THE NAPOLEONIC WARS [_Continued_]: THE RISE OF NELSON
In the Mediterranean, where the protection of commerce, the fate
of Italy and all southern Europe, and the exposed interests of
France gave abundant motives for the presence of a British fleet,
the course of naval events may be sufficiently indicated by following
the work of Nelson, who came thither in 1793 in command of the
_Agamemnon_ (64) and remained until the withdrawal of the fleet at
the close of 1796. Already marked within the service, in the words
of his senior, Hood, as "an officer to be consulted on questions
relative to naval tactics," Nelson was no doubt also marked as
possessed of an uncomfortable activity and independence of mind.
Singled out nevertheless for responsible detached service, he took
a prominent part in the occupation of Corsica, where at the siege
of Calvi he lost the sight of his right eye, and later commanded
a small squadron supporting the left flank of the Austrian army
on the Riviera.
In these latter operations, during 1795 and 1796, Nelson felt that
much more might have been done. The Corniche coast route into Italy,
the only one at first open to the French, was exposed at many points
to fire from ships at sea, and much of the French army supplies as
well as their heavy artillery had to be transported in boats along
the coast. "The British fleet could have prevented the invasion
of Italy," wrote Nelson five years later, "if our friend Hotham
[who had succeeded Hood as commander in chief in the Mediterranean]
had kept his fleet on that coast."[1] Hotham felt, perhaps rightly,
that the necessity of watching the French ships at Toulon made this
impossible. But had the Toulon fleet been destroyed or effectually
crippled at either of the two opportunities which offered in 1795, no
such need would have existed; the British fleet would have dominated
the Mediterranean, and exercised a controlling influence on the
wavering sympathies of the Italian states and Spain. At the first
of these opportunities, on the 13th and 14th of March, Hotham said
they had done well enough in capturing two French ships-of-the-line.
"Now," remarked Nelson, whose aggressive pursuit had led to the
capture, "had we taken 10 sail and allowed the 11th to escape,
when it had been possible to have got at her, I should not have
called it well done." And again of the second encounter: "To say how
much we wanted Lord Hood on the 13th of July, is to say, 'Will you
have all the French fleet, or no action?'" History, and especially
naval history, is full of might-have-beens. Aggressive action
establishing naval predominance might have prevented Napoleon's
brilliant invasion and conquest of Italy; Spain would then have
steered clear of the French alliance; and the Egyptian campaign
would have been impossible.
[Footnote 1: DISPATCHES, June 6, 1800.]
The succession of Sir John Jervis to the Mediterranean command
in November, 1795, instituted at once a new order of things, in
which inspiring leadership, strict discipline, and closest attention
to the health of crews, up-keep vessels, and every detail of ship
and fleet organization soon brought the naval forces under him to
what has been judged the highest efficiency attained by any fleet
during the war. Jervis had able subordinates--Nelson, Collingwood
and Troubridge, to carry the list no further; but he may claim a
kind of paternal share in molding the military character of these
men.
Between Jervis and Nelson in particular there existed ever the
warmest mutual confidence and admiration. Yet the contrast between
them well illustrates the difference between all-round professional
and administrative ability, possessed in high degree by the older
leader, and supreme fighting genius, which, in spite of mental
and moral qualities far inferior, has rightly won Nelson a more
lasting fame. As a member of parliament before the war, as First
Lord of the Admiralty from 1801 to 1803, and indeed in his sea
commands, Jervis displayed a breadth of judgment, a knowledge of
the world, a mastery of details of administration, to which Nelson
could not pretend. In the organization of the Toulon and the Brest
blockades, and in the suppression of mutiny in 1797, Jervis better
than Nelson illustrates conventional ideals of military discipline.
When appointed to the Channel command in 1799 he at once adopted
the system of keeping the bulk of the fleet constantly on the enemy
coast "well within Ushant with an easterly wind." Captains were to
be on deck when ships came about at whatever hour. In port there
were no night boats and no night leave for officers. To one officer
who ventured a protest Jervis wrote that he "ought not to delay
one day his intention to retire." "May the discipline of the
Mediterranean never be introduced in the Channel," was a toast on
Jervis's appointment to the latter squadron. "May his next glass
of wine choke the wretch," was the wish of an indignant officer's
wife. Jervis may have been a martinet, but it was he, more than
any other officer, who instilled into the British navy the spirit
of war.
