THE NAPOLEONIC WAR [_Concluded_]: TRAFALGAR AND AFTER
The peace finally ratified at Amiens in March, 1802, failed to
accomplish any of the purposes for which England had entered the
war. France not only maintained her frontiers on the Scheldt and
the Rhine, but still exercised a predominant influence in Holland
and western Italy, and excluded British trade from territories
under her control. Until French troops were withdrawn from Holland,
as called for by the treaty, England refused to evacuate Malta.
Bonaparte, who wished further breathing space to build up the French
navy, tried vainly to postpone hostilities by threatening to invade
England and exclude her from all continental markets. "It will be
England," he declared, "that forces us to conquer Europe." The
war reopened in May of 1803.
With no immediate danger on the Continent and with all the resources
of a regenerated France at his command, Bonaparte now undertook
the project of a descent upon England on such a scale as never
before. Hazardous as he always realized the operation to be--it
was a thousand to one chance, he told the British envoys, that he
and his army would end at the bottom of the sea--he was definitely
committed to it by his own threats and by the expectation of France
that he would now annihilate her hereditary foe.
_Napoleon's Plan of Invasion_
An army of 130,000 men, with 400 guns and 20 days' supplies, was
to embark from four ports close to Boulogne as a center, and cross
the 36 miles of Channel to a favorable stretch of coast between
Dover and Hastings, distant from London some 70 miles. The transport
flotilla, as finally planned, was to consist of 2000 or more small
flat-bottomed sailing vessels with auxiliary oar propulsion-_chaloupes_
and _bateaux canonnières_, from 60 to 80 feet over all, not over 8
feet in draft, with from two to four guns and a capacity for 100
to 150 men. Large open boats (_péniches_) were also to be used,
and all available coast craft for transport of horses and supplies.
Shipyards from the Scheldt to the Gironde were soon busy building
the special flotilla, and as fast as they were finished they skirted
the shores to the points of concentration under protection of coast
batteries. Extensive harbor and defense works were undertaken at
Boulogne and neighboring ports, and the 120 miles from the Scheldt
to the Somme was soon bristling with artillery, in General Marmont's
phrase, "a coast of iron and bronze."
The impression was spread abroad that the crossing was to be effected
by stealth, in calm, fog, or the darkness of a long winter night,
without the protection of a fleet. Almost from the first, however,
Bonaparte seems to have had no such intention. The armament of the
flotilla itself proved of slight value, and he was resolved to
take no uncalled-for risks, on an unfamiliar element, with 100,000
men. An essential condition, which greatly complicated the whole
undertaking, became the concentration of naval forces in the Channel
sufficient to secure temporary control. "Let us be masters of the
Strait for 6 hours," Napoleon wrote to Latouche-Treville in command
of the Toulon fleet, "and we shall be masters of the world." In
less rhetorical moments he extended the necessary period to from
two to fifteen days.
Up to the spring of 1804 neither army nor flotilla was fully ready,
and thereafter the crossing was always definitely conditioned upon a
naval concentration. But the whole plan called for swift execution.
As time lapsed, difficulties multiplied. Harbors silted up, transports
were wrecked by storms, British defense measures on land and sea grew
more formidable, the Continental situation became more threatening.
The Boulogne army thus became more and more--what Napoleon perhaps
falsely declared later it had always been--an army concentrated
against Austria. To get a fleet into the Channel without a battle
was almost impossible, and once in, its position would be dangerous
in the extreme. Towards the end, in the opinion of the French student
Colonel Desbrière, Napoleon's chief motive in pressing for fleet
coöperation was the belief that it would lead to a decisive naval
action which, though a defeat, would shift from his own head the
odium of failure.
Whether this theory is fully accepted or not, the fact remains that
the only sure way of conquering England was by a naval contest.
Her first and main defense was the British fleet, which, spread out
to the limits of safety to watch French ships wherever harbored,
guarded not only against a concentration in the Channel, but against
incursions into other fields. The immediate defense of the coasts was
intrusted to flotillas of armed boats, over 700 in all, distributed
along the coast from Leith south-about to Glasgow, with 100 on the
coast of Ireland. Naval men looked upon these as of slight value,
a concession, according to Earl St. Vincent, to "the old women
in and out" (of both sexes) at home. The distribution of the main
battle squadrons varied, but in March, 1805, at the opening of the
Trafalgar campaign they were stationed as follows: Boulogne and the
Dutch forces were watched by Admiral Keith with 11 of the line and
150 smaller units scattered from the Texel to the Channel Islands.
The 21 French ships under Ganteaume at Brest, the strategic center,
were closely blockaded by Cornwallis, whose force, by Admiralty
orders, was not to fall below 18 of the line. A small squadron had
been watching Missiessy's 5 ships at Rochefort and upon his escape
in January had followed him to the West Indies. The 5 French and 10
Spanish at Ferrol and the 6 or more ready for sea at Cadiz were
held in check by forces barely adequate. In the Gulf of Lyons Nelson
with 13 ships had since May, 1803, stood outside the distant but
dangerous station of Toulon. Owing to the remoteness from bases,
a close and constant blockade was here impossible; moreover, it
was the policy to let the enemy get out in the hope of bringing
him to action at sea.
