CONCLUSION
The brief survey of sea power in the preceding chapters has shown
that the ocean has been the highway for the march of civilization and
empire. Crete in its day became a great island power and distributed
throughout the Mediterranean the wealth and the arts of its own
culture and that of Egypt. In turn, Phnicia held sway on the inland
sea, and though creating little, she seized upon and developed the
material and intellectual resources of her neighbors, and carried
them not only to the corners of the Mediterranean, but far out
on the unknown sea. Later when Phnicia was subject to Persia,
Athens by her triremes saved the growing civilization of Greece,
and during a brief period of glory planted the seeds of Greek,
as opposed to Asiatic culture, on the islands and coasts of the
Ægean. After Athens, Carthage inherited the trident, and in turn
fell before the energy of a land power, Rome. And as the Roman
Empire grew to include practically all of the known world, every
waterway, river and ocean, served to spread Roman law, engineering,
and ideals of practical efficiency, at the same time bringing back
to the heart of the Empire not only the products of the colonies,
but such impalpable treasures as the art, literature, and philosophy
of Greece. This was the story of the sea in antiquity.
After the dissolution of the Roman empire, as Christian peoples
were struggling in blood and darkness, a great menace came from
Arabia, the Saracen invasion, which was checked successfully and
repeatedly by the navy of Constantinople. To this, primarily, is
due the preservation of the Christian ideal in the world. Later, the
cities of Italy began to reëstablish sea commerce, which had been
for centuries interrupted by pirates. Venice gained the ascendancy,
and Venetian ships carried the Crusading armies during the centuries
when western peoples went eastward to fight for the Cross and brought
back new ideas they had learned from the Infidels. Then there arose
a new Mohammedan threat, the Turk, determined like the earlier
Saracen to conquer the world for the Crescent. Constantinople,
betrayed by Christian nations, fell, Christian peoples of the Levant
were made subject to the Turk, and thereafter till our day the
Ægean was a Turkish lake. About the same time a new Mohammedan sea
power arose in the Moors of the African coast, and for a century
and more the Mediterranean was a no-man's land between the rival
peoples and the rival religions.
Meanwhile the trade with the East by caravan routes to the Arabian
Gulf had been stopped by the presence of the Turk. To reach the
old markets, therefore, new routes had to be found and there came
the great era of discovery. The new world was only an accidental
discovery in a search for the westward route to Asia. The claims of
Spain to this new region called forth her fleets of trading ships.
But the lure of the West attracted the energies of the English
also, and England and Spain clashed. As Spain became more and more
dependent on her western colonies for income, and yet failed to
establish her ascendancy over the Atlantic routes, she declined
in favor of her enemies, England and Holland. The latter country,
being dependent on the sea for sustenance, early captured a large
part of the world's carrying trade, especially in the Mediterranean
and the East. Her rich profits excited the envy and rivalry of the
English, and in consequence, after three hard-fought naval wars,
the scepter of the sea passed to England. The subsequent wars between
England and France served only to strengthen England's control of
trade routes and extend her colonial possessions; with one notable
exception, when France, denying to her rival the control of the sea
at a critical juncture in the American Revolution, deprived her
of her richest and most extensive colony. It was primarily England
with her navy that broke the power of Napoleon in the subsequent
conflict, and throughout a century of peace the spread of English
speech and institutions has extended to the uttermost parts of
the world. One power in our day challenged Britain's control of
the sea--now even more essential to her security than it was in
the 17th century to that of Holland--and the World War was the
consequence.
In all this story it is interesting to note that insularity in
position is the reverse of insularity in fact. Crete touched the
far shores of the Mediterranean because she was an island and her
people were forced upon the sea. Similarly, Phnicia, driven to
sea by mountains and desert at her back, spread her sails beyond
the Pillars of Hercules. And England, hemmed in by the Atlantic,
has carried her goods and her language to every nook and cranny of
the earth. Thus the ocean has served less to separate than to bring
together. As a common highway it has not only excited quarrels, but
established common interests between nations. Special agreements
governing the suppression of piracy and the slave trade, navigation
regulations and the like, have long since brought nations together in
peace on a common ground. It has also gone far to create international
law for the problems of war. Rules governing blockade, contraband,
and neutral rights have been agreed upon long since. But, as every
war has proved, international law has needed a higher authority to
enforce its rules in the teeth of a powerful belligerent. To remedy
this defect is one of the purposes of a League of Nations.
