THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
There was only one action between the British Grand Fleet and the
German High Seas Fleet in the World War, the battle of Jutland.
This was indecisive, but even in a history with the limits of this
book it deserves a chapter of its own. In the magnitude of the
forces engaged, a magnitude less in numbers of ships--great as
that was--than in the enormous destructive power concentrated in
those ships, it was by far the greatest naval battle in history.
Moreover, this was the one fleet battle fought with the weapons
of to-day. Any discussion of modern tactics, therefore, must be
based for some time to come on an analysis of Jutland. Finally, the
indecisiveness of the action has resulted in a controversy among
naval critics that is likely to continue indefinitely. Meanwhile
the debatable points are rich in interest and suggestion.
In earlier wars the nation with a more powerful fleet blockaded
the ports of the enemy. In this war the sea mine, the submarine,
the aircraft and the long-range gun of coast defenses made the
old-fashioned close blockade impossible. Such blockade as could
be maintained under modern conditions had to be "distant." The
British made a base in the Orkneys, Scapa Flow, which had central
position with relation to a possible sortie of the German fleet
toward either the North Atlantic or the Channel. The intervening
space of North Sea was patrolled by a scouting force of light vessels
of various sorts and periodical sweeps by the Grand Fleet. On May
30, 1916, the Grand Fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, set out from
its base at Scapa Flow for one of these patrolling cruises. On
the same day Vice Admiral Beatty left his base at Rosyth (in the
Firth of Forth) with his advance force of battle cruisers and
battleships, under orders to join Jellicoe at sea. On the following
day the High Seas Fleet took the sea and the two great forces came
together in battle.
It is not certain why the German fleet should have been cruising
at this time. Having declined to offer battle in the summer of
1914, on account of the British superiority of force, the High
Command could hardly have contemplated attacking in 1916 when the
odds were much heavier. From statements published by German officers
since the war, the objects seem to have been, first, to prevent a
suspected attempt to force an entrance into the Baltic; secondly,
to fall upon Beatty's Battle Cruiser Squadron, during its frequent
patrolling cruises, when it was detached from the main force; and,
thirdly, to destroy the British trading fleets which were conducting
an important volume of commerce from the ports of Norway with England
and Russia. It is not easy to see, however, why the High Seas Fleet
should be sent out on a mere commerce destroying raid. The Germans
had been out twice before, since April 1st of that year, and probably
it was considered good policy to send the fleet to sea every now
and then for the moral effect. The people could not relish the idea
of their navy being condemned to inaction in their own harbors,
and there was bad feeling over the fact that the government had
just yielded to President Wilson's protest on ruthless submarine
warfare. A victory over Beatty's battle cruisers, or some other
detached unit of the British fleet, would have been very opportune
in bracing German morale. At the same time Admiral von Scheer had
probably reckoned on being able to avoid battle with the Grand
Fleet by means of a swift retreat under cover of smoke screens
and torpedo attacks. Certainly the odds were too heavy to permit
of any other policy on his part.
_The First Phase_
[Illustration: CRUISING FORMATION OF THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET
(After diagram by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost, U.S.N., _U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Nov., 1919._)
Forces:
24 Dreadnought Battleships
3 Battle Cruisers
12 Light Cruisers
8 Armored Cruisers
51 Destroyers
Note: One destroyer accompanied each armored cruiser.]
At 2 p. m. of the 31st of May, 1916, the British main fleet, under
Admiral Jellicoe, was in Latitude 57° 57' N., Longitude 3° 45'
E. (off the coast of Norway), holding a south-easterly course.
It consisted of 24 battleships formed in a line of six divisions
screened by destroyers and light cruisers, as indicated in the
accompanying diagram. Sixteen miles ahead of the battle fleet was
the First Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Arbuthnot and the
Second Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Heath; these consisted of
four armored cruisers each. They were spread out at intervals of six
miles, with the _Hampshire_ six miles astern of the _Minotaur_
to serve as link ship for signals to and from the main fleet. Four
miles ahead was the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron of three ships
under Rear Admiral Hood. These were steaming in column, screened by
four destroyers and two light cruisers (_Chester_ and _Canterbury_).
The diagram on p. 388 shows the complete formation of the Battle
Fleet and Cruiser Squadrons, under Admiral Jellicoe's personal
command. It is interesting as an example of the extreme complexity
of fleet formation under modern conditions, especially when it is
realized that the whole fleet was proceeding on its base course
by zigzagging.
[Illustration: BEATTY'S CRUISING FORMATION, 2 P. M.
(After diagrams by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost, U.S.N., _U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Nov., 1919._)]
Seventy-seven miles to the southward Vice Admiral Beatty, commanding
the scouting force, was heading on a northeasterly course. His force
was spread out in scouting formation. The First Battle Cruiser
Squadron of four ships, headed by the flagship _Lion_, was flanked
three miles to the eastward by the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron of
two ships, and five miles to the north by the Fifth Battle Squadron,
consisting of four of the finest battleships in the fleet, 25-knot
_Queen Elizabeths_, under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. Each of these
squadrons had its screen of destroyers and light cruisers. Eight miles
to the south the First, Second, and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons
were spread out in line at five-mile intervals. The formation is
made clear by the accompanying diagram.
At the same hour, 2 p. m., Vice Admiral Hipper, with the German
scouting force, was heading north about 15 to 20 miles to the southeast
of Beatty. Hipper commanded the First Battle Cruiser Squadron,
consisting of the _Lützow_ (flag), _Derflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke_,
and _Van der Tann_, accompanied by a screening force of four or
five light cruisers and about 15 destroyers. Fifty miles south
of this advance force was the main body of the High Seas Fleet under
Vice Admiral von Scheer. It consisted of three battle squadrons
arranged apparently in one long column of 22 ships escorted by
a screen of 62 destroyers, eight or ten light cruisers, and the
one remaining armored cruiser in the German navy, the _Roon_.
Thus the stage was set and the characters disposed for the great
naval drama of that day.
[Illustration: TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLE CRUISER: THE DERFFLINGER
From Jane, _Fighting Ships, 1918_
Normal displacement, 26,600 to 28,000 tons.
Length (waterline), 689 to 700 feet. Beam, 95 to 96 feet. Mean draught,
27-1/2 feet.
