REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE: HAMPTON ROADS AND LISSA.
During the 19th century, from 1815 to 1898, naval power, though
always an important factor in international relations, played in
general a passive rôle. The wars which marked the unification of
Germany and Italy and the thrusting back of Turkey from the Balkans
were fought chiefly on land. The navy of England, though never
more constantly busy in protecting her far-flung empire, was not
challenged to a genuine contest for mastery of the seas. In the
Greek struggle for independence there were two naval engagements
of some consequence--Chios (1822), where the Greeks with fireships
destroyed a Turkish squadron and gained temporary control of the
Ægean, and Navarino (1827), in which a Turkish force consisting
principally of frigates was wiped out by a fleet of the western
powers. But both of these actions were one-sided, and showed nothing
new in types or tactics. In the American Civil War control of the
sea was important and even decisive, but was overwhelmingly in the
hands of the North. Hence the chief naval interest of the period
lies not so much in the fighting as in the revolutionary changes in
ships, weapons, and tactics--changes which parallel the extraordinary
scientific progress of the century; and the engagements may be
studied now, as they were studied then, as testing and illustrating
the new methods and materials of naval war.
_Changes in Ships and Weapons_
Down to the middle of the 19th century there had been only a slow
and slight development in ships and weapons for a period of nearly
300 years. A sailor of the Armada would soon have felt at home in
a three-decker of 1815. But he would have been helpless as a child
in the fire-driven iron monsters that fought at Hampton Roads. The
shift from sail to steam, from oak to iron, from shot to shell, and
from muzzle-loading smoothbore to breech-loading rifle began about
1850; and progress thereafter was so swift that an up-to-date ship
of each succeeding decade was capable of defeating a whole squadron
of ten years before. Success came to depend on the adaptability
and mechanical skill of personnel, as well as their courage and
discipline, and also upon the progressive spirit of constructors
and naval experts, faced with the most difficult problems, the
wrong solution of which would mean the waste of millions of dollars
and possible defeat in war. Every change had to overcome the spirit
of conservatism inherent in military organizations, where seniority
rules, errors are sanctified by age, and every innovation upsets
cherished routine. Thus in the contract for Ericsson's _Monitor_
it was stipulated that she should have masts, spars, and sails!
The first successful steamboat for commerce was, as is well known,
Robert Fulton's flat-bottomed side-wheeler _Clermont_, which in
August, 1807, made the 150 miles from New York to Albany in 32
hours. During the war of 1812 Fulton designed for coast defense
a heavily timbered, double-ender floating battery, with a single
paddle-wheel located inside amidships. On her trial trip in 1815
this first steam man-of-war, the U. S. S. _Fulton_, carried 26 guns
and made over 6 knots, but she was then laid up and was destroyed
a few years later by fire. Ericsson's successful application of
the screw propeller in 1837 made steam propulsion more feasible
for battleships by clearing the decks and eliminating the clumsy
and exposed side-wheels. The first American screw warship was the
U. S. S. _Princeton_, of 1843, but every ship in the American Navy
at the outbreak of the Civil War had at least auxiliary sail rig.
Though by 1850 England had 30 vessels with auxiliary steam, the
_Devastation_ of 1869 was the first in the British service to use
steam exclusively. Long after this time old "floating museums"
with sail rig and smoothbores were retained in most navies for
motives of economy, and even the first ships of the American "White
Squadron" were encumbered with sails and spars.
[Illustration: EARLY IRONCLADS]
Progress in ordnance began about 1822, when explosive shells, hitherto
used only in mortars, were first adopted for ordinary cannon with
horizontal fire. At the time of the Crimean War shells were the
usual ammunition for lower tier guns, and at Sinope in 1853 their
smashing effect against wooden hulls was demonstrated when a Russian
squadron destroyed some Turkish vessels which fired only solid
shot. The great professional cry of the time, we are told, became
"For God's sake, keep out the shell."[1]
[Footnote 1: Custance, THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, p. 9.]
In 1851 Minié rifles supplanted in the British army the old smoothbore
musket or "Brown Bess," with which at ranges above 200 yards it was
difficult to hit a target 11 feet square. This change led quickly
to the rifling of heavy ordnance as well. The first Armstrong rifles
of 1858--named after their inventor, Sir William Armstrong, head
of the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich--included guns up to 7-inch
diameter of bore. The American navy, however, depended chiefly
on smoothbores throughout the Civil War.
Breech-loading, which had been used centuries earlier, came in
again with these first rifles, but after 1865 the British navy
went back to muzzle-loading and stuck to it persistently for the
next 15 years. By that time the breech-loading mechanism had been
simplified, and its adoption became necessary to secure greater length
of gun barrel, increased rapidity of fire, and better protection for
gun-crews. About 1880 quick-fire guns of from 3 to 6 inches, firing
12 or 15 shots a minute, were mounted in secondary batteries.
As already suggested, the necessity for armor arose from the smashing
and splintering effect of shell against wooden targets and the
penetrating power of rifled guns. To attack Russian forts in the
Crimea, the French navy in 1855 built three steam-driven floating
batteries, the _Tonnant, Lave_, and _Dévastation_, each protected
by 4.3-inch plates and mounting 8 56-lb. guns. In the reduction of
the Kinburn batteries, in October of the same year, these boats
suffered little, but were helped out by an overwhelming fire from
wooden ships, 630 guns against 81 in the forts.