Such has been the significance of the sea. The nations who have
used it have made history and have laid the rest of the world under
their dominion intellectually, commercially, and politically. Indeed,
the story of the sea is the history of civilization.
At the conclusion of this survey, it is appropriate to pause and
summarize what is meant by the term "sea power." It is a catch
phrase, made famous by Mahan and glibly used ever since. What does
sea power mean? What are its elements?
Obviously it means, in brief, a nation's ability to enforce its will
upon the sea. This means a navy superior to those of its enemies.
But it means also strategic bases equipped for supplying a fleet
for battle or offering refuge in defeat. To these bases there must
run lines of communication guarded from interruption by the enemy.
Imagine, for instance, the Suez or the Panama Canal held by a hostile
force, or a battlefleet cut off from its fuel supply of coal or
oil.
The relation of shipping to sea power is not what it was in earlier
days. Merchantmen are indeed still useful in war for transport
and auxiliary service, but it is no longer true that men in the
merchant service are trained for man-of-war service. The difference
between them has widened as the battleship of to-day differs from
a merchantman of to-day. Nor can a merchantship be transformed
into a cruiser, as in the American navy of a hundred years ago.
The place of shipping in sea power is therefore subsidiary. In
fact, unless a nation can control the sea, the amount of its wealth
dispersed in merchantmen is just so much loss in time of war.
The major element in sea power is the fleet, but possession of
the largest navy is no guarantee of victory or even of control
of the sea. Size is important, but it is an interesting fact that
most of the great victories in naval history have been won by a
smaller fleet over a larger. The effectiveness of a great navy
depends first on its quality, secondly, on how it is handled, and
thirdly, on its power of reaching the enemy's communications.
The quality of a navy is two-fold, material and personal. In material,
the great problem of modern days is to keep abreast of the time. The
danger to a navy lies in conservatism and bureaucratic control. There
is always the chance that a weaker power may defeat the stronger, not
by using the old weapons, but by devising some new weapon that will
render the old ones obsolete. The trouble with the professional man
in any walk of life has always been that he sticks to the traditional
ways. In consequence he lays himself open to the amateur, who,
caring nothing about tradition, beats him with something novel.
The inventions that have revolutionized naval warfare have come
from men outside the naval profession. Thus the Romans, unable to
match the Carthaginians in seamanship, made that seamanship of no
value by their invention of the corvus. Greek fire not only saved
the insignificant fleets of the Eastern Empire, but annihilated the
huge armadas of Saracen and Slav. If the South in our Civil War
had possessed the necessary resources, her ironclad rams would
have made an end of the Union navy and of the war. In our own time
the German submarine came within an ace of winning the war despite
all the Allied dreadnoughts, because its potentialities had not
been realized and no counter measures devised. A navy that drops
behind is lost.
The personal side is a matter of training and morale. The material
part is of no value unless it is operated by skill and by the will
to win. Slackness or inexperience or lack of heart in officers
or men--any of these may bring ruin. Napoleon once spoke of the
Russian army as brave, but as "an army without a soul." A navy
must have a soul. Unfortunately, the tendency in recent years has
been to emphasize the material and the mechanical at the expense of
the intellectual and spiritual. With all the enormous development
of the ships and weapons, it must be remembered that the man is,
and always will be, greater than the machine.
As to handling the navy, first of all the War Staff and the commander
in chief must solve the strategic problem correctly. The fate of
the Spanish Armada in the 16th Century and that of the Russian
navy at the beginning of the 20th are eloquent of the effect of
bad strategy on a powerful fleet. Secondly, the commander in chief
must be possessed of the right fighting doctrine--the spirit of the
offensive. In all ages the naval commander who sought to achieve
his purpose by avoiding battle went to disaster. The true objective
must be, now as always, _the destruction of the enemy's fleet_.
Such are the material and the spiritual essentials of sea power.