[Illustration: POSITIONS OF BRITISH AND ENEMY SHIPS, MARCH, 1805]
To effect a concentration in the Channel in the face of these obstacles
was the final aim of all Napoleon's varied naval combinations of
1804 and 1805--combinations which impress one with the truth of
Gravière's criticism that the Emperor lacked "_le sentiment exact
des difficultes de la marine_," and especially, one should perhaps
add, _de la marine française_. The first plan, the simplest and,
therefore, most promising, was that Latouche Treville with the
Toulon fleet should evade Nelson and, after releasing ships on
the way, enter the Channel with 16 of the line, while Cornwallis
was kept occupied by Ganteaume. This was upset by the death of
Latouche, France's ablest and most energetic admiral, in August
of 1804, and by the accession, two months later, of Spain and the
Spanish navy to the French cause. After many misgivings Napoleon
chose Villeneuve to succeed at Toulon. Skilled in his profession,
honest, and devoted, he was fatally lacking in self-confidence
and energy to conquer difficulties. "It is sad," wrote an officer
in the fleet, "to see that force which under Latouche was full of
activity, now without faith in either their leader or themselves."
The final plan, though still subject to modifications, was for
a concentration on a larger scale in the West Indies. Villeneuve
was to go thither, picking up the Cadiz ships on the way, join
the Rochefort squadron if it were still there, and wait 40 days
for the Brest fleet. Upon its arrival the entire force of 40 ships
was to move swiftly back to the Channel. It was assumed that the
British squadrons, in alarm for the colonies, would in the meantime
be scattered in pursuit.
_The Pursuit of Villeneuve_
Villeneuve put to sea in a rising gale on January 17, 1805, but
was soon back in port with damaged ships, the only effect being
to send Nelson clear to Egypt in search of him. A successful start
was made on March 30. Refusing to wait for 5 Spanish vessels at
Carthagena, Villeneuve with 11 sail reached Cadiz on April 9, picked
up one French vessel and two Spanish under Admiral Gravina, and
leaving 4 more to follow was off safely on the same night for the
West Indies.
From Gibraltar to the Admiralty in London, Villeneuve's appearance
in the Atlantic created a profound stir. His departure from Cadiz
was known, but not whither he had gone. The five ships on the Cadiz
blockade fell back at once to the Channel. A fast frigate from
Gibraltar carried the warning to Calder off Ferrol and to the Brest
blockade, whence it reached London on April 25. A convoy for Malta
and Sicily with 6000 troops under Gen. Craig--a pledge which Russia
called for before sending her own forces to southern Italy--was already
a week on its way and might fall an easy victim. In consequence of
an upheaval at the Admiralty, Lord Barham, a former naval officer
now nearly 80 years of age, had just begun his memorable 9 months'
administration as First Lord of the Admiralty and director of the
naval war. Immediately a whole series of orders went out to the
fleets to insure the safety of the troop ships, the maintenance of
the Ferrol blockade, an eventual strengthening of forces outside
the Channel, and the safety of the Antilles in case Villeneuve
had gone there.
Where was Nelson? His scout frigates by bad judgment had lost Villeneuve
on the night of March 31 east of Minorca, with no clue to his future
course. Nelson took station between Sardinia and the African coast,
resolved not to move till he "knew something positive." In the
absence of information, the safety of Naples, Sicily, and Egypt
was perhaps not merely an obsession on his part, but a proper
professional concern; but it is strange that no inkling should
have reached him from the Admiralty or elsewhere that a western
movement from Toulon was the only one Napoleon now had in mind.
It was April 18 before he received further news of the enemy, and
not until May 5 was he able to get up to and through the Straits
against steady head winds; even then he could not, as he said,
"run to the West Indies without something beyond mere surmise."
Definite reports from Cadiz that the enemy had gone thither reached
him through an Admiral Campbell in the Portuguese service, and were
confirmed by the fact that they had been seen nowhere to northward.
On the 12th, leaving the _Royal Sovereign_ (100) to strengthen
the escort of Craig's convoy, which had now appeared, he set out
westward with 10 ships in pursuit of the enemy's 18.
He reached Barbados on June 4, only 21 days after Villeneuve's
arrival at Martinique. The latter had found that the Rochefort
squadron--as a result of faulty transmission of Napoleon's innumerable
orders--was already back in Europe, and that the Brest squadron had
not come. In fact, held tight in the grip of Cornwallis, it was
destined never to leave port. But a reënforcement of 2 ships had
reached Villeneuve with orders to wait 35 days longer and in the
meantime to harry the British colonies. Disgruntled and despondent, he
had scarcely got troops aboard and started north on this mission when
he learned that Nelson was hot on his trail. The troops were hastily
thrown into frigates to protect the French colonies. Without other
provision for their safety, and in disregard of orders, Villeneuve
at once turned back for Europe, hoping the Emperor's schemes would
still be set forward by his joining the ships at Ferrol.
