THE WORLD WAR: THE FIRST YEAR (1914-1915)
The Russo-Japanese war greatly weakened Russia's position in Europe,
and left the Dual Alliance of France and Russia overweighted by the
military strength of the Teutonic Empires, Germany and Austria,
whether or not Italy should adhere to the Triple Alliance with
these nations. To Great Britain, such a disturbance of the European
balance was ever a matter of grave concern, and an abandonment
of her policy of isolation was in this instance virtually forced
upon her by Germany's rivalry in her own special sphere of commerce
and sea power.
The disturbing effect of Germany's naval growth during the two
decades prior to 1914 affords in fact an excellent illustration
of the influence of naval strength in peace as well as in war.
Under Bismarck Germany had pushed vigorously though tardily into
the colonial field, securing vast areas of rather doubtful value
in East and West Africa, and the Bismarck Archipelago, Marshall
Islands, and part of New Guinea in the Pacific. With the accession
of William II in 1888 and the dropping of the pilot, Bismarck,
two years later, she embarked definitely upon her quest for world
power. The young Kaiser read eagerly Mahan's _Influence of Sea
Power Upon History_ (1890), distributed it among the ships of his
still embryonic navy, and fed his ambition on the doctrines of
this epoch-making work.
Naval development found further stimulus and justification in the
rapid economic growth of Germany. In 1912 her industrial production
attained a value of three billion dollars, as compared with slightly
over four billion for England and seven billion for the United
States. Since 1893 her merchant marine had tripled in size and
taken second place to that of England with a total of over five
million tons. During the same period she surpassed France and the
United States in volume of foreign commerce, and in this respect
also reached a position second to Great Britain, with a more rapid
rate of increase. An emigration of 220,000 a year in the early
eighties was cut down to 22,000 in 1900.[1] To assure markets for
her manufactures, and continued growth in population and industry,
Germany felt that she must strive to extend her political power.
[Footnote 1: Figures from Priest, GERMANY SINCE 1840, p. 150 ff.]
Though Germany's commercial expansion met slight opposition even
in areas under British control, it undoubtedly justified measures
of political and naval protection; and it was this motive that was
advanced in the preface to the German Naval Bill of 1900, which
declared that, "To protect her sea trade and colonies ... Germany
must have a fleet so strong that a war, even with the greatest naval
power, would involve such risks as to jeopardize the position of that
power."[2] Furthermore, Germany's quest for colonies and points of
vantage such as Kiao-chau, her scheme for a Berlin-Bagdad railroad
with domination of the territories on the route, had parallel in
the activities of other nations. Unfortunately, however, Germany's
ambitions grew even more rapidly than her commerce, until her true
aim appeared to be destruction of rivals and domination of the
world.
[Footnote 2: Hurd and Castle, GERMAN SEA POWER, Appendix II.]
The seizure of Kiao-chau in 1897-98 coincided with the appointment
of Admiral von Tirpitz as Imperial Minister of Marine. Under his
administration, the Naval Bill of 1900, passed in a heat of anglophobia
aroused by the Boer War, doubled the program of 1898, and contained
ingenious provisions by which the Reichstag was bound to steady
increases covering a long period of years, and by which the Navy
Department was empowered to replace worthless old craft, after 20
or 25 years' service, with new ships of the largest size. As the
armament race grew keener, this act was amended in the direction
of further increases, but its program was never cut down.
International crises and realignments marked the growing tension of
these years. In 1905 England extended for ten years her understanding
with Japan. By the _Entente Cordiale_ with France in 1904 and a
later settlement of outstanding difficulties with Russia, she also
practically changed the Dual Alliance into a Triple Entente, though
without positively binding herself to assistance in war. To the
agreement of 1904 by which England and France assured each other
a free hand in Egypt and Morocco, respectively, the Kaiser raised
strenuous objections, and forced the resignation of the anglophile
French Foreign Minister, Delcassé; but at the Algeciras Convention
of 1906, assembled to settle the Morocco question, Germany and
Austria stood virtually alone. Even the American delegates, sent
by President Roosevelt at the Kaiser's invitation, voted generally
with the Western Powers. When Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1909, the Kaiser shook the mailed fist to better effect than at
Algeciras, with the result that Russia had to accept this extension
of Austro-German influence in the Balkan sphere. Still again two years
later, when the German cruiser _Panther_ made moves to establish a
base at Agadir on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, Europe approached
the verge of war; but Germany found the financial situation against
her, backed down, and eventually took a strip of land on the Congo
in liquidation of her Morocco claims.
For all her resolute saber-rattling in these years, Germany found
herself checkmated in almost every move. The Monroe Doctrine, for
which the United States showed willingness to fight in the Venezuela
affair of 1902, balked her schemes in the New World. In the Far
East she faced Japan; in Africa, British sea power. A "_Drang nach
Osten_," through the Balkans and Turkey toward Asia Minor, offered
on the whole the best promise; and it was in this quarter that
Austria's violent demands upon Serbia aroused Russia and precipitated
the World War.
Great Britain's foreign agreements, already noted, had as a primary
aim the concentration of her fleet in home waters. Naval predominance
in the Far East she turned over to Japan; in the western Atlantic,
to the United States (at least by acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine
and surrender of treaty rights to share in the construction of the
Panama Canal); and in the Mediterranean, to France, though England
still kept a strong cruiser force in this field. The old policy of
showing the flag all over the world was abandoned, 160 old ships
were sent to the scrap heap as unable "either to fight or to run
away," and 88% of the fleet was concentrated at home, so quietly
that it "was found out only by accident by Admiral Mahan."[1]
[Footnote 1: Admiral Fisher, MEMORIES, p. 185.]
These and other changes were carried out under the energetic régime
of Admiral Fisher, First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910. The British
_Dreadnought_ of 1906, completed in 10 months, and the battle cruisers
of 1908--_Indefatigable, Invincible_ and _Indomitable_--came as
an unpleasant surprise to Germany, necessitating construction of
similar types and enlargement of the Kiel Canal. Reforms in naval
gunnery urged by Admiral Sir Percy Scott were taken up, and plans
were made for new bases in the Humber, in the Forth at Rosyth, and
in the Orkneys, necessitated by the shift of front from the Channel
to the North Sea. But against the technical skill, painstaking
organization, and definitely aggressive purpose of Germany, even more
radical measures were needed to put the tradition-ridden British
navy in readiness for war.
Naval preparedness was vital, for the conflict was fundamentally,
like the Napoleonic Wars, a struggle between land power predominant
on the Continent and naval power supreme on the seas. As compared
with France in the earlier struggle, Germany was more dependent
on foreign commerce, and in a long war would feel more keenly the
pressure of blockade. On the other hand, while the naval preponderance
of England and her allies was probably greater than 100 years before,
England had to throw larger armies into the field and more of her
shipping into naval service, and found her commerce not augmented
but cut down.
Indeed, Germany was not without advantage in the naval war. As
she fully expected, her direct sea trade was soon shut off, and
her shipping was driven to cover or destroyed. But Germany was
perhaps 80% self-supporting, was well supplied with minerals and
munitions, and could count on trade through neutral states on her
frontiers. Her shallow, well-protected North Sea coast-line gave
her immunity from naval attack and opportunity to choose the moment
in which to throw her utmost strength into a sortie. So long as her
fleet remained intact, it controlled the Baltic by virtue of an
interior line through the Kiel Canal, thus providing a strangle hold
on Russia and free access to northern neutrals. Only by dangerous
division of forces, or by leaving the road to England and the Atlantic
open, could the British fleet enter the Baltic Sea. England it is
true had a superior navy (perhaps less superior than was commonly
thought), and a position of singular advantage between Germany and
the overseas world. But for her the maintenance of naval superiority
was absolutely essential. An effective interference with her sea
communications would quickly put her out of the war.