The phrase has become so popular that a superior fleet has been
widely accepted as a talisman in war. The idea is that a nation
with sea power must win. But with all the tremendous "influence of
sea power on history," the student must not be misled into thinking
that sea power is invincible. The Athenian navy went to ruin under
the catapults of Syracuse whose navy was insignificant. Carthage, the
sea power, succumbed to a land power, Rome. In modern times France,
with a navy second to England's, fell in ruin before Prussia, which
had practically no navy at all. And in the World War it required
the entry of a new ally, the United States, to save the Entente
from defeat at the hands of land power, despite an overwhelming
superiority on the sea.
The significance of sea power is _communications_. Just so far
as sea control affects lines of communications vital to either
belligerent, so far does it affect the war. To a sea empire like
the British, sea control is essential as a measure of defense.
If an enemy controls the sea the empire will fall apart like a
house of cards, and the British Isles will be speedily starved
into submission. It is another thing, however, to make the navy
a sword as well as a shield. Whenever the British navy could cut
the communications of the enemy, as in the case of the wars with
Spain and Holland, it was terribly effective. When it fought a
nation like Russia in the Crimean War, it hardly touched the sources
of Russian supplies, because these came by the interior land
communications. So also the French navy in 1870 could not touch
a single important line of German communications and its effect
therefore was negligible. If in 1914 Russia, for example, had been
neutral, no Allied naval superiority could have saved France from
destruction by the combined armies of Germany and Austria, just
as the Grand Fleet was powerless to check the conquest or deny
the possession of Belgium. It must be borne in mind that a land
power has the advantages of central position and interior lines, and
the interior lines of to-day are those of rail and motor transport,
offering facilities for a rapid concentration on any front.
Of course, modern life and modern warfare are so complex that few
nations are able to live and wage war entirely on their own resources;
important communications extend across the sea. In this respect
the United States is singularly fortunate. With the exception of
rubber, every essential is produced in our country, and the sea
power that would attempt to strangle the United States by a blockade
on two coasts would find it unprofitable even if it were practicable.
A hostile navy would have to land armies to strike directly at the
manufacturing cities near the seaboard in order to affect our
communications. In brief, sea power is decisive just so far as
it cuts the enemy's communications.
Finally in considering sea power we should note the importance
of coördinating naval policies with national. The character of a
navy and the size of a navy depend on what policy a nation expects
to stand for. It is the business of a navy to stand behind a nation's
will. For Great Britain, circumstances of position have long made
her policy consistent, without regard to change of party. She had
to dominate the sea to insure the safety of the empire. With the
United States, the situation has been different. The nation has
not been conscious of any foreign policy, with the single exception
of the Monroe Doctrine. And even this has changed in character
since it was first enunciated.
At the present day, for example, how far does the United States
purpose to go in the Monroe Doctrine? Shall we attempt to police
the smaller South and Central American nations? Shall we make the
Caribbean an area under our naval control? What is to be our policy
toward Mexico? How far are we willing to go to sustain the Open Door
policy in the Far East? Are we determined to resist the immigration
of Asiatics? Are we bound to hold against conquest our outlying
possessions,--the Philippines, Guam, Hawaiian Islands, and Alaska?
Shall we play a "lone hand" among nations, or join an international
league? Until there is some answer to these questions of foreign
policy, our naval program is based on nothing definite. In short,
the naval policy of a nation should spring from its national policy.
On that national policy must be based not only the types of ships
built and their numbers, but also the number and locale of the
naval bases and the entire strategic plan. In the past there has
been too little mutual understanding between the American navy and
the American people. The navy--the Service, as it is appropriately
called--is the trained servant of the republic. It is only fair to
ask that the republic make clear what it expects that servant to
do. But before a national policy is accepted, it must be thought
out to its logical conclusion by both the popular leaders and naval
advisers. As Mahan has said, "the naval officer must be a statesman
as well as a seaman." Is the policy accepted going to conflict
with that of another nation; if so, are we prepared to accept the
consequences?