Nelson followed four days later, on June 13, steering for his old
post in the Mediterranean, but at the same time despatching the
fast brig _Curieux_ to England with news of the French fleet's
return. This vessel by great good fortune sighted Villeneuve in
mid-ocean, inferred from his northerly position that he was bound
for Ferrol, and reached Portsmouth on July 8. Barham at the Admiralty
got the news the next morning, angry that he had not been routed out
of bed on the arrival of the captain the night before. By 9 o'clock
the same morning, orders were off to Calder on the Ferrol station
in time so that on the 22d of July he encountered the enemy, still
plowing slowly eastward, some 300 miles west of Cape Finisterre.
As a result of admirable communication work and swift administrative
action the critic of Nelson at Cape St. Vincent now had a chance
to rob the latter of his last victory and end the campaign then
and there. His forces were adequate. Though he had only 14 ships
to 20, his four three-deckers, according to the estimates of the
time, were each worth two of the enemy 74's, and on the other hand,
the 6 Spanish ships with Villeneuve could hardly be counted for
more than three. In the ensuing action, fought in foggy weather,
two of the Spanish were captured and one of Calder's three-deckers
was so injured that it had to be detached. The two fleets remained
in contact for three days following, but neither took the aggressive.
In a subsequent court martial Calder was reprimanded for "not having
done his utmost to renew the said engagement and destroy every
ship of the enemy."
[Illustration: NELSON'S PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE, MARCH-SEPTEMBER,
1805]
On July 27 the Allied fleet staggered into Vigo, and a week later,
after dropping three ships and 1200 sick men, it moved around to
Corunna and Ferrol. Instead of being shaken down and strengthened
by the long cruise, it was, according to the commander's plaintive
letters, in worse plight than when it left Toulon. Nevertheless,
ten days later he was ready to leave port, with 29 units, 14 of them
raw vessels from Ferrol, and 11 of them Spanish. If, as Napoleon
said, France was not going to give up having a navy, something
might still be done. His orders to Villeneuve were to proceed to
Brest and thence to Boulogne. "I count," he ended, "on your zeal
in my service, your love of your country, and your hatred of that
nation which has oppressed us for 40 generations, and which a little
preseverance on your part will now cause to rëenter forever the
ranks of petty powers."[1]
[Footnote 1: Orders of 26 July, Desbrière, PROJETS, Vol. V, p. 672.]
Such were Villeneuve's instructions, the wisdom or sincerity of
which it was scarcely his privilege to question (though it may
be ours). In passing judgment on his failure to execute them it
should be remembered that two months later, to avoid the personal
disgrace of being superseded, he took his fleet out to more certain
disaster than that which it now faced in striking northward from
Corunna. "_Un poltron du tête et non de la cur_"[2] the French
Admiral was handicapped throughout by a paralyzing sense of the
things he could not do.
[Footnote 2: Gravière II, 136.]
If he had sailer northward he would have found the British fleet
divided. Nelson, it is true, after returning to Cadiz had fallen
back from Gibraltar to the Channel, where he left his eleven ships
with the Brest squadron in remarkable condition after more than two
years at sea. Calder had also joined, bringing Cornwallis' total
strength to 39. These stood between the 21 French at Brest and
the 29 at Ferrol. But on August 16 Cornwallis divided his forces,
keeping 18 (including 10 three-deckers) and sending Calder back to
the Spanish coast with the rest. Napoleon called this a disgraceful
blunder (_insigne bêtise_), and Mahan adds, "This censure was just."
Sir Julian Corbeh says it was a "master stroke... in all the campaign
there is no movement--not even Nelson's chase of Villeneuve--that
breathes more deeply the true spirit of war." According to Napoleon,
Villeneuve might have "played prisoners' base with Calder's squadron
and fallen upon Cornwallis, or with his 30 of the line have beaten
Calder's 20 and obtained a decisive superiority."
So perhaps a Napoleonic admiral. Villeneuve left Ferrol on August
13 and sailed northwest on a heavy northeast wind till the 15th.
Then, his fixed purpose merely strengthened by false news from a
Danish merchantman of 25 British in the vicinity, he turned before
the wind for Cadiz. As soon as he was safely inside, the British
blockaders again closed around the port.