The importance (for Germany as well as for England) of preserving
their main fighting fleets, may explain the wariness with which
they were employed. Instead of risking them desperately, both sides
turned to commerce warfare--the Western Powers resorting to blockade
and the Germans to submarines. Each of these forms of warfare played
a highly important part in the war, and the submarine campaign in
particular, calling for new methods and new instruments, seems
almost to have monopolized the naval genius and energies of the
two groups of belligerents. It may be noted, however, that but
for the cover given by the High Seas Fleet, the submarine campaign
could hardly have been undertaken; and but for the Grand Fleet,
it would have been unnecessary.
The naval strength of the various belligerents in July, 1914, appears
in the table on the following page.[1]
[Footnote 1: From table prepared by U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence,
July 1, 1916.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Great |Ger-| U.S. | | | | |
|Britain|many|(1916)|France|Japan|Russia|Italy|Austria
---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
Dreadnoughts | 20 | 13 | 12 | 4 | 2 | .. | 3 | 3
---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
Pre-dreadn'ts | 40 | 20 | 21 | 18 | 13 | 7 | 8 | 6
---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
Battle Cruisers| 9 | 4 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | ..
---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
Armored Cr's | 34 | 9 | 10 | 20 | 13 | 6 | 9 | 2
---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
Cruisers | 74 | 41 | 14 | 9 | 13 | 9 | 6 | 5
---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
Destroyers | 167 |130 | 54 | 84 | 50 | 91 | 36 | 18
---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-------
Submarines | 78 | 30 | 44 | 64 | 13 | 30 | 19 | 6
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Owing to new construction, these figures underwent rapid change.
Thus England added 4 dreadnoughts (2 built for Turkey) in August,
1914; the battle cruiser _Tiger_ in November; the dreadnought _Canada_
and 5 _Queen Elizabeths_ in 1915; and 5 _Royal Sovereigns_ in
1915-1916. In comparisons, full account is not always taken of
the naval support of England's allies; it is true, however, that
the necessity of protecting coasts, troop convoys, and commerce
prevented her from throwing her full strength into the North Sea.
Her capital ships were in two main divisions--the 1st or Grand
Fleet in the Orkneys, and the 2d fleet, consisting at first of
16 pre-dreadnoughts, in the Channel. Admiral Jellico[1] gives the
strength of the Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet, on
August 4, 1914, as follows:
[Footnote 1: THE GRAND FLEET, p. 31.]
--------------------------------------------------------------------
| | Pre- | | | | |
|Dread- |Dread- | Battle | Light |Destroyers| Air-|Cruisers
|noughts|noughts|cruisers|cruisers| |ships|
-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-----|---------
British| 20 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 42 | .. | 9
German | 13 | 16 | 3 | 15 | 88 | 1 | 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Of submarines, according to the same authority, England had 17 of
the D and E classes fit for distant operations, and 37 fit only for
coast defense, while Germany had 28 U boats, all but two or three
of which were able to cruise overseas. The British admiral's account
of the inferiority of the British navy in submarines, aircraft,
mines, destroyers, director firing (installed in only 8 ships in
1914), armor-piercing shells, and protection of bases, seems to
justify the caution of British operations, but is a severe indictment
of the manner in which money appropriated for the navy was used.
To open a war with England by surprise naval attack was no doubt
an element in German plans; but in 1914 this was negatived by the
forewarning of events on the Continent, by Germany's persistent delusion
that England would stay neutral, and by the timely mobilization of
the British fleet. This had been announced the winter before as
a practical exercise, was carried out according to schedule from
July 16 to July 23 (the date of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia),
and was then extended until July 29, at which date the Grand Fleet
sailed for Scapa Flow.
At midnight of August 4 the British ultimatum to Germany expired
and hostilities began. During the same night the Grand Fleet swept
the northern exit of the North Sea to prevent the escape of enemy
raiders, only one of which, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, actually
reached the Atlantic in this first stage of the war. On a similar
sweep further south, the Harwich light cruiser and destroyer force
under Commodore Tyrwhitt sank by gunfire the mine layer _Königin
Luise_, which a trawler had reported "throwing things overboard";
but the next morning, August 6, the cruiser _Amphion_, returning
near the same position, was destroyed by two mines laid by her
victim of the day before. On the same date five cables were cut
leading from Germany overseas. From August 10 to 23 all British
forces were busy covering the transit of the first troops sent to
the Continent. Such, in brief summary, and omitting more distant
activities for the present, were the opening naval events of the
war.
_The Heligoland Bight Action_
On the morning of August 28 occurred a lively action in Heligoland
Bight, which cost Germany 3 light cruisers and a destroyer, and
seemed to promise further aggressive action off the German shores.
The British plan called for a destroyer and light cruiser sweep
southward to a point about 12 miles west of Heligoland, and thence
westward, with submarines disposed off Heligoland as decoys, the
object being to cut off German destroyers and patrols. Commodore
Tyrwhitt's force which was to execute the raid consisted of the
1st and 3rd flotillas of 16 destroyers each, led by the new light
cruiser _Arethusa_, flagship (28.5 knots, two 6", six 4" guns),
and the _Fearless_ (25-4 knots, ten 4" guns). These were to be
supported about 50 miles to westward by two battle cruisers from
the Humber. This supporting force was at the last moment joined
by three battle cruisers under Admiral Beatty and 6 cruisers under
Commodore Goodenough from the Grand Fleet; but news of the accession
never reached Commodore Keyes of the British submarines, who was
hence puzzled later by the appearance of Goodenough's cruisers
on the scene.
[Illustration: HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, AUG. 28, 1914]
The Germans, it appears, had got wind of the enemy plan, and arranged
a somewhat similar counter-stroke. As Commodore Tyrwhitt's flotillas
swept southward, they engaged and chased 10 German destroyers straight
down upon Heligoland. Here the _Arethusa_ and the _Fearless_ were
sharply engaged with two German light cruisers, the _Stettin_, and
the _Frauenlob_ (ten 4.1" guns each), until actually in sight of
the island. Both sides suffered, the _Frauenlob_ withdrawing to
Wilhelmshaven with 50 casualties, and the _Arethusa_ having her
speed cut down and nearly every gun put temporarily out of
commission.
Whipping around to westward, the flotillas caught the German destroyer
_V 187_, which at 9.10, after an obstinate resistance, was reduced to
a complete wreck enveloped in smoke and steam. As British destroyers
picked up survivors, they were driven off by the _Stettin_; but two
boats with British crews and German prisoners were rescued later by
the British submarine _E 4_, which had been lurking nearby.
Extraordinary confusion now developed from the fact that Commodore
Keyes in his submarine flotilla leader _Lurcher_ sighted through
the mist two of Goodenough's cruisers (which had chased a destroyer
eastward), and reported them as enemies. The call was picked up
by Goodenough himself, who brought his remaining four ships to
Keyes' assistance; but when these appeared, Keyes thought that
he had to deal with four enemies more! Tyrwhitt was also drawn
backward by the alarm. Luckily the situation was cleared up without
serious consequences.
German cruisers, darting out of the Ems and the Jade, were now
entering the fray. At 10.55 the _Fearless_ and the _Arethusa_ with
their flotillas were attacked by the _Stralsund_, which under a
heavy fire made off toward Heligoland. Then at 11.15 the _Stettin_
engaged once more, and five minutes later the _Mainz_. Just as
this last ship was being finished up by destroyer attack, and the
_Stettin_ and two fresh cruisers, _Köln_ and _Ariadne_, were
rushing to her assistance, Beatty's five battle cruisers appeared
to westward and rose swiftly out of the haze.
Admiral Beatty's opportune dash into action at this time, from
his position 40 miles away, was in response to an urgent call from
Tyrwhitt at 11.15, coupled with the fact that, as the Admiral states
in his report, "The flotillas had advanced only 2 miles since 8
a.m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy bases." "Our high
speed," the report continues, "made submarine attack difficult,
and the smoothness of the sea made their detection fairly easy. I
considered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sortie
except by a battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in
time, provided our stroke was sufficiently rapid."