The recent history of Germany is a striking example of the effect
of a naval policy on international relations. The closing decade
of the 19th century found Great Britain still following the policy
of "splendid isolation," with France and Russia her traditional
enemies. Her relations with Germany were friendly, as they always
had been. At the close of the century, the Kaiser, inspired by
Mahan's "_Influence of Sea Power on History,_" launched the policy
of a big navy. First, he argued, German commerce was growing with
astonishing rapidity. It was necessary, according to Mahan, to have
a strong navy to protect a great carrying trade. This von Tirpitz[1]
emphasizes, though he never makes clear just what precise danger
threatened the German trading fleets, provided Germany maintained a
policy of friendly relations with England. Secondly, Germany found
herself with no outlet for expansion. The best colonial fields had
already been appropriated by other countries, chiefly England. To
back up German claims to new territory or trading concessions, it
was necessary to have a strong navy. All this was strictly by the
book, and it is characteristic of the German mind that it faithfully
followed the text. "_Unsere Zukunft_," cried the Kaiser, "_liegt
auf dem Wasser!_" But what was implied in this proposal? A great
navy increasing rapidly to the point of rivaling that of England
could be regarded by that country only as a pistol leveled at her
head. England would be at the mercy of any power that could defeat
her navy. And this policy coupled with the demand for "a place in
the sun," threatened the rich colonies that lay under the British
flag. It could not be taken otherwise.
[Footnote 1: MY MEMOIRS, Chap. xv and _passim._]
These implications began to bear fruit after their kind. In the
place of friendliness on the part of the English,--a friendliness
uninterrupted by war, and based on the blood of their royal family
and the comradeship in arms against France in the days of Louis
XIV, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon--there developed a growing
hostility. In vain missions were sent by the British Government
to promote a better understanding, for the Germans declined to
accept either a "naval holiday" or a position of perpetual naval
inferiority. In consequence, England abandoned her policy of isolation,
and came to an understanding with her ancient enemies, Russia and
France. Thus Germany arrayed against herself all the resources of
the British Empire and in this act signed her own death warrant.
A final word as to the future of sea power. The influence of modern
inventions is bound to affect the significance of the sea in the
future. Oceans have practically dwindled away as national barriers.
Wireless and the speed of the modern steamship have reduced the
oceans to ponds. "Splendid isolation" is now impossible. Modern
artillery placed at Calais, for instance, could shell London and
cover the transportation of troops in the teeth of a fleet. Aircraft
cross land and sea with equal ease. The submersible has come to
stay. Indeed, it looks as if the navy of the future will tend first
to the submersible types and later abandon the sea for the air,
and the "illimitable pathways of the sea" will yield to still more
illimitable pathways of the sky. The consequence is bound to be a
closer knitting of the peoples of the world through the conquering
of distance by time.
This bringing together breeds war quite as easily as peace, and
the progress of invention makes wars more frightful. The closely
knit economic structure of Europe did not prevent the greatest
war in history and there is little hope for the idea that wars
can never occur again. The older causes of war lay in pressure
of population, the temptation of better lands, racial hatreds or
ambitions, religious fanaticism, dynastic aims, and imperialism.
Some of these remain. The chief modern source of trouble is trade
rivalry, with which imperialism is closely interwoven and trade
rivalry makes enemies of old friends. There is, therefore, a place
for navies still.
At present there are two great naval powers, Great Britain and
the United States. A race in naval armaments between the two would
be criminal folly, and could lead to only one disastrous end. The
immediate way toward guaranteeing freedom of the seas is a closer
entente between the two English-speaking peoples, whose common
ground extends beyond their speech to institutions and ideals of
justice and liberty. The fine spirit of cöoperation produced by
the World War should be perpetuated in peace for the purpose of
maintaining peace. In his memoirs van Tirpitz mourns the fact that
now "Anglo-Saxondom" controls the world. There is small danger that
where public opinion rules, the two peoples will loot the world
to their own advantage. On the other hand, there is every prospect
that, for the immediate future, sea power in their hands can be made
the most potent influence toward peace, and the preservation of
that inheritance of civilization which has been slowly accumulated
and spread throughout the world by those peoples of every age who
have been the pathfinders on the seas.
INDEX
A.