_The Battle of Trafalgar_
After twenty-five days in England, Nelson took command off Cadiz
on September 28, eager for a final blow that would free England for
aggressive war. There was talk of using bomb vessels, Congreve's
rockets, and Francis's (Robert Fulton's) torpedoes to destroy the
enemy in harbor, but it soon became known that Villeneuve would
be forced to put to sea. On October 9, Nelson issued the famous
Memorandum, or battle plan, embodying what he called "the Nelson
touch," and received by his captains with an enthusiasm which the
inspiration of the famous leader no doubt partly explains. This
plan, which had been formulating itself in Nelson's mind as far
back as the pursuit of the French fleet to the West Indies, may
be regarded as the product of his ripest experience and genius;
the praise is perhaps not extravagant that "it seems to gather
up and coördinate every tactical principle that has ever proved
effective."[1]
[Footnote 1: Corbett. THE CAMPAIGN OF TRAFALGAR, p. 349.]
[Illustration: NELSON'S VICTORY
Built in 1765. 2162 tons.]
Though the full text of the Memorandum will repay careful study,
its leading principles may be sufficiently indicated by summary.
Assuming 40 British ships to 46 of the enemy (the proportions though
not the numbers of the actual engagement), it provides first that
"the order of sailing is to be the order of battle, placing the
fleet in two lines of 16 ships each, with an advanced squadron of
8 of the fastest sailing two-decked ships." This made for speed
and ease in maneuvering, and was based on the expressed belief
that so many units could not be formed and controlled in the
old-fashioned single line without fatal loss of time. The ships
would now come into action practically in cruising formation, which
was commonly in two columns. The only noteworthy change contemplated
was that the flagships of the first and second in command should
shift from first to third place in their respective columns, and
even this change was not carried out. Perhaps because the total
force was smaller than anticipated, the advance squadron was merged
with the two main divisions on the night before the battle, and
need not be further regarded. Collingwood, the second in command,
was given freedom of initiative by the provision that "after my
intentions are made known to him he will have entire direction
of his line."
The plan next provides, first for attack from to leeward, and second
for attack from to windward. In either case, Collingwood's division
was to bring a superior force to bear on 12 ships of the enemy rear,
while Nelson would "cut two, three or four ships ahead of their
center so far as to ensure getting at their commander in chief."
"Something must be left to chance... but I look with confidence
to a victory before the van of the enemy can succor their rear."
And further, "no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship
alongside that of an enemy."
Of the attack from the windward a very rough diagram is given, thus:
[Illustration]
But aside from this diagram, the lines of which are not precisely
straight or parallel in the original, and which can hardly be reconciled
with the instructions in the text, there is no clear indication that
the attack from the windward (as in the actual battle) was to be
delivered in line abreast. What the text says is: "The divisions
of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the
enemy's center. The signal will most probably then be given for the
lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering
sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line
and to cut through." Thus, if we assume a convergent approach in
column, there was to be no slow deployment of the rear or leeward
division into line abreast to make the attack of all its ships
simultaneous; rather, in the words of a captain describing what
really happened, they were simply to "scramble into action" at
best speed. Nor is there any suggestion of a preliminary shift
from line ahead in the case of Nelson's division. Though endless
controversy has raged over the point, the prescribed approach seems
to have been followed fairly closely in the battle.
The concentration upon the rear was not new; in fact, it had become
almost conventional, and was fully anticipated by the enemy. More
originality lay in the manner of "containing" the center and van.
For this purpose, in the first place, the approach was to be at
utmost speed, not under "battle canvas" but with all sail spread.
In the second place, the advance of Nelson's division in column,
led by the flagship, left its precise objective not fully disclosed
to the enemy until the last moment, and open to change as advantage
offered. It could and did threaten the van, and was finally directed
upon the center when Villeneuve's presence there was revealed.
Finally, the very serious danger of enemy concentration upon the head
of the column was mitigated not only by the speed of the approach,
but by the concentration there of three heavy three-deckers. The
plan in general had in view a particular enemy, superior in numbers
but weak in gunnery, slow in maneuver, and likely to avoid decisive
action. It aimed primarily at rapidity of movement, but combined
also the merits of concentration, simplicity, flexibility, and
surprise.
In this discussion of the scheme of the battle, around which interest
chiefly centers, the actual events of the engagement have been
in some measure anticipated, and may now be told more briefly.
Driven to desperation by the goadings of Napoleon and the news
that Admiral Rosily was approaching to supersede him, Villeneuve
at last resolved to put to sea. "The intention of His Majesty,"
so the Minister of Marine had written, "is to seek in the ranks,
wherever they may be found, officers best suited for superior command,
requiring above all a noble ambition, love of glory, decision of
character, and unbounded courage. His Majesty wishes to destroy that
circumspection which is the reproach of the navy; that defensive
system which paralyzes our fleet and doubles the enemy's. He counts
the loss of vessels nothing if lost with honor; he does not wish
his fleet blockaded by an enemy inferior in strength; and if that
is the situation at Cadiz he advises and orders you to attack."
