RIVALRY FOR WORLD POWER
Even more significant in its relation to sea power than the revolution
in armaments during the 19th century was the extraordinary growth
of ocean commerce. The total value of the world's import and export
trade in 1800 amounted in round numbers to 1-1/2 billion dollars,
in 1850 to 4 billion, and in 1900 to nearly 24 billion. In other
words, during a period in which the population of the world was not
more than tripled, its international exchange of commodities was
increased 16-fold. This growth was of course made possible largely
by progress in manufacturing, increased use of steam navigation,
and vastly greater output of coal and iron.[1] At the end of the
Napoleonic wars England was the only great commercial and industrial
state. At the close of the century, though with her colonies she
still controlled one-fourth of the world's foreign trade, she faced
aggressive rivals in the field. The United States after her Civil
War, and Germany after her unification and the Franco-Prussian
War, had achieved an immense industrial development, opening up
resources in coal and iron that made them formidable competitors.
Germany in particular, a late comer in the colonial field, felt
that her future lay upon the seas, as a means of securing access on
favorable terms to world markets and raw materials. Other nations
also realized that their continued growth and prosperity would
depend upon commercial expansion. This might be accomplished in a
measure by cheaper production and superior business organization,
but could be greatly aided by political means--by colonial activity,
by securing control or special privileges in unexploited areas
and backward states, by building up a merchant fleet under the
national flag. Obviously, since the seas join the continents and
form the great highways of trade, this commercial and political
expansion would give increased importance to naval power.
[Footnote 1: Coal production increased during the century from
11.6 million tons to 610 million, and pig iron from half a million
tons to 37 million. Figures from Day, HISTORY OF COMMERCE, Ch.
XXVIII.]
Admiral Mahan, an acute political observer as well as strategist,
summed up the international situation in 1895 and again in 1897 as
"an equilibrium on the [European] Continent, and, in connection
with the calm thus resulting, an immense colonizing movement in
which all the great powers were concerned."[1] Later, in 1911, he
noted that colonial rivalries had again been superseded by rivalries
within Europe, but pointed out that the European tension was itself
largely the product of activities and ambitions in more distant
spheres. In fact the international developments of recent times,
whether in the form of colonial enterprises, armament competition,
or actual warfare, find a common origin in economic and commercial
interests. Commerce and quick communications have drawn the world
into closer unity, yet by a kind of paradox have increased the
possibilities of conflict. Both by their common origin and by their
far-reaching consequences, it is thus possible to connect the story
of naval events from the Spanish-American to the World War, and to
gather them up under the general title, "rivalry for world power."
1. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
To this rivalry the United States could hardly hope or desire to
remain always a passive spectator, yet, aside from trying to stabilize
the western hemisphere by the Monroe Doctrine, she cherished down
to the year 1898 a policy of isolation from world affairs. During
the first half of the 19th century, it is true, her interests were
directed outward by a flourishing merchant marine. In 1860 the
American merchant fleet of 2,500,000 tons was second only to Great
Britain's and nearly equal to that of all other nations combined.
But its decay had already begun, and continued rapidly. The change
from wood to iron construction enabled England to build cheaper
ships; and American shipping suffered also from lack of government
patronage, diversion of capital into mare profitable projects of
Western development, and loss of a third of its tonnage by destruction
or shift to foreign register during the Civil War. At the outbreak
of that war 72 per cent of American exports were carried in American
bottoms; only 9 per cent in 1913. Thus the United States had reached
the unsatisfactory condition of a nation with a large and rapidly
growing foreign commerce and an almost non-existent merchant marine.
[Footnote 1: NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 104.]
This was the situation when the nation was thrust suddenly and
half unwillingly into the main stream of international events by
the Spanish-American War. Though this war made the United States
a world power, commercial or political aggrandizement played no
part in her entry into the struggle. It arose solely from the
intolerable conditions created by Spanish misrule in Cuba, and
intensified by armed rebellion since 1895. Whatever slight hope
or justification for non-intervention remained was destroyed by
the blowing up of the _U. S. S. Maine_ in Havana harbor, February
15, 1898, with the loss of 260 of her complement of 354 officers
and men. Thereafter the United States pushed her preparations for
war; but the resolution of Congress, April 19, 1898, authorizing
the President to begin hostilities expressly stated that the United
States disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty over Cuba,
and after its pacification would "leave the government and control
of the island to its people."
It was at once recognized that the conflict would be primarily
naval, and would be won by the nation that secured control of the
sea. The paper strength of the two navies left little to choose,
and led even competent critics like Admiral Colomb in England to
prophesy a stalemate--a "desultory war." Against five new American
battleships, the _Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon_ and _Texas_,
the first four of 10,000 tons, and the armored cruisers _Brooklyn_
and _New York_ of 9000 and 8000 tans, Spain could oppose the
battleship _Pelayo_, a little better than the _Texas_ and five
armored cruisers, the _Carlos V, Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante
Oquendo_, and _Vizcaya_, each of about 7000 tons, and the somewhat
larger and very able former Italian cruiser _Cristobal Colon_.
Figures and statistics, however, give no idea of the actual weakness
of the Spanish navy, handicapped by shiftless naval administration,
by dependence on foreign sources of supply, and by the incompetence
and lack of training of personnel. Of the squadron that came to
Cuba under Admiral Cervera, the _Colon_ lacked two 10-inch guns
for her barbettes, and the _Vizcaya_ was so foul under water that
with a trial speed of 18-1/2 knots she never made above 13--Cervera
called her a "buoy." There was no settled plan of campaign; to
Cervera's requests for instructions came the ministerial reply
that "in these moments of international crisis no definite plans
can be formulated."[1] The despairing letters of the Spanish Admiral
and his subordinates reveal how feeble was the reed upon which
Spain had to depend for the preservation of her colonial empire.
The four cruisers and two destroyers that sailed from the Cape
Verde Islands on April 29 were Spain's total force available. The
_Pelayo_ and the _Carlos V_, not yet ready, were the only ships of
value left behind.
[Footnote 1: Bermejo to Cervera, April 4, 1898.]