Guns: Some (4.7 inch?) anti-aircraft
8--1.2 inch, 50 cal. (A5) 2 machine
14--5.9 inch, 50 cal. in M. & H. Torpedo tubes (21.7 inch):
but only 2 or 4 submerged (broadside)
12--5.9 inch, 50 cal. in D. 1 submerged (bow)
(1.2 or less--3.4 inch, 22 pdr. ?)]
At 2.20 the light cruiser _Galatea_ (v. diagram), which lay farthest
to the east of Beatty's force, reported two German light cruisers
engaged in boarding a neutral steamer. Beatty thereupon changed
course toward Horn Reef Lightship in order to cut them off from
their base, his light cruisers of the first and third divisions
spreading out as a screen to the eastward. It would be interesting
to know why, at this point, he did not draw in his battleships and
thus concentrate his force, for when he did establish contact with
the Germans, Evan-Thomas's squadron was too far away for effective
support. Ten minutes later Hipper got word of British light cruisers
and destroyers sighted to the westward and, changing course to
northwest, he headed for them at high speed. At 2.45 Beatty sent
out a seaplane from the _Engadine_ to ascertain the enemy's position.
This is the first instance in naval history of a fleet scouting by
means of aircraft. The airplane came close enough to the enemy
to draw the fire of four light cruisers, and returning reported
their position. Meanwhile the _Galatea_ had reported heavy smoke
"as from a fleet."
At the first report from the _Galatea_, which had been intercepted
on the flagship, _Iron Duke_, Jellicoe ordered full speed, and
despatched ahead the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Hood,
to cut off the escape of the Germans to the Skagerrak, as Beatty
was then heading to cut them off from their bases to the south.
Admiral Scheer, also, on getting report of the English cruisers,
quickened the speed of his main fleet.
At 3.30 Beatty and Hipper discovered each other's battle cruiser
forces. Hipper turned about and headed on a southerly course to lead
the British toward the advancing main fleet. Beatty also turned,
forming his battle cruisers on a line of bearing to clear the smoke,
and the two forces approached each other on converging courses as
indicated in the diagram.
At this point it is worth while to compare the two battle cruiser
forces:[1]
BRITISH GERMAN
Displace- Displace-
Name Armor ment Guns Name Armor ment Guns
Queen Mary 9" 26,350 8 13.5" Lützow 13" 26,180 8 12"
Lion 9" 26,350 8 13.5" Derfflinger 13" 26,180 8 12"
Tiger 9" 28,500 8 13.5" Seydlitz 11" 24,610 10 11"
Princess Royal 9" 28,350 8 13.5" Moltke 11" 22,640 10 11"
Indefatigable 8" 18,800 8 12" VonderTann 10" 19,100 11"
New Zealand 8" 18,800 8 12"
------- -------
145,150 118,710
[Footnote 1: Table from Lieut. Comdr. H. H. Frost, U. S. N., _U.
S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, Nov., 1919, p. 850.]
A glance shows the superiority of the British in guns and the German
superiority in armor. The British had six ships to the German five,
and if the four new battleships of Evan-Thomas's division could
be effectively brought into action, the British superiority in
force would be reckoned as considerably more than two to one. These
battleships had 13" armor, eight 15" guns each, and a speed of 25
knots. They were the most powerful ships afloat.
[Illustration: TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER: THE LION
From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1918
Normal displacement, 26,350 tons. Full load, 29,700.
Length (w. l.). 675 feet. Beam, 88-1/2, feet.
Mean draught, 27-2/3 feet. Max. draught, 31-2/3 feet.
Length over all, 700 feet. Length, p. p., 660 feet.
Guns: (P. R. 2--2 pdr. pom-pom)
8--13.5 inch (M. V.). Dir. Con. 5 M. G. (1 landing)
16--4 inch, 50 cal, Dir. Con. Torpedo tubes (21 inch):
2--3 inch (anti-aircraft) 2 submerged (broadside)
4--3 pdr.]
In speed, Beatty had a marked advantage. He could make 29 knots with
all six of his cruisers and 32 knots with his four best,--_Queen
Mary, Tiger, Lion_, and _Princess Royal_. Hipper's squadron
could make but 28 knots, though the _Lützow_ and _Derfflinger_
were probably capable of 30.
At 3.48 British and German battle cruisers opened fire. According
to Beatty's report the range at this moment was 18,500 yards. Beatty
then turned to starboard, assuming a course nearly parallel to
that of Hipper. Almost immediately, three minutes after the first
salvo, the _Lion_, the _Tiger_, and the _Princess Royal_ were
hit by shells. In these opening minutes the fire of the Germans
seems to have been fast and astonishingly accurate. The _Lion_
was hit repeatedly, and at four o'clock the roof of one of her
turrets was blown off. It is said that the presence of mind and
heroic self-sacrifice of an officer saved the ship from the fate
that subsequently overwhelmed two of her consorts. By this time
the range had decreased to 16,000 yards (British reckoning) and
Beatty shifted his course more to the south to confuse the enemy's
fire control. Apparently this move did not succeed in its purpose
for at 4.06 a salvo struck the _Indefatigable_ on a line with her
after turret, and exploded a magazine. As she staggered out of
column and began sinking, another salvo smashed into her forward
decks and she rolled over and sank like a stone.
About this time the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action, but
it was not able to do effective service. The range was extreme,
about 20,000 yards, and being some distance astern of the battle
cruisers, on account of its inferior speed, it had to contend with
the battle smoke of the squadron ahead as well as the gradually
thickening atmospheric conditions. In addition the Germans frequently
laid smoke screens and zigzagged. Evan-Thomas's division never saw
more than two enemy ships at a time.
The shift of course taken by Beatty at four o'clock, accompanied
possibly by a corresponding shift of Hipper, opened the range so
far in a few minutes that fire slackened on both sides. Beatty
then swung to port in order to close to effective range. At 4.15
twelve of his destroyers, acting on the general order to attack
when conditions were favorable, dashed out toward the German line.