The Allied fleet worked out of Cadiz on the 19th of October and
on the 20th tacked southward under squally westerly winds. On the
21st, the day of the battle, the wind was still from the west, light
and flawy, with a heavy swell and signs of approaching storm. At dawn
the two fleets were visible to each other, Villeneuve about 9 miles
northeast and to leeward of the British and standing southward from
Cape Trafalgar. The French Admiral had formed his main battle line
of 21 ships, French and Spanish intermingled, with the _Santisima
Trinidad_ (128) in the center and his flagship _Bucentaure_ next;
the remaining 12 under the Spanish Admiral Gravina constituted
a separate squadron stationed to windward to counter an enemy
concentration, which was especially expected upon the rear.
As the British advance already appeared to threaten this end of
their line, the Allied fleet wore together about 9 o'clock, thus
reversing their order, shifting their course northward, and opening
Cadiz as a refuge. The maneuver, not completed until an hour later,
left their line bowed in at the center, with a number of ships slightly
to leeward, while Gravina's squadron mingled with and prolonged
the rear in the new order.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCT. 21, 1805
Position of ships about noon, when _Royal Sovereign_ opened fire.
(From plan by Capt. T. H. Tizard, R.N., British Admiralty Report,
1913.)]
The change, though it aroused Nelson's fear lest his quarry should
escape, facilitated his attack as planned, by exposing the enemy rear
to Collingwood's division. As rapidly as the light airs permitted,
the two British columns bore down, Nelson in the _Victory_ (100)
leading the windward division of 12 ships, closely followed by
the heavy _Neptune_ and _Téméraire_, while Collingwood in the
freshly coppered and refitted _Royal Sovereign_ set a sharp pace
for the 15 sail to leeward. Of the forty ships Nelson had once
counted on, some had not come from England, and a half dozen others
were inside the straits for water. While the enemy were changing
course, Collingwood had signaled his division to shift into a line
of bearing, an order which, though rendered almost ineffective by
his failure to slow down, served to throw the column off slightly
and bring it more nearly parallel to the enemy rear. (See plan.)
Both commanders clung to the lead and pushed ahead as if racing
into the fray, thus effectually preventing deployment and leaving
trailers far behind. Nelson went so far as to try to jockey his
old friend out of first place by ordering the _Mars_ to pass him,
but Collingwood set his studding sails and kept his lead. Possibly
it was then he made the remark that he wished Nelson would make no
more signals, as they all knew what they had to do, rather than
after Nelson's famous final message: "England expects that every
man will do his duty."
Nelson, uncertain of Villeneuve's place in the line and anxious to
prevent escape northward, steered for a gap ahead of the _Santisima
Trinidad_, as if to threaten the van. But at 12:00 noon, as the
first shots were fired at the _Royal Sovereign_, flags were broken
from all ships, and Villeneuve's location revealed. Swinging to
southward under heavy fire, the _Victory_ passed under the stern
of the _Bucentaure_ and then crashed into the _Redoutable_, which
had pushed close up to the flagship. The relative effectiveness
of the gunnery in the two fleets is suggested by the fact that
the _Victory_ while coming in under the enemy's concentrated fire
had only 50 killed and wounded, whereas the raking broadside she
finally poured into the _Bucentaure's_ stern is said to have swept
down 400 men. Almost simultaneously with the leader, the _Téméraire_
and _Neptune_ plunged into the line, the former closing with the
_Bucentaure_ and the latter with the _Santisima Trinidad_ ahead.
Other ships soon thrust into the terrific artillery combat which
centered around the leaders in a confused mingling of friend and
foe.
At about 12:10, nearly half an hour before the _Victory_ penetrated
the Allied line, the _Royal Sovereign_ brought up on the leeward
side of the _Santa Ana_, flagship of the Spanish Admiral Alava,
after raking both her and the _Fougueux_ astern. The _Santa Ana_
was thirteenth in the actual line, but, as Collingwood knew, there
were 16, counting those to leeward, among the ships he had thus
cut off for his division to subdue. As a combined effect of the
light breeze and the manner of attack, it was an hour or more before
the action was made general by the advent of British ships in the
rear. All these suffered as they closed, but far less than those
near the head of the line. Of the total British casualties fully
a third fell upon the four leading ships--_Victory, Téméraire,
Royal Sovereign_ and _Belleisle_.
Not until about three o'clock were the shattered but victorious
British in the center threatened by the return of the ten ships in
the Allied van. Culpably slow, however hindered by lack of wind,
several of these joined stragglers from Gravina's division to leeward;
the _Intrépide_, under her brave skipper Infernet, set an example all
might well have followed by steering straight for the _Bucentaure_,
and surrendered only to overwhelming odds; five others under Rear
Admiral Dumanoir skirted to windward and escaped with the loss of
one of their number, cut off by two British late-comers, _Spartiate_
and _Minotaur_.