In the Mediterranean, however, he arrived too late. There, as in
the Atlantic, the French Directory after the experiments of 1794
and 1795 had now abandoned the idea of risking their battleships;
and while these still served effectively in port as a fleet in
being, their crews were turned to commerce warfare or transport
flotilla work for the army. Bonaparte's ragged heroes were driving
the Austrians out of Italy. Sardinia made peace in May of 1796.
Spain closed an offensive and defensive alliance with the French
Republic in August, putting a fleet of 50 of the line (at least
on paper) on Jervis's communications and making further tenure
of the Mediterranean a dangerous business. By October, 26 Spanish
ships had joined the 12 French then at Toulon. Even so, Jervis with
his force of 22 might have hazarded action, if his subordinate Mann,
with a detached squadron of 7 of these, had not fled to England.
Assigning to Nelson the task of evacuating Corsica and later Elba,
Jervis now took station outside the straits, where on February 13,
1797, Nelson rejoined his chief, whose strength still consisted
of 15 of the line.
_The Battle of Cape St. Vincent_
The Spanish fleet, now 27, was at this time returning to Cadiz,
as a first step toward a grand naval concentration in the north. A
stiff Levanter having thrown the Spanish far beyond their destination,
they were returning eastward when on February 14, 1797, the two
fleets came in contact within sight of Cape St. Vincent. In view
of the existing political situation, and the known inefficiency of
the Spanish in sea fighting, Jervis decided to attack. "A victory,"
he is said to have remarked, "is very essential to England at this
hour."
As a fresh westerly wind blew away the morning fog, the Spanish
were fully revealed to southward, running before the wind, badly
scattered, with 7 ships far in advance and thus to leeward of the
rest. After some preliminary pursuit, the British formed in a single
column (Troubridge in the _Culloden_ first, the flagship _Victory_
seventh, and Nelson in the _Captain_ third from the rear), and
took a southerly course which would carry them between the two
enemy groups. As soon as they found themselves thus separated,
the Spanish weather division hauled their wind, opened fire, and
ran to northward along the weather side of the British line; while
the lee division at first also turned northward and made some effort
to unite with the rest of their company by breaking through the
enemy formation, but were thrown back by a heavy broadside from
the _Victory_. Having accomplished his first purpose, Jervis had
already, at about noon, hoisted the signal to "tack in succession,"
which meant that each ship should continue her course to the point
where the _Culloden_ came about and then follow her in pursuit
of the enemy weather division. This critical and much discussed
maneuver appears entirely justified. The British by tacking in
succession kept their column still between the parts of the enemy,
its rear covering the enemy lee division, and the whole formation
still in perfect order and control, as it would not have been had
the ships tacked simultaneously. Again, if the attack had been
made on the small group to leeward, the Spanish weather division
could easily have run down into the action and thus brought their
full strength to bear.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, FEBRUARY 14, 1797
BRITISH: 15 ships, 1232 guns. SPANISH: 27 ships, 2286 guns.]
But against an enemy so superior in numbers more was needed to keep
the situation in hand. Shortly before one o'clock, when several
British vessels had already filled away on the new course, Nelson
from his position well back in the column saw that the leading
ships of the main enemy division were swinging off to eastward
as if to escape around the British rear. Eager to get into the
fighting, of which his present course gave little promise, and
without waiting for orders, he wore out of the column, passed between
the two ships next astern, and threw himself directly upon the three
big three-deckers, including the flagship _Santisima Trindad_ (130
guns), which headed the enemy line. Before the fighting was over, his
ship was badly battered, "her foretopmast and wheel shot away, and
not a sail, shroud or rope left";[1] but the _Culloden_ and other
van ships soon came up, and also Collingwood in the _Excellent_
from the rear, after orders from Jervis for which Nelson had not
waited. Out of the mêlée the British emerged with four prizes,
Nelson himself having boarded the _San Nicolas_ (80), cleared her
decks, and with reënforcements from his own ship passed across
her to receive the surrender of the _San Josef_ (112). The swords
of the vanquished Spanish, Nelson says, "I gave to William Fearney,
one of my bargemen, who placed them with the greatest _sangfroid_
under his arm."