The French armored ship _Gloire_ of 1859 caused England serious worry
about her naval supremacy, and led at once to H. M. S. _Warrior_,
like the _Gloire_, full rigged with auxiliary steam. The _Warrior's_
4.5-inch armor, extending from 6 feet below the waterline to 16 feet
above and covering about 42 per cent of the visible target, was
proof against the weapons of the time. At this initial stage in
armored construction, naval experts turned with intense interest
to watch the work of ironclads against ships and forts in the
American Civil War.
_The American Civil War_
The naval activities of this war are too manifold to follow in
detail. For four years the Union navy was kept constantly occupied
with the tasks of blockading over 3000 miles of coast-line, running
down enemy commerce destroyers, cooperating with the army in the
capture of coast strongholds, and opening the Mississippi and other
waterways leading into the heart of the Confederacy. To make the
blockade effective and cut off the South from the rest of the world,
the Federal Government unhesitatingly applied the doctrine of
"continuous voyage," seizing and condemning neutral ships even when
bound from England to Bermuda or the Bahamas, if their cargo was
ultimately destined for Southern ports. The doctrine was declared
inapplicable when the last leg of the journey was by land,[1] doubtless
because there was little danger of heavy traffic across the Mexican
frontier. Blockade runners continued to pour goods into the South
until the fall of Fort Fisher in 1865; but as the blockade became
more stringent, it crippled the finances of the Confederacy, shut
out foodstuffs and munitions, and shortened, if it did not even
have a decisive effect in winning the war.
[Footnote 1: Peterhoff Case, 1866 (5 Wall, 28).]
To meet these measures the South was at first practically without
naval resources, and had to turn at once to new methods of war. Its
first move was to convert the steam frigate _Merrimac_, captured
half-burned with the Norfolk Navy Yard, into an ironclad ram. A
casemate of 4 inches of iron over 22 inches of wood, sloping 35
degrees from the vertical, was extended over 178 feet, or about
two-thirds of her hull. Beyond this structure the decks were awash.
The _Merrimac_ had an armament of 6 smoothbores and 4 rifles, two
of the latter being pivot-guns at bow and stern, and a 1500-lb.
cast-iron beak or ram. With her heavy load of guns and armor she
drew 22 feet aft and could work up a speed of barely 5 knots.
Faced with this danger, the North hurriedly adopted Ericsson's
plan for the _Monitor_,[2] which was contracted for on October
4, 1861, and launched after 100 days. Old marlin-spike seamen
pooh-poohed this "cheesebox on a raft." As a naval officer said,
it might properly be worshiped by its designer, for it was an image
of nothing in the heavens above, or the earth beneath, or the waters
under the earth. It consisted of a revolving turret with 8-inch
armor and two 11-inch smoothbore guns, set on a raft-like structure
142 feet in length by 41-1/2 feet in beam, projecting at bow, stern,
and sides beyond a flat-bottomed lower hull. Though unseaworthy,
the _Monitor_ maneuvered quickly and drew only 10-1/2 feet. She
was first ordered to the Gulf, but on March 6 this destination
was suddenly changed to the Chesapeake.
[Footnote 2: So called by Ericsson because it would "admonish"
the South, and also suggest to England "doubts as to the propriety
of completing four steel-clad ships at three and one-half millions
apiece."]
The South in fact won the race in construction and got its ship
first into action by a margin of just half a day. At noon on March
8, with the iron-workers still driving her last rivets, the _Merrimac_
steamed out of Norfolk and advanced ponderously upon the three sail
and two steam vessels then anchored in Hampton Roads.
In the Northern navy there had been much skepticism about the ironclad
and no concerted plan to meet her attack. Under a rain of fire
from the Union ships, and from share fortifications too distant
to be effective, the _Merrimac_ rammed and sank the sloop-of-war
_Cumberland_, and then, after driving the frigate _Congress_ aground,
riddled her with shells. Towards nightfall the Confederate vessel
moved dawn stream, to continue the slaughter next day.
About 12 o'clock that night, after two days of terrible buffeting
on the voyage down the coast, the little _Monitor_ anchored on
the scene lighted up by the burning wreck of the _Congress_. The
first battle of ironclads began next morning at 8:30 and continued
with slight intermission till noon. It ended in a triumph, not
for either ship, but for armor over guns. The _Monitor_ fired 41
solid shot, 20 of which struck home, but merely cracked some of
the _Merrimac's_ outer plates. The _Monitor_ was hit 22 times by
enemy shells. Neither craft was seriously harmed and not a man was
killed on either side, though several were stunned or otherwise
injured. Lieut. Worden, in command of the _Monitor_, was nearly
blinded by a shell that smashed in the pilot house, a square iron
structure then located not above the turret but on the forward
deck.