At the same instant German destroyers, to the number of fifteen
accompanied by the light cruiser _Regensburg_, advanced toward
the British line, both forces maneuvering to get on the bows of
the opposing battle cruisers. For this purpose the British flotilla
was better placed because their battle cruisers were well ahead of
the Germans. The German destroyers, therefore, concentrated their
efforts on the battleship division, which turned away to avoid
the torpedoes. In numbers the advantage lay with the Germans, and a
fiercely contested action took place between the lines conducted with
superb gallantry on both sides. The Germans succeeded in breaking up
the British attack at a cost of two destroyers. Two of the British
destroyers also were rendered unmanageable and sank later when the
High Seas Fleet arrived on the scene.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF JUTLAND, FIRST PHASE
Action Between Battle Cruiser Forces.]
Meanwhile, at 4.26, just before the destroyers clashed, a salvo
struck the _Queen Mary_, blew up a magazine, and she disappeared
with practically all on board. Thus the second of Beatty's battle
cruisers was sent to the bottom with tragic suddenness.
At 4.38, Commodore Goodenough, commanding the Second Light Cruiser
Squadron, who was scouting ahead of the battle cruisers, reported
that the German battle fleet was in sight steering north, and gave
its position. Beatty at once called in his destroyers and turned
his ships in succession, sixteen points to starboard, ordering
Evan-Thomas to turn similarly. Thus the capital ships turned right
about on the opposite course, the battleships following the cruisers
as before, and all heading for the main fleet which was then about
fifty miles away to the north. Commodore Goodenough at this point
used his initiative in commendable fashion. Without orders he kept
on to the south to establish contact with the German battle fleet
and hung on its flanks near enough to report its position to the
commander in chief. He underwent a heavy fire, but handled his
frail ships so skillfully as to escape serious loss. At the same
time the constant maneuvering he was forced to perform or a defect
in the British system of communication made his reports of bearing
seriously inaccurate. Whatever the cause, this error created a
difficulty for the commander in chief, who, fifty miles away, was
trying to locate the enemy for attack by the Grand Fleet.
_The Second Phase_
The northward run of the British advance force and the German advance
force, followed by their main fleet, was uneventful. The situation
was at this stage exactly reversed. Beatty was endeavoring to lead
the German forces into the guns of the Grand Fleet, while ostensibly
he was attempting to escape from a superior force, much as Hipper
had been doing with relation to Scheer during the first phase.
Beatty's four remaining battle cruisers continued to engage the
five German battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000 yards, assisted
by the two leading ships of Evan-Thomas's Battle Squadron. The
other two battleships engaged the head of the advancing German
battle fleet at the extreme range of 19,000 yards as often as they
could make out their enemy. The visibility grew worse and apparently
neither side scored on the other.
As the British main fleet was reported somewhat to the east of
Beatty's position, he bore toward that quarter; and Hipper, to avoid
being "T-d" by his enemy, turned to the eastward correspondingly. The
mistiness increased to such a degree that shortly after five o'clock
Beatty lost sight of the enemy's battle cruisers and ceased fire for
half an hour. Between 5.40 and six o'clock, however, conditions were
better and firing was opened again by the British ships, apparently
with good effect. Meanwhile clashes had already taken place between
the light cruiser _Chester_, attached to the Third Battle Squadron
of the main fleet, and the light cruisers of the enemy, which were
far in advance of their battle cruisers.
_The Third Phase_
We have already noted that as soon as Jellicoe learned of the presence
of the enemy he ordered Hood, with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron,
to cut off the German retreat to the Skagerrak and to support Beatty.
Hood's course had taken him well to the east of where the action
was in progress. At 5.40 he saw the flashes of guns far to the
northwest, and immediately changed course in that direction. Fifteen
minutes later he was able to open fire on German light cruisers,
with his four destroyers darting ahead to attack with torpedoes.
These light cruisers, which had just driven off the _Chester_ with
heavy losses, discharged torpedoes at Hood's battle cruisers and
turned away. The latter shifted helm to avoid them and narrowly
missed being hit. One torpedo indeed passed under the _Invincible_.
At this point another group of four German light cruisers appeared
and Hood's destroyers advanced to attack them. The fire of the
cruisers damaged two destroyers though not before one of them,
the _Shark_, had torpedoed the German cruiser _Rostock_. The
_Shark_ herself was in turn torpedoed and sunk by a German
destroyer. At about the same time action had begun between the
ships of the armored cruiser squadron under Arbuthnot and another
squadron of German light cruisers.
A moment later (at 5.56) Beatty sighted the leaders of the Grand
Fleet and knew that contact with his support was established. At
once he changed course to about due east and put on full speed
in order to head off the German line, and by taking position to
the eastward, allow the battle fleet to form line astern of his
battle cruisers. Such an overwhelming force was now concentrated
on the German light cruisers that they turned back. Of their number
the _Wiesbaden_ had been disabled by a concentration of fire and
the _Rostock_ torpedoed. Hipper then made a turn of 180° with his
battle cruisers in order to get back to the support of the battleships
which he had left far to the rear. Then he turned round again, and
continued to lead the German advance. All this time he seems to
have had no suspicion that the Grand Fleet was in the neighborhood.
[Illustration: TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLESHIP: THE IRON DUKE
From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1919
Normal displacement, 25,000 tons. Full load, 28,800.
Length (o. a.), 622-3/4 feet. Beam, 89-1/2 feet.
Mean draught, 28-1/2, feet. Max. draught, 32-3/4 feet.
Length (p. p.), 580 feet
Guns: 5 M. G.
10--13.5 inch (M. V.), Dir. Con. (1 landing)
12--6 inch, 50 cal., Dir. Con. Torpedo tubes (21 inch):
2--3 inch (anti-aircraft) 4 submerged (broadside)
4--3 pdr.]