On the American naval list, in addition to the main units already
mentioned, there were six monitors of heavy armament but indifferent
fighting value, a considerable force of small cruisers, four converted
liners for scouts, and a large number of gunboats, converted yachts,
etc., which proved useful in the Cuban blockade. Of these forces
the majority were assembled in the Atlantic theater of war. The
_Oregon_ was on the West Coast, and made her famous voyage of 14,700
miles around Cape Horn in 79 days, at an average speed of 11.6
knots, leaving Puget Sound on March 6 and touching at Barbados in
the West Indies an May 18, just as the Spanish fleet was steaming
across the Caribbean. The cruise effectively demonstrated the danger
of a divided navy and the need of an Isthmian canal. Under Commodore
Dewey in the Far East were two gunboats and four small cruisers,
the best of them the fast and heavily armed flagship _Olympia_,
of 5800 tons.
_The Battle of Manila Bay_
[Illustration: APPROACHES TO MANILA]
With this latter force the first blow of the war was struck on May
1 in Manila Bay. Dewey, largely through the influence of Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, had been appointed to the eastern
command the autumn before. On reaching his station in January, he
took his squadron to Hong Kong to be close to the scene of possible
hostilities. On February 25 he received a despatch from Roosevelt,
then Acting Secretary: "Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration
of war Spain, your duty will be to see that Spanish squadron does
not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the
Philippine Islands." On April 25 came the inspiring order: "Proceed
at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly
against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use
utmost endeavor." The Commodore had already purchased a collier and
a supply ship for use in addition to the revenue cutter _McCulloch_,
overhauled his vessels and given them a war coat of slate-gray, and
made plans for a base at Mirs Bay, 30 miles distant in Chinese
waters, where he would be less troubled by neutrality rules in time
of war. On April 22 the _Baltimore_ arrived from San Francisco
with much-needed ammunition. On the 27th Consul Williams joined
with latest news of preparations at Manila, and that afternoon
the squadron put to sea.
On the morning of the 30th it was off Luzon, and two ships scouted
Subig Bay, which the enemy had left only 24 hours before. At 12 that
night Dewey took his squadron in column through the entrance to Manila
Bay, just as he had steamed past the forts on the Mississippi with
Farragut 35 years before. Only three shots were fired by the guns
on shore. The thoroughness of Dewey's preparations, the rapidity
of his movements up to this point, and his daring passage through a
channel which he had reason to believe strongly defended by mines
and shore batteries are the just titles of his fame. The entrance to
Manila is indeed 10 miles wide and divided into separate channels by
the islands Corregidor, Caballo, and El Fraile. The less frequented
channel chosen was, as Dewey rightly judged, too deep for mining
except by experts. Yet the Spanish had news of his approach the
day before; they had 17 guns, including 6 modern rifles, on the
islands guarding the entrance; they had plenty of gunboats that
might have been fitted out as torpedo launches for night attack.
It does not detract from the American officer's accomplishment
that he drew no false picture of the obstacles with which he had
to deal.
At daybreak next morning, having covered slowly the 24 miles from
the mouth of the bay up to Manila, the American ships advanced
past the city to attack the Spanish flotilla drawn up under the
Cavite batteries 6 miles beyond. Here was what an American officer
described as "a collection of old tubs scarcely fit to be called
men-of-war." The most serviceable was Admiral Montojo's flagship
_Reina Cristina_, an unarmored cruiser of 3500 tons; the remaining
half dozen were older ships of both wood and iron, some of them
not able to get under way. They mounted 31 guns above 4-inch to
the Americans' 53. More serious in prospect, though not in reality,
was the danger from shore batteries and mines. The United States
vessels approached in column, led by the _Olympia_, which opened
fire at 5.40. In the words of Admiral Dewey's report, "The squadron
maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5000
to 2000 yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel
to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but
generally ineffective. Three runs were made from the eastward and
three from the westward, so that both broadsides were brought to
bear." One torpedo launch which dashed out was sunk and another
driven ashore. The _Cristina_ moved out as if to ram, but staggered
back under the _Olympia's_ concentrated fire. At 7.35, owing to a
mistaken report that only 15 rounds of ammunition were left for the
5-inch guns, the American squadron retired temporarily, but renewed
action at 11.16 and ended it an hour later, when the batteries were
silenced and "every enemy ship sunk, burned or deserted."
[Illustration: BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY 1, 1898]
As reported by Admiral Montojo, the Spanish lost 381 men. The American
ships were hit only 15 times and had 7 men slightly injured. Volume
and accuracy of gunfire won the day. Somewhat extravagant language
has been used in describing the battle, which, whatever the perils
that might naturally have been expected, was a most one-sided affair.
But it is less easy to overpraise Admiral Dewey's energetic and
aggressive handling of the entire campaign.
Manila thereafter lay helpless under the guns of the squadron,
and upon the arrival and landing of troops surrendered on August
13, after a merely formal defense. In the interim, Spain sent out
a relief force under Admiral Camara consisting of the _Pelaya,
Carlos V_ and other smaller units, before encountering which Dewey
planned to leave Manila and await the arrival of two monitors then
on their way from San Francisco. After getting through the Suez
Canal, Camara was brought back (July 8) by an American threat against
the coast of Spain.
Soon after the battle a number of foreign warships congregated
at Manila, including 5 German ships under Admiral von Diedrichs,
a force superior to Dewey's, and apparently bent on learning by
persistent contravention all the rules of a blockaded port. The
message finally sent to the German Admiral is reticently described
by Dewey himself, but is said to have been to the effect that, if
the German admiral wanted a fight, "he could have it right now."
On the day of the surrender of Manila the British and the Japanese
ships in the harbor took a position between the American and the
German squadrons. This was just after the seizure of Kiao-chau,
at a time when Germany was vigorously pushing out for "a place in
the sun." But for the American commander's quiet yet firm stand,
with British support, the United States might have encountered
more serious complications in taking over 127,000 square miles of
archipelago in the eastern world, with important trade interests,
a lively insurrection, and a population of 7 million.