"Partial firing continued until 4:30, when a victory having been
reported to the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Nelson, he died of
his wound." So reads the _Victory's_ log. The flagship had been
in deadly grapple with the _Redoutable_, whose complement, like
that of many another French and Spanish ship in the action, showed
that the decadence of their navies was not due to lack of fighting
spirit in the rank and file. Nelson was mortally wounded by a musket
shot from the mizzen-top soon after the ships closed. In his hour
of supreme achievement death came not ungraciously, giving final
assurance of the glory which no man ever faced death more eagerly
to win.
Of the Allied fleet, four fled with Dumanoir, but were later engaged
and captured by a British squadron near Corunna. Eleven badly battered
survivors escaped into Cadiz. Of the 18 captured, 11 were wrecked or
destroyed in the gales that swept the coast for several days after
the battle; three were recaptured or turned back to their crews
by the prize-masters, and only four eventually reached Gibraltar.
[Illustration: TRAFALGAR, ABOUT 12:30
From plan attached to report of Capt. Prigny, Villeneuve's Chief
of Staff (Deshrière, _Trafalgar_, App. p. 128.)]
The Trafalgar victory did not indeed reduce France to terms, and
it thus illustrates the limitations of naval power against an enemy
not primarily dependent upon the sea. But it freed England from
further threat of invasion, clinched her naval predominance, and
opened to her the prospect of taking a more aggressive part in
the land war. Even this prospect was soon temporarily thrust into
the background. On the very day of Trafalgar Napoleon's bulletins
announced the surrender of 60,000 Austrians at Ulm, and the Battle
of Austerlitz a month later crushed the Third Coalition. The small
British contingents in Germany and southern Italy hastened back to
their transports. It was only later, when France was approaching
exhaustion, that British forces in the Spanish peninsula and elsewhere
took a conspicuous part in the Continental war.
_The Continental System_
England's real offensive strength lay not in her armies but in
her grip on Europe's intercourse with the rest of the world. And
on the other hand, the only blow that Napoleon could still strike
at his chief enemy was to shut her from the markets of Europe--to
"defeat the sea by the land." This was the aim of his Continental
System. It meant a test of endurance--whether he could force France
and the rest of Europe to undergo the tremendous strain of commercial
isolation for a sufficient period to reduce England to ruin.
The Continental System came into being with Napoleon's famous Berlin
Decree of November, 1806, which, declaring a "paper" blockade of the
British Isles, put all trade with England under the ban. Under this
decree and later supplementary measures, goods of British origin,
whatever their subsequent ownership, were confiscated or destroyed
wherever French agents could lay hands on them; and neutral vessels
were seized and condemned for entering British ports, accepting
British convoy, or even submitting to British search.
England's chief retaliatory measure was the Orders in Council of
November, 1807. Her object in these orders and later modifications
was not to cut off trade with the Continent, but to control it to
her own profit and the injury of the enemy--in short, "no trade
except through England." The orders aimed to compel the aid of
neutrals by excluding neutral ships from the Continent unless they
should first enter British ports, pay British dues, and (as would
be an inevitable consequence) give covert assistance in carrying
on British trade.
The Continental System reached its greatest efficiency during the
apogée of Napoleon's power in 1809 and 1810. To check forbidden
traffic, which continued on an enormous scale, he annexed Holland
to his empire, and threw a triple cordon of French troops along
Germany's sea frontier. As a result, in the critical year of 1811
goods piled up in British warehouses, factories closed, bankruptcies
doubled, and her financial system tottered.[1] But to bar the tide
of commerce at every port from Trieste to Riga was like trying
to stem the sea. At each leak in the barrier, sugar, coffee, and
British manufactures poured in, and were paid for at triple or
tenfold prices, not in exports, but in coin. Malta, the Channel
Islands, and Heligoland (seized by England from Denmark in 1807)
became centers of smuggling. The beginning of the end came when
the Czar, tired of French dictation and a policy ruinous to his
country, opened his ports, first to colonial products (December,
1810), and a year later to all British wares. Six hundred vessels,
brought under British convoy into the Baltic, docked at Libau,
and caravans of wagons filled the roads leading east and south.
[Footnote 1: In spite of this crisis, British trade showed progressive
increase in each half decade from 1800 to 1815, and did not fall off
again until the five years after the war. The figures (in millions
of pounds sterling) follow: 1801-05, 61 million; 1806-10, 67 million;
1811-15, 74 million; 1816-20, 60 million.--Day, HISTORY OF COMMERCE,
p. 355.]
In June of 1812 Napoleon gathered his "army of twenty nations" for
the fatal Russian campaign. Now that they had served their purpose,
England on June 23 revoked her Orders in Council. The Continental
System had failed.