Abercromby, British general
Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy, British cruisers, loss of
Aboukir Bay, battle of, _see_ Nile
Actium, campaign of; battle of
Ægospotami, battle of
Agrippa, Roman admiral
Aircraft, in World War
Albuquerque, Portuguese viceroy
Alfred, king of England
Algeciras Convention
Ali Pasha, Turkish admiral
Allemand, French admiral
Almeida, Portuguese leader
Amboyna
Amiens, treaty of
Amsterdam
Anthony, Roman general, at Actium
Antwerp
Arabs, at war with Eastern Empire; as traders; ships of
Arbuthnot, British admiral
Ariabignes, Persian admiral
Aristides
Armada, _see_ Spanish Armada
Armed Neutrality, league of
Armor
Armstrong, Sir William
Athens, _see_ Greece
_Audacious_, British ship
August 10, battle of
Austerlitz battle of
Austria, in Napoleonic Wars; at war with Italy; in Triple Alliance;
in World War
B.
Bacon, Roger
Bagdad Railway
Bantry Bay, action in; attempted landing in
Barbarigo, Venetian admiral
Barbarossa, Turkish admiral
Barham, First Lord of Admiralty
Bart, Jean, French naval leader
Battle cruiser, _see_ Ships of War
Beachy Head, battle of
Beatty, British admiral, at Heligoland Bight; at Dogger Bank; at Jutland
Berlin Decree
Bismarck
Blake, British admiral
Blockade, in American Civil War; in World War
Boisot, Dutch admiral
Bonaparte, _see_ Napoleon
Bossu, Spanish admiral
Boxer Rebellion
Boyne, battle of
Bragadino, Venetian general
Breda, peace of
Bridport, British admiral
Brill, capture of
Brueys, French admiral
Burney, British admiral
Bushnell, David
C.
Cabot, John
Cadiz, founded; British expeditions to; blockaded by Blake; blockaded
by Jervis; Allied fleet in
Calder, British admiral; in action with Villeneuve
Camara, Spanish admiral
Camperdown, battle of
Canidius, Roman general
Carden, British admiral
Carpenter, Alfred, British commander
Carthage, founded; at war with Greece; in Punic Wars
Cervantes
Cervera, Spanish admiral; in Santiago campaign
Ceylon
Champlain, battle of Lake
Charlemagne
Charles II of England
Charles V of Spain
Charleston, attack on
Chatham, raided by Dutch
Chauncey, U. S. commodore
China, in ancient times; first ships to; at war with Japan; in disruption
Chios, battle of
Churchill, Winston
Cinque Ports
Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, in Actium campaign
Clerk, John
Collingwood, British admiral; at Trafalgar
Colonna, admiral of Papal States
Colport, British admiral
Columbus; voyages of
Commerce, of Phoenicians; under Roman Empire; with the East; in northern
Europe; in modern times
Commerce Warfare, in Dutch War of Independence; in Napoleonic Wars;
in War of 1812; in World War,
Communications, in warfare
Compass, introduction of
Condalmiero, Venetian admiral
Conflans, French admiral
Constantinople, founded; attacked by Arabs; attacked by Russians;
sacked by Crusaders; captured by Turks; in World War
Continental System
Continuous Voyage, doctrine of
Contraband
Convoy, System in World War
Cook, Captain James
Copenhagen, battle of
Corinthian Gulf, battle of
Cornwallis, British admiral
Coronel, battle of
Corsica
Corunna, Armada sails from; attacked by Drake; Allied fleet in
Corvi
Cradock, British admiral, at Coronel
Crete
Cromwell, Oliver
Custozza, battle of
Cyprus
D.