_The Santiago Campaign_
In the Atlantic, where it was the American policy not to carry
their offensive beyond Spain's West Indies possessions, events
moved more slowly. Rear Admiral Sicard, in command of the North
Atlantic squadron based on Key West, was retired in March for physical
disability and succeeded by William T. Sampson, who stepped up
naturally from senior captain in the squadron and was already
distinguished for executive ability and knowledge of ordnance. Sampson's
first proposal was, in the event of hostilities, a bombardment of
Havana, a plan approved by all his captains and showing a confidence
inspired perhaps by coastal operations in the Civil War; but this
was properly vetoed by the Department on the ground that no ships
should be risked against shore defenses until they had struck at
the enemy's naval force and secured control of the sea. An earlier
memorandum from Secretary Long, outlining plans for a blockade
of Cuba, had been based on suggestions from Rear Admiral (then
Captain) Mahan,[1] and his strategic insight may have guided this
decision. On April 22, Sampson, now acting rear admiral, placed
his force off Havana and established a close blockade over 100
miles on the northern coast.
[Footnote 1: Goode, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, p. 19.]
The problem for American strategy was now Cervera's "fleet in
being,"--inferior in force but a menace until destroyed or put out
of action--which, as before stated, left the Cape Verde Islands
on April 29, for a destination unknown. A bombardment of cities on
the American coast or a raid on the North Atlantic trade routes
was within the realm of possibilities. Difficulties of coaling
and an inveterate tendency to leave the initiative to the enemy
decided the Spanish against such a project. But its bare possibility
set the whole east coast in a panic, which has been much ridiculed,
but which arose naturally enough from a complete lack of instruction
in naval matters and from lack of a sensible control of the press.
The result was an unfortunate division of the fleet. A so-called
Flying squadron under Commodore Schley, consisting of the _Brooklyn,
Massachusetts, Texas,_ and 3 small cruisers, was held at Hampton
Roads; whereas, if not thus employed, these ships might have blockaded
the south side of Cuba from the beginning of the war. A northern
patrol squadron, of vessels not of much use for this or any other
purpose, was also organized to guard the coast from Hampton Roads
north.
On May 4, with Cervera still at large, Sampson lifted his guard of
Havana--unwisely in the opinion of Mahan--and took his best ships,
the _New York, Indiana, Iowa,_ and two monitors, to reconnoiter San
Juan, Porto Rico, where it was thought the missing fleet might
first appear. Just as he was bombarding San Juan, on the morning
of May 12, the Navy Department received a cable from Martinique
announcing Cervera's arrival there. Havana and Cienfuegos (on the
south side of Cuba and connected with Havana by rail) were considered
the only two ports where the Spanish fleet could be of value to
the forces on the island; and from these two ports both American
squadrons were at this time a thousand miles away. Schley hastened
southward, left Key West on the 19th, and was off Cienfuegos by
daylight on the 21st. It was fairly quick work; but had the Spanish
fleet moved thither at its usual speed of 6 knots from its last
stopping-place, it would have got there first by at least 12 hours.
The Spanish admiral, finding no coal at Martinique, had left a
crippled destroyer there and moved on to the Dutch island of Curaçao,
where on the 14th and 15th he secured with difficulty about 500
tons of fuel. Thence, in all anxiety, he made straight for the
nearest possible refuge, Santiago, where he put in at daybreak on
the 19th and was soon receiving congratulations on the completion
of a successful cruise.
[Illustration: WEST INDIES
Movements in the Santiago campaign.]
By the next day Sampson, having hurried back from San Juan and
coaled, was again in force off Havana. There he received news of
Cervera's arrival in Santiago. Since Havana could not be uncovered,
he sent instructions to Schley--at first discretionary, and then,
as the reports were confirmed, more imperative--to blockade the
eastern port. Though the commander of the Flying Squadron received
the latter orders on the 23d, he had seen smoke in Cienfuegos harbor
and still believed he had Cervera cornered there. Accordingly he
delayed until evening of the next day. Then, after reaching Santiago,
he cabled on the 27th that he was returning to Key West to coal,
though he had a collier with him and stringent orders to the contrary;
and it was not until the 29th that he actually established the
Santiago Blockade. Sampson, his superior in command (though not
his senior in the captains' list), later declared his conduct at
this time "reprehensible"[1]--possibly too harsh a term, for the
circumstances tried judgment and leadership in the extreme. Cervera
found Santiago destitute of facilities for refitting. Yet the fact
remains that he had 10 days in which to coal and get away. "We
cannot," writes Admiral Mahan, "expect ever again to have an enemy
so inept as Spain showed herself to be."[1*]
[Footnote 1: Letter to Secretary, July 10, 1898, SAMPSON-SCHLEY
DOCUMENTS, p. 136: "Had the commodore left his station at that
time he probably would have been court-martialed, so plain was
his duty.... This reprehensible conduct I cannot separate from
his subsequent conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him
ample justice on this occasion." A court of inquiry later decided
that Commodore Schley's service up to June 1 was characterized
by "vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise."]
[Footnote 1*: LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, p. 157.]
The "bottling up" of Cervera cleared the situation, and the navy
could now concentrate on a task still difficult but well defined.
Sampson brought his force to Santiago on June 1, and assumed immediate
command. A close blockade was instituted such as against adequate
torpedo and mine defenses would have been highly dangerous even
at that day. Three picket launches were placed about a mile off
shore, three small vessels a mile further out, and beyond these
the 5 or 6 major units, under steam and headed toward the entrance
in a carefully planned disposition to meet any attempt at escape.
At night a battleship stood in and played its searchlight directly
on the mouth of the channel. The latter was six miles in length,
with difficult turns, and at the narrowest point only 300 feet
wide. Lieut. Hobson's gallant effort on June 3 to sink the collier
_Merrimac_ across the channel had made its navigation even more
difficult, though the vessel did not lie athwart-stream. Mine barriers
and batteries on the high hills at the harbor mouth prevented forcing
the channel, but the guns were mostly of ancient type and failed to
keep the ships at a distance. On the other hand, bombardments from
the latter did little more than to afford useful target practice.