_The War of 1812_
In the same month, on June 18, the United States declared war on
Great Britain. Up to 1807 her commerce and shipping, in the words
of President Monroe, had "flourished beyond example," as shown by
the single fact that her re-export trade (in West Indies products)
was greater in that year than ever again until 1915.[1] Later they
had suffered from the coercion of both belligerents, and from her
own futile countermeasures of embargo and non-intercourse. Her
final declaration came tardily, if not indeed unwisely as a matter
of practical policy, however abundantly justified by England's
commercial restrictions and her seizure of American as well as
British seamen on American ships. An additional motive, which had
decisive weight with the dominant western faction in Congress,
was the hope of gaining Canada or at least extending the northern
frontier.
[Footnote 1: United States exports rose from a value of 56 million
dollars in 1803 to 108 million in 1807; then fell to 22 million in
1808, and after rising to about 50 million before the war, went
down to 6 million in 1814.--_Ibid._, p 480.]
A subordinate episode in the world conflict, the War of 1812 cannot
be neglected in naval annals. The tiny American navy retrieved
the failures of American land forces, and shook the British navy
out of a notorious slackness in gunnery and discipline engendered
by its easy victories against France and Spain.
In size the British Navy in 1812 was more formidable than at any
earlier period of the general war. Transport work with expeditionary
forces, blockade and patrol in European waters, and commerce protection
from the China Sea to the Baltic had in September, 1812, increased
the fleet to 686 vessels in active service, including 120 of the
line and 145 frigates. There were 75 in all on American stations,
against the total American Navy of 16, of which the best were the fine
44-gun frigates _Constitution, President_ and _United States_.
In the face of such odds, and especially as England's European
preoccupations relaxed, the result was inevitable. After the first
year of war, while a swarm of privateers and smaller war vessels
still took heavy toll of British commerce, the frigates were blockaded
in American ports and American commerce was destroyed.
But before the blockade closed down, four frigate actions had been
fought, three of them American victories. In each instance, as will
be seen from the accompanying table, the advantage in weight of
broadside was with the victor. The American frigates were in fact
triumphs of American shipbuilding, finer in lines, more strongly
timbered, and more heavily gunned than British ships of their class.
But that good gunnery and seamanship figured in the results is
borne out by the fact that of the eight sloop actions fought during
the war, with a closer approach to equality of strength, seven
were American victories. The British carronades that had pounded
French ships at close range proved useless against opponents that
knew how to choose and hold their distance and could shoot straight
with long 24'S.
------------------+----------+----+------+----+------+-------------------
| | |Wt. of| |Casu- |
Ship[1] |Commander |Guns|broad-|Crew|alties| Place and date
| | |side | | |
------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
Constitution[2] |Hull | 54 | 684 |456 | 14 |750 miles east of
| | | | | | Boston, Aug. 19,
Guerrière (Brit.) |Dacres | 49 | 556 |272 | 79 | 1812.
------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
United States[2] |Decatur | 54 | 786 |478 | 12 |Off Canary Islands,
Macedonian (Brit.)|Carden | 49 | 547 |301 | 104 | Oct. 25. 1812.
------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
Constitution[2] |Bainbridge| 52 | 654 |475 | 34 |Near Bahia, Dec.
Java (Brit.) |Lambert | 49 | 576 |426 | 150 | 29, 1812.
------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
Chesapeake |Lawrence | 50 | 542 |379 | 148 |Off Boston, June 1,
Shannon (Brit.)[2]|Broke | 52 | 550 |330 | 83 | 1813.
------------------|----------|----|------|----|------|-------------------
[Footnote 1: The figures are from Roosevelt's NAVAL WAR OF 1812,
in which 7% is deducted for the short weight of American shot.]
[Footnote 2: Victorious.]
"It seems," said a writer in the London _Times_, "that the Americans
have some superior mode of firing." But when Broke with his crack
crew in the _Shannon_ beat the _Chesapeake_ fresh out of port, he
demonstrated, as had the Americans in other actions, that the
superiority was primarily a matter of training and skill.
On the Great Lakes America's naval efforts should have centered,
for here was her main objective and here she was on equal terms.
Both sides were tremendously hampered in communications with their
main sources of supply. But with an approach from the sea to Montreal,
the British faced no more serious obstacle in the rapids of the St.
Lawrence above than did the Americans on the long route up the
Mohawk, over portages into Oneida Lake, and thence down the Oswego
to Ontario, or else from eastern Pennsylvania over the mountains to
Lake Erie. The wilderness waterways on both sides soon saw the
strange spectacle of immense anchors, cables, cannon, and ship
tackle of all kinds, as well as armies of sailors, shipwrights,
and riggers, making their way to the new rival bases at Sackett's
Harbor and Kingston, both near the foot of Lake Ontario.