[Footnote 1: Nelson's DISPATCHES, Vol. II, p. 345.]
For Nelson's initiative (which is the word for such actions when
they end well) Jervis had only the warmest praise, and when his
fleet captain, Calder, ventured a comment on the breach of orders,
Jervis gave the tart answer, "Ay, and if ever you offend in the
same way I promise you a forgiveness beforehand." Jervis was made
Earl St. Vincent, and Nelson, who never hid his light under a bushel,
shared at least in popular acclaim. It was not indeed a sweeping
victory, and there is little doubt that had the British admiral
so chosen, he might have done much more. But enough had been
accomplished to discourage Spanish naval activities in the French
cause for a long time to come. They were hopelessly outclassed;
but in their favor it should be borne in mind that their ships
were miserably manned, the crews consisting of ignorant peasants
of whom it is reported that they said prayers before going aloft,
and with whom their best admiral, Mazzaredo, had refused to sail.
Moreover, they were fighting half-heartedly, lacking the inspiration
of a great national cause, without which victories are rarely won.
The defeat of the Spanish, as Jervis had foreseen, was timely.
Mantua had just capitulated; British efforts to secure an honorable
peace had failed; consols were at 51, and specie payments stopped
by the Bank of England; Austria was on the verge of separate
negotiations, the preliminaries of which were signed at Loeben on
April 18; France, in the words of Bonaparte, could now "turn all
her forces against England and oblige her to a prompt peace."[1]
The news of St. Vincent was thus a ray of light on a very dark
horizon. Its strategic value, along with the Battle of Camperdown,
has already been made clear.
[Footnote 1: CORRESPONDENCE, III, 346.]
The British fleet, after refitting at Lisbon, took up a blockade
of the Spanish at Cadiz which continued through the next two years.
Discontent and mutiny, which threatened with each fresh ship from
home, was guarded against by strict discipline, careful attention to
health and diet, and by minor enterprises which served as diversions,
such as the bombardment of Cadiz and the unsuccessful attack on Santa
Cruz in the Canary Islands, July 24-25, 1797, in which Nelson lost
his right arm.
[Illustration: THE NILE CAMPAIGN, MAY-AUGUST 1798]
_The Battle of the Nile_
Nelson's return to the Cadiz blockade in May, 1798, after months
of suffering in England, was coincident with the gathering of a
fresh storm cloud in the Mediterranean, though the direction in
which it threatened was still completely concealed. While Sicily,
Greece, Portugal and even Ireland were mentioned by the British
Admiralty as possible French objectives, Egypt was apparently not
thought of. Yet its strategic position between three continents
remained as important as in centuries past, controlling the trade
of the Levant and threatening India by land or sea. "The time is
not far distant," Bonaparte had already written, "when we shall feel
that truly to destroy England we must take possession of Egypt."
In point of fact the strength of England rested not merely on the
wealth of the Indies, but on her merchant fleets, naval control,
home products and manufactures, in short her whole industrial and
commercial development, too strong to be struck down by a blow in
this remote field. Still, if the continued absence of a British
fleet from the Mediterranean could be counted on, the Egyptian
campaign was the most effective move against her that offered at
the time. It was well that the British Admiralty rose to the danger.
Jervis, though he pointed out the risks involved, was directed to
send Nelson with an advance squadron of 3 ships, later strengthened
to 14, to watch the concentration of land and naval forces at Toulon.
"The appearance of a British fleet in the Mediterranean," wrote
the First Lord, Spencer, in urging the move, "is a condition on
which the fate of Europe may be stated to depend."
Before a strong northwest wind the French armada on May 19 left
Toulon--13 of the line, 13 smaller vessels, and a fleet of transports
which when joined by contingents from Genoa, Corsica, and Civita
Vecchia brought the total to 400 sail, crowded with over 30,000
troops. Of the fighting fleet there is the usual tale of ships
carelessly fitted out, one-third short-handed, and supplied with
but two months' food--a tale which simply points the truth that
the winning of naval campaigns begins months or years before.
The gale from which the French found shelter under Sardinia and
Corsica fell later with full force on Nelson to the westward of
the islands. His flagship the _Vanguard_ lost her foremast and
remaining topmasts, while at the same time his four frigates, so
essential in the search that followed, were scattered and failed
to rejoin. Having by extraordinary exertions refitted in Sardinia
in the short space of four days, he was soon again off Toulon,
but did not learn of the enemy's departure until May 31, and even
then he got no clue as to where they had gone. Here he was joined
on June 7 by the promised reënforcements, bringing his squadron
to 13 74's and the _Leander_ of 50 guns.