The despatch of troops to Santiago was at once decided upon, and
the subsequent campaign, if it could be fully studied, would afford
interesting lessons in combined operations. On June 22, 16,000 men
under General Shafter landed at Daiquiri, 15 miles east of Santiago,
in 52 boats provided by the fleet, though the War Department had
previously stated that the general would "land his own troops."[2]
"It was done in a scramble," writes Col. Roosevelt; and there was
great difficulty in getting the skippers of army transports to bring
their vessels within reasonable distance of the shore. Since the sole
object of the campaign was to get at and destroy the enemy fleet,
the navy fully expected and understood that the army would make its
first aim to advance along the coast and capture the batteries at
the entrance, so that the mines could be lifted and the harbor
forced. Army authorities declare this would have involved division
of forces on both sides of the channel and impossibilities of
transportation due to lack of roads. But these difficulties applied
also in a measure to the defenders, and might perhaps have been
surmounted by full use of naval aid.
[Footnote 2: Goode, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, p. 182.]
Instead, the army set out with some confidence to capture the city
itself. El Caney and San Juan Hill were seized on July 2 after
a bloody struggle in which the Spanish stuck to their defenses
heroically and inflicted 1600 casualties. By their own figures the
Spanish on this day had only 1700 men engaged, though there were
36,500 Spanish troops in the province and 12,000 near at hand. In
considerable discouragement, Shafter now spoke of withdrawal, and
urged Sampson "immediately to force the entrance"[1]--in spite of
the fact that the main purpose in sending troops had been to avoid
this very measure. In view of threatening foreign complications
and the impossibility of replacing battleships, it was imperative
not to risk them against mines.
[Footnote 1: _Ibid._, p. 190.]
Food conditions were serious in Santiago, but Cervera was absolutely
determined not to assume responsibility for taking his fleet out to
what he regarded as certain slaughter. A night sortie, with ships
issuing one by one out of an intricate channel into the glare of
searchlights, he declared more difficult than one by day. Fortunately
for the Americans, in view of the situation ashore, the decision was
taken out of his hands, and Governor General Blanco from Havana
peremptorily ordered him to put to sea. The time of his exit, Sunday
morning, July 3, was luckily chosen, for Sampson, in the _New York_,
was 10 miles to eastward on his way to a conference with Shafter,
and the _Massachusetts_ was at Guantanamo for coal. The flagship
_Maria Teresa_ led out at 9.35, followed 10 minutes later by the
_Vizcaya_, and then by the _Colon, Oquendo_, and the destroyers
_Furor_ and _Pluton_, each turning westward at top speed.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898]
Simultaneously the big blockaders crowded toward them and opened a
heavy fire, while stokers shoveled desperately below to get up steam.
To the surprise of other vessels, Schley's ship, the _Brooklyn_,
after heading towards the entrance, swung round, not with the enemy,
but to starboard, just sliding past the _Texas'_ bow. This much
discussed maneuver Schley afterward explained as made to avoid
blanketing the fire of the rest of the squadron. The _Oregon_,
which throughout the blockade had kept plenty of steam, "rushed
past the _Iowa_," in the words of Captain Robley Evans, "like an
express train," in a cloud of smoke lighted by vicious flashes from
her guns. In ten minutes the _Maria Teresa_ turned for shore, hit
by 30 projectiles, her decks, encumbered with woodwork, bursting
into masses of flame. The concentration upon her at the beginning
had shifted to the _Oquendo_ in the rear, which ran ashore with
guns silenced 5 minutes after the leader.
Shortly before 11, the _Vizcaya_, with a torpedo ready in one of
her bow tubes, turned towards the _Brooklyn_, which had kept in
the lead of the American ships. A shell hitting squarely in the
_Vizcaya's_ bow caused a heavy explosion and she sheered away, the
guns of the _Brooklyn, Oregon_, and _Iowa_ bearing on her as she
ran towards the beach. The _Colon_, with a trial speed of 20 knots,
and 6 miles ahead of the _Brooklyn_ and _Oregon_, appeared to
stand a good chance of getting finally away. The _New York_, rushing
back toward the battle, was still well astern. But the _Colon's_
speed, which had averaged 13.7 knots, slackened as her fire-room
force played out; and shortly after 1 p.m. she ran shoreward, opened
her Kingston valves, and went down after surrender. She had been
hit only 6 times.
In the first stage of the fight the little yacht _Gloucester_,
under Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, had dashed pluckily upon
the two destroyers, which were also under fire from the secondary
batteries of the big ships. The _Furor_ was sunk and the _Plutón_
driven ashore.
There is hardly a record in naval history of such complete destruction.
Of 2300 Spaniards, 1800 were rescued as prisoners from the burning
wrecks or from the Cuban guerillas on shore, 350 met their death,
and the rest escaped towards Santiago. The American loss consisted
of one man killed and one wounded on the _Brooklyn_. This ship,
which owing to its leading position had been the chief enemy target,
received 20 hits from shells or fragments, and the other vessels
altogether about as many more. An examination of the half-sunken
and fire-scarred Spanish hulks showed 42 hits out of 1300 rounds
from the American main batteries, or 3.2 per cent, and 73 from
secondary batteries. Probably these figures should be doubled to
give the actual number, but even so they revealed the need of
improvement in gunnery.
Sampson was right when he stated earlier in the campaign that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet would end the war. Santiago surrendered
a fortnight later without further fighting. An expeditionary force
under General Miles made an easy conquest of Puerto Rico. On August
12, a protocol of peace was signed, by the terms of which the United
States took over Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (upon payment
of 20 million dollars), and Cuba became independent under American
protection. The war greatly strengthened the position of the United
States in the Caribbean, and gave her new interests and responsibilities
in the Pacific. In the possession of distant dependencies the nation
found a new motive for increased naval protection and for more
active concern in international affairs.
2. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
At the time when the United States acquired the Philippines, the
Far East was a storm center of international disturbance. Russia,
with the support of Germany and France, had, as already noted,
combined to prevent Japan from fully exploiting her victory over
China. The latter country, however, had every appearance of a melon
ripe for cutting; and under guise of security for loans, indemnity
for injuries, railroad and treaty-port concessions, and special
spheres of influence, each European nation endeavored to mark out
its prospective share. Russia, in return for protecting China against
Japan, gained a short-cut for her Siberian Railway across Northern
Manchuria, with rail and mining concessions in that province and
prospects of getting hold of both Port Arthur and Kiao-chau. But,
at an opportune moment for Germany, two German missionaries were
murdered in 1897 by Chinese bandits. Germany at once seized Kiao-chau,
and in March, 1898, extorted a 99-year lease of the port, with
exclusive development privileges throughout the peninsula of Shantung.
