
attack. In fact, it was the submarine itself which, contrary to all
pre-war theories, proved the most effective type of naval craft against
its own kind. Whereas fuel economy compelled German submarines to
spend as much time as possible on the surface, the Allied under-water
boats, operating near their bases, could cruise awash or submerged
and were thus able to creep up on the enemy and attack unawares.
According to Admiral Sims, Allied destroyers, about 500 in all, were
credited with the certain destruction of 34 enemy submarines; yachts,
patrol craft, etc., over 3000 altogether, sank 31; whereas about 100
Allied submarines sank probably 20.[1] Since 202 submarines were
destroyed, this may be an underestimate of the results accomplished
by each type, but it indicates relative efficiency. Submarines kept
the enemy beneath the surface, led him to stay farther away from
the coast, and also, owing to the disastrous consequences that might
ensue from mistaken identity, prevented the U-boats from operating
in pairs. The chief danger encountered by Allied submarines was from
friendly surface vessels. On one occasion an American submarine,
the AL-10, approaching a destroyer of the same service, was forced
to dive and was then given a bombardment of depth charges. This
bent plates, extinguished lights, and brought the submarine again
to the surface, where fortunately she was identified in the nick
of time. The two commanders had been roommates at Annapolis.
[Footnote 1: THE VICTORY AT SEA, _World's Work_, May, 1920, p. 56.]
_Work of the United States Navy_
Having borne the brunt of the naval war for three years, the British
navy welcomed the reënforcements which the United States was able
to contribute, and shared to the utmost the experience already
gained. On May 3, 1917, the first squadron of 6 American destroyers
arrived at Queenstown, and was increased to 50 operating in European
waters in November, and 70 at the time of the armistice. A flotilla
of yachts, ill adapted as they were for such service, did hazardous
duty as escorts in the Bay of Biscay; and a score of submarines
crossed the Atlantic during the winter to operate off Ireland and
in the Azores. Five dreadnoughts under Admiral Rodman from the U.
S. Atlantic fleet became a part of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow.
Probably the most notable work of the American navy was in projects
where American manufacturing resources and experience in large-scale
undertakings could be brought to bear. In four months, from July
to November, 1917, the United States Navy constructed an oil pipe
line from the west to the east coast of Scotland, thus eliminating
the long and dangerous northern circuit. Five 14-inch naval guns,
on railway mountings, with a complete train of 16 cars for each gun,
were equipped by the navy, manned entirely with naval personnel, and
were in action in France from August, 1918, until the armistice,
firing a total of 782 rounds on the German lines of communication,
at ranges up to 30 miles.
The American proposal of a mine barrage across the entrance to the
North Sea from Scotland to Norway at first met with slight approval
abroad, so unprecedented was the problem of laying a mine-field 230
miles in length, from 15 to 30 miles in width, and extending at
least 240 feet downward in waters the total depth of which was 400
or more feet. Even the mine barrier at the Straits of Dover had
proved ineffective owing to heavy tides, currents, and bad bottom
conditions, until it was strengthened by Admiral Keyes in 1918. By
employing a large type of mine perfected by the United States Naval
Bureau of Ordnance, it was found possible, however, to reduce by
one-third the number of mines and the amount of wire needed for the
North Sea Barrage. The task was therefore undertaken, and completed
in the summer of 1918. Out of a total of 70,000 mines, 56,570, or
about 80 per cent, were planted by American vessels. The barrage
when completed gave an enemy submarine about one chance in ten of
getting through. According to reliable records, it accomplished
the destruction or serious injury of 17 German submarines, and by
its deterrent effect, must have practically closed the northern
exit to both under-water and surface craft.
[Illustration: OSTEND-ZEEBRUGGE AREA]
_The Attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend_
At the Channel exit of the North Sea, a vigorous blow at the German
submarine nests on the Belgian coast was finally struck on April
22-23, 1918, by the Dover Force under Vice Admiral Roger Keyes, in
one of the most brilliant naval operations of the war. Of the two
Belgian ports, Ostend and Zeebrugge, the latter was much more useful
to the Germans because better protected, less exposed to batteries
on the land front, and connected by a deeper canal with the main
base 8 miles distant at Bruges. It was planned, however, to attack
both ports, with the specific purpose of sinking 5 obsolete cruisers
laden with concrete across the entrances to the canals. The operation
required extensive reconstruction work on the vessels employed, a
thorough course of training for personnel, suitable conditions of
atmosphere, wind, and tide, and execution of complicated movements
in accordance with a time schedule worked out to the minute.
At Ostend the attack failed owing to a sudden shift of wind which
blew the smoke screen laid by motor boats back upon the two block
ships, and so confused their approach that they were stranded and
blown up west of the entrance.