The drawn battle was hailed as a Northern victory. Imagination
had been drawing dire pictures of what the _Merrimac_ might do. At
a Cabinet meeting in Washington Sunday morning, March 9, Secretary
of War Stanton declared: "The _Merrimac_ will change the course of
the war; she will destroy _seriatim_ every naval vessel; she will
lay all the cities on the seaboard under contribution. I have no
doubt that the enemy is at this minute on the way to Washington, and
that we shall have a shell from one of her guns in the White House
before we leave this room." The menace was somewhat exaggerated. With
her submerged decks, feeble engines, and general awkwardness, the
_Merrimac_ could scarcely navigate in Hampton Roads. In the first
day's fighting her beak was wrenched off and a leak started, two
guns were put out of action, and her funnel and all other top-hamper
were riddled. As was shown by Farragut in Mobile Bay, and again by
Tegetthoff at Lissa, even wooden vessels, if in superior numbers,
might do something against an ironclad in an aggressive mêlée.
Both the antagonists at Hampton Roads ended their careers before
the close of 1862; the _Merrimac_ was burned by her crew at the
evacuation of Norfolk, and the _Monitor_ was sunk under tow in a
gale off Hatteras. But turret ships, monitors, and armored gunboats
soon multiplied in the Union navy and did effective service against
the defenses of Southern harbors and rivers. Under Farragut's energetic
leadership, vessels both armored and unarmored passed with relatively
slight injury the forts below New Orleans, at Vicksburg, and at the
entrance to Mobile Bay. Even granting that the shore artillery was
out of date and not very expertly served, it is well to realize that
similar conditions may conceivably recur, and that the superiority
of forts over ships is qualified by conditions of equipment and
personnel.
Actually to destroy or capture shore batteries by naval force is
another matter. As Ericsson said, "A single shot will sink a ship,
while 100 rounds cannot silence a fort."[1] Attacks of this kind
against Fort McAllister and Charleston failed. At Charleston, April
7, 1863, the ironclads faced a cross-fire from several forts, 47
smoothbores and 17 rifles against 29 smoothbores and 4 rifles in
the ships, and in waters full of obstructions and mines.
[Footnote 1: Wilson, IRONCLADS IN ACTION, Vol. I, p. 91.]
The capture of Fort Fisher, commanding the main entrance to Wilmington,
North Carolina, was accomplished in January, 1865, by the combined
efforts of the army and navy. The fort, situated on a narrow neck
of land between the Cape Fear River and the sea, had 20 guns on
its land face and 24 on its sea face, 15 of them rifled. Against
it were brought 5 ironclads with 18 guns, backed up by over 200
guns in the rest of the fleet. After a storm of shot and shell
for three successive days, rising at times to "drum-fire," the
barrage was lifted at a signal and troops and sailors dashed forward
from their positions on shore. Even after this preparation the
capture cost 1000 men. As at Kinhurn in the Crimean War, the
effectiveness of the naval forces was due less to protective armor
than to volume of fire.
_Submarines and Torpedoes_
In the defense of Southern harbors, mines and torpedoes for the
first time came into general use, and the submarine scored its
first victim. Experiments with these devices had been going on
for centuries, but were first brought close to practical success
by David Bushnell, a Connecticut Yankee of the American Revolution.
His tiny submarine, resembling a mud-turtle standing on its tail,
embodied many features of modern underwater boats, including a
primitive conning tower, screw propulsion (by foot power), a vertical
screw to drive the craft down, and a detachable magazine with 150
pounds of gunpowder. The _Turtle_ paddled around and even under
British men-of-war off New York and New London, but could not drive
a spike through their copper bottoms to attach its mine.
Robert Fulton, probably the greatest genius in nautical invention,
carried the development of bath mines and submarines much further.
His _Nautilus_, so-called because its collapsible sail resembled
that of the familiar chambered nautilus, was surprisingly ahead of
its time; it had a fish-like shape, screw propulsion (by a two-man
hand winch), horizontal diving rudder, compressed air tank, water
tank filled or emptied by a pump, and a torpedo[1] consisting of
a detachable case of gunpowder. A lanyard ran from the torpedo
through an eye in a spike, to be driven in the enemy hull, and
thence to the submarine, which as it moved away brought the torpedo
up taut against the spike and caused its explosion. Fulton interested
Napoleon in his project, submerged frequently for an hour or more,
and blew up a hulk in Brest harbor. But the greybeards in the French
navy frowned on these novel methods, declaring them "immoral" and
"contrary to the laws of war."
[Footnote 1: This name, coined by Fulton, was from the _torpedo
electricus_, or cramp fish, which kills its victim by electric
shock.]
[Illustration: BUSHNELL'S TURTLE]
Later the British Government entered into negotiations with the
inventor, and in October, 1804, used his mines in an unsuccessful
attack an the French flotilla of invasion at Boulogne. Only one
pinnace was sunk. Fulton still maintained that he could "sweep
all military marines off the ocean."[2] But Trafalgar ended his
chances. As the old Admiral Earl St. Vincent remarked, "Pitt [the
Prime Minister] would be the greatest fool that ever existed to
encourage a mode of war which they who command the sea do not want
and which if successful would deprive them of it." So Fulton took
£15,000 and dropped his schemes.
[Footnote 2: Letter to Pitt, Jan. 6, 1806.]
[Illustration: FULTON'S NAUTILUS]
Much cruder than the _Nautilus_, owing to their hurried construction,
were the Confederate "Davids" of the Civil War. One of these launches,
which ran only semi-submerged, drove a spar torpedo against the
U. S. S. _New Ironsides_ off Charleston, but it exploded on the
rebound, too far away. The C. S. S. _Hunley_ was a real submarine,
and went down readily, but on five occasions it failed to emerge
properly, and drowned in these experiments about 35 men. In August,
1864, running on the surface, it sank by torpedo the U. S. Corvette
_Housatonic_ off Charleston, but went down in the suction of the
larger vessel, carrying to death its last heroic crew.