"The German Michael," as Kaiser Wilhelm said at a banquet on the
departure of his fleet to the East, had "firmly planted his shield
upon Chinese soil"; and "the gospel of His Majesty's hallowed person,"
as Admiral Prince Heinrich asserted in reply, "was to be preached
to every one who will hear it and also to those who do not wish
to hear." "Our establishment on the coast of China," writes
ex-Chancellor van Bülow, "was in direct and immediate connection
with the progress of the fleet, and a first step into the field
of world politics... giving us _a place in the sun_ in Eastern
Asia."[1]
[Footnote 1: From London _Spectator_, Dec. 26, 1897, quoted in
Morse, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE, Vol. III,
p. 108.]
[Illustration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR]
Thus forestalled at Kiao-chau, Russia at once pushed through a
25-year lease of Port Arthur, and proceeded to strengthen it as
a fortified port and naval base. England, though preoccupied with
the Boer War, took Wei-hai-wai as a precautionary measure, "for as
long a time as Port Arthur shall remain a possession of Russia."[1]
France secured a new base in southern China on Kwang-chau Bay, and
Italy tried likewise but failed. Aroused by the foreign menace,
the feeling of the Chinese masses burst forth in the summer of 1900
in the massacres and uprisings known as the Boxer Rebellion. In
the combined expedition to relieve the legations at Peking Japanese
troops displayed superior deftness, discipline, and endurance,
and gained confidence in their ability to cope with the armies of
European powers.
[Footnote 1: _Ibid._, III, 118.]
In the period following, Germany in Shantung and Russia in Manchuria
pursued steadily their policy of exploitation. Against it, the
American Secretary of State John Hay advanced the policy of the
_Open Door_, "to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative
entity... and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and
impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."[1] To this
the powers gave merely lip-service, realizing that her fixed policy
of isolation would restrain the United States from either diplomatic
combinations or force. "The open hand," wrote Hay in discouragement,
"will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinese as the
raised club,"[2] nor was it so efficacious in dealing with other
nations concerned. Japan, however, had strained every energy to
build up her army and navy for a conflict that seemed inevitable,
and was ready to back her opposition to European advances by force
if need be. In 1902 she protected herself against a combination of
foes by defensive alliance with England. She demanded that Russia
take her troops out of Manchuria and recognize Japanese predominance
in Korea. Russia hoped to forestall hostilities until she could
further strengthen her army and fleet in the East, but when the
transfer of ships reached the danger point, Japan declared war,
February 8, 1904, and struck viciously that same night.
[Footnote 1: NOTE TO THE EUROPEAN POWERS, July 3, 1900.]
[Footnote 2: Thayer, LIFE OF HAY, II, 369.]
As in the Spanish-American War, control of the sea was vital, since
Japan must depend upon it to move her troops to the continental
theater of war. Nor could she hold her army passive while awaiting
the issue of a struggle for sea control. Delay would put a greater
relative strain on her finances, and give Russia, handicapped by
long communications over the single-track Siberian Railway, a better
chance to mass in the East her troops and supplies. Japan's plan
was therefore to strike hard for naval advantage, but to begin
at once, in any event, the movement of troops overseas. At the
outbreak of war her fleet of 6 battleships and 6 armored cruisers,
with light cruiser and destroyer flotillas, was assembled at Sasebo
near the Straits of Tsushima, thoroughly organized for fighting
and imbued with the spirit of war. Japan had an appreciable naval
superiority, but was handicapped by the task of protecting her
transports and by the necessity--which she felt keenly--of avoiding
losses in battle which would leave her helpless upon the possible
advent of Russia's Baltic reserves.
Russia's main naval strength in the East consisted of 7 battleships
and 3 armored cruisers, presenting a combined broadside of 100
guns against Japan's 124. The support of the Black Sea fleet was
denied by the attitude of England, which would prevent violation
of the agreement restricting it from passing the Dardanelles. The
Baltic fleet, however, was an important though distant reserve
force, a detachment from which was actually in the Red Sea on its
way east at the outbreak of war.
Just as clearly as it was Japan's policy to force the fighting on
land, so it should have been Russia's to prevent Japan's movement
of troops by aggressive action at sea. This called for concentration
of force and concentration of purpose. But neither was evident in
the Russian plan of campaign, which betrayed confusion of thought
and a traditional leaning toward the defensive--acceptance on the
one hand of what has been called "fortress fleet" doctrine, that
fleets exist to protect bases and can serve this purpose by being
shut up in them; and on the other hand of exaggerated "fleet in
being" theory, that the mere presence of the Russian fleet, though
inactive, would prevent Japan's use of the sea. Thus in October,
1903, Witjeft, chief of the Port Arthur naval staff, declared that
a landing of Japanese troops either in the Liao-tung or the Korean
Gulf was "impossible so long as our fleet is not destroyed." Just
as Russia's total force was divided between east and west, so her
eastern force was divided between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, with
the Japanese in central position between. Three armored cruisers
were in the northern port, and 7 battleships in the other; and all
Russia's efforts after war broke out were vainly directed toward
remedying this faulty disposition before it began. The whole Russian
fleet in the East, moreover, was, it is said, badly demoralized and
unready for war, owing chiefly to bureaucratic corruption and to
the fact that not merely its strategical direction but its actual
command was vested in the Viceroy, Alexieff, with headquarters on
shore.
_Operations Around Port Arthur_
On January 3, 1904, Japan presented practically an ultimatum; on
February 6 broke off diplomatic relations; on February 8 declared
war; and on the same night--just as the Czar was discussing with
his council what should be done--she delivered her first blow. By
extraordinary laxity, though the diplomatic rupture was known,
the Port Arthur squadron remained in the outer anchorage, "with
all lights burning, without torpedo nets out, and without any guard
vessels."[1] Ten Japanese destroyers attacked at close quarters,
fired 18 torpedoes, and put the battleship _Tsarevitch_ and two
cruisers out of action for two months. It was only poor torpedo
work, apparently, that saved the whole fleet from destruction. A
Russian light cruiser left isolated at Chemulpa was destroyed the
next day. The transportation of troops to Korea and Southern Manchuria
was at once begun. Though not locked in by close blockade, and not
seriously injured by the frequent Japanese raids, bombardments,
and efforts to block the harbor entrance, the Port Arthur squadron
made no move to interfere.