The ensuing search continued for two months, until August 1, the
date of the Battle of the Nile. During this period, Nelson appears
to best advantage; in the words of David Hannay, he was an "embodied
flame of resolution, with none of the vulgar bluster that was to
appear later."
Moving slowly southward, the French flotilla had spent ten days
in the occupation of Malta--the surrender of which was chiefly
due to French influence among the Knights of St. John who held the
island--and departed on June 19 for their destination, following
a circuitous route along the south side of Crete and thence to
the African coast 70 miles west of Alexandria.
Learning off Cape Passaro on the 22d of the enemy's departure from
Malta, Nelson made direct for Alexandria under fair wind and press
of sail. He reached the port two days ahead of Bonaparte, and finding
it empty, at once set out to retrace his course, his impetuous
energy betraying him into what was undoubtedly a hasty move. The
two fleets had been but 60 miles apart on the night of the 25th.
Had they met, though Bonaparte had done his utmost by organization
and drill to prepare for such an emergency, a French disaster would
have been almost inevitable, and Napoleon, in the amusingly partisan
words of Nelson's biographer Southey, "would have escaped those
later crimes that have incarnadined his soul." Nelson had planned
in case of such an encounter to detach three of his ships to attack
the transports.
The trying month that now intervened, spent by the British fleet
in a vain search along the northern coast of the Mediterranean,
a brief stop at Syracuse for water and supplies, and return, was
not wholly wasted, for during this time the commander in chief
was in frequent consultation with his captains, securing their
hearty support, and familiarizing them with his plans for action
in whatever circumstances a meeting might occur. An interesting
reference to this practice of Nelson's appears in a later
characterization of him written by the French Admiral Décres to
Napoleon. "His boastfulness," so the comment runs, "is only equalled
by his ineptitude, but he has the saving quality of making no pretense
to any other virtues than boldness and good nature, so that he is
accessible to the counsels of those under him." As to who dominated
these conferences and who profited by them we may form our own
opinion. It was by such means that Nelson fostered a spirit of
full coöperation and mutual confidence between himself and his
subordinates which justified his affectionate phrase, "a band of
brothers."
The result was seen at the Nile. If rapid action lost the chance
of battle a month before, it did much to insure victory when the
opportunity came, and it was made possible by each captain's full
grasp of what was to be done. "Time is everything," to quote a
familiar phrase of Nelson; "five minutes may spell the difference
between victory and defeat." It was two in the afternoon when the
British, after looking into Alexandria, first sighted the French
fleet at anchor in Aboukir Bay, and it was just sundown when the
leading ship _Goliath_ rounded the _Guerrier's_ bows. The battle
was fought in darkness. In the face of a fleet protected by shoals
and shore batteries, with no trustworthy charts or pilots, with ships
still widely separated by their varying speeds, a less thoroughly
drilled force under a less ardent leader would have felt the necessity
of delaying action until the following day. Nelson never hesitated.
His ships went into action in the order in which they reached the
scene.
The almost decisive advantage thus gained is evident from the confusion
which then reigned in Aboukir Bay. In spite of the repeated letters
from Bonaparte urging him to secure his fleet in Alexandria harbor,
in spite of repeated soundings which showed this course possible,
the French Admiral Brueys with a kind of despondent inertia still
lay in this exposed anchorage at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile.
Mortars and cannon had been mounted on Aboukir point, but it was
known that their range did not cover the head of the French line.
The frigates and scout vessels that might have given more timely
warning were at anchor in the bay. Numerous water parties were
on shore and with them the ships' boats needed to stretch cables
from one vessel to another and rig gear for winding ships, as had
been vaguely planned. At a hurried council it was proposed to put
to sea, but this was given up for the sufficient reason that there
was no time. The French were cleared for action only on the out-board
side. Their admiral was chiefly fearful of attack in the rear, a
fear reasonable enough if his ships had been sailing before the
wind at sea; but at anchor, with the Aboukir batteries ineffective
and the wind blowing directly down the line, attack upon the van
would be far more dangerous, since support could less easily be
brought up from the rear.