By the end of the century, chiefly owing to the genius and patient
efforts of two American inventors, John P. Holland and Simon Lake,
the submarine was passing from the experimental to the practical
stage. Its possibilities were increased by the Whitehead torpedo
(named after its inventor, a British engineer established in Fiume,
Austria), which came out in 1868 and was soon adopted in European
navies. With gyroscopic stabilizing devices and a "warmer" for the
compressed air of its engine, the torpedo attained before 1900
a speed of 28 knots and a possible range of 1000 yards. Its first
victim was the Chilean warship _Blanco_, sunk in 1891 at 50 yards
after two misses. Thornycroft in England first achieved speed for
small vessels, and in 1873 began turning out torpedo boats. Destroyers
came in twenty years later, and by the end of the century were
making over 30 knots.
Long before this time the lessons of the Civil War had hastened the
adoption of armor, the new ships ranging from high-sided vessels
with guns in broadside, as in the past, to low freeboard craft
influenced by the _Monitor_ design, with a few large guns protected
by revolving turrets or fixed barbettes, and with better provision
for all-around fire. Ordnance improved in penetrating power, until
the old wrought-iron armor had to be 20 inches thick and confined
to waterline and batteries. Steel "facing" and the later plates of
Krupp or Harveyized steel made it possible again to lighten and
spread out the armor, and during the last decade of the century
it steadily increased its ascendancy over the gun.
_The Battle of Lissa_
The adoption of armor meant sacrifice of armament, and a departure
from Farragut's well-tried maxim, "The best protection against the
enemy's fire is a well-sustained fire from your own guns." Thus
the British _Dreadnought_ of 1872 gave 35% of its displacement to
armor and only 5% to armament. Invulnerability was secured at the
expense of offensive power. That aggressive tactics and weapons
retained all their old value in warfare was to receive timely
illustration in the Battle of Lissa, fought in the year after the
American war. The engagement illustrated also another of Farragut's
pungent maxims to the effect that iron in the ships is less important
than "iron in the men"--a saying especially true when, as with the
Austrians at Lissa, the iron is in the chief in command.
In 1866 Italy and Prussia attacked Austria in concert, Italy having
secured from Bismarck a pledge of Venetia in the event of victory.
Though beaten at Custozza on June 24, the Italians did their part
by keeping busy an Austrian army of 80,000. Moltke crushed the
northern forces of the enemy at Sadowa on July 3, and within three
weeks had reached the environs of Vienna and practically won the
war. Lissa was fought on July 20, just 6 days before the armistice.
This general political and military situation should be borne in
mind as throwing some light on the peculiar Italian strategy in
the Lissa campaign.
Struggling Italy, her unification under the House of Piedmont as
yet only partly achieved, had shown both foresight and energy in
building up a fleet. Her available force on the day of Lissa consisted
of 12 armored ships and 16 wooden steam vessels of same fighting
value. The ironclads included 7 armored frigates, the best of which
were the two "kings," _Re d'Italia_ and _Re di Portogallo_, built
the year before in New York (rather badly, it is said), each armed
with about 30 heavy rifles. Then there was the new single-turret
ram _Affondatore_, or "Sinker," with two 300-pounder 10-inch rifles,
which came in from England only the day before the battle. Some
of the small protected corvettes and gunboats were of much less
value, the _Palestro_, for instance, which suffered severely in
the fight, having a thin sheet of armor over only two-fifths of
her exposed hull.
The Austrian fleet had the benefit of some war experience against
Denmark in the North Sea two years before, but it was far inferior
and less up-to-date, its armored ships consisting of 7 screw frigates
armed chiefly with smoothbores. Of the wooden ships, there were
7 screw frigates and corvettes, 9 gunboats and schooners, and 3
little side-wheelers--a total of 19. The following table indicates
the relative strength:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
|Armored | Wooden |Small craft| Total | Rifles |Total w't
|--------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|of metal
|No.|Guns|No.|Guns| No.| Guns |No.|Guns|No.|Weight|
--------|---|----|---|----|----|------|---|----|---|------|---------
Austria | 7| 176| 7| 304| 12 | 52 | 22| 532|121| 7,130| 23,538
Italy | 12| 243| 11| 382| 5 | 16 | 28| 641|276|28,700| 53,236
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus in general terms the Italians were nearly twice as strong
in main units, could fire twice as heavy a weight of metal from
all their guns, and four times as heavy from their rifles. Even
without the _Affondatore_, their advantage was practically as great
as this from the beginning of the war.
With such a preponderance, it would seem as if Persano, the Italian
commander in chief, could easily have executed his savage-sounding
orders to "sweep the enemy from the Adriatic, and to attack and
blockade them wherever found." He was dilatory, however, in assembling
his fleet, negligent in practice and gun drill, and passive in his
whole policy to a degree absolutely ruinous to morale. War was
declared June 20, and had long been foreseen; yet it was June 25
before he moved the bulk of his fleet from Taranto to Ancona in
the Adriatic. Here on the 27th they were challenged by 13 Austrian
ships, which lay off the port cleared for action for two hours, while
Persano made no real move to fight. It is said that the Italian
defeat at Custozza three days before had taken the heart out of
him. On July 8 he put to sea for a brief three days' cruise and
went through some maneuvers and signaling but no firing, though
many of the guns were newly mounted and had never been tried by
their crews.