[Footnote 1: Semenoff, RASPLATA, p. 45.]
Both fleets suffered from mines. Vice Admiral Makaroff, Russia's
foremost naval leader, who took command at Port Arthur in March,
went down with the _Petropavlosk_ on April 13, when his ship struck
a mine laid by the Japanese. On May 14, on the other hand, the
Russian mine-layer _Amur_ slipped out in a fog, spread her mines
in the usual path of Japanese vessels off the port, and thus on
the same day sank two of their best ships, the _Hatsuse_ and
_Yashima_. Mining, mine-sweeping, an uneventful Russian sortie
an June 23, progress of Japanese land forces down the peninsula
and close investment of Port Arthur--this was the course of events
down to the final effort of the Russian squadron on August 10.
[Illustration: HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR]
By this time Japanese siege guns were actually reaching ships in
the harbor. Action of any kind, especially if it involved some
injury to the enemy navy, was better than staying to be shot to
pieces from the shore. Yet Makaroff's successor, Witjeft, painfully
and consciously unequal to his responsibilities, still opposed
an exit, and left port only upon imperative orders from above.
Scarcely was the fleet an hour outside when Togo appeared on the
scene. The forces in the Battle of August 10 consisted of 6 Russian
battleships and 4 cruisers, against 6 Japanese armored vessels and
9 cruisers; the combined large-caliber broadsides of the armored
ships being 73 to 52, and of the cruisers 55 to 21, in favor of
Togo's squadron. In spite of this superiority in armament, and of
fully a knot in speed, Togo hesitated to close to decisive range.
Five hours or more of complicated maneuvering ensued, during which
both squadrons kept at "long bowls," now passing each other, now
defiling across van or rear, without marked advantage for either
side.
At last, at 5.40 p.m., the Japanese got in a lucky blow. Two 12-inch
shells struck the flagship _Tsarevitch_, killing Admiral Witjeft,
jamming the helm to starboard, and thus serving to throw the whole
Russian line into confusion. Togo now closed to 3000 yards, but
growing darkness enabled his quarry to escape. The battle in fact
was less one-sided than the later engagement at Tsushima. On both
sides the percentage of hits was low, about 1% for the Russians
and 6 or 7% for their opponents. Togo's flagship _Mikasa_ was hit
30 times and lost 125 men; the total Japanese loss was about half
that of the enemy--236 to 478.
Much might still have been gained, in view of the future coming of
the Baltic fleet, had the Russians still persisted in pressing onward
for Vladivostok; but owing to loss of their leader and ignorance of
the general plan, they scattered. The cruiser _Novik_ was caught and
sunk, another cruiser was interned at Shanghai, a third at Saigon,
and the _Tsarevitch_ at Kiao-chau. The rest, including 5 of the 6
battleships, fled back into the Port Arthur death-trap. Largely in
order to complete their destruction, the Japanese sacrificed 60,000
men in desperate assaults on the fortress, which surrendered January
2, 1905. As at Santiago, the necessity of saving battleships, less
easily replaced, led the Japanese to the cheaper expenditure of
men.
On news of the Port Arthur sortie, the Vladivostok squadron, which
hitherto had made only a few more or less futile raids on Japanese
shipping, advanced toward Tsushima Straits, and met there at dawn
of August 14 a slightly superior force of 4 cruisers under Kamimura.
The better shooting of the Japanese soon drove the slowest Russian
ship, the _Rurik_, out of line; the other two, after a plucky fight,
managed to get away, with hulls and funnels riddled by enemy shells.
The complete annulment of Russia's eastern fleet in this first
stage of hostilities had enabled Japan to profit fully by her easier
communications to the scene of war. Its final destruction with the
fall of Port Arthur gave assurance of victory. The decisive battle
of Mukden was fought in March, 1905. Close to their bases, trained
to the last degree, inspired by success, the Japanese navy could
now face with confidence the approach of Russia's last fleet.
_Rojdestvensky's Cruise_
After a series of accidents and delays, the Baltic fleet under
Admiral Rojdestvensky--8 battleships, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and
numerous auxiliaries--left Libau Oct. 18, 1904, on its 18,000-mile
cruise. Off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea, the ships fired into
English trawlers under the impression that they were enemy torpedo
craft, and thus nearly stirred England to war. Off Tangier some of
the lighter vessels separated to pass by way of Suez, and a third
division from Russia followed a little later by the same route.
Hamburg-American colliers helped Rojdestvensky solve his logistical
problem on the long voyage round Africa, and German authorities
stretched neutrality rules upon his arrival in Wahlfish Bay, for
the engrossment of Russia in eastern adventures was cheerfully
encouraged by the neighbor on her southern frontier. France also
did her best to be of service to the fleet of her ally, though
she had "paired off" with England to remain neutral in the war.
With the reunion of the Russian divisions at Nossi Bé, Madagascar,
January 9, 1905, came news of the fall of Port Arthur. The home
government now concluded to despatch the fag-ends of its navy,
though Rojdestvensky would have preferred to push ahead without
waiting for such "superfluous encumbrances" to join. Ships, as
his staff officer Semenoff afterward wrote, were needed, but not
"old flatirons and galoshes"; guns, but not "holes surrounded by
iron."[1] After a tedious 10 weeks' delay in tropical waters, the
fleet moved on to French Indo-China, where, after another month
of waiting, the last division under Nebogatoff finally joined--a
slow old battleship, 3 coast defense ironclads, and a cruiser.
Upon these, Rojdestvensky's officers vented their vocabulary of
invective, in which "war junk" and "auto-sinkers" were favorite
terms.
[Footnote 1: RASPLATA, p. 426.]
Having already accomplished almost the impossible, the armada of
50 units on May 14 set forth on the last stage of its extraordinary
cruise. Of three possible routes to Vladivostok--through the Tsugaru
Strait between Nippon and Yezo, through the Strait of La Perouse
north of Yezo, or through the Straits of Tsushima--the first was
ruled out as too difficult of navigation; the second, because it
would involve coaling off the coast of Japan. Tsushima remained.