[Illustration: COAST MAP
From Alexandria to Rosetta Mouth of the Nile]
It was on the head of the line that the attack came. Nelson had
given the one signal that "his intention was to attack the van
and center as they lay at anchor, according to the plan before
developed." This plan called for doubling, two ships to the enemy's
one. With a fair wind from the north-northwest Captain Foley in
the _Goliath_ at 6 p.m. reached the _Guerrier_, the headmost of
the thirteen ships in the enemy line. Either by instant initiative,
or more likely in accordance with previous plans in view of such an
opportunity, he took his ship inside the line, his anchor dragging
slightly so as to bring him up on the quarter of the second enemy
vessel, the _Conquérant_. The _Zealous_, following closely,
anchored on the bows of the _Guerrier_; the _Orion_ engaged inside
the fifth ship; the _Theseus_ inside the third; and the _Audacious_,
passing between the first two of the enemy, brought up on the
_Conquérant's_ bow. With these five engaged inside, Nelson in the
_Vanguard_ and the two ships following him engaged respectively
outside the third, fourth and fifth of the enemy. Thus the concentration
on the van was eight to five.
About a half hour later the _Bellerophon_ and the _Majestic_
attacked respectively the big flagship _Orient_ (110) in the
center and the _Tonnant_ (80) next astern, and against these superior
antagonists suffered severely, losing in killed and wounded 390
men divided about equally between them, which was nearly half the
total loss of 896 and greater than the total at Cape St. Vincent.
Both later drifted almost helpless down the line. The _Culloden_
under Troubridge, a favorite of both Jervis and Nelson, had
unfortunately grounded and stuck fast on Aboukir shoal; but the
_Swiftsure_ and the _Alexander_ came up two hours after the battle
had begun as a support to the ships in the centre, the _Swiftsure_
engaging the _Orient_, and the _Alexander_ the _Franklin_ next
ahead, while the smaller _Leander_ skillfully chose a position
where she could rake the two. By this time all five of the French
van had surrendered; the _Orient_ was in flames and blew up about
10 o'clock with the loss of all but 70 men. Admiral Brueys, thrice
wounded, died before the explosion. Of the four ships in the rear,
only two, the _Guillaume Tell_ under Admiral Villeneuve and the
_Généreux_, were able to cut their cables next morning and get
away. Nelson asserted that, had he not been incapacitated by a
severe scalp wound in the action, even these would not have escaped.
Of the rest, two were burned and nine captured. Among important
naval victories, aside from such one-sided slaughters as those of
our own Spanish war, it remains the most overwhelming in history.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE NILE]
The effect was immediate throughout Europe, attesting dearly the
contemporary importance attached to sea control. "It was this battle,"
writes Admiral de la Gravière, "which for two years delivered over
the Mediterranean to the British and called thither the squadrons
of Russia, which shut up our army in the midst of a hostile people
and led the Porte to declare against us, which put India beyond
our reach and thrust France to the brink of ruin, for it rekindled
the hardly extinct war with Austria and brought Suvaroff and the
Austro-Russians to our very frontiers."[1]
[Footnote 1: GUERRES MARITIMES, II, 129.]
The whole campaign affords an instance of an overseas expedition
daringly undertaken in the face of a hostile fleet (though it should
be remembered that the British were not in the Mediterranean when
it was planned), reaching its destination by extraordinary good
luck, and its possibilities then completely negatived by the
reëstablishment of enemy naval control. The efforts of the French
army to extricate itself northward through Palestine were later
thwarted partly by the squadron under Commodore Sidney Smith, which
captured the siege guns sent to Acre by sea and aided the Turks in
the defense of the fortress. In October of 1799 Bonaparte escaped
to France in a frigate. French fleets afterwards made various futile
efforts to succor the forces left in Egypt, which finally surrendered
to an army under Abercromby, just too late to strengthen the British
in the peace negotiations of October, 1801.
Nelson's subsequent activities in command of naval forces in Italian
waters need not detain us. Physically and nervously weakened from
the effects of his wound and arduous campaign, he fell under the
influence of Lady Hamilton and the wretched court of Naples, lent
naval assistance to schemes of doubtful advantage to his country,
and in June of 1800 incurred the displeasure of the Admiralty by
direct disobedience of orders to send support to Minorca. He returned
to England at the close of 1800 with the glory of his victory somewhat
tarnished, and with blemishes on his private character which
unfortunately, as will be seen, affected also his professional
reputation.