At this time Napoleon III of France had already undertaken mediation
between the hostile powers. In spite of the orders of June 8, quoted
above, which seem sufficiently definite, and urgent orders to the
same effect later, Persano was unwilling to take the offensive,
and kept complaining of lack of clear instructions as to what he
should do. He was later convicted of cowardice and negligence;
but the campaign he finally undertook against Lissa was dangerous
enough, and it seems possible that some secret political maneuvering
was partly responsible for his earlier delay.[1]
[Footnote 1: In July Persano wrote to the Deputy Boggio: "Leave the
care of my reputation to me; I would rather be wrongly dishonored
than rightly condemned. Patience will bring peace; I shall be called
a traitor, but nevertheless Italy will have her fleet intact, and
that of Austria will be rendered useless." Quoted in Bernotti,
IL POTERE MARITTIMO NELLA GRANDE GUERRA, p. 177.]
It is significant at least that the final proposal to make a descent
upon the fortified island of Lissa came not from Persana but from
the Minister of Marine. On July 15 the latter took up the project
with the fleet chief of staff, d'Amico, and with Rear Admiral Vacca,
but not until later with Persano. All agreed that the prospect
of a truce allowed no time for a movement against Venice or the
Austrian base at Pola, but that they should strike a swift stroke
elsewhere. Lissa commanded the Dalmatian coast, was essential to
naval control in the Adriatic, and was coveted by Italy then as
in later times. It would be better than trying to crush the enemy
fleet at the risk of her own if she could enter the peace conference
with possession of Lissa a _fait accompli_.
Undertaken in the face of an undefeated enemy fleet, this move has
been justly condemned by naval strategists. But with a less alert
opponent the coup might have succeeded. Tegetthoff, the Austrian
commander, was not yet 41 years of age, but had been in active
naval service since he was 18, and had led a squadron bravely in
a fight with the Danes two years before off Heligoland. He had
his heterogeneous array of fighting craft assembled at Pola at
the outbreak of war. "Give me everything you have," he told the
Admiralty when they asked him what ships he wanted; "I'll find
some use for them." His crews were partly men of Slav and Italian
stock from the Adriatic coast, including 600 from Venice; there
is no reason for supposing them better than those of Persano. The
influence of their leader, however, inspired them with loyalty and
fighting spirit, and their defiance of the Italians at Ancona on
June 27 increased their confidence. When successive cable messages
from Lissa satisfied him that the Italian fleet was not attempting
a diversion but was actually committed to an attack on the island,
Tegetthoff set out thither on July 19 with his entire fighting
force. His order of sailing was the order of battle. "Every captain
knew the admiral's intention as well as the admiral himself did;
every officer knew what had to be done, and every man had some
idea of it, and above all knew that he had to fight."[1]
[Footnote 1: Laughton, STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY, Tegetthoff, p. 164.]
In the meantime the Italian drive on Lissa had gone ahead slowly.
The island batteries were on commanding heights and manned by marines
and artillerymen resolved to fight to the last ditch. During the
second day's bombardment the _Affondatore_ appeared, and also some
additional troops needed to complete the landing force. Two-thirds
of the guns on shore were silenced that day, and if the landing
operations had been pushed, the island captured, and the fleet
taken into the protected harbor of St. Giorgio, Tegetthoff would
have had a harder problem to solve. But as the mist blew away with
a southerly wind at 10 o'clock on the next day, July 20, the weary
garrison on the heights of the island gave cheer after cheer as
they saw the Austrian squadron plunging through the head seas at
full speed from the northeastward, while the Italian ships hurriedly
drew together north of the island to meet the blow.
The Austrians advanced in three successive divisions, ironclads,
wooden frigates, and finally the smaller vessels, each in a wedge-shaped
formation (shown by the diagram), with the apex toward the enemy.
The object was to drive through the Italian line if possible near
the van and bring on a close scrimmage in which all ships could
take part, ramming tactics could be employed, and the enemy would
profit less by their superiority in armor and guns. Like Nelson's at
Trafalgar, Tegetthoff's formation was one not likely to be imitated,
but it was at least simple and well understood, and against a passive
resistance it gave the results planned.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF LISSA, JULY 20, 1866]
"_Ecco i pescatori!_" (Here come the fishermen), cried Persana,
with a scorn he was far from actually feeling. The Italians were
in fact caught at a disadvantage. One of their best ships, the
_Formidabile_, had been put _hors de combat_ by the batteries
on the day before. Another, coming in late from the west end of
the island, took no part in the action. The wooden ships, owing
to the cowardice of their commander, Albini, also kept out of the
fight, though Persano signaled desperately to them to enter the
engagement and "surround the enemy rear." With his remaining ironclads
Persano formed three divisions of three ships each and swung across
the enemy's bows in line ahead. Just at the critical moment, and
for no very explicable motive, he shifted his flag from the _Re
d'Italia_ in the center to the _Affondatore_, which was steaming
alone on the starboard side of the line. The change was not noted
by all his ships, and thus caused confusion of orders. The delay
involved also left a wider gap between van and center, and through
this the Austrians plunged, Tegetthoff in his flagship _Erzherzog
Ferdinand Max_ leading the way.