The _Stettin_ broke backward just in the nick of time. The _Köln_
flagship of the German commodore, was soon staggering off in a
blaze, and was later sunk with her total complement of 380 officers
and men. The _Ariadne_, steaming at high speed across the bows of
the British flagship _Lion_, was put out of action by two well-placed
salvos. At 1.10 the _Lion_ gave the general signal "Retire."
[Illustration: HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, FINAL PHASE, 12:30-1:40
From 20 to 40 miles slightly S. of W. from Heligoland.]
Though the German cruisers had fought hard and with remarkable
accuracy of fire, their movements had been tardy and not well concerted.
The British losses amounted altogether to only 33 killed and 40
wounded; while the enemy lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners
over 1000 men. Very satisfactory, from the British standpoint, was
the effect of the victory upon their own and upon enemy morale.
Encouragement of this kind was desirable, for German submarines
and mines were already beginning to take their toll. Off the Forth
on September 5, a single torpedo sank the light cruiser _Pathfinder_
with nearly all hands. This loss was avenged when a week later the
_E 9_, under Lieut. Commander Max Harton, struck down the German
cruiser _Hela_ within 6 miles of Heligoland. But on September 22,
at 6.30 a.m., a single old-type German craft, the _U 9_, dealt a
staggering blow. With a total of 6 torpedoes Commander Weddigen sank
first the _Aboukir_, and then in quick succession the _Hogue_
and the _Cressy_, both dead in the water at the work of rescue.
The loss of these rather antiquated vessels was less serious than
that of over 1400 trained officers and men. A shock to British
traditions came with the new order that ships must abandon injured
consorts and make all speed away.
In the bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, which at the outbreak of
war were totally unprotected against submarines and thought to
be beyond their reach, the Grand Fleet felt less secure than when
cruising on the open sea. Safer refuges were sought temporarily
on the west coast of Scotland and at Lough Swilly in the north
of Ireland, but even off this latter base on October 27, the big
dreadnought _Audacious_ was sunk by mines laid by the German auxiliary
cruiser _Berlin_. In view of the impending Turkish crisis, the loss
was not admitted by the Admiralty, though since pictures of the
sinking ship had actually been taken by passengers on the White
Star liner _Olympic_, it could not long remain concealed. Mines and
submarines had seemingly put the British navy on the defensive,
even if consolation could be drawn from the fact that troops and
supplies were crossing safely to France, the enemy had been held
up at the Marne, the German surface fleet was passive, and the
blockade was closing down.
_Escape of the "Göben" and the "Breslau"_
In distant waters Germany at the outbreak of the war had only ten
cruisers--_Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Nürnberg_, and _Leipzig_
in the Pacific, _Königsberg_ on the east coast of Africa,
_Karlsruhe_ and _Dresden_ in the West Indies, and _Göben_
and _Breslau_ in the Mediterranean. Within six months' time,
these, together with a few auxiliary cruisers fitted out abroad,
were either destroyed or forced to intern in neutral ports. Modern
wireless communication, difficulties of coaling and supply, and
the overwhelming naval strength of the Allies made the task of
surface raiders far more difficult than in previous wars. They
were nevertheless skillfully handled, and, operating in the wide
ocean areas, created a troublesome problem for the Western Powers.
The battle cruiser _Göben_ and the light cruiser _Breslau_
alone, operating under Admiral Souchon in Mediterranean waters,
accomplished ultimate results which would have easily justified
the sacrifice of ten times the number of ships lost by Germany in
distant seas. To hunt down these two vessels, and at the same time
contain the Austrian Navy, the Entente had in the Mediterranean
not only the bulk of the French fleet but also 3 battle cruisers, 4
armored cruisers, and 4 light cruisers of Great Britain. Early on
August 4, as he was about to bombard the French bases of Bona and
Philippeville in Algiers, Admiral Souchon received wireless orders
to make for the Dardanelles. Germany and England were then on the
very verge of war. Knowing the British ships to be concentrated near
Malta, and actually passing the _Indomitable_ and the _Invincible_ in
sullen silence as he turned eastward, the German commander decided
to put in at Messina, Sicily.
At the end of the 24 hours granted in this port, the prospects
for the German ships appeared so desperate that the officers, it
is said, made their final testaments before again putting to sea.
Slipping eastward through the Straits of Messina at twilight of
the 6th, they were sighted by the British scout _Gloucester_, which
stuck close at their heels all that night and until 4.40 p.m. the
next day. Then, under orders to turn back, and after boldly engaging
the _Breslau_ to check the flight, Captain Kelly of the _Gloucester_
gave up the pursuit as the enemy rounded the Morea and entered
the Greek Archipelago.
The escape thus apparently so easy was the outcome of lack of
coördination between French and British, slow and poor information
from the British Admiralty, and questionable disposition of the
British forces on the basis of information actually at hand. Prior
to hostilities, it was perhaps unavoidable that the British commander,
Admiral Milne, should be ignorant of French plans; but even on August
5 and 6 he still kept all his battle cruisers west and north of
Sicily to protect the French troop transports, though by this time
he might have felt assured that the French fleet was at sea. At
the time of the escape Admiral Troubridge with 4 armored cruisers
and a destroyer force barred the Adriatic; though he caught the
_Gloucester's_ calls, he was justified in not moving far from his
station without orders, in view of his inferior strength and speed.
Not until August 10 did British forces enter the Ægean; and at
5 p.m. that day the two German ships steamed uninvited up the
Dardanelles. Since the Turkish situation was still somewhat dubious,
Admiral Souchon had been ordered to delay his entrance; but on
the 10th, hearing British wireless signals steadily approaching
his position in the Greek islands, he took the decision into his
own hands. Germany had "captured Turkey," as an Allied diplomat
remarked upon seeing the ships in the Golden Horn.
In this affair the British, it is true, had many preoccupations--the
hostile Austrian fleet, the doubtful neutrality of Italy, the French
troop movement; the safety of Egypt and Suez. Yet the Admiralty were
well aware that the German Ambassador von Wangenheim was dominant
in Turkish councils and that the Turkish army was mobilized under
German officers. It seems strange, therefore, that an escape into
Constantinople was, in the words of the British Official History,
"the only one that had not entered into our calculations." The whole
affair illustrates the immense value political information may have
in guiding naval strategy. The German ships, though ostensibly
"sold" to the Turks, retained their German personnel. Admiral Souchon
assumed command of the Turkish Navy, and by an attack on Russian
ships in the Black Sea later succeeded in precipitating Turkey's
entrance into the war, with its long train of evil consequences
for the Western Powers.
_Coronel and the Falkland Islands_
In the Pacific the German cruisers were at first widely scattered,
the _Emden_ at Kiao-chau, the _Leipzig_ on the west coast of
Mexico, the _Nürnberg_ at San Francisco, and the armored cruisers
_Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ under Admiral von Spee in the Caroline
Islands. The two ships at the latter point, after being joined by
the _Nürnberg_, set out on a leisurely cruise for South America,
where, in view of Japan's entry into the war, the German Admiral may
have felt that he would secure a clearer field of operations and,
with the aid of German-Americans, better facilities for supplies.
After wrecking on their way the British wireless and cable station at
Fanning Island, and looking into Samoa for stray British cruisers,
the trio of ships were joined at Easter Island on October 14 by the
_Leipzig_ and also by the _Dresden_, which had fled thither from the
West Indies.
The concentration thus resulting seems of doubtful wisdom, for,
scattered over the trade routes, the cruisers would have brought
about greater enemy dispersion and greater injury to commerce; and,
as the later course of the war was to show, the loss of merchant
tonnage was even more serious for the Entente than loss of fighting
ships. It seems evident, however, that Admiral van Spee was not
attracted by the tame task of commerce destroying, but wished to
try his gunnery, highly developed in the calm waters of the Far
East, against enemy men-of-war.