_The Copenhagen Campaign_
Under the rapid scene-shifting of Napoleon, the political stage
had by this time undergone another complete change from that which
followed the battle of the Nile. Partly at least as a consequence
of that battle, the so-called Second Coalition had been formed by
Great Britain, Russia, and Austria, the armies of the two latter
powers, as already stated, carrying the war again to the French
frontiers. It required only the presence of Bonaparte, in supreme
control after the _coup d'état_ of the Eighteenth _Brumaire_
(9 Nov., 1799), to turn the tide, rehabilitate the internal
administration of France, and by the victories of Marengo in June
and Hohenlinden in December of 1800 to force Austria once more to
a separate peace. Paul I of Russia had already fallen out with his
allies and withdrawn his armies and his great general, Suvaroff,
a year before. Now, taken with a romantic admiration for Napoleon,
and angry when the British, after retaking Malta, refused to turn
it over to him as Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, he was
easily manipulated by Napoleon into active support of the latter's
next move against England.
This was the Armed Neutrality of 1800, the object of which, from
the French standpoint, was to close to England the markets of the
North, and combine against her the naval forces of the Baltic.
Under French and Russian pressure, and in spite of the fact that
all these northern nations stood to suffer in one way or another
from rupture of trade relations with England, the coalition was
accomplished in December, 1800; Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark
pledging themselves to resist infringements of neutral rights,
whether by extension of contraband lists, seizure of enemy goods
under neutral flag, search of vessels guaranteed innocent by their
naval escort, or by other methods familiar then as in later times.
These were measures which England, aiming both to ruin the trade
of France and to cut off her naval supplies, felt bound to insist
upon as the belligerent privileges of sea power.
To overcome this new danger called for a mixture of force and diplomacy,
which England supplied by sending to Denmark an envoy with a 48-hour
ultimatum, and along with him 20 ships-of-the-line, which according
to Nelson were "the best negotiators in Europe." The commander in
chief of this squadron was Sir Hyde Parker, a hesitant and mediocre
leader who could be trusted to do nothing (if that were necessary),
and Nelson was made second in command. Influence, seniority, a clean
record, and what-not, often lead to such choices, bad enough at
any time but indefensible in time of war. Fortunately for England,
when the reply of the Danish court showed that force was required,
the two admirals virtually changed places with less friction than
might have been expected, and Nelson "Lifted and carried on his
shoulders the dead weight of his superior,"[1] throughout the ensuing
campaign.
[Footnote 1: Mahan, INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON FRENCH REVOLUTION
AND EMPIRE, II, 52.]
When the envoy on March 23 returned to the fleet, then anchored in
the Cattegat, he brought an alarming tale of Danish preparations,
and an air of gloom pervaded the flagship when Nelson came aboard
for a council of war. Copenhagen, it will be recalled, is situated
on the eastern coast of Zealand, on the waterway called the Sound
leading southward from the Cattegat to the Baltic. Directly in
front of the city, a long shoal named the Middle Ground separates
the Sound into two navigable channels, the one nearer Copenhagen
known as the King's Deep (_Kongedyb_). The defenses of the Danish
capital, so the envoy reported, were planned against attack from
the northward. At this end of the line the formidable Trekroner
Battery (68 guns), together with two ships-of-the-line and some
smaller vessels, defended the narrow entrance to the harbor; while
protecting the city to the southward, along the flats at the edge
of the King's Deep, was drawn up an array of about 37 craft ranging
from ships-of-the-line to mere scows, mounting a total of 628 guns,
and supported at some distance by batteries on land. Filled with
patriotic ardor, half the male population of the city had volunteered
to support the forces manning these batteries afloat and ashore.