As Beatty dashed across the front of the approaching battle fleet
he sighted Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron ahead of him and
signaled him to take station ahead. Accordingly Hood countermarched
and led Beatty's line in the _Invincible_. Evan-Thomas was by this
time so far in the rear of the speedier battle cruisers that he
was unable to follow with Beatty, and in order to avoid confusion
with the oncoming battle fleet he turned left 90° in order to form
astern of the Sixth Battle Division, by this move, however, leaving
Beatty's cruisers unsupported. Meanwhile the armored cruisers of
Arbuthnot were already under fire from Hipper's squadron and suffering
severely. At 6.16 the _Defense_, the flagship of the squadron, blew
up; the _Warrior_ was badly disabled, and the _Black Prince_ was
so crippled as to be sunk during the night action. As Evan-Thomas
made his turn, one of his battleships, the _Warspite_, was struck
by a shell that jammed her steering gear in such a way as to send
her head on toward the Germans. She served to shield the _Warrior_
from destruction, but suffered thirty hits from heavy projectiles
before she was brought under control and taken out of action.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF JUTLAND, MAY 31, 1916
2nd and 3rd phases]
Between six and 6.15 Jellicoe received bearings from Vice Admiral
Burney (of the Sixth Battle Division), Evan-Thomas, and Beatty
which enabled him for the first time to plot accurately the position
of the German battle fleet. This information revealed the fact
that previous plotting based on bearings coming from Goodenough
and others was seriously wrong. The Germans were twelve miles to
the west of where they were supposed to be. Jellicoe then formed
line of battle, not on the starboard wing, which was nearest the
head of the German advance, but on the port wing, which was farthest
away, and speed was reduced to 14 knots in order to enable the
battle cruisers to take station at the head of the line. Indeed
some of the ships in the rear or sixth division had to stop their
engines to avoid collision during deployment. By this time the
ships of the sixth division began to come under the shells of the
German battle fleet and they returned the fire. By half past six
all sixteen of the German dreadnoughts were firing at the British
lines, the slow predreadnoughts being so far to the rear as to
be unable to take part. The battleship fire, however, neither at
this point nor later showed the extraordinary accuracy displayed
by the battle cruisers at the beginning, but this may possibly
be attributed to the gathering mistiness that hung over the sea,
darkened by the low-lying smoke from the host of ships.
As soon as Scheer realized that he had not only run right into the
arms of the Grand Fleet, but lay in the worst tactical position
imaginable with an overwhelming force concentrated on the head
of his line, he turned away to escape. The battle cruisers (at
6.30) swung away sharply from east to south, the ships turning
in succession. Meanwhile the torpedo flotillas tried to cover the
turn by a gallant attack on the British battle line. At the same
time smoke screens also were laid to cover the retirement. The
_Invincible_, Hood's flagship, which was leading the British line,
was at this juncture struck by a shell that penetrated her armor
and exploded a magazine. The ship instantly broke in two and went
to the bottom, and only four officers and two men were saved. Almost
at the same instant the German battle cruiser _Lützow_, Hipper's
flagship, was so badly disabled by shells and torpedo that she
fell out of line helpless. Hipper managed, however, to board a
destroyer and two hours later succeeded in shifting his flag to
the _Moltke_.
[Illustration: TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLESHIP: THE KOENIG
From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1919
Normal displacement, 25,800 tons. Length (waterline), 573 feet.
Beam, 96-3/4 feet. Mean draught, 27-1/4 feet. Length (over all),
580 feet.
Guns: 2 machine.
10--12 inch, 45 cal. Torpedo tubes (19.7 inch):
14--5.9 inch, .50 cal. 4 (broadside) submerged.
(10 or 4--3.4 inch, 22 pdr.?) 1 (bow) submerged.
(2 anti-aircraft?)]
At 6.35 Scheer performed a difficult maneuver that the fleet had
practiced for just the situation that existed at this time. He
wheeled his battleships simultaneously to starboard, forming line
again on a westerly course. Twenty minutes later, finding that he
was no longer under fire from the Grand Fleet, he repeated the
maneuver, the ships turning again to starboard and forming line
ahead again on an easterly, then southerly course. These changes of
course were made under cover of smoke screens and were not observed
by the British.
By this time the Grand Fleet had formed line of battle on a
southeasterly course and by 7.10 its leaders were concentrating
their fire on the head of the German line, which was now caught
under an overwhelming superiority of force. Unfortunately for the
Germans the visibility conditions at this time were worse for them
than for their enemy, for while the British ships were nearly or
quite invisible, the Germans every now and then stood silhouetted
against the western sky. The British fire at this time was heavy
and accurate. The German fleet seemed marked for destruction.
For Scheer it was now imperative to withdraw if he could. Accordingly
at this juncture he sent out a flotilla of destroyers in a desperate
effort to cover the retreat of his fleet. They fired a number of
torpedoes at the English battle line, and retired with the loss
of one boat. Their stroke succeeded, for Jellicoe turned his whole
line of battleships away to avoid the torpedoes. Beatty, holding
his course at the head of the line, signaled Admiral Jerram of
the _King George V_ to follow astern, but he was evidently bound
to the orders of his commander in chief. For the second time that
day Beatty was left unsupported in his fight at the head of the
line.
Meanwhile Scheer's capital ships had simultaneously wheeled away
in line to the westward under cover of the torpedo attacks and
smoke screens made by the destroyers. This was the third time within
an hour that they had effected this maneuver, and the skill with
which the battleships managed these turns in line under a rain of
fire speaks well for German seamanship. Meanwhile, to rëenforce
the covering movement made by the destroyers, Scheer sent out his
battle cruisers in a sortie against Beatty, who was pressing hard
on the head of the German line. The following account from Commander
von Hase of the _Derfflinger_, which led this sortie, is interesting
not only for its description of what occurred at this time but
also as a picture of a personal experience of the terrific fire
that the battle cruisers of both sides had to sustain throughout
the greater part of the engagement. It was on them that the brunt
of the fighting fell. The narrative is quoted from the pages of
the _Naval and Military Record_:
"By now our Commander-in-Chief had realized the danger threatening
our fleet, the van of which was enclosed in a semicircle by the
hostile fleet. We were, in fact, absolutely 'in the soup' (in absoluten
Wurstkessel)! There was only one way to get clear of this tactically
disadvantageous position: to turn the whole fleet about and steer on
an opposite course. First to evade this dangerous encirclement. But
the maneuver must be unobserved and executed without interference.
The battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats must cover the movement of the
fleet. At about[1] 9.12 the Commander-in-Chief made the signal to
alter course, and almost simultaneously made by W/T [wireless] the
historic signal to the battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats: 'Charge the
enemy!' (Ran an den Feind!) Without turning a hair the captain ordered
'Full speed ahead, course south-east.' Followed by the _Seydlitz,
Molke_, and _Von der Tann_, we steamed at first south-east, then,
from 9.15 onward, directly towards the head of the enemy's line.