Da Gama, Vasco
Dardanelles, German squadron enters; campaign of
Darius, king of Persia
De Grasse, French admiral, at Virginia Capes; at Saints' Passage
De Guichen, French admiral
Denmark, in Copenhagen campaign
De Ruyter, Dutch admiral
D'Estaing, French admiral
Destroyer, _see_ Ships of War
Dewa, Japanese admiral
Dewey, U. S. admiral, at Manila
De Witt, Dutch admiral
Diaz, Bartolomeo
Diedrichs, German admiral
Director fire
Dirkzoon, Dutch admiral
Diu, battle of
Dogger Bank, Russian fleet off; action off
Don Juan of Austria, at Lepanto
Doria, Andrea, Genoese admiral
Doria, Gian Andrea, Genoese admiral
Dragut, Turkish commander
Drake, Sir Francis, British admiral, voyages of; in Armada campaign;
last years of
Dreadnought, _see_ Ships of War
Drepanum, battle of
Duguay-Trouin, French commander
Duilius, Roman consul
Dumanoir, French admiral
Duncan, British admiral, at Camperdown
Dungeness, battle of
E.
East Indies Companies, British and Dutch
Ecnomus, battle of
Egypt, early ships of; Napoleon in
Elizabeth, queen of England
_Emden_, German cruiser; cruise of
England, early naval history of; at war with Spain; at war with
Holland; at war with France; plans for invasion of.
_See_ Great Britain
Entente of Great Britain, France, and Russia
Ericsson, John
Erie, battle of Lake
Eurybiades, Spartan commander
Evan-Thomas, British admiral
Evertsen, Dutch admiral
F.
Falkland Islands, battle of
Farragut, U. S. admiral
Fighting Instructions, of British Navy
Fireships
First of June, battle of
Fisher, British admiral
Fisher, Fort, capture of
Fleet in Being
Foch, French general
Foley, British captain
Four Days' Battle, in Dutch Wars
France, at war with England in 18th century; in Napoleonic Wars; in
Far East; aids Russia; in World War
Francis I, of France
Frobisher, Martin
Fulton, Robert; his submarine
G.
Gabbard, battle of
_Galleon of Venice_, Venetian ship
Galley, galleon, galleas, _see_ Ships of War
Gallipoli Peninsula, operations on; _see_ Dardanelles
Ganteaume, French admiral
Genoa; at war with Venice
Germany, early commerce under Hausa; unification of; in Far East;
aids Russia; growth of; in World War.
Gibraltar, captured by British; blockaded
_Göben_, German battle cruiser, escape of
Goodenough, British naval officer, at Heligoland Bight; at Jutland
Grand Fleet, British; strength of; at Jutland
Graves, British admiral
Gravina, Spanish admiral
Great Britain, in Napoleonic Wars; in War of 1812; in World War.
_See_ England.
Greece; at war with Persia; in Peloponnesian War
Greek fire
Grenville, Sir Richard
Guns, gunpowder, _see_ Ordnance
Gunfleet, battle of
H.
Hampton Roads, battle of
Hannibal
Hanseatic League
Hase, German naval officer, quoted
Hawke, British admiral
Hawkins, John
Heath, British admiral
Heimskirck, Jacob van, Dutch seaman
Heligoland; battle of
Heligoland Bight, battle of
Hellespont
Henry, Prince, the Navigator
Henry VIII, of England
Herbert, Lord Torrington, British admiral
Hermæa, battle of
High Seas Fleet, of Germany; strength of; at Jutland; surrender of
Hindenberg, German general
Hipper, German admiral, at Dogger Bank; at Jutland
Hobson, U. S. naval officer
Hoche, French general
Holland, _see_ Netherlands
Holland, John P.
Hood, British admiral, at Virginia Capes; at Saints' Passage,
Hood, British rear-admiral, at Jutland
Horton, Max, British commander
Hotham, British admiral
Howard, Thomas, of Effingham
Howe, British admiral; at First of June
Hudson, Henry
Hughes, British admiral
I.
Interior Lines, defined
Italy, at war with Austria; in World War
Ito, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu
J.
Jamaica, captured by British
Janissaries
Japan, at war with China; at war with Russia
Jellicoe, British admiral; at Jutland
Jervis, Earl St. Vincent, British admiral; character of; at Cape
St. Vincent
Jones, Paul, American naval officer
Juan, _see_ Don Juan
Jutland, battle of
K.
Kamimura, Japanese admiral
_Karlsrühe_, German cruiser
Keith, British admiral
Kentish Knock, battle of
Keyes, British naval officer
Kiao-chau, seized by Germany
Kiel Canal
Kitchener, British general
_Königsberg_, German cruiser
Korea
L.