Nelson's plan for meeting these obstacles, as well as his view of
the whole situation, as presented at the council, was embodied in
a memorandum dated the following day, which well illustrates his
grasp of a general strategic problem. The Government's instructions,
as well as Parker's preference, were apparently to wait in the
Cattegat until the combined enemy forces should choose to come
out and fight. Instead, the second in command advocated immediate
action. "Not a moment," he wrote, "should be lost in attacking the
enemy; they will every day and hour be stronger." The best course,
in his opinion, would be to take the whole fleet at once into the
Baltic against Russia, as a "home stroke," which if successful
would bring down the coalition like a house of cards. If the Danes
must first be dealt with, he proposed, instead of a direct attack,
which would be "taking the bull by the horns," an attack from the
rear. In order to do so, the fleet could get beyond the city either
by passing through the Great Belt south of Zealand, or directly
through the Sound. Another resultant advantage, in case the five
Swedish sail of the line or the 14 Russian ships at Revel should
take the offensive, would be that of central position, between
the enemy divisions.
"Supposing us through the Belt," the letter concludes, "with the
wind northwesterly, would it not be possible to either go with
the fleet or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one
Bomb and two Fireships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron
at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment,
and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The
measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion that the boldest
measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous
assertion of her force, directed with judgment."
Here was a striking plan of aggressive warfare, aimed at the heart of
the coalition. The proposal to leave part of the fleet at Copenhagen
was indeed a dangerous compromise, involving divided forces and
threatened communications, but was perhaps justified by the known
inefficiency of the Russians and the fact that the Danes were actually
fought and defeated with a force no greater than the plan provided.
In the end the more conservative course was adopted of settling
with Denmark first. Keeping well to the eastern shore, the fleet
on March 30 passed into the Sound without injury from the fire of
the Kronenburg forts at its entrance, and anchored that evening
near Copenhagen.
Three days later, on April 2, 1801, the attack was made as planned,
from the southward end of the Middle Ground. Nelson in the _Elephant_
commanded the fighting squadron, which consisted of seven 74's,
three 64's and two of 50 guns, with 18 bomb vessels, sloops, and
fireships. The rest of the ships, under Parker, were anchored at
the other end of the shoal and 5 miles north of the city; it seems
they were to have coöperated, but the south wind which Nelson needed
made attack impossible for them. Against the Danish total of 696
guns on the ships and Trekroner fortification, Nelson's squadron
had 1014, but three of his main units grounded during the approach
and were of little service. There was no effort at concentration,
the British when in position engaging the whole southern part of
the Danish line. "Here," in the words of Nelson's later description,
"was no maneuvering; it was downright fighting"--a hotly contested
action against ships and shore batteries lasting from 10 a. m., when
the _Elephant_ led into position on the bow of Commodore Fischer's
flagship _Dannebroge_, until about one.
In the midst of the engagement, as Nelson restlessly paced the
quarterdeck, he caught sight of the signal "Leave off action" flown
from Sir Hyde's flagship. Instead of transmitting the signal to the
vessels under him, Nelson kept his own for "Close action" hoisted.
Colonel Stewart, who was on board at the time, continues the story as
follows: "He also observed, I believe to Captain Foley, 'You know,
Foley, I have only one eye--I have a right to be blind sometimes';
and then with an archness peculiar to his character, putting the
glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, 'I really do not see the
signal.'" It was obeyed, however, by the light vessels under Captain
Riou attacking the Trekroner battery, which were suffering severely,
and which could also more easily effect a retreat.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN, APRIL 2, 1801]
Shortly afterward the Danish fire began to slacken and several
of the floating batteries surrendered, though before they could
be taken they were frequently remanned by fresh forces from the
shore. Enough had been accomplished; and to end a difficult
situation--if not to extricate himself from it--Nelson sent the
following summons addressed "To the brothers of Englishmen, the
Danes": "Lord Nelson has orders to spare Denmark when no longer
resisting; if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord
Nelson will be obliged to set fire to the floating batteries he
has taken, without having the power of saving the brave Danes who
have defended them."
A truce followed, during which Nelson removed his ships. Next day
he went ashore to open negotiations, while at the same time he
brought bomb vessels into position to bombard the city. The cessation
of hostilities was the more readily agreed to by the Danes owing
to the fact that on the night before the battle they had received
news, which they still kept concealed from the British, of the
assassination of the Czar Paul. His successor, they knew, would be
forced to adopt a policy more favorable to the true interests of
Russian trade. The league in fact was on the verge of collapse. A
fourteen weeks' armistice was signed with Denmark. On April 12 the
fleet moved into the Baltic, and on May 5, Nelson having succeeded
Parker in command, it went on to Revel, whence the Russian squadron
had escaped through the ice to Kronstadt ten days before. On June
17 a convention was signed with Russia and later accepted by the
other northern states, by which Great Britain conceded that neutrals
might engage in trade from one enemy port to another, with the
important exception of _colonial_ ports, and that naval stores
should not be contraband; whereas Russia agreed that enemy goods
under certain conditions might be seized in neutral ships, and
that vessels under naval escort might be searched by ships-of-war.