[Footnote 1: There was a difference of two hours in time between
the German and the English standard.]
"And now an infernal fire was opened on us, especially on the
_Derfflinger_, as leading ship. Several ships were concentrating
their fire upon us. I selected a target and fired as rapidly as
possible. The range closed from 12,000 to 8,000 meters, and still
we steamed full speed ahead into this inferno of fire, presenting
a splendid target to the enemy, while he himself was very difficult
to see. Salvo after salvo fell in our immediate vicinity, and shell
after shell struck our ship. They were the most exciting minutes.
I could no longer communicate with Lt. von Stosch (who was in the
foretop control), as the telephone and voice-pipes had been shot
away, so I had to rely an my own observations to direct the fire.
At 9.13, previous to which all four 12 in. turrets were in action,
a serious catastrophe occurred. A 15 in. shell penetrated the armor
of No. 3 turret and exploded inside. The gallant turret captain, Lt.
von Boltenstern, had both his legs torn off, and with him perished
practically the entire guns' crew. The explosion ignited three
cartridges, flames from which reached the working chamber, where
eight more cartridges were set on fire, and passed down to the
magazine, igniting still more cartridges. They burned fiercely,
the flames roaring high above the turret--but they burned only,
they did not explode--as our enemy's cartridges had done--and that
saved the ship! Still, the effect of the burning cartridges was
catastrophic; the flames killed everything within their reach.
Of the 78 men of the turret crew only five escaped, some badly
wounded, by crawling out through the holes for expelling empty
cartridge cases. The remaining 73 men died instantly. A few seconds
after this catastrophe another disaster befell us. A 15 in. shell
pierced the shield of No. 4 turret and burst inside, causing frightful
destruction. With the exception of one man, who was blown out of
the turret hatch by the blast of air, the entire crew, including
all the men in the magazines and shell-rooms, 80 souls in all,
were instantly killed. All the cartridges which had been taken out
of their metal cases were ignited, so that flames were now shooting
sky-high from both the after turrets....
"The enemy's shooting was splendid. Shell after shell crashed into
us, and my heart stood still as I thought of what must be happening
inside the ship. My thoughts were rudely disturbed. Suddenly it
was to us as if the world had come to an end. A terrific roar, a
mighty explosion, and then darkness fell upon us. We shook under
a tremendous blow, which lifted the conning-tower bodily off its
base, to which it sank back vibrating. A heavy shell had struck
the gunnery control station about 20 inches from me. The shell
burst, but did not penetrate because it had hit the thick armor at
an angle, but huge pieces of plating were torn away.... We found,
however, that all the artillery connections were undamaged. Splinters
had penetrated the lookout slits of the conning-tower, wounding
several people inside. The explosion had forced open the door,
which jammed, and two men were unable to move it. But help from an
unexpected quarter was at hand. Again we heard a terrific roar and
crash, and with the noise of a thunderbolt a 15 in. shell exploded
beneath the bridge. The blast of air swept away everything that was
not firmly riveted down, and the chart-house disappeared bodily.
But the astounding thing was that this same air pressure closed
the door of the conning-tower! The Englishman was polite; having
first opened the door, he carefully shut it again for us. I searched
with my glass for the enemy, but, although the salvos were still
falling about us, we could see practically nothing of him; all
that was really visible were the huge, golden-red flames from the
muzzles of his guns.... Without much hope of hurting the enemy I
fired salvo after salvo from the forward turrets. I could feel
how our shooting was calming the nerves of the crew. Had we not
fired at this moment the whole ship's company would have been
overpowered by a great despair, for everyone knew that a few minutes
more of this would finish us. But so long as we fired things could
not be so bad with us. The medium guns fired also, but only two
of the six 5.9's on one side were still in action. The fourth gun
was split from end to end by a burst in the muzzle, and the third
was shot to pieces...."
The battle-cruisers were recalled just in time--so it would appear--to
save them from annihilation, and Com. von Hase proceeds:
"All hands were now busy quelling the fires. Thick clouds of yellow
gas still poured from both after turrets, but the flooding of the
magazines soon got rid of this. None of us had believed that a
ship could stand so many heavy hits. Some twenty 15 in. hits were
counted after the battle, and about the same number of bad hits
from smaller calibers. The _Lützow_ was out of sight (she sank
later), but the _Seydlitz, Moltke_, and _Von der Tann_ were
still with us. They, too, had been badly punished, the _Seydlitz_
worst of all. Flames still roared from one of her turrets, and
all the other ships were burning. The bow of the _Seydlitz_ was
deep in the water. Every battle-cruiser had suffered severe
casualties.... But the death charge had achieved its purpose by
covering the retreat of the battle fleet.... Our ship was very
heavily battered, and in many places the compartments were mere
heaps of débris. But vital parts were not hit, and, thanks to the
strong armor, the engines, boilers, steering gear, and nearly all
auxiliaries were undamaged. For a long time the engine-room was
filled with noxious fumes, necessitating the use of gas masks.
The entire ship was littered with thousands of large and small
shell splinters, among which we found two practically undamaged
15 in. shell caps, which were later used in the wardroom as wine
coolers. The belt armour was pierced several times, but either
the leaks were stopped or the inflow of water was localized in
small compartments. In Wilhelmshaven we buried our dead, nearly
200 in all."
By 8 o'clock the German battleships had vanished, with the British
steering westward by divisions in pursuit. But never again did
the two battle fleets regain touch with each other. Occasional
contact with an enemy vessel was made by other units of Jellicoe's
force. About 8.20 another destroyer attack was threatened, and
again Jellicoe swerved away, at the same time, however, sending
the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron and two destroyer flotillas,
which succeeded in breaking up the attempt. At 8.30 he reformed
his fleet in column and continued on a southwesterly course until
9 o'clock.
_Fourth Phase_
As darkness came on, Jellicoe, declining to risk his ships under
conditions most favorable to torpedo attack, arranged his battleships
in four squadrons a mile apart, with destroyer flotillas five miles
astern, and sent a mine-layer to lay a mine field in the neighborhood
of the Vyl lightship, covering the route over which the Germans
were expected to pass if they attempted to get home via the Horn
Reef. He then headed southeast. Beatty also drew off from pursuit
with his battle cruisers. Jellicoe's plan was to avoid a general
night action, but to hold such a position as to compel the Germans
to fight again the following morning in order to reach their bases.