At Zeebrugge, two of the three block ships, the _Iphigenia_ and
the _Intrepid_, got past the heavy guns on the mole, through the
protective nets, and into the canal, where they were sunk athwart
the channel by the explosion of mines laid all along their keels.
To facilitate their entrance, the cruiser _Vindictive_ (Commander
Alfred Carpenter), fitted with a false deck and 18 brows or gangways
for landing forces, had been brought up 25 minutes earlier--to
be exact, at a minute past midnight--along the outer side of the
high mole or breakwater enclosing the harbor. Here, in spite of a
heavy swell and tide, she was held in position by the ex-ferryboat
_Daffodill_, while some 300 or 400 bluejackets and marines swarmed
ashore under a violent fire from batteries and machine guns and
did considerable injury to the works on the mole. Fifteen minutes
later, an old British submarine was run into a viaduct connecting
the mole with the shore and there blown up, breaking a big gap in
the viaduct. Strange to say, the _Vindictive_ and her auxiliaries,
after lying more than an hour in this dangerous position, succeeded
in taking aboard all survivors from the landing party and getting
safely away. Motor launches also rescued the crews of the blockships
and the men--all of them wounded--from the submarine. One British
destroyer and two motor boats were sunk, and the casualties were
176 killed, 412 wounded, and 49 missing. For a considerable period
thereafter, all the larger German torpedo craft remained cooped
up at Bruges, and the Zeebrugge blockships still obstructed the
channel at the end of the war.
[Illustration: ZEEBRUGGE HARBOR WITH GERMAN DEFENSES AND BRITISH
BLOCKSHIPS]
_The Convoy System_
Of all the anti-submarine measures employed, prior to the North
Sea Barrage and the Zeebrugge attack, the adoption of the convoy
system was undoubtedly the most effective in checking the loss
of tonnage at the height of the submarine campaign. Familiar as
a means of commerce protection in previous naval wars, the late
adoption of the convoy system in the World War occasioned very
general surprise. It was felt by naval authorities, however, that
great delay would be incurred in assembling vessels, and in restricting
the speed of all ships of a convoy to that of the slowest unit.
Merchant captains believed themselves unequal to the task of keeping
station at night in close order, with all lights out and frequent
changes of course, and they thought that the resultant injuries
would be almost as great as from submarines. Furthermore, so long
as a large number of neutral vessels were at sea, it appeared a
very doubtful expedient to segregate merchant vessels of belligerent
nationality and thus distinguish them as legitimate prey.
[Illustration: BRITISH, ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS DESTROYED
BY GERMAN RAIDERS, SUBMARINES AND MINES
(Figures in thousands of gross tons)
The accompanying chart shows the merchant shipping captured or
destroyed by Germany in the course of the war. After 1914 the losses
were inflicted almost entirely by submarines, either by mine laying
or by torpedoes. According to a British Admiralty statement of
Dec. 5, 1919, the total loss during the war was 14,820,000 gross
tons, of which 8,918,000 was British, and 5,918,000 was Allied
or neutral. The United States lost 354,450 tons. During the same
period the world's ship construction amounted to 10,850,000 tons,
and enemy shipping captured and eventually put into Allied service
totalled 2,393,000 tons, so that the net loss at the close of the
war was about 1,600,000 tons.]
But in April, 1917, the situation was indeed desperate. The losses
had become so heavy that of every 100 ships leaving England it was
estimated that 25 never returned.[1] The American commander in
European waters, Admiral Sims, reports Admiral Jellicoe as saying
at this time, "They will win unless we can stop these losses--and
stop them soon."[2] Definitely adopted in May following, the convoy
system was in general operation before the end of the summer, with
a notable decline of sinkings in both the Mediterranean and the
Atlantic. The following table, based on figures from the Naval
Annual for 1919, indicates the number of vessels sunk for each
submarine destroyed. It shows the decreased effectiveness of submarine
operations after September 1, 1917, which is taken as the date
when the convoy system had come into full use, and brings out the
crescendo of losses in 1917.
[Footnote 1: Brassey's NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919.]
[Footnote 2: _World's Work_, Sept., 1919.]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Vessels sunk| |
| per | Total No. |
| submarine | sunk |
| destroyed | |
--------------|------------|-----------|---------------------------------
Aug. 1, 1914- | 10.4 | |69 ships sunk, almost entirely by
Feb., 1915 | | | surface cruisers.
| | |
Feb. 1, 1915- | 48 | 544 |Half by torpedo; 148 without
Feb. 1, 1917 | |(two years)| warning; 3,066 lives lost.
| | |
Feb. 1, 1917- | 67 | 736 |572 by torpedo; 595 (69%) with
Sept. 1, 1917 | |(7 months) | out warning.
| | |
Sept. 1, 1917-| 20.2 | 548 |448 (82%) without warning.