In the meantime, Nelson, realizing that active operations were
over with, resigned his command.
In the opinion of the French naval critic Gravière, the campaign
thus ended constitutes in the eyes of seamen Nelson's best title to
fame--"_son plus beau titre gloire._"[1] Certainly it called forth
the most varied talents--grasp of the political and strategical
situation; tact and force of personality in dealing with an inert
commander in chief; energy in overcoming not only military obstacles
but the doubts and scruples of fellow officers; aggressiveness in
battle; and skill in negotiations. In view of the Czar's murder--of
which the British Government would seem to have had an inkling
beforehand--it may be thought that less strenuous methods would
have served. On the contrary, however, hundreds of British merchant
vessels had been seized in northern ports, trade had been stopped,
and the nation was threatened with a dangerous increment to her
foes. Furthermore, after a brief interval of peace, Great Britain
had to face ten years more of desperate warfare, during which nothing
served her better than that at Copenhagen the northern neutrals
had had a sharp taste of British naval power. Force was needed.
That it was employed economically is shown by the fact that, when a
renewal of peace between France and Russia in 1807 again threatened
a northern confederation, Nelson's accomplishment with 12 ships
was duplicated, but this time with 25 of the line, 40 frigates,
27,000 troops, the bombardment of Copenhagen, and a regular land
campaign.
[Footnote 1: GUERRES MARITIMES, Vol. II, p. 43.]
Upon Nelson's return to England, popular clamor practically forced
his appointment to command the Channel defense flotilla against
the French armies which were now once more concentrated on the
northern coast. This service lasted for only a brief period until
the signing of peace preliminaries in October, 1801.
During the eight years of hostilities thus ended Great Britain, it
is true, had been fighting largely on the defensive, but on a line
of defense carried to the enemy's sea frontiers and comparable to
siege lines about a city or fortress, which, when once established,
thrust upon the enemy the problem of breaking through. The efforts
of France to pierce this barrier, exerted in various directions
and by various means, were, as we have seen, defeated by naval
engagements, which insured to England the control of the sea. During
this period, France lost altogether 55 ships-of-the-line, Holland
18, Spain 10, and Denmark 2, a total of 85, of which at least 50
were captured by the enemy. Great Britain lost 20, but only 5 by
capture. The British battle fleet at the close of hostilities had
increased to 189 capital ships; that of France had shrunk to 45.
For purposes of commerce warfare the French navy had suffered the
withdrawal of many of its smaller fighting vessels and large numbers
of its best seamen, attracted into privateering by the better promise
of profit and adventure. As a result of this warfare, about 3500
British merchantmen were destroyed, an average of 500 a year,
representing an annual loss of 2-1/2 per cent of all the ships of
British register. But in the meantime the French merchant marine
and commerce had been literally swept off the seas. In 1799 the
Directory admitted there was "not a single merchant ship on the seas
carrying the French flag." French imports from Asia, Africa, and
America in 1800 amounted to only $300,000, and exports to $56,000,
whereas England's total export and import trade had nearly doubled,
from 44-1/2 million pounds sterling in 1792 to nearly 78 million in
1800. It is true that, owing to the exigencies of war, the amount of
British shipping employed in this trade actually fell off slightly,
and that of neutrals increased from 13 to 34%. But the profits
went chiefly to British merchants. England had become the great
storehouse and carrier for the Continent, "Commerce," in the phrase
engraved on the elder Pitt's monument, "being united with and made
to flourish by war."[1]
[Footnote 1: Figures on naval losses from Gravière, GUERRES MARITIMES,
Vol. II, ch. VII, and on commerce, from Mahan, FRENCH REVOLUTION
AND EMPIRE, Vol. II, ch. XVII.]
REFERENCES
See end of Chapter XIII, page 285.