Here orderly formation ended, and only the more striking episodes
stand out in a desperate close combat, during which the black ships
of Austria and the gray of Italy rammed or fired into each other
amid a smother of smoke and spray. The Austrian left flank and
rear held up the Italian van; the Austrian ironclads engaged the
Italian center; and the wooden ships of the Austrian middle division,
led by the 92-gun _Kaiser_, smashed into the Italian rear. Of all
the Austrian ships, the big _Kaiser_, a relic of other days, saw
the hardest fighting. Twice she avoided the _Affondatore's_ ram,
and she was struck by one of her 300-pound projectiles. Then the
_Re di Portogallo_ bore down, but Petz, the _Kaiser's_ captain,
rang for full speed ahead and steered for the ironclad, striking
a glancing blow and scraping past her, while both ships poured in
a heavy fire. The _Kaiser_ soon afterward drew out of the action,
her foremast and funnel down, and a bad blaze burning amidships.
Altogether she fired 850 rounds in the action, or about one-fifth
of the total fired by the Austrians, and she received 80 hits,
again one-fifth of the total. Of the 38 Austrians killed and 138
wounded in the battle, she lost respectively 24 and 75.
The _Kaiser's_ combat, though more severe, was typical of what
was going on elsewhere. The Italian gunboat _Palestro_ was forced
to withdraw to fight a fire that threatened her magazines. The
_Re d'Italia_, which was at first supposed by the Austrians to be
Persano's flagship, was a center of attack and had her steering
gear disabled. As she could go only straight ahead or astern, the
Austrian flagship seized the chance and rammed her squarely amidships
at full speed, crashing through her armor and opening an immense
hole. The Italian gunboat heeled over to starboard, then back again,
and in a few seconds went down, with a loss of 381 men.
This spectacular incident practically decided the battle. After
an hour's fighting the two squadrons drew apart about noon, the
Austrians finally entering St. Giorgio harbor and the Italians
withdrawing to westward. During the retreat the fire on the _Palestro_
reached her ammunition and she blew up with a loss of 231 of her
crew. Except in the two vessels destroyed, the Italian losses were
slight--8 killed and 40 wounded. But the armored ships were badly
battered, and less than a month later the _Affondatore_ sank in a
squall in Ancona harbor, partly, it was thought, owing to injuries
received at Lissa.
For a long time after this fight, an exaggerated view was held
regarding the value of ramming, line abreast formation, and bow
fire. Weapons condition tactics, and these tactics of Tegetthoff
were suited to the means he had to work with. But they were not
those which should have been adopted by his opponents; nor would
they have been successful had the Italians brought their broadsides
to bear on a parallel course and avoided a mêlée. What the whole
campaign best illustrates--and the lesson has permanent interest--is
how a passive and defensive policy, forced upon the Italian fleet
by the incompetence of its admiral or otherwise, led to its
demoralization and ultimate destruction. After a long period of
inactivity, Persano weakened his force against shore defenses before
he had disposed of the enemy fleet, and was then taken at a
disadvantage. His passive strategy was reflected in his tactics.
He engaged with only a part of his force, and without a definite
plan; "A storm of signals swept over his squadron" as it went into
action. What really decided the battle was not the difference in
ships, crews, or weapons, but the difference in aggressiveness
and ability of the two admirals in command.
_The Battle of the Yalu_
Twenty-eight years elapsed after Lissa before the next significant
naval action, the Battle of the Yalu, between fleets of China and
Japan. Yet the two engagements may well be taken together, since
at the Yalu types and tactics were still transitional, and the
initial situation at Lissa was duplicated--line abreast against
line ahead. The result, however, was reversed, for the Japanese
in line ahead took the initiative, used their superior speed to
conduct the battle on their own terms, and won the day.
Trouble arose in the Far East over the dissolution of the decrepit
monarchy of Korea, upon which both Japan and China cast covetous
eyes. As nominal suzerain, China in the spring of 1894 sent 2000
troops to Korea to suppress an insurrection, without observing
certain treaty stipulations which required her to notify Japan. The
latter nation despatched 5000 men to Chemulpo in June. Hostilities
broke out on July 25, when four fast Japanese cruisers, including the
_Naniwa Kan_ under the future Admiral Togo, fell upon the Chinese
cruiser _Tsi-yuen_ and two smaller vessels, captured the latter
and battered the cruiser badly before she got away, and then to
complete the day's work sank a Chinese troop transport, saving
only the European officers on board.
After this affair the Chinese Admiral Ting, a former cavalry officer
but with some naval experience, favored taking the offensive, since
control of the sea by China would at once decide the war. But the
Chinese Foreign Council gave him orders not to cruise east of a
line from Shantung to the mouth of the Yalu. Reverses on land soon
forced him to give all his time to troop transportation, and this
occupied both navies throughout the summer.