April 1, 1918 | |(7 months) |
| | |
April 1, 1918-| 12 | 252 |239 (91%) without warning.
Nov. 1, 1918 | |(7 months) |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
From July 26, 1917, to October 26, 1918, 90,000 vessels were convoyed,
with a total loss from the convoys of 436, or less than half of one
per cent. The convoy system forced submarines to expose themselves
to the attacks of destroyer escorts, or else to work close in shore
to set upon vessels after the dispersion of the convoy. But when
working close to the coast they were exposed to Allied patrols
and submarines.
Testifying before a German investigation committee, Captain Bartenbach,
of the V-boat section of the German Admiralty, gave the chief perils
encountered by his boats as follows: (1) mines, (2) Allied submarines,
which "destroyed a whole series of our boats," (3) aircraft of all
types, (4) armed merchantmen, (5) hydrophones and listening devices.
Admiral Capelle in his testimony referred to the weakening of their
efforts due to "indifferent material and second-rate crews."
_Transport Work_
Dependent in large measure upon the anti-submarine campaign for
its safety and success, yet in itself an immense achievement, the
transport of over 2,000,000 American troops to France must be regarded
as one of the major naval operations of the war. Of these forces
48% were carried in British, and 43% in American transports. About
83% of the convoy work was under the protection of American naval
vessels.
The transportation work of the British navy, covering a longer
period, was, of course, on a far greater scale. Speaking in Parliament
on October 29, 1917, Premier Lloyd George indicated the extent of
this service as follows: "Since the beginning of the war the navy
has insured the safe transportation to the British and Allied armies
of 13,000,000 men, 12,000,000 horses, 25,000,000 tons of explosives
and supplies, and 51,000,000 tons of coal and oil. The loss of
men out of the whole 13,000,000 was 3500, of which only 2700 were
lost through the action of the enemy. Altogether 130,000,000 tons
have been transported by British ships." These figures, covering but
three years of the war, are of significance chiefly as indicating
the immense transportation problems of the British and Allied navies
and the use made of sea communications.
These three main Allied naval operations--the blockade of Germany,
the anti-submarine campaign, and the transportation of American
troops to France--were unquestionably decisive factors in the war.
Failure in any one of them would have meant victory for Germany. The
peace of Europe, it is true, could be achieved only by overcoming
Germany's military power on land. A breakdown there, with German
domination of the Continent, would have created a situation which
it is difficult to envisage, and which very probably would have
meant a peace of compromise and humiliation for England and America.
It is obvious, however, that, but for the blockade, Germany could
have prolonged the war; but for American reënforcements, France
would have been overrun; but for the conquest of the submarine,
Great Britain would have been forced to surrender.
In the spring of 1918 Germany massed her troops on the western
front and began her final effort to break the Allied lines and
force a decision. With supreme command for the first time completely
centralized under Marshal Foch, and with the support of American
armies, the Allies were able to hold up the enemy drives, and on
July 18 begin the forward movement which pushed the Germans back
upon their frontiers. Yet when the armistice was signed on November
11, the German armies still maintained cohesion, with an unbroken
line on foreign soil. Surrender was made inevitable by internal
breakdown and revolution, the first open manifestations of which
appeared among the sailors of the idle High Seas Fleet at Kiel.
On November 21, 1918, this fleet, designed as the great instrument
for conquest of world empire, and in its prime perhaps as efficient
a war force as was ever set afloat, steamed silently through two
long lines of British and Allied battleships assembled off the
Firth of Forth, and the German flags at the mainmasts went down
at sunset for the last time.
REFERENCES
BRASSEY'S NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919.
THE VICTORY AT SEA, Vice-Admiral W. S. Sims, U. S. N., 1920.
ANNUAL REPORT of the U. S Secretary of the Navy, 1918
THE DOVER PATROL, 1915-1917, Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, R. N.,
1919.
ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND DISPATCHES, ed. by C. Sanford Terry, 1919.
LAYING THE NORTH SEA MINE BARRAGE, Captain R. R. Belknap,
U. S. N., U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan.-Feb., 1920.
AMERICAN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN THE WORLD WAR, by Prof.
C. S. Alden, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. June-July, 1920.
For more popular treatment see also SUBMARINE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE,
Sir Henry Newbolt, 1919; THE FIGHTING FLEETS, Ralph
D. Payne, 1918; THE U-BOAT HUNTERS, James B. Connolly, 1918;
SEA WARFARE, Rudyard Kipling, 1917; etc.