Lake, Simon
La Hogue, battle of
La Touche Tréville, French admiral
Lepanto, campaign of; battle of
Lepidus, Roman general
Leyden, siege of
Lowestoft, battle of
London, Declaration of
Louis XIV of France
_Lusitania_, loss of
M.
McGiffin, American naval officer, at the Yalu
Macdonough, U. S. commodore
Magellan, Portuguese navigator
Mahan, American naval officer, quoted; in Spanish-American War
_Maine_, U. S. battleship
Makaroff, Russian admiral
Malta; siege of
Manila, battle of
Marathon, battle of
Mardonius
Martel, Charles
Mary Queen of Scots
Matelieff, de Jonge, Dutch seaman
Medina Sidonia, Duke of
_Merrimac_, Confederate ram; in action with _Monitor_
Milne, British admiral
Mine barrage, in North Sea
Missiessy, French admiral
Mohammed
Mohammedans, _see_ Arabs
_Monitor_, U. S. ironclad-292
Monk, British admiral
Monroe Doctrine
Montojo, Spanish admiral
Moore, British admiral
Muaviah, Emir of Syria
Mukden, battle of
Müller, German naval officer
Muza, Mohammedan general
Mycale, battle of
Mylæ, battle of
N.
Napoleon, quoted; in Italy; in Egypt; plans northern coalition;
attempts invasion of England; instructs Villeneuve; adopts
continental system
Naupaktis, battle of
Navarino, battle of
Navigation, progress in
Navigation Acts
Navy, British, administration of; under Commonwealth; training of
officers for; at Restoration; in 18th century; in French
Revolutionary Wars; mutiny in; in War of 1812; size of, in World
War. _See_ England, Great
Britain.
French, in 18th century; in French Revolution. _See_ France.
United States, in War of 1812; in Civil War; in World War.
_See_ United States
Nebogatoff, Russian admiral
Nelson, Horatio, British admiral; in Mediterranean; at Cape St.
Vincent; at the Nile; at Copenhagen; in the Channel; in Trafalgar
campaign and battle
Netherlands, at war with Hansa; commerce of; at war with Spain; at
war with England; in War of American Revolution; in Napoleonic Wars,
New York, taken by British; held by Howe
Nicosia, siege of
Nile, campaign of; battle of
Nore, mutiny at
North Sea Mine Barrage, _see_ Mine Barrage
O.
Octavius, Roman emperor, at Actium
Ontario, campaign on Lake
Open Door Policy
Oquendo, Spanish naval officer
Ordnance, early types of; introduced on ships; at Armada;
breech-loading; rifled; long range
_Oregon_, U. S. battleship, cruise of; at Santiago
P.
Panama Canal
Parker, British Admiral, at Copenhagen-258
Parma, Duke of
Peloponnesian War
Penn, British admiral
Perry, U. S. Commodore
Persano, Italian admiral, at Lissa
Persia, conquers Phnicia; at war with Greece
Pharselis, battle of
Philip II, of Spain
Phnicia, commerce and colonies of; at Salamis
Phormio, Greek admiral
Platea, battle of
Port Arthur; given to Japan; seized by Russia; operations around; fall of
Portland, battle of
Portsmouth, Treaty of
Portugal, commerce and colonies of; decline of
Prevesa, battle of
Prussia, in Northern Coalition; at war with Austria
Ptolemy
Q.
"Q-ships"
Quiberon Bay, battle of
R.
Raleigh, Sir Walter
Recalde, Spanish naval officer
Renaissance
_Revenge_, Drake's flagship; last fight of
Robeck, British admiral, at Dardanelles
Rodman, U. S. admiral
Rodney, British admiral; at Saints' Passage
Rojdestvensky, Russian admiral, cruise of; at Tsushima
Rome, in Punic Wars; in Actium campaign; wars of Eastern Empire
Rooke, British admiral
Roosevelt, Theodore
Rosyth, British base
Rupert, Prince
Russia, in Napoleonic Wars; in Far East;
at war with Japan, in World War
Ruyter. _See_ De Ruyter
S.