On September 16, the day before the Battle of the Yalu, the Chinese
battleships escorted transports with 5000 troops to the mouth of
the Yalu, and on the following morning they were anchored quietly
outside the river. "For weeks," writes an American naval officer
who was in command of one of the Chinese battleships, "we had
anticipated an engagement, and had had daily exercise at general
quarters, etc., and little remained to be done.... The fleet went
into action as well prepared as it was humanly possible for it
to be with the same officers and men, handicapped as they were
by official corruption and treachery ashore."[1] As the midday
meal was in preparation, columns of black smoke appeared to
southwestward. The squadron at once weighed anchor, cleared for
action, and put on forced draft, while "dark-skinned men, with
queues tightly coiled around their heads, and with arms bare to the
elbow, clustered along the decks in groups at the guns, waiting to
kill or be killed." Out of the smoke soon emerged 12 enemy cruisers
which, with information of the Chinese movements, had entered the
Gulf intent on battle.
[Footnote 1: Commander P. N. McGiffin, THE BATTLE OF THE YALU,
_Century Magazine_, August, 1895, pp. 585-604.]
The forces about to engage included the best ships of both nations.
There were 12 on each side, excluding 4 Chinese torpedo boats, and
10 actually in each battle line. The main strength of the Chinese
was concentrated in two second-class battleships, the _Ting-yuen_
and the _Chen-yuen_, Stettin-built in 1882, each of 7430 tons, with
14-inch armor over half its length, four 12-inch Krupp guns in two
barbettes, and 6-inch rifles at bow and stern. The two barbettes
were _en echelon_ (the starboard just ahead of the port), in such a
way that while all four guns could fire dead ahead only two could bear
on the port quarter or the starboard bow. These ships were designed
for fighting head-on; and hence to use them to best advantage Admiral
Ting formed his squadron in line abreast, with the _Ting-yuen_ and
_Chen-yuen_ in the center. The rest of the line were a "scratch
lot" of much smaller vessels--two armored cruisers (_Lai-yuen_ and
_King-yuen_) with 8 to 9-inch armored belts; three protected
cruisers (_Tsi-yuen, Chi-yuen_, and _Kwang-ping_) with 2 to 4-inch
armored decks; on the left flank the old corvette _Kwang-chia_;
and opposite her two other "lame ducks" of only 1300 tons, the
_Chao-yung_ and _Yang-wei_. Ting had properly strengthened his
center, but had left his flanks fatally weak. On board the flagship
_Ting-yuen_ was Major von Hannekin, China's military adviser, and
an ex-petty officer of the British navy named Nichols. Philo N.
McGiffin, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, commanded
the _Chen-yuen_.
The Japanese advanced in column, or line ahead, in two divisions.
The first, or "flying squadron," was led by Rear Admiral Tsuboi
in the _Yoshino_, and consisted of four fast protected cruisers.
Four similar ships, headed by Vice Admiral Ito in the _Matsushima_,
formed the chief units of the main squadron, followed by the older
and slower ironclads, _Fuso_ and _Hiyei_. The little gunboat
_Akagi_ and the converted steamer _Saikio Maru_ had orders not
to engage, but nevertheless pushed in on the left of the line.
Aside from their two battleships, the Chinese had nothing to compare
with these eight new and well-armed cruisers, the slowest of which
could make 17-1/2 knots.
In armament the Japanese also had a marked advantage, as the following
table, from Wilsan's _Ironclads in Action_, will show:
---------------------------------------------------------------
|SHIPS | GUNS |SHOTS IN 10 MINUTES
|------|-----------------------------|-------------------
| | | Large |Small q. f.| | Weight of
|Number|6-inch|quick fire|and machine|Number | metal
------|------|------|----------|-----------|-------|-----------
China | 12 | 40 | 2 | 130 | 33 | 4,885
Japan | 10 | 34 | 66 | 154 | 185 | 11,706
---------------------------------------------------------------
The smaller quick-fire and machine guns proved of slight value
on either side, but the large Japanese quick-firers searched all
unprotected parts of the enemy ships with a terrific storm of shells.
After the experience of July 25, the Chinese had discarded much
of their woodwork and top hamper, including boats, thin steel
gun-shields, rails, needless rigging, etc., and used coal and sand
bags an the upper decks; but the unarmored ships nevertheless suffered
severely. From the table it is evident that the Japanese could
pour in six times as great a volume of fire. The Chinese had a
slight advantage in heavier guns, and their marksmanship, it is
claimed, was equally accurate (possibly 10% hits on each side), but
their ammunition was defective and consisted mostly of non-bursting
projectiles. They had only 15 rounds of shell for each gun.
During the approach the Japanese steered at first for the enemy
center, thus concealing their precise objective, and then swung to
port, with the aim of attacking on the weaker side of the Chinese
battleships (owing to their barbette arrangement) and on the weaker
flank of the line. In the meantime the Chinese steamed forward at
about 6 knots and turned somewhat to keep head-on, thus forcing the
Japanese to file across their bows. At 12.20 p.m. the _Chen-yuen_
and _Ting-yuen_ opened at 5800 yards on Tsuboi's squadron, which
held its fire until at 3000 yards or closer it swung around the
Chinese right wing.
The main squadron followed. Admiral Ito has been criticized for thus
drawing his line across the enemy's advance, instead of attacking
their left flank. But he was previously committed to the movement,
and executed it rapidly and for the most part at long range. Had
the Chinese pressed forward at best speed, Lissa might have been
repeated. As it was, they cut off only the _Hiyei_. To avoid ramming,
this old ironclad plunged boldly between the _Chen-yuen_ and
_Ting-yuen_. She was hit 22 times and had 56 killed and wounded,
but managed to pull through.