During the night (between ten and 2.35) there were several sharp
conflicts, mainly between the destroyers and light cruisers of
the opposing fleets, with considerable loss on both sides. On the
British side, two armored cruisers, _Black Prince_ and _Warrior_,
went down--both crippled by damages sustained during the day--and
five destroyers. Six others were severely damaged. On the German
side, the battle cruiser _Lützow_ sank as a result of her injuries,
the predreadnought battleship _Pommern_ was blown up by a torpedo,
three light cruisers were sunk, and four or five other ships suffered
from torpedo or mine.
The contacts made by British destroyers and cruisers confirm the
accounts of the Germans as to the course of their fleet during
the night. About nine o'clock Scheer changed course sharply from
west to southeast and cut through the rear of the British fleet.
At dawn, about 2.40, he was twenty miles to eastward of Jellicoe on
the road to Wilhelmshaven. At noon the greater part of the German
fleet was safe in port. Some of the lighter ships, to escape the
assaults of the British destroyers during the night, headed north
and got home by way of the Skagerrak and the Kiel Canal.
Jellicoe had avoided a night pursuit for the sake of fighting on
better terms the next morning, but at dawn he found his destroyers
scattered far and wide. Judging it unwise to pursue the High Seas
Fleet without a screening force, and discovering by directional
wireless that it was already south of Horn Reef and in the neighborhood
of the mine fields, he gave up the idea of renewing the engagement
and turned north. He spent the forenoon in sweeping the scene of
the previous day's fighting, collecting his dispersed units, and
then returned to his bases.
The claim of victory, which was promptly and loudly made by the
German press, is absurd enough. After the Grand Fleet arrived there
could be only one thought for the Germans and that was a fighting
retreat. Nevertheless, they had every reason to be proud of what
they had done. They had met a force superior by a ratio of about 8
to 5 and had escaped after inflicting nearly twice as much damage
as they had sustained. These losses may be compared by means of
the following table[1]:
BRITISH, Three Battle Cruisers, QUEEN MARY 26,350 tons
INDEFATIGABLE 18,800 "
INVINCIBLE 17,250 "
Three Armored Cruisers, DEFENSE 14,600 "
WARRIOR 13,550 "
BLACK PRINCE 13,350 "
Eight Destroyers, TIPPERARY 1,430 "
NESTOR 890 "
NOMAD 890 "
TURBULENT 1,100 "
FORTUNE 965 "
ARDENT 935 "
SHARK 935 "
SPARROWHAWK 935 "
------------
Total 111,980 tons
GERMANS, One Battle Cruiser LUETZOW 26,180 tons
One Pre-dreadnought, POMMERN 13,200 "
Four Light Cruisers, WIESBADEN 5,400 "
ELBING 4,500 "
ROSTOCK 4,900 "
FRAUENLOB 2,700 "
Five Destroyers, V-4 570 "
V-48 750 "
V-27 640 "
V-29 640 "
S-33 700 "
------------
Total 60,180 tons
Personnel, killed and wounded: BRITISH, about 6,600: GERMANS, 3,076.
[Footnote 1: Figures in these tables taken from Lieut. Comdr. H.
H. Frost, U. S. N., _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, Jan.,
1920, p. 84.]
With all allowance for the poor visibility conditions and the deepening
twilight, it must be admitted also that Scheer handled his ships
with great skill. Caught in a noose by an overwhelming force, he
disentangled himself by means of the torpedo attacks of his destroyer
flotillas and turned away under cover of their smoke screens. After
nightfall he boldly cut through the rear of the British fleet in
battle line, and reached his base in safety with the great bulk
of his ships. Meanwhile at practically all stages of the fighting
German gunnery was both rapid and accurate, the seamanship was
admirable, and there was no lack of courage of the highest order.
As to material, Admiral Jellicoe notes the superiority of the German
fleet in range-finding devices, searchlights, smoke screens, a star
shell--unknown to the British and invaluable for night fighting--and
in the armor piercing quality of the shells. Moreover the Germans
were completely equipped with systems of director firing, while
the British were not. According to Admiral Sir Percy Scott,[1]
"at the Battle of Jutland ... the commander in chief had only six
ships of his fleet completely fitted with director firing ... he
had not a single cruiser in the fleet fitted for director firing."
[Footnote 1: FIFTY YEARS IN THE ROYAL NAVY, p. 278.]
The greatest superiority of all probably lay in the structural
features of the newer German ships. For some years prior to the
war Admiral von Tirpitz had devoted himself to the problem of under
water protection, to localize the effect of torpedo and mine on
the hull of a ship. To quote the words of von Tirpitz:[2]
[Footnote 2: MY MEMOIRS, Vol. I, p. 171.]
"We built a section of a modern ship by itself and carried out
experimental explosions on it with torpedo heads, carefully testing
the result every time. We tested the possibility of weakening the
force of the explosion by letting the explosive gases burst in
empty compartments without meeting any resistance. We ascertained
the most suitable steel for the different structural parts, and
found further that the effect of the explosion was nullified if
we compelled it to pulverize coal in any considerable quantity.
This resulted in a special arrangement of the coal bunkers. We
were then able to meet the force of the explosion ... by a strong,
carefully constructed steel wall which finally secured the safety
of the interior of the ship."
The only German armored ship that succumbed to the blow of a single
torpedo was the _Pommern_, an old vessel, built before the fruits
of these experiments were embodied in the German fleet. The labor
of von Tirpitz was well justified by the results, as may be seen
by the instantaneous fashion in which the three British battle
cruisers went to the bottom, compared with the ability of the German
battle cruisers to stand terrific pounding and yet stay afloat and
keep going. According to the testimony of a German officer,[1] the
_Lützow_ was literally shot to pieces in the battle and even then
it took three torpedoes to settle her. Actually she was sunk by
opening her seacocks to prevent her possible capture. The remarkable
ability of the battle cruiser _Göben_, in Turkish waters, to survive
shell, mines, and torpedo, bears the same testimony, as does the
_Mainz_, which, in the action of the Heligoland Bight had to be
sunk by one of her own officers, as in the case of the _Lützow_.