Saint Andrée, Jean Bon
St. Vincent, battle of Cape
St. Vincent, Earl of. _See_ Jervis
Saints' Passage, battle of
Salamis, battle of; campaign of
Salonika
Sampson, U. S. admiral, in Santiago campaign
San Juan de Ulna, fight at
Santa Cruz, Spanish admiral
Santiago, battle of
Saracens. _See_ Arabs
Scapa Flow, British base
Scheer, German admiral, at Jutland
Scheldt River; battle in; blockaded by Dutch
Scheveningen, battle of
Schley, U. S. naval officer, in Santiago campaign
Schoonevelt, battle of
Scott, Sir Percy, British admiral
Sea Beggars
Sea Power, preserves Greece; England's gains by; in Napoleonic Wars;
in World War; influence of; elements of
Selim the Drunkard, Sultan of Turkey
Semenoff, Russian naval officer
Seymour, British admiral, at Armada
Shafter, U. S. general
Shimonoseki, Treaty of
Ships of War, "round" and "long"; trireme; penteconter; liburna;
galley; dromon; galleas; junk; Viking craft; galleon; two and
three-deckers; steam; submarine; destroyer; battle cruiser;
dreadnought
Sicily; in Punic Wars
Sims, U. S. admiral
Sinope, bombardment of
Sirocco. Turkish admiral
Sluis, battle of
Solebay, battle of
Soliman the Magnificent, Sultan of Turkey
Souchon, German admiral
Spain, at war with Turks; discoveries of; at war with Dutch; at war
with England; in Napoleonic Wars; at war with United States
Spanish Armada
Sparta. _See_ Greece.
Spee, German admiral
Steam navigation, beginnings of
Sturdee, British admiral
Submarine, early types of; in World War
Suez Canal
Suffren, French admiral
Syracuse, at war with Athens
T.
Tactics, of galleys; after use of sails and guns; in Dutch wars; in
18th century; after use of armor; influenced by Lissa; at Jutland;
in submarine warfare
Takeomi, Japanese naval officer
Tegetthoff, Austrian admiral, at Lissa
Teneriffe, attacked by Blake
Terschelling, raided by English
Texel, battle of
Themistocles
Theophanes
Thermopylæ, battle of
Ting, Chinese admiral, at the Yalu
Tirpitz, German admiral
Togo, Japanese admiral; at battle of 10th of August; at Tsushima
Togo, Japanese squadron commander
Tordesillas, Treaty of
Torpedoes, origin of name; Whitehead; in Russo-Japanese war,
Torrington, Earl of. _See_ Herbert
Toscanelli, Paul
Toulon, French base
Tourville, French admiral
Trafalgar, battle of
Transport service, in World War
Triple Alliance
Tromp, Cornelius, Dutch admiral
Tromp, Martin, Dutch admiral
Troubridge, British naval officer
Tsuboi, Japanese admiral, at the Yalu
Tsushima, battle of
Tunis; captured by Spanish; attacked by Blake
Turkey, rise of; at war with Venice and Spain; in World War
Tyrwhitt, British naval officer
U.
Ulm, battle of
Uluch Ali, Turkish leader; in Lepanto campaign
United States, in American Revolution; in War of 1812; in Civil War;
in Spanish-American War; in World War; naval problems of. _See_ Navy
V.
Valdes, Pedro de, Spanish naval officer
Valdes, Pedrode, Spanish naval officer
Vandals
Veniero, Venetian admiral
_Vengeur du Peuple_, French ship
Venice, early history of; commerce of; at war with Turks; ships of
Vikings
Villaret de Joyeuse, French admiral, at First of June
Villeneuve, French admiral; at the Nile; in Trafalgar campaign and battle
Virginia Capes, battle of
W.
Wangenheim, Baron von
Wei-hai-wei
William II, German emperor
William III of England
William, Prince of Orange
Wilson, Woodrow, President of United States
Winter, Dutch admiral
Witjeft, Russian admiral
X.-Y.-Z.
Xerxes
"Y-guns"
Yalu, battle of
York, Duke of, afterward James II of England
Zama, battle of
Zeebrugge, attack on