In its present strength and position, the German "fleet in being"
constituted a serious menace, for to assemble an adequate force
against it on either side of Cape Horn would mean to leave the
other side dangerously exposed. It was with a keen realization of
this dilemma that Admiral Cradock in the British armored cruiser
_Good Hope_ left the Falklands on October 22 to join the _Monmouth,
Glasgow_, and auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_ in a sweep along the west
coast. The old battleship _Canopus_, with 12-inch guns, but only 12
knots cruising speed, was properly judged too slow to keep with the
squadron. It is difficult to say whether the failure to send Cradock
reënforcements at this time from either the Atlantic or the Pacific
was justified by the preoccupations in those fields. Needless to
say, there was no hesitation, _after_ Coronel, in hurrying ships to
the scene. On November 1, when the Admiralty Board was reorganized
with Admiral Fisher in his old place as First Sea Lord, orders
at once went out sending the _Defense_ to Cradock and enjoining
him not to fight without the _Canopus_. But these orders he never
received.
The composition of the two squadrons now approaching each other
off the Chilean coast was as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name | Type |Displace-| Belt | Guns |Speed
| | ment |armor | |
-------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|-----
Scharnhorst |Armored cruiser | 11,600 |6-inch|8-8.2", 6-6" | 23.5
Gneisenau |Armored cruiser | 11,600 |6-inch|8-8.2", 6-6" | 23.5
Leipzig |Protected cruiser| 3,250 |none |10-4" | 23
Nürnberg |Light cruiser | 3,450 |none |10-4" | 24
Dresden |Light cruiser | 3,600 |none |10-4" | 24
-------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|-----
Good Hope |Armored cruiser | 14,000 |6-inch|2-9.2", 16-6", 14-3"| 24
Monmouth |Armored cruiser | 9,800 |4-inch|14-6", 8-3" | 24
Glasgow |Light cruiser | 4,800 |none |2-6", 10-4" | 26.5
-------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|-----
Canopus | | | | |
(not engaged)|Coast defense | 12,950 |6-inch|4-35 cal. 12", 12-6"| 16.5
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without the _Canopus_, the British had perhaps a slight advantage
in squadron speed, but only the two 9.2-inch guns of the _Good
Hope_ could match the sixteen 8.2-inch guns of the Germans. Each
side had information of the other's strength; but on the afternoon
of November 1, the date of the Battle of Coronel, each supposed
that only one enemy cruiser was in the immediate vicinity. Hence
there was mutual surprise when the two squadrons, spread widely
on opposite courses, came in contact at 4.40 p. m.
While concentrating and forming his squadron, Admiral Cradock must
have pondered whether he should fight or retreat. The _Canopus_ he
knew was laboring northward 250 miles away. It was highly doubtful
whether he could bring the enemy into action later with his slow
battleship in line. His orders were to "search and protect trade."
"Safety," we are told, "was a word he hardly knew." But his best
justification lay in the enemy's menace to commerce and in the
comment of Nelson upon a similar situation, "By the time the enemy
has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no more harm that year."
It was perhaps with this thought that Admiral Cradock signaled to
the _Canopus_, "I am going to fight the enemy now."
At about 6 p.m. the two columns were 18,000 yards distant on southerly
converging courses. The British, to westward and slightly ahead, tried
to force the action before sunset, when they would be silhouetted
against the afterglow. Their speed at this time, however, seems
to have been held up by the auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_, which
later retreated southwestward, and their efforts to close were
thwarted by the enemy's turning slightly away. Admiral von Spee
in fact secured every advantage of position, between the British
and the neutral coast, on the side away from the sun, and on such
a course that the heavy seas from east of south struck the British
ships on their engaged bows, showering the batteries with spray
and rendering useless the lower deck guns.
At 7 o'clock the German ships opened fire at 11,260 yards. The
third salvo from the _Scharnhorst_ disabled the _Good Hope's_
forward 9.2-inch gun. The _Monmouth's_ forecastle was soon on fire.
It seems probable indeed that most of the injury to the British was
inflicted by accurate shooting in this first stage of the action.
On account of the gathering darkness, Admiral von Spee allowed the
range to be closed to about 5500 yards, guiding his aim at first
by the blaze on the Monmouth, and then for a time ceasing fire.
Shortly before 8 o'clock a huge column of flame shooting up between
the stacks of the _Good Hope_ marked her end. The _Monmouth_
sheered away to westward and then northward with a heavy list that
prevented the use of her port guns. An hour later, at 9.25, with
her flag still flying defiantly, she was sunk by the _Nürnberg_
at point blank range. The _Glasgow_, which had fought throughout
the action, but had suffered little from the fire of the German
light cruisers, escaped in the darkness.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOV. 1, 1914
From _Official British Naval History_, Vol. I.]
"It is difficult," writes an American officer, "to find fault with
the tactics of Admiral van Spee; he appears to have maneuvered so
as to secure the advantage of light, wind, and sea, and to have
suited himself as regards the range."[1] The _Scharnhorst_ was hit
twice, the _Gneisenau_ four times, and the German casualties
were only two men wounded.
[Footnote 1: Commander C. C. Gill, NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR, p. 51.]
[Illustration: ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS]
This stinging blow and the resultant danger aroused the new Board
of Admiralty to energetic moves. Entering the Atlantic, the German
squadron might scatter upon the trade routes or support the rebellion
in South Africa. Again, it might double westward or northward in the
Pacific, or pass in groups of three, as permitted by American rules,
through the Panama Canal into the West Indies. Concerted measures
were taken against these possibilities. Despite the weakening of the
Grand Fleet, the battle cruisers _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_
under Admiral Sturdee, former Chief of Admiralty Staff, sailed on
November 11 for the Falkland Islands. Their destination was kept
a close secret, for had the slightest inkling of their mission
reached German ears it would at once have been communicated to von
Spee.
After the battle, the German admiral moved slowly southward, coaling
from chartered vessels and prizes; and it was not until December
1 that he rounded the Horn. Even now, had he moved directly upon
the Falklands, he would have encountered only the _Canopus_, but he
again delayed several days to take coal from a prize. On December
7 the British battle cruisers and other ships picked up in passage
arrived at the island base and at once began to coal.
Their coming was not a moment too soon. At 7.30 the next morning,
while coaling was still in progress and fires were drawn in the
_Bristol_, the signal station on the neck of land south of the harbor
reported two strange vessels, which proved to be the _Gneisenau_ and
the _Nürnberg_, approaching from the southward. As they eased down
to demolish the wireless station, the _Canopus_ opened on them at
about 11,000 yards by indirect fire. The two ships swerved off,
and at 9.40, perceiving the dense clouds of smoke over the harbor
and what appeared to be tripod masts, they fell back on their main
force.
Hull down, and with about 15 miles' start, the Germans, had they
scattered at this time might, most of them at least, have escaped,
as they certainly would have if their approach had been made more
cautiously and at a later period in the day. The British ships
were now out, with the fast _Glasgow_ well in the lead. In the
chase that followed, Admiral van Spee checked speed somewhat to
keep his squadron together. Though Admiral Sturdee for a time did
the same, he was able at 12.50 to open on the rear ship _Leipzig_
at 16,000 yards. At 1.20 the German light cruisers scattered to
southwestward, followed by the _Cornwall, Kent_, and _Glasgow_.
The 26-knot _Bristol_, had she been able to work up steam in time,
would have been invaluable in this pursuit; she was sent instead
to destroy three enemy colliers or transports reported off the
islands.
Between the larger ships the action continued at long range, for
the superior speed of the battle cruisers enabled Admiral Sturdee
to choose his distance, and his proper concern was to demolish the
enemy with his own ships unscathed. At 2.05 he turned 8 points
to starboard to clear the smoke blown down from the northwest and
reduce the range, which had increased to 16,000 yards. Admiral
von Spee also turned southward, and the stern chase was renewed
without firing until 2.45. At this point both sides turned to port,
the Germans now slightly in the rear and working in to 12,500 yards
to use their 5.9-inch guns.
At 3.15 the British came completely about to avoid the smoke, and
the Germans also turned, a little later, as if to cross their bows.
(See diagram.) The _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_, though fighting
gamely, were now beaten ships, the latter with upper works a "shambles
of torn and twisted iron," and holes in her sides through which could
be seen the red glow of flames. She turned on her beam-ends at 4.17
and sank with every man an board. At 6 o'clock, after a fight of
extraordinary persistence, the _Gneisenau_ opened her sea-cocks and
went down. All her 8-inch ammunition had been expended, and 600 of
her 850 men were disabled or killed. Some 200 were saved.
Against ships with 12-inch guns and four times their weight of
broadside the _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ made a creditable
record of over 20 hits. The British, however, suffered no casualties
or material injury. While Admiral Sturdee's tactics are thus justified,
the prolongation of the battle left him no time to join in the light
cruiser chase, and even opened the possibility, in the rain squalls
of the late afternoon, that one of the armored cruisers might get
away. In spite of a calm sea and excellent visibility during most
of the action, the gunnery of the battle cruisers appears to have
been less accurate at long range than in the later engagement off
the Dogger Bank.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, DEC. 8, 1914
From _Official British Naval History_, Vol. I.
_British Squadron_
_Name Type Guns Speed_
Invincible Battle Cruiser 8--12", 16--4" 26.5
Inflexible Battle Cruiser 8--12", 16--4" 26.5
Carnarvon Armored Cruiser 4--7.5", 6--6" 23.0
Cornwall Armored Cruiser 14--6" 23.5
Kent Armored Cruiser 14--6" 23.0
Bristol Scout Cruiser 2--6", 10--4" 26.5
Glasgow Scout Cruiser 2--6", 10--4" 26.5
Canopus Coast Defense 4--12", 12--6" 16.5
_German Squadron_
Scharnhorst Armored Cruiser 8--8.2", 6--6" 23.5
Gneisenau Armored Cruiser 8--8.2", 6--6" 23.5
Leipzig Protected Cruiser 10--4" 23.0
Nürnberg Scout Cruiser 10--4" 24.0
Dresden Scout Cruiser 10--4" 24.0]
Following similar tactics, the _Glasgow_ and _Cornwall_ overtook
and finally silenced the _Leipzig_ at 7 p.m., four hours after
the _Glasgow_ had first opened fire. Defiant to the last, like
the _Monmouth_ at Coronel, and with her ammunition gone, she sank
at 9.25, carrying down all but 18 of her officers and crew. The
_Kent_, stoking all her woodwork to increase steam, attained at
5 o'clock a position 12,000 yards from the _Nürnberg_, when the
latter opened fire. At this late hour a long range action was out
of the question. As the _Nürnberg_ slowed down with two of her
boilers burst, the _Kent_ closed to 3000 yards and at 7.30 finished
off her smaller opponent. The _Dresden_, making well above her
schedule speed of 24 knots, had disappeared to southwestward early
in the afternoon. Her escape entailed a long search, until, on
March 14, 1915, she was destroyed by the _Kent_ and _Glasgow_
off Juan Fernandez, where she had taken refuge for repairs.
_Cruise of the "Emden"_
Among the German cruisers other than those of Admiral van Spee's
squadron, the exploits of the _Emden_ are best known, and reminiscent
of the _Alabama's_ famous cruise in the American Civil War. It
may be noted, however, as indicative of changed conditions, that
the _Emden's_ depredations covered only two months instead of two
years. A 3600 ton ship with a speed of 25 knots, the _Emden_ left
Kiao-chau on August 6, met von Spee's cruisers in the Ladrones
on the 12th, and on September 10 appeared most unexpectedly on
the west side of the Bay of Bengal. Here she sank five British
merchantmen, all following the customary route with lights aglow.
On the 18th she was off the Rangoon River, and 6 days later across
the bay at Madras, where she set ablaze two tanks of the Burma Oil
Company with half a million gallons of kerosene. From September 26
to 29 she was at the junction of trade routes west of Ceylon, and
again, after an overhaul in the Chagos Archipelago to southward,
spent October 16-19 in the same profitable field. Like most raiders,
she planned to operate in one locality not more than three or four
days, and then, avoiding all vessels on her course, strike suddenly
elsewhere. During this period, British, Japanese, French, and Russian
cruisers--the Germans assert there were 19 at one time--followed
her trail.
The most daring adventure of Captain von Müller, the _Emden's_
skipper, was now carried out in the harbor of Penang, on the west
side of the Malay Peninsula. With an additional false funnel to
imitate British county-class cruisers, the _Emden_ at daybreak
of October 28 passed the picket-boat off the harbor unchallenged,
destroyed the Russian cruiser _Jemtchug_ by gunfire and two torpedoes,
and, after sinking the French destroyer _Mousquet_ outside, got
safely away. The Russian commander was afterward condemned for
letting his ship lie at anchor with open lights, with only an anchor
watch, and with strangers at liberty to visit her.
Steaming southward, the raider made her next and last appearance
on the morning of November 9 off the British cable and wireless
station on the Cocos Islands. As she approached, word was promptly
cabled to London, Adelaide, and Singapore, and--more profitably--was
wirelessed to an Australian troop convoy then only 45 miles away. The
_Emden_ caught the message, but nevertheless sent a party ashore,
and was standing outside when the armored cruiser _Sydney_ came
charging up. Against the _Emden's_ ten 4.1-inch guns, the _Sydney_
had eight 6-inch guns, and she was at least 4 knots faster. Outranged
and outdone in speed, the German ship was soon driven ashore in a
sinking condition, with a funnel down and steering gear disabled.
During her two months' activity thus ended, the _Emden_ had made
21 captures, destroying ships and cargoes to the value of over
$10,000,000.
The other German cruisers were also short-lived. The _Karlsrühe_,
after arming the liner _Kronprinz Wilhelm_ off the Bahamas (August
6) and narrowly escaping the _Suffolk_ and the _Bristol_ by
superior speed, operated with great success on the South American
trade routes. Her disappearance--long a mystery to the Allies--was
due to an internal explosion, just as she was about to crown her
exploits by a raid on the island of Barbados. The _Königsberg_,
on the east coast of Africa, surprised and sank the British light
cruiser _Pegasus_ while the latter lay at Mombasa, Zanzibar, making
repairs. She was later bottled up in the Rufigi River (October
30) and finally destroyed there (July 11, 1915) by indirect fire
from monitors, "spotted" by airplanes.
[Illustration: THE CRUISE OF THE EMDEN, SEPT. 1-NOV. 9, 1914]
Of the auxiliary cruisers, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_ was
sunk by the _Highflyer_ (August 26), and the _Cap Trafalgar_
went down after a hard fight with the _Carmania_ (September 14).
The _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_, which had entered the Atlantic with
von Spee, interned at Newport News, Virginia, in March, 1915, and
was followed thither a month later by the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_.
The results of this surface warfare upon commerce amounted to 69
merchant vessels, totaling 280,000 tons. With more strict concentration
upon commerce destruction, and further preparations for using German
liners as auxiliaries, the campaign might have been prolonged and made
somewhat more effective. But for the same purpose the superiority
of the submarine was soon demonstrated. To take the later surface
raiders: the _Wolf_ sank or captured 20 ships in 15 months at sea;
the _Seeadler_, 23 in 7 months; the _Möwe_ 15 in 2 months. But
many a submarine in one month made a better record than these.
The opening of Germany's submarine campaign, to be treated later,
was formally announced by her blockade proclamation of February
4, 1915.
_The Dogger Bank Action_
The strategic value of the battle cruiser, as a means of throwing
strength quickly into distant fields, was brought out in the campaign
against von Spee. As an outcome of German raids on the east coast of
England, its tactical qualities, against units of equal strength,
were soon put to a sharper trial. Aside from mere _Schrecklichkeit_--a
desire to carry the terrors of war to English soil--these raids had
the legitimate military objects of helping distant cruisers by
holding British ships in home waters, of delaying troop movements
to France, and of creating a popular clamor that might force a
dislocation or division of the Grand Fleet. The first incursion,
on November 3, inflicted trifling damage; the second, on December
16, was marked by the bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and
Whitby, in which 99 civilians were killed and 500 wounded. The
third, on January 24 following, brought on the Dogger Bank action,
the first encounter between battle cruisers, and one of the two
capital ship actions of the war.
At dawn on this date, the _Derfflinger, Seydlitz_ (flagship of
Admiral von Hipper), _Moltke_, and armored cruiser _Blücher_,
with 4 light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas, were moving
westward about midway in the North Sea on a line between Heligoland
and the scene of their former raids. Five battle cruisers under
Admiral Beatty were at the same time approaching a rendezvous with
the Harwich Force for one of their periodical sweeps in the southern
area. The Harwich Force first came in contact with the enemy about
7 a.m. Fortunately for the Germans, they had already been warned
of Beatty's approach by one of their light cruisers, and had just
turned back at high speed when the British battle cruisers made
them out to southeastward 14 miles away. The forces opposed were
as follows:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Dis- | | | Best | |Dis- | | | Best
British |place-|Armor| Guns |recent|German |place-|Armor| Guns |recent
| ment | | |speed*| |ment | | |speed
-----------|------|-----|-------|------|-----------|------|-----|-------|------
Lion |26,350| 9" |8 13.5"| 31.7 |Derfflinger|26,180| 13" | 8 12" | 30
Tiger |28,500| 9" |8 13.5"| 32 |Seydlitz |24,610| 11" |10 11" | 29
Princess |28,350| 9" |8 13.5"| 31.7 |Moltke |22,640| 11" |10 11" | 28.4
Royal | | | | | | | | |
New Zealand|18,800| 8" |8 12" | 29 |Blücher |15,550| 6" |12 8.2"| 25.3
Indomitable|17,250| 7" |8 12" | 28.7 | | | | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Footnote *: Jane's FIGHTING SHIPS, 1914.]
[Illustration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA]
Settling at once to a stern chase, the British ships increased
speed to 28.5 knots; while the Germans, handicapped by the slower
_Blücher_, were held down to 25. At 8.52 the _Lion_ was within
20,000 yards of the _Blücher_, and, after deliberate ranging shots,
scored her first hit at 9.09. As the range further decreased, the
_Tiger_ opened on the rear ship, and the _Lion_ shifted to the
third in line at 18,000 yards. The enemy returned the fire at
9.14. Thus the action continued, both squadrons in lines of
bearing, and Beatty's ships engaged as a rule with their opposites
in the enemy order.
[Illustration: DOGGER BANK ACTION, JAN. 24, 1915]
At 9.45 the German armored cruiser had suffered severely, and ships
ahead also showed the effects of the heavier enemy fire. Under
cover of a thick smoke screen from destroyers on their starboard
bow, and a subsequent destroyer attack, the Germans now shifted
course away from the enemy and the rear ships hauled out on the
port quarter of their leader to increase the range. The British
cruisers, according to Admiral Beatty's report, "were ordered to
form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed."
An hour later the _Blücher_ staggered away to northward. Badly
crippled, she was assigned by Beatty to the _Indomitable_, and was
sunk at 12.37. At 10.54 submarines were reported on the British
starboard bows.
Just after 11 the flagship _Lion_, having received two hits under
water which burst a feed tank and thus put the port engine out of
commission, turned northward out of the line. Though the injury
was spoken of as the result of a "chance shot," the _Lion_ had been
hit 15 times. About an hour later Admiral Beatty hoisted his flag
in the _Princess Royal_, but during the remainder of the battle Rear
Admiral Moore in the _Tiger_ had command. Judging from the fact
that the _Tiger_ was hit only 8 times in the entire action
and the _Princess Royal_ and the _New Zealand_ not at all, there
seems to have been little effort at this time to press the attack.
The British lost touch at 11.50, and turned back at noon.
In the lively discussion aroused by the battle, the question was
raised why the _Blücher_ was included in the German line. Any encounter
that developed on such an excursion was almost certain to be with
superior forces, against which the armored cruiser would be of
slight value. In a retreat, the "lame duck" would slow down the
whole squadron, or else must be left behind.
During the first hour of the battle, the British gained about three
knots, and brought the range to 17,500 yards. The range after 9.45
is not given, but was certainly not lowered in a corresponding
degree. This may have been due to increased speed on the part of
the German leaders, or to the interference of German destroyers,
which now figured for the first time as important factors in day
action. Two of these attacks were delivered, one at 9.40 and another
about an hour later, and though repulsed by British flotillas,
they both caused interference with the British course and fire.
The injury to the _Lion_, in the words of Admiral Beatty, "undoubtedly
deprived us of a greater victory." The British wireless caught
calls from Hipper to the High Seas Fleet, which (though this seems
strange at the time of a battle cruiser sortie) is declared by
the Germans to have been beyond reach at Kiel.[1] Worried by the
danger to the _Lion_ in case of retreat before superior forces, and
in the belief that he was being led into submarine traps and mine
fields, Admiral Moore gave up the chase. The distance to Heligoland
was still at least 70 miles; the German ships were badly injured;
the course since 9.45 had been more to the northward; the Grand
Fleet was rapidly approaching the scene. The element of caution,
seen again in the Jutland battle 15 months later, seems to have
prevented pressing the engagement to more decisive results.
[Footnote 1: Capt. Persius, _Naval and Military Record_, Dec. 10,
1919.]
The conditions of flight and pursuit obtaining at the Dogger Bank
emphasized the importance of speed and long range fire. Owing to
the fact that they had twice the angle of elevation (30 degrees),
the German 11-inch and 12-inch guns were not outranged by the British
13.5-inch guns; and at 17,000 yards their projectiles had no greater
angle of fall. The chief superiority of the larger ordnance therefore
lay in their heavier bursting charges and greater striking energy,
12,800 foot-tons to 8,900 foot-tons. According to a German report,
the first salvo that hit the _Seydlitz_ knocked out both after-turrets
and annihilated their crews; and the ship was saved only by flooding
the magazines.[1]
[Footnote 1: Admiral van Scheer, quoted in _Naval and Military Record_,
London, March 24, 1920.]
_The Dardanelles Campaign_
Throughout the war a difference of opinion existed in Allied councils
as to whether it was better to concentrate all efforts in the western
sphere of operations, or to assail the Central Powers in the Near
East as well, where the accession of Turkey (and later of Bulgaria)
threatened to put the resources of all southeastern Europe under
Teutonic control, and even opened a gateway into Asia. Such a division
of effort was suggested not only by the necessity of protecting the
Suez Canal, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, but by the difficulty of breaking
the stalemate on the western front, and by the opportunity that
would be offered of utilizing Allied control of sea communications.
Furthermore, the Allies had a margin of predreadnoughts and cruisers
ready for action and of no obvious value elsewhere.
On November 3, 1914, three days after Turkey entered the war, an
Allied naval force that had been watching off the Dardanelles engaged
the outer forts in a 10-minute bombardment, of no significance
save perhaps as a warning to the Turks of trouble later on. In the
same month the First Lord of the British Admiralty, Mr. Winston
Churchill, proposed an attack on the Straits as "an ideal method
of defending Egypt"; but it was not seriously considered until, on
January 2, Russia sent an urgent appeal for a diversion to relieve
her forces in the Caucasus. Lord Kitchener, the British Minister
of War, answered favorably, but, feeling that he had no troops
to spare, turned the solution over to the Navy.
From the first the decision was influenced by political considerations.
Russia needed assurance of Allied solidarity--and it is significant
that in February Lord Grey announced that England no longer opposed
Russia's ambition to control Constantinople. Nine-tenths of Russia's
exports were blocked by the closing of the Straits; their reopening
would afford not only access to her vast stores of foodstuffs,
but an entry--infinitely more convenient than Vladivostok or
Archangel--for munitions and essential supplies. The Balkan States
were wavering. In Turkey there was a strong neutral or pro-Ally
sentiment. Victory would give an enormous material advantage, help
Russia in the impending German drive on her southwestern frontier,
and bolster Allied prestige throughout the eastern world.
Faced with the problem, the Admiralty sent an inquiry to Admiral
Carden, in command on the scene, as to the practicability of forcing
the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone, assuming that old ships
would be employed, and "that the importance of the results would
justify severe loss." He replied on January 5: "I do not think the
Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended
operations with a large number of ships." In answer to further
inquiries, accompanied by not altogether warranted assurance from
the First Lord that "High authorities here concur in your opinion,"
Admiral Carden outlined four successive operations:
(a) The destruction of defenses at the entrance to the Dardanelles.
(b) Action inside the Straits, so as to clear the defenses up to
and including Cephez Point battery N8.
[Illustration: THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE]
(c) Destruction of defenses of the Narrows.
(d) Sweeping of a dear channel through the mine-field and advance
through the Narrows; followed by a reduction of the forts further
up, and advance into the Sea of Marmora.
This plan was presented at a meeting of the British War Council
on January 13. It may be noted at this point that the War Council,
though composed of 7 members of the Cabinet, was at this time dominated
by a triumvirate--the Premier (Mr. Asquith), the Minister of War
(General Kitchener), and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr.
Churchill); and in this triumvirate, despite the fact that England's
strength was primarily naval, the head of the War Office played a
leading rôle. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Fisher) and one or two
other military experts attended the Council meetings, but they were
not members, and their function, at least as they saw it, was "to
open their mouths when told to." Staff organizations existed also
at both the War Office and the Admiralty, at the latter consisting
of the First Lord, First Sea Lord and three other officers not
on the Admiralty Board. The working of this improvised and not
altogether ideal machinery for the supreme task of conducting the
war is interestingly revealed in the report[1] of the commission
subsequently, appointed to investigate the Dardanelles Campaign.
[Footnote 1: British ANNUAL REGISTER, 1918, Appendix, pp. 24 ff.,
from which quotations here are taken.]
"Mr. Churchill," according to this report, "appears to have advocated
the attack by ships alone before the War Council on a certain amount
of half-hearted and hesitating expert opinion." Encouraged by his
sanguine and aggressive spirit, the Council decided that "the Admiralty
should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and
take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective."
In view of the fact that the operation as then conceived was to be
purely naval, the word "take" suggests an initial misconception
of what the navy could do. The support for the decision, especially
from the naval experts, was chiefly on the assumption that if Admiral
Carden's first operation were unpromising, the whole plan might
be dropped.
Admiral Fisher's misgivings as to the wisdom of the enterprise
soon increased, owing primarily to his desire to employ the full
naval strength in the home field. He did not believe that "cutting
off the enemy's big toe in the East was better than stabbing him
to the heart." He had begun the construction of 612 new vessels
ranging from "hush-hush" ships of 33 knots and 20-inch guns to
200 motor-boats, and he wished to strike for access to the Baltic,
with a threat of invasion on Germany's Baltic coast. The validity
of his objections to the Dardanelles plan appears to depend on the
practicability of this alternative, which was not attempted later
in the war. The First Lord and the First Sea Lord presented their
difference of opinion to the Premier, but it appears that there was
no ill feeling; Admiral Fisher later writes that "Churchill had
courage and imagination--he was a war man."
At a Council meeting on January 28, when the decision was made
definite, Admiral Fisher was not asked for an opinion and expressed
none. (The Investigation Commission declare that the naval experts
should have been asked, and should have expressed their views whether
asked or not.) But there was a dramatic moment when, after rising as
if to leave the Council, he was quickly followed by Lord Kitchener,
who pointed out that all the others were in favor of the plan, and
induced him once more to take his seat. After the decision, Mr.
Churchill testifies, "I never looked back. We had left the region
of discussion and consultation, of balancings and misgivings. The
matter had now passed into the domain of action."
To turn to the scene of operations, there were now assembled at
the Dardanelles 10 British and 4 French predreadnoughts, together
with the new battleship _Queen Elizabeth_, the battle cruiser
_Inflexible_, and many cruisers and torpedo craft. On February
19, 1915, again on February 25-26, and on March 1-7, this force
bombarded the outer forts at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr and the
batteries 10 miles further up at Cephez Point. These were in part
silenced and demolished by landing parties. Bad weather, however,
interfered with operations, and there was also some shortage of
ammunition. The batteries, and especially the mobile artillery of
the Turks, still greatly hampered the work of mine sweeping, which
at terrible hazards was carried on at night within the Straits.
In the meantime the Government, to quote General Callwell, the
Director of Military Operations, had "drifted into a big military
attack." But the despatch from England of the 29th Division, which
was to join the forces available in Egypt, was delayed; owing to
Lord Kitchener's concern about the western situation, from Feb. 22
to March 16--an unfortunate loss of time. By March 17, however, the
troops from Egypt and most of the French contingent were assembled
at the island of Lemnos, and General Sir Ian Hamilton had arrived
to take command. His instructions included the statement that
"employment of military forces on any large scale at this juncture
is only contemplated in the event of the fleet failing to get through
after every effort has been exhausted. Having entered on the project
of forcing the Straits, there can be no idea of abandoning the
scheme."
On March 11 the First Lord sent to Admiral Carden a despatch asking
whether the time had not arrived when "you will have to press hard
for a decision," and adding: "Every well-conceived action for forcing
a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive
our support." The Admiral replied concurring, but expressing the
opinion that "in order to insure my communication line immediately
fleet enters Sea of Marmora, military operations should be opened
at once." On March 16 he resigned owing to ill health, and his
second in command, Admiral de Robeck, succeeded, with the feeling
that he had orders to force the Straits.
The attack of March 18 was the crucial and, as it proved, the final
action of the purely naval campaign. At this time the mines had
been swept as far up as Cephez Point, and a clear channel opened
for some distance beyond. During the morning the _Queen Elizabeth_
and 5 other ships bombarded the Narrows forts at 14,000 yards.
Then at 12.22 the French predreadnoughts _Suffren, Gaulois,
Charlemagne_, and _Bouvet_ approached to about 9000 yards and by
1.25 had for the time being silenced the batteries of the Narrows.
Six British battleships now advanced (2.36) to relieve the French.
In the maneuvering and withdrawal, the _Biouvet_ was sunk by a
drifting mine[1] with a loss of over 600 men, and the _Gaulois_
was hit twice under water and had to be beached on an island
outside the Straits. About 4 o'clock the _Irresistible_ also
ran foul of a mine and was run ashore on the Asiatic side, where
most of her men were taken off under fire. The _Ocean_, after going
to her assistance, struck a mine and went down about 6 o'clock.
Not more than 40 per cent. of the injuries sustained in the action
were attributable to gunfire, the rest to mines sent adrift from
the Narrows. Of the 16 capital ships engaged, three were sunk,
one had to be beached, and some of the others were hardly ready
for continuing the action next day.
[Footnote 1: It is stated that an ingenious device caused these
mines to sink after a certain time and come back on an under-current
that flows _up_ the Dardanelles, and then rise at the Narrows for
recovery. This may have enabled the Turks to keep up their presumably
limited supply of mines; but how well the automatic control worked
is not known.]
[Illustration: DARDANELLES DEFENSES]
There is some military support for the opinion that if, on the
18th or at some more suitable time, the fleet had acted in the
spirit of Farragut's "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam ahead!" and,
protected by dummy ships, bumpers, or whatever other devices naval
ingenuity could devise, had steamed up to and through the Narrows
in column, it would not have suffered much more severely than during
the complicated maneuvering below. Of such an attack General von
der Goltz, in command of the Turkish army, said that, "Although
he thought it was almost impossible to force the Dardanelles, if
the English thought it an important move in the general war, they
could by sacrificing ten ships force the entrance, and do it very
fast, and be up in Marmora within 10 hours from the time they forced
it."[l] Admiral Fisher estimated that the loss would be 12 ships.
[Footnote 1: Repeated by Baron van Wangenheim to Ambassador Morgenthau,
prior to the attack of March 18, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY,
_World's Work_, September, 1918. See also Col. F. N. Maude, Royal
Engineers, _Contemporary Review_, June, 1915.]
After such deductions, there would be no great surplus to deal with
the _Göben_, which would fight desperately, and with the defenses of
Constantinople. Indeed, such losses would seem absolutely prohibitive,
if viewed only from the narrow standpoint of the force engaged,
and without taking into fullest account the limited value of the
older ships and the fact that the Government was fully committed
to a prosecution of the campaign. It is of course easy to see that
victory purchased by the loss of 10 predreadnoughts and 10,000 men
would be cheap, as compared with the sacrifice of over 100,000
men killed and wounded and 10,000 invalided in the later campaign
on land.
General Callwell has pointed out that the naval commanders were
properly worried about what would happen after they got through
the Straits, if the Sublime Porte should not promptly "throw up
the sponge." "The communications would have remained closed to
colliers and small craft by movable armament, if not also by mines.
Forcing the pass would in fact have resembled bursting through a
swing door. Sailors and soldiers alike have an instinctive horror
of a trap, and they are in the habit of looking behind them as
well as before them."[1] But according to Ambassador Morgenthau,
who was probably in a better position than any one else to form
an opinion, "The whole Ottoman State on the 18th day of March,
1915, was on the brink of dissolution." The Turkish Government
was divided into factions and restive under German domination, and
there was thus an excellent prospect that it would have capitulated
under the guns of the Allied fleet. If not, then there might have
been nothing left for the latter but to try to get back the way
it came.
[Footnote 1: NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, March, 1919, p. 486.]
Feeling in Constantinople during the month from February 19th to
March 19th has already been suggested; it was nervous in the extreme.
Neither Turks nor Germans felt assured that the Dardanelles could
withstand British naval power. Plans were made for a general exit
to Asia Minor, and there was a conviction that in a few days Allied
ships would be in the Golden Horn. At the forts, if we may believe
evidence not as yet definitely disproved, affairs were still more
desperate. The guns, though manned largely by Germans, were not of
the latest type, and for a month had been engaged in almost daily
bombardment. Ammunition was running short. "Fort Hamadié, the most
powerful defense on the Asiatic side, had just 17 armor-piercing
projectiles left, while at Killid-ul-Bahr, the main defense on
the European side, there were precisely 10."[2] To this evidence
may be added the statement of Enver Pasha: "If the English had
only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles
they could have got to Constantinople, but their delay enabled us
to fortify the peninsula, and in 6 weeks' time we had taken down
there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns."
[Footnote 2: AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY, _World's Work_, September,
1918, p. 433, corroborating the statement of the correspondent G.
A. Schreiner, in FROM BERLIN TO BAGDAD.]
If Mr. Churchill was chiefly responsible for undertaking the campaign,
he was not responsible for the delay after March 18. "It never
occurred to me," he states, "that we should not go on." Admiral
de Robeck in his first despatches appeared to share this view. On
March 26, however, he telegraphed: "The check on March 18 is not,
in my opinion, decisive, but on March 22 I met General Hamilton and
heard his views, and I now think that, to obtain important results
and to achieve the object of the campaign, a combined operation
will be essential." This despatch, Mr. Churchill says, "involved a
complete change of plan and was a vital decision. I regretted it
very much. I believed then, as I believe now, that we were separated
by very little from complete success." He proposed that the Admiral
should be directed to renew the attack; but the First Sea Lord did
not agree, nor did Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, nor Admiral Sir Henry
Jackson. So it was decided to wait for the army, and some satire
has been directed at Mr. Churchill and those other "acknowledged
experts in the technicalities of amphibious warfare," Mr. Balfour
and Mr. Asquith, who were inclined to share his views. The verdict
of the Dardanelles Commission was that, "Had the attack been renewed
within a day or two there is no reason to suppose that the proportion
of casualties would have been less; and, if so, even had the second
attack succeeded, a very weak force would have been left for subsequent
naval operations."
Once decided upon, it was highly essential that the combined operation
should begin without further delay. But it was now found that the
army transports had been loaded, so to speak, up-side-down, with
guns and munitions buried under tents and supplies. Sending them
back to Alexandria for reloading involved a six weeks' delay, though
Lord Kitchener wired, "I think you had better know at once that
I regard such postponement as far too long." The landing on the
tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, which was nearest the forts in
the Straits and said to be the only feasible place, actually began
on April 25, and was achieved under the guns of the fleet, and by
almost unexampled feats of heroism by boats' crews and the first
parties on shore.
Henceforth the navy played a subordinate though not insignificant
part in the campaign. "By our navy we went there and were kept
there," writes Mr. John Masefield in _Gallipoli_, "and by our navy
we came away. During the nine months of our hold on the peninsula
over 300,000 men were brought by the navy from places three, four,
or even six thousand miles away. During the operations some half
of these were removed by our navy, as sick and wounded, to ports
from 800 to 3000 miles away. Every day, for 11 months, ships of
our navy moved up and down the Gallipoli coast bombarding the Turk
positions. Every day during the operations our navy kept our armies
in food, drink and supplies. Every day, in all that time, if weather
permitted, ships of our navy cruised in the Narrows and off
Constantinople, and the seaplanes of our navy raided and scouted
within the Turk lines."
On May 12 the predreadnought _Goliath_ was torpedoed by a Turkish
destroyer; and on May 25-26 the German submarine _U 23_, which
had made the long voyage by way of Gibraltar, sank the _Triumph_
and the _Majestic_. It was upon a forewarning of this attack that
Admiral Fisher, according to his own statement, resigned as a protest
against the retention of the _Queen Elizabeth_ and other capital
units in this unpromising field. British and French submarines, on
the other hand, worked their way into the Sea of Marmora, entered
the harbor of Constantinople, and inflicted heavy losses, including
two Turkish battleships, 8 transports, and 197 supply vessels.
So almost unprecedented were the problems of a naval attack on the
Dardanelles that it appears rash to condemn either the initiation
or the conduct of an operation that ended in failure when seemingly
on the verge of success. Clearly, the campaign was handicapped
by lack of unanimous support and whole-hearted faith on the part
of authorities at home. It was not thoroughly thought out at the
start, and was subjected to trying delays. No advantage was ever
taken of the invaluable factor of surprise. Even so, it was not
wholly barren of results. It undoubtedly relieved Russia, kept
Bulgaria neutral for at least five months, and immobilized 300,000
Turks, according to Lord Kitchener's estimate, for nine months'
time. Nevertheless, the final failure was a tremendous blow to
Allied prestige. Upon the withdrawal, in January of 1916, some
of the troops were transferred to Salonika; and it is noteworthy
that in Macedonia, as at Gallipoli, the army was dependent on the
navy for the transport of troops, munitions, and in fact virtually
everything needed in the campaign.
Aside from the Dardanelles failure, the naval situation at the end
of 1915 was such as to give assurance to the Western Powers. They
had converted potential control of the sea into actual control, save
in limited areas on the enemies' sea frontiers. Germany had lost
her cruisers and her colonies, and her shipping had been destroyed
or driven from the seas. Though losses from submarines averaged
150,000 tons a month in 1915, they had not yet caused genuine alarm.
The German fleet was still a menace, but, in spite of attrition
warfare, the Grand Fleet was decidedly stronger than in 1914.
REFERENCES
BRITISH OFFICIAL NAVAL HISTORY, Sir Julian Corbett, London, 1920.
THE GRAND FLEET, Admiral Jellicoe, London, 1918.
THE BRITISH NAVY IN BATTLE, Arthur H. Pollen, London, 1919.
MY MEMOIRS, Admiral van Tirpitz, 1919.
THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORLD WAR, Vice Admiral van
Scheer, 1920.
U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, WAR NOTES, 1914-1918.
LES ENSEIGNEMENTS MARITIMES DE LA GUERRE ANTI-GERMANIQUE,
Admiral Daveluy, Paris, 1919.
IL POTERE MARITTIMO NELLA GRANDE GUERRA, Captain Romeo Bernotti,
Leghorn, 1920.
NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR, Commander C. C. Gill, New York, 1918.