It is possible that Jellicoe assumed an inferiority of the British
armor piercing shell because of this power of the German ships to
stay afloat. But photographs published after the armistice showed
that British shells penetrated the 11-inch turret armor of the
_Seydlitz_ and the 13-inch of the _Derfflinger_ with frightful
effect. The difference was in the fact that they did not succeed
in sinking those ships, which, after all is the chief object of a
shell, and this must be attributed to better under-water construction.
[Footnote 1: Quoted in _Naval and Military Record_, Dec. 24, 1919,
p. 822.]
The only criticism it seems possible to suggest on Scheer's tactics
is the unwariness of his pursuit, which might so easily have led
to the total destruction of the German fleet. Strangely enough,
although a Zeppelin hovered over the British fleet at dawn of the
day after the battle, no aircraft of any kind scouted ahead of the
Germans the day before. In pursuing Beatty, Scheer had to take
a chance, well aware that if the Grand Fleet were within reach,
Beatty's wireless would bring it upon him. But Scheer was evidently
perfectly willing to risk the encounter. Such criticism as arose in
Germany--from Captain Persius, for example--centered on "Tirpitz's
faulty constructional methods"; which, in the light of the facts
of the battle would seem to be the very last thing to hit upon.
As for types and weapons it is clear that the armored cruisers
served only as good targets and death traps. The British would
have been better off if every armored cruiser had been left at
home. The dominating feature of the story is the influence of the
torpedo on Jellicoe's tactics. It is fair to say that it was the
Parthian tactics of the German destroyer, both actual and potential,
that saved the High Seas Fleet and robbed the British of a greater
Trafalgar. At every crisis in the battle it was either what the
German destroyer did or might do that governed the British commander's
maneuvers. At the time of deployment he formed on the farthest rather
than on the nearest division because of what German destroyers
might do. When the Grand Fleet swung away to the east and lost
all contact with their enemy for the rest of the battle, it was
because of a destroyer attack. At this time eleven destroyers
accomplished the feat of driving 27 dreadnoughts from the field!
Again, the pursuit was called off at nightfall because of the peril
of destroyer attacks under cover of darkness, and finally Jellicoe
decided not to risk an action the following morning because his
capital ships had no screening forces against the torpedo of the
enemy. It is worth noting in this connection that although the
Admiralty were aware of the battle in progress, they held back the
Harwich force of destroyers and light cruisers which would have
proved a welcome reënforcement in pursuing the retreating fleet.
The reason for this decision has never been published.
In connection with the important part played by the German destroyers
at Jutland it is worth remarking that before the war it was the
Admiralty doctrine that destroyers could not operate successfully
by day, and they were accordingly painted black for night service.
The German destroyers were painted gray. After Jutland the British
flotillas also were painted the battleship gray.
Naturally the failure of the superior fleet to crush the inferior one
aroused a storm of criticism, the most severe emanating from English
naval writers. The sum and substance is the charge of overcaution
on the part of the British Commander in Chief. It is held that
Jellicoe should have formed his battle line on his starboard instead
of his port wing, thus turning toward the enemy and concentrating
on the head of their column at once. Forming on the port division
caused the battle fleet to swerve away from the enemy and open
the range just at the critical moment of contact, leaving Beatty
unsupported in his dash across the head of the enemy's line. It
is said that the latter even sent a signal to the _Marlborough_
for the battleships to fall in astern of him, and the failure to
do so made his maneuver fruitless. Apparently this message was
not transmitted to the flagship at the time. In answer Jellicoe
explains in great detail that the preliminary reports received
from Goodenough and others as to the position of the High Seas
Fleet were so meager and conflicting that he could not form line
of battle earlier than he did, and secondly that deploying on the
starboard division at the moment of sighting the enemy would have
thrown the entire battle fleet into confusion, blanketed their
fire, and created a dangerous opening for torpedo attack from the
destroyers at the head of the German column. On this point Scheer
agrees with the critics. Deploying on the starboard division instead
of the port, he says, "would have greatly impeded our movements and
rendered a fresh attack on the enemy's line extremely difficult."
The second point of criticism rested on the turning away of the
battleships at the critical point of the torpedo attack at 7.20,
under cover of which the German battleships wheeled to westward and
disappeared. Jellicoe's reply is that if he had swung to starboard,
turning toward the enemy, he would have headed into streams of
approaching torpedoes under conditions of mist and smoke that were
ideal for torpedo attack, and if he had maintained position in line
ahead he would have courted heavy losses. In connection with this
turn he calls attention to the fact that British light cruisers and
destroyers could not be used to deliver a counter attack because,
on account of the rapid changes of course and formation made by the
battlefleet, they had been unable to reach their proper station
in the van.
Thirdly, if conditions for night battle were too risky why did
the Grand Fleet fail to keep sufficient touch with the enemy by
means of its light flotillas so as to be informed of his movements
and prevent his escape? There were frequent contacts during that
short night, and the Germans were sighted steering southeast. The
attacks made by British destroyers certainly threw the German line
into confusion, and some of the light vessels were driven to the
north, reaching German bases by way of the Baltic. Nevertheless
the fleet succeeded in cutting through without serious loss. To
this there seems to be no answer.
Lastly, to the query why Jellicoe did not seek another action in
the morning, as originally intended, he replies that he discovered
by directional wireless that the Germans were already safe between
the mine fields and the coast, and that he could not safely proceed
without his screening force of destroyers and light cruisers, which,
after their night operations, were widely scattered. From German
accounts, however, we find no mention of a shelter behind mine
fields, but astonishment at the fact that they were permitted to go
on their way unmolested. Morning found the two fleets only twenty
miles apart, and the Germans had a half day's steaming before they
could reach port. They were in no condition to fight. The battleship
_Ostfriesland_ had struck a mine and had to be towed. The battle
cruiser _Seydlitz_ had to be beached to keep her from sinking, and
other units were limping along with their gun decks almost awash.
Certainly the tactics of Jellicoe do not suggest those of Blake,
Hawke, or Nelson. They do not fit Farragut's motto--borrowed from
Danton[1]--"l'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace," or
Napoleon's "frappez vite, frappez fort." War, as has been observed
before, cannot be waged without taking risks. The British had a
heavy margin to gamble on. As it happened, 23 out of the entire 28
battleships came out of the fight without so much as a scratch on
their paint; and, after deployment, only one out of the battle line
of 27 dreadnoughts received a single hit. This was the _Colossus_,
which had four men wounded by a shell.