Of the whole lake and river frontier, Ontario was of the most vital
importance. A decisive American victory here, including the capture
of Kingston, would cut enemy communications and settle the control
of all western Canada. Kingston as an objective had the advantage
over Montreal that it was beyond the direct reach of the British
navy. The British, fully realizing the situation, made every effort
to build up their naval forces on this lake, and gave Commodore Yeo,
who was in command, strict orders to avoid action unless certain
of success. On the other hand, the American commander, Chauncey,
though an energetic organizer, made the mistake of assuming that his
mission was also defensive. Hence when one fleet was strengthened by
a new ship it went out and chased the other off the lake, but there
was little fighting, both sides engaging in a grand shipbuilding
rivalry and playing for a sure thing. Naval control remained unsettled
and shifting throughout the war. It was fortunate, indeed, says
the British historian, James, that the war ended when it did, or
there would not have been room on the lake to maneuver the two
fleets. The _St. Lawrence_, a 112-gun three-decker completed at
Kingston in 1814, was at the time the largest man-of-war in the
world.
Possibly a growing lukewarmness about the war, manifested on both
sides, prevented more aggressive action. But it did not prevent two
brilliant American victories in the lesser theaters of Lake Erie
and Lake Champlain. Perry's achievement on Lake Erie in building
a superior flotilla in the face of all manner of obstacles was even
greater than that of the victory itself. The result of the latter,
won on September 10, 1813, is summed up in his despatch: "We have
met the enemy and they are ours--2 ships, 2 brigs, 1 schooner, and
1 sloop." It assured the safety of the northwestern frontier.
On Lake Champlain Macdonough's successful defense just a year later
held up an invasion which, though it would not have been pushed
very strenuously in any case, might have made our position less
favorable for the peace negotiations then already under way. In
this action, as in the one on Lake Erie, the total strength of each
of the opposing flotillas, measured in weight of broadsides (1192
pounds for the British against 1194 far the Americans), was about
that of a single ship-of-the-line. But the number of units employed
raised all the problems of a squadron engagement. Macdonough's
shrewd choice of position in Plattsburg Bay, imposing upon the
enemy a difficult approach under a raking fire, and his excellent
handling of his ships in action, justify his selection as the ablest
American naval leader developed by the war.
At the outbreak of the American War, France and England had been
engaged in a death grapple in which the rights of neutrals were
trampled under foot. Napoleon, by his paper blockade and confiscations
on any pretext, had been a more glaring offender. But America's
quarrel was after all not with France, who needed American trade,
but with England, a commercial rival, who could back her restrictions
by naval power. Once France was out of the war, the United States
found it easy to come to terms with England, whose commerce was
suffering severely from American privateers.[1] At the close of the
war the questions at issue when it began had dropped into abeyance,
and were not mentioned in the treaty terms.
[Footnote 1: According to figures cited in Mahan's WAR OF 1812, (Vol.
II, p. 224), 22 American naval vessels took 165 British prizes, and
526 privateers took 1344 prizes. In the absence of adequate motives
on either side for prolonging the war, these losses, though not
more severe than those inflicted by French cruisers, were decisive
factors for peace.]
The view taken of the aggressions of sea power in the Napoleonic
Wars will depend largely on the view taken regarding the justice of
the cause in which it fought. It saved the Continent from military
conquest. It preserved the European balance of power, a balance
which statesmen of that age deemed essential to the safety of Europe
and the best interests of America and the rest of the world. On
the other hand, but for the sacrifices of England's land allies,
the Continental System would have forced her to make peace, though
still undefeated at sea. Even if her territorial accessions were
slight, England came out of the war undisputed "mistress of the
seas" as she had never been before, and for nearly a century to come
was without a dangerous rival in naval power and world commerce.
REFERENCES
For general history of the period see: HISTORIES OF THE BRITISH NAVY
by Clowes (Vols. V, VI, 1900) and Hannay (1909), Mahan's INFLUENCE
OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE (1892) and WAR
OF 1812 (1905), Chevalier's HISTOIRE DE LA MARINE FRANçAISE
SOUS LA PREMIèRE RéPUBLIQUE (1886), Gravière's GUERRES MARITIMES
(1885), Callender's SEA KINGS OF BRITAIN (Vol. III, 1911),
and Maltzahn's NAVAL WARFARE (tr. Miller, 1908).
Among biographies: Mahan's and Laughton's lives of Nelson, Anson's
LIFE OF JERVIS (1913), Clark Russell's LIFE OF COLLINGWOOD (1892),
and briefer sketches in FROM HOWARD TO NELSON, ed. Laughton (1899).
For the Trafalgar campaign see:
British Admiralty blue-book on THE TACTICS OF TRAFALGAR (with
bibliography, 1913), Corbett's CAMPAIGN OF TRAFALGAR (1910), Col.
Desbrière's PROJETS ET TENTATIVES DE DéBARQUEMENT AUX ILES BRITANNIQUES
(1902) and CAMPAGNE MARITIME DE TRAFALGAR (1907).
See also Col. C. E. Callwell's MILITARY OPERATIONS AND MARITIME
PREPONDERANCE (1913), and Professor Clive Day's HISTORY OF COMMERCE
(revised edition, 1911, with bibliography).