on the coast-road from Valencia, and to San Mateo on the parallel
inland road, with his whole army, including the force which
Bassecourt had been commanding. It consisted of no more than 10,000
ill-organized troops of the Line, who had been joined by nearly as
many unregimented peasants in loose guerrilla bands. The whole mass
was far from being formidable, as Suchet knew. Wherefore the French
general, cutting down to the smallest possible figure the containing
troops left before Tortosa, and at his head quarters at Mora, marched
with eleven battalions and a cavalry regiment--only 6,000 men in
all--to meet the Valencians. He drove their advanced cavalry from
Vinaros, and advanced against their positions at Calig and Cervera
del Maestre. Caro at once ordered a precipitate retreat, and did
not stop till he had placed thirty miles between himself and the
enemy. His obvious terror and dismay at the approach of the French
roused such anger that he was summoned to give up the command by his
own officers, and obeyed without hesitation[597]. He fled by sea to
Majorca, knowing, it is said, that he would have been torn to pieces
if he had shown his face before the populace at Valencia, over which
he had exercised a sort of dictatorship for more than a year. Suchet,
unable to catch such an evasive enemy, and regarding the routed army
as a negligible quantity, returned to Mora, where he received the
news that the long-expected Macdonald was at last about to appear
(August 20).
[597] For details see Arteche, ix. 267, Schepeler, iv. 659-60, and
Suchet’s _Mémoires_, vol. i. p. 193. The dictator’s own brother,
General Juan Caro, was one of those who deposed him.
The Duke of Tarentum had thrown the third and last of his great
convoys into Barcelona on the 18th of August, having brought with
him as its escort the French division of his army, which was now
commanded by Frère[598], and the Italian divisions of Severoli and
Pignatelli. He had left behind him General Baraguay d’Hilliers, in
the position which Reille had been wont to hold, as the defender of
the Ampurdam and Northern Catalonia as far as Hostalrich. Eighteen
thousand men were told off for this task, including all the German
brigades; but after garrisoning Gerona, Rosas, Figueras, and
Hostalrich, d’Hilliers had no great field-force left, and found
full employment in warding off the raids of Manso, Rovira, and
the other miquelete leaders upon the communication between Gerona
and Perpignan. Nearly 10,000 men had also been left in Barcelona,
including many sick, and the three divisions with which Macdonald
marched to join Suchet did not exceed 16,000 sabres and bayonets,
though the whole force of the 7th Corps was reckoned at over 50,000
men.
[598] Vice Souham, wounded at Vich, and Augereau recalled.
On August 13 Macdonald forced the Pass of Ordal, after some
skirmishing with the somatenes, and entered the plain of Tarragona.
It