[Footnote 1: And borrowed by Danton from Cicero.]
The touchstone of naval excellence is Nelson. As Mahan has so ably
pointed out, while weapons change principles remain. Dewey, in
deciding to take the chances involved in a night entry of Manila
Bay did so in answer to his own question, "What would Farragut
do?" Hence in considering Jutland one may take a broader view than
merely a criticism of tactics. In a word, does the whole conduct
of the affair reveal the method and spirit of Nelson?
At Trafalgar there was no need for a deployment after the enemy
was sighted because in the words of the famous Memorandum, "the
order of sailing is to be the order of battle." The tactics to
be followed when the French appeared had been carefully explained
by Nelson to his commanders. No signal was needed--except the fine
touch of inspiration in "England expects every man to do his duty."
In brief, the British fleet had been so thoroughly indoctrinated,
and the plan was so simple, that there was no room for hesitation,
uncertainty, or dependence on the flagship for orders at the last
minute. It is hard to see evidence of any such indoctrination of
the Grand Fleet before Jutland.
Again, Nelson was, by example and precept, constantly insisting
on the initiative of the subordinate. "The Second in Command will
... have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon
the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or
destroyed.... Captains are to look to their particular line as
their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen nor
perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his
ship alongside that of an enemy." At Jutland, despite the urgent
signals of Beatty at two critical moments, neither Burney of the
sixth division nor Jerram of the first felt free to act independently
of the orders of the Commander in Chief. The latter tried, as Nelson
emphatically did not, to control from the flagship every movement
of the entire fleet.
Further, if naval history has taught anything it has established
a point so closely related to the responsibility and initiative
of the subordinate as to be almost a part of it; namely, a great
fleet that fights in a single rigid line ahead never achieves a
decisive victory. Blake, Tromp, and de Ruyter fought with squadrons,
expecting--indeed demanding--initiative on the part of their flag
officers. That was the period when great and decisive victories
were won. The close of the 17th century produced the "Fighting
Instructions," requiring the unbroken line ahead, and there followed
a hundred years of indecisive battles and bungled opportunities. Then
Nelson came and revived the untrammeled tactics of the days of Blake
with the added glory of his own genius. It appears that at Jutland
the battleships were held to a rigid unit of fleet formation as in
the days of the Duke of York or Admiral Graves. And concentration
with a long line of dreadnoughts is no more possible to-day than
it was with a similar line of two-decked sailing ships a century
and a half ago.
Finally, in the matter of spirit, the considerations that swayed
the movements of the Grand Fleet at all stages were apparently
those of what the enemy might do instead of what might be done
to the enemy, the very antithesis of the spirit of Nelson. It is
no reflection on the personal courage of the Commander in Chief
that he should be moved by the consideration of saving his ships.
The existence of the Grand Fleet was, of course, essential to the
Allied cause, and there was a heavy weight of responsibility hanging
on its use. But again it is a matter of naval doctrine. Did the
British fleet exist merely to maintain a numerical preponderance
over its enemy or to crush that enemy--whatever the cost? If the
battle of Jutland receives the stamp of approval as the best that
could have been done, then the British or the American officer of
the future will know that he is expected primarily to "play safe."
But he will never tread the path of Blake, Hawke, or Nelson, the
men who made the traditions of the Service and forged the anchors
of the British Empire.
Thus the great battle turned out to be indecisive; in fact, it
elated the Germans with a feeling of success and depressed the
British with a keen sense of failure. Nevertheless, the control of
the sea remained in the hands of the English, and never again did
the High Seas Fleet risk another encounter. The relative positions
at sea of the two adversaries therefore remained unaltered.
On the other hand, if the British had destroyed the German fleet
the victory would have been priceless. As Jervis remarked at Cape
St. Vincent, "A victory is very essential to England at this hour."
The spring of 1916 was an ebb point in Allied prospects. The Verdun
offensive was not halted, the Somme drive had not yet begun, the
Russians were beaten far back in their own territory, the Italians
had retreated, and there was rebellion in Ireland. The annihilation
of the High Seas Fleet would have reversed the situation with dramatic
suddenness and would have at least marked the turning point of the
war. Without a German battle fleet, the British could have forced
the fighting almost to the very harbors of the German coast--bottling
up every exit by a barrage of mines. The blockade, therefore, could
have been drawn close to the coast defenses. Moreover, with the High
Seas Fleet gone, the British fleet could have entered and taken
possession of the Baltic, which throughout the war remained a German
lake. By this move England would have threatened the German Baltic
coast with invasion and extended her blockade in a highly important
locality, cutting off the trade between Sweden and Germany. She
would also have come to the relief of Russia, which was suffering
terrible losses from the lack of munitions. Indeed it would have
saved that ally from the collapse that withdrew her from the war.
With no German "fleet in being" great numbers of workers in English
industry and vast quantities of supplies might have been transferred
to the support of the army. The threat of invasion would have been
removed, and the large army that was kept in England right up to
the crisis of March, 1918,[1] would have been free to reenforce
the army at the front. Finally, without the personnel of the German
fleet there could have been no ruthless submarine campaign the year
after, such as actually came so near to winning the war. Thus,
while the German claim to a triumph that drove the British from
the seas is ridiculous, it is equally so to argue, as the First
Lord of the Admiralty did, that there was no need of a British
victory at Jutland, that all the fruits of victory were gained as
it was. The subsequent history of the war tells a different tale.
[Footnote 1: A quarter of a million men were sent from England at
this time.]
REFERENCES
THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916, Admiral Viscount Lord Jellicoe of
Scapa, 1919.
THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORLD WAR, Vice Admiral
von Scheer, 1920.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, Commander Carlyon Bellairs, M. P., 1920.
THE NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919, Earl Brassey.
A DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, Lieut. Commander H.
H. Frost, U. S. N., in U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, vol.
45, pp. 1829 ff, 2019 ff; vol. 46, pp. 61 ff.
THE BRITISH NAVY IN BATTLE, A. H. Pollen, 1919.