Before this time the _Chao-yung_ and _Yang-wei_ on the right
flank of the Chinese line had crumpled under a heavy cross-fire
from the flying squadron. These ships had wooden cabins on deck
outboard, and the whole superstructure soon became roaring masses
of flames. Both dropped out of line and burned to the water's edge.
The two ships on the opposite flank had seized an early opportunity
to withdraw astern of the line, and were now off for Port Arthur
under full steam, "followed," writes McGiffin, "by a string of
Chinese anathemas from our men at the guns."
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE YALU, SEPT. 17, 1894]
The Japanese van turned to port and was thus for some time out
of action. The main division turned to starboard and circled the
Chinese rear. Of the 6 Chinese ships left in the line, the four
smaller seem now to have moved on to southward, while both Japanese
divisions concentrated on the two battleships _Chen-yuen_ and
_Ting-yuen_. These did their best to keep head to the enemy, and
stood up doggedly, returning slowly the fire of the circling
cruisers. Tsuboi soon turned away to engage the lighter vessels.
Finally, at 3.26, as the _Matsushima_ closed to about 2000 yards,
the _Chen-yuen_ hit her fairly with a last remaining 12-inch shell.
This one blow put Ito's flagship out of action, exploding some
ammunition, killing or wounding 50 or more men, and starting a
dangerous fire. The Japanese hauled off, while according to Chinese
accounts the battleships actually followed, but at 4.30 came again
under a severe fire. About 5.30, when the Chinese were practically
out of ammunition, Ito finally withdrew and recalled his van.
Of the other Chinese ships, the _Chi-yuen_ made a desperate attempt
to approach the Japanese van and went down at 3.30 with screws
racing in the air. The _King-yuen_, already on fire, was shot to
pieces and sunk an hour later by the _Yoshino's_ quick-firers.
As the sun went down, the _Lai-yuen_ and _Kwang-ping_, with two
ships from the river mouth, fell in behind the battleships and
staggered off towards Port Arthur, unpursued. The losses on the
two armored ships had been relatively slight--56 killed and
wounded. The Japanese lost altogether 90 killed and 204 wounded,
chiefly on the _Matsushima_ and _Hiyei_.
Though China saved her best ships from the battle, her fighting
spirit was done for. The battleships were later destroyed by Japanese
torpedo operations after the fall of Wei-hai-wei. Her crews had on
the whole fought bravely, handicapped as they were by their poor
materials and lack of skill. For instance, when McGiffin called
for volunteers to extinguish a fire on the _Chen-yuen's_ forecastle,
swept by enemy shells, "men responded heartily and went to what
seemed to them certain death." It was at this time that the commander
himself, leading the party, was knocked over by a shell explosion
and then barely escaped the blast of one of his own 12-inch guns
by rolling through an open hatch and falling 8 feet to a pile of
débris below.
In the way of lessons, aside from the obvious ones as to the value
of training and expert leadership and the necessity of eliminating
inflammables in ship construction, the battle revealed on the one
hand the great resisting qualities of the armored ship, and on
the other hand the offensive value of superior gunfire. Admiral
Mahan said at the time that "The rapid fire gun has just now fairly
established its position as the greatest offensive weapon in naval
warfare."[1] Another authority has noted that, both at Lissa and
the Yalu, "The winning fleet was worked in divisions, as was the
British fleet in the Dutch wars and at Trafalgar, and the Japanese
fleet afterwards at Tsushima." Remarking that experiments with
this method were made by the British Channel Fleet in 1904, the
writer continues: "The conception grew out of a study of Nelson's
Memorandum. Its essence was to make the fleet flexible in the hands
of the admiral, and to enable any part to be moved by the shortest
line to the position where it was most required."[2]
[Footnote 1: LESSONS FROM THE YALU FIGHT, _Century Magazine_, August,
1895, p. 630.]
[Footnote 2: Custance, THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, p. 103.]
By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) which closed the war,
Japan won Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula, the Pescadores
Islands and Formosa, and China's withdrawal from Korea. But just as
she was about to lay hands on these generous fruits of victory,
they were snatched out of her grasp by the European powers, which
began exploiting China for themselves. Japan had to acquiesce and
bide her time, using her war indemnity and foreign loans to build
up her fleet. The Yalu thus not only marks the rise of Japan as
a formidable force in international affairs, but brings us to a
period of intensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far
East and elsewhere which gave added significance to naval power
and led to the war of 1914.
REFERENCES
Aside from those already cited see:
ROBERT FULTON, ENGINEER AND ARTIST, H. W. Dickinson, 1913.
THE STORY OF THE GUNS, J. E. Tennant, 1864.
THE BRITISH NAVY, Sir Thomas Brassey, 1884.
CLOWES' HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, Vol. VII (p. 20, bibliography).
NAVAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 19TH CENTURY, N. Barnaby, 1904.
THE TORPEDO IN PEACE AND WAR, F. T. Jane, 1898.
SUBMARINE WARFARE, H. C. Fyfe, 1902.
THE SUBMARINE IN WAR AND PEACE, Simon Lake, 1918.
FOUR MODERN NAVAL CAMPAIGNS, Lissa, W. L. Clowes, 1902.
THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN NAVAL WAR, Journal of the United Service
Institution, Vol. XI, pp. 104ff.