To avoid torpedo attack, the Russian admiral planned to pass the
straits by day, and fully expected battle. But the hope lingered
in his mind that fog or heavy weather might enable him to pass
unscathed. He had been informed that owing to traffic conditions
on the Siberian railway, he could get nothing at Vladivostok in
the way of supplies. Hence, as a compromise measure which weakened
fighting efficiency, he took along 3 auxiliary steamers, a repair
ship, 2 tugs, and 2 hospital ships, the rest of the train on May
25 entering Shanghai; and he so filled the bunkers and piled even
the decks with fuel, according to Nebogatoff's later testimony,
that they went into action burdened with coal for 3,000 miles.[2]
[Footnote 2: Mahan, NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 412.]
[Illustration: ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCT. 18, 1904-MAY 27, 1905]
The main Russian fighting force entered the battle in three divisions
of 4 ships each: (1) the _Suvaroff_ (flagship), _Alexander III,
Borodino_ and _Orel_, each a new battleship of about 13,600 tons;
(2) the _Ossliabya_, a slightly smaller battleship, and three
armored cruisers; (3) Nebogatoff's division as given above, with the
exception of the cruiser. Then there was a squadron of 4 smaller
cruisers, 4 other cruisers as scouts, and 9 destroyers. The Japanese
engaged in two main divisions of 6 ships each (4 battleships and
8 armored cruisers), backed by four light cruiser divisions of 4
ships each. The Russian line had the advantage in heavy ordnance,
as will appear from the following table, but this was more than
compensated for by the enemy's superiority in 8-inch guns and
quick-firers, which covered the Russians with an overwhelming rain
of shells. Of guns in broadside, the Japanese ships-of-the-line
had 127 to 98; and the cruisers 89 to 43.
--------------------------------------------------
| | MAIN BATTERIES | Q.F.
| |---------------------|------------
| Ships | 12" | 10" | 9" | 8" | 6" | 4·7"
-------|-------|-----|-----|----|----|-----|------
Japan | 12 | 16 | 1 | | 30 | 160 |
Russia | 12 | 26 | 15 | 4 | 3 | 90 | 20
On the basis of these figures, and the 50% superiority of the Japanese
in speed, the issue could hardly be in doubt. Admiral Togo, moreover,
had commanded his fleet in peace and war for 8 years, and had veteran
subordinates on whom he could depend to lead their divisions
independently yet in coordination with the general plan. Constant
training and target practice had brought his crews to a high degree
of skill. The Japanese shells were also superior, with fuses that
detonated their charges on the slightest contact with an explosive
force like that of mines. Between the enemy and their base, the
Japanese could wait quietly in home waters, while the Russian fleet
was worn out by its eight months' cruise. At best, the latter was
a heterogeneous assemblage of new ships hastily completed and old
ships indifferently put in repair, which since Nebogatoff joined
had had but one opportunity for maneuvers and had operated as a
unit for only 13 days.
On the night of May 26-27, as the Russian ships approached Tsushima
through mist and darkness, half the officers and men were at their
posts, while the rest slept beside the guns. Fragments of wireless
messages--"Last night" ... "nothing" ... "eleven lights" ... "but
not in line"--revealed enemy patrols in the waters beyond. Semenoff
on the _Suvaroff_ describes vividly "the tall, somewhat bent figure
of the Admiral on the side of the bridge, the wrinkled face of
the man at the wheel stooping over the compass, the guns' crews
chilled at their posts." In the brightly lighted engine-rooms,
"life and movement was visible on all sides; men were nimbly running
up and down ladders; there was a tinkling of bells and buzzing
of voices; orders were being transmitted loudly; but, on looking
more intently, the tension and anxiety--that same peculiar frame
of mind so noticeable on deck--could also be observed."[1]
[Footnote 1: THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, p. 28.]
_The Battle of Tsushima_
At dawn (4.45) the Japanese scout _Sinano Maru_, which for an hour
or more had been following in the darkness, made them out clearly
and communicated the intelligence at once to Togo in his base at
Masampho Bay, on the Korean side of the straits, and to the cruiser
divisions off the Tsushima Islands. This was apparently the first
definite news that Togo had received for several days, and the fact
suggests that his scouting arrangements were not above criticism,
for it took fast steaming to get to the straits by noon. Cruiser
divisions were soon circling towards the Russians through the mist
and darting as swiftly away, first the 5th and 6th under Takeomi
and Togo (son of the admiral), then the 3d under Dewa, all reporting
the movements of the enemy fleet and shepherding it till the final
action began. Troubled by their activity, Rojdestvensky made several
shifts of formation, first placing his 1st and 2d divisions in
one long column ahead of the 3d, then at 11.20 throwing the 1st
division again to starboard, while the cruisers protected the
auxiliaries which were steaming between the lines in the rear.
This was the disposition when, shortly after one o'clock, the Japanese
main divisions appeared to northward about 7 miles distant, steaming
on a westerly course across the enemy's bows. Since morning Togo
had covered a distance of 90 miles. From his signal yards fluttered
the stirring message: "The fate of the empire depends upon to-day's
battle. Let every man do his utmost." Ordering all his cruisers to
circle to the Russian rear, and striking himself for their left
flank, which at the moment was the weaker, Togo first turned southward
as if to pass on opposite courses, and then at about two o'clock
led his two divisions around to east-northeast, so as to "cross
the T" upon the head of the enemy line.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, MAY 27, 1905
_Japanese_
I Division (Togo) II Division (Kamimura)
Mikasa, B.S. Idzumo
Shikishima, B.S. Iwate
Asahi, B.S. Adzumo
Fuji, B.S. Asama
Nisshin, A.C. Tokiwa
Kasuga Yakumo
_Russians_
I Division II Division
Suvaroff Ossliabya (flag)
Alexander III
Borodino III Division
Orel]
Just as Togo's flagship _Mikasa_ straightened on her new course,
nearly north of the _Suvaroff_, and 6400 yards distant, the _Suvaroff_
opened fire. It has been suggested that at this critical moment the
Russian admiral should have closed with the enemy, or, leading
his ships on a northwesterly course, laid his starboard broadsides
on the knuckle formed by the Japanese turn. But the position of
the enemy cruisers and destroyers, and worry over his transports,
guided his movements. Moreover, he had not yet completed an awkwardly
executed maneuver to get his ships back into single column with
the 1st division ahead. The _Ossliabya_ and other ships of the
2d division were thrown into confusion, and forced to slow down
and even stop engines. Under these difficulties, the _Suvaroff_
sheered more to eastward. As they completed their turn the Japanese
secured a "capping" position and could concentrate on the leading
ships of both the 1st and the 2d Russian divisions, 4 ships on
the _Suvaroff_ and 7 on the _Ossliabya_. Under this terrible fire
the _Ossliabya_ went down, the first modern battleship (in the
narrow sense of the word) ever sunk by gunfire, and the _Suvaroff_
a few moments later fell out of line, torn by shells, her forward
funnel down, and steering gear jammed. "She was so battered," wrote
a Japanese observer, "that scarcely any one would have taken her
for a ship."
With an advantage in speed of 15 knots to 9, the Japanese drew
ahead. The _Alexander_, followed by other Russian ships in much
confusion, about three o'clock made an effort to pass northward
across the enemy rear, but they were countered by the Japanese first
division turning west together and the 2d division in succession at
3.10. The first and decisive phase of the action thus ended. Both
fleets eventually resumed easterly and then southerly courses,
for considerable periods completely lost to each other in smoke
and haze.
Plunging through heavy seas from the southwest, the Japanese cruisers
had in the meantime punished the Russian rear less severely than
might have been expected. Two transports went down in flames, two
cruisers were badly damaged, and the high-sided ex-German liner
_Ural_ was punctured with shells. On the other hand, Dewa's flagship
_Kasagi_ was driven to port with a bad hole under water, and Toga's
old ship _Naniwa Kan_ had to cease action for repairs. Hits and
losses in fact were considerable in both the main and the cruiser
divisions of the Japanese, their total casualties numbering 465.
Late in the afternoon the Russian destroyer _Buiny_ came up to
the wreck of the _Suvaroff_, and lurched alongside long enough for
Rojdestvensky, wounded and almost unconscious, to be practically
thrown on board. He was captured with the destroyer next day. In
spite of her injuries, the _Suvaroff_ held off a swarm of cruisers
and destroyers until at last torpedoed at 7.20 p. m.
The Russian battleships had meanwhile described a large circle to
southward, and at 5 p. m. were again steaming north, accompanied
by some of their cruisers and train. Attacked once more between
6 and 7 o'clock, and almost incapable of defense, the _Alexander
III_ and _Borodino_ went down, making 4 ships lost out of the 5 new
vessels that had formed the backbone of Rojdestvensky's forces. In
the gathering darkness. Nebogatoff collected the survivors and
staggered northward.
Of slight value in the day engagement, 21 Japanese destroyers,
with about 40 torpedo boats which had sheltered under Tsushima
Island, now darted after the fleeing foe. In the fog and heavy
weather they were almost as great a menace to each other as to
the enemy. Russian ships without searchlights escaped harm. Of
three or perhaps four Russian vessels struck, all but the _Navarin_
stayed afloat until the next day. Admiral Custance estimates 8 hits,
or 9% of the torpedoes fired. There were at least 6 collisions
among the flotillas, and 4 boats destroyed.
On the morning of the 28th the remains of the Russian fleet were
scattered over the sea. Nebagatoff with 4 battleships and 2 cruisers
surrendered at 10.30. Of the 37 ships all told that entered Tsushima
Straits, only the following escaped: the cruisers _Oleg, Aurora_,
and _Jemschug_ reached Manila on June 3; a tug and a supply ship
entered Shanghai, and another transport with plenty of coal went
clear to Madagascar; only the fast cruiser _Almaz_ and two
destroyers made Vladivostok.
Among the lessons to be drawn from Tsushima, one of the clearest is
the weakening effect of divided purpose. With all honor to Admiral
Rojdestvensky for his courage and persistence during his cruise,
it is evident that at the end he allowed the supply problem to
interfere with his preparations for battle, and that he fought
"with one eye on Vladivostok." It is evident also that only by a
long period of training and operating as a unit can a collection
of ships and men be welded into an effective fighting force. Torpedo
results throughout the war, whether due to faulty materials or
unskilled employment, were not such as to increase the reliance upon
this weapon. The gun retained its supremacy; and the demonstrated
advantage conferred by speed and heavy armament in long range fighting
was reflected in the "all-big-gun" _Dreadnought_ of 1906 and the
battle cruisers of 1908.
Immediately after the Russian navy had been swept out of existence,
President Roosevelt offered to mediate, and received favorable replies
from the warring nations. By the treaty signed at Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, on September 5, 1905, Russia withdrew from Manchuria
in favor of China, recognized Japan's paramount position in Korea
(annexed by Japan in 1910), and surrendered to Japan her privileges
in Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula. In lieu of indemnity,
Japan after a long deadlock was induced by pressure on the part
of England and the United States to accept that portion of the
island of Saghalien south of the parallel of 50°. Thus the war
thwarted Russia's policy of aggressive imperialism in the East,
and established Japan firmly on the mainland at China's front door.
At the same time, by the military débâcle of Russia, it dangerously
disturbed the balance of power in Europe, upon which the safety
of that continent had long been made precariously to depend.
REFERENCES
_Spanish-American War_
NOTES ON THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR (a series of publications issued
by the Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy Department, 1900).
SAMPSON-SCHLEY OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE U. S. SENATE, Gov't
Printing Office, 1899.
THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN, H. W. Wilson, 1900.
WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, W. A. M. Goode, 1899.
A HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, R. H. Tetherington, 1900.
_Russo-Japanese War_
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE, 3 vols., H. B.
Morse, 1918.
THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA (1906), RASPLATA (1910), Captain Vladimir
Semenoff.
JAPANESE OFFICIAL HISTORY, translated in U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, July-August, September-October, 1914.
THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, Admiral Reginald Custance, 1912.
THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, Captain N. Klado, 1905.
OFFICIAL BRITISH HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 3 vols., 1910.
THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE, Debaters' Handbook Series,
N. Y., 1916 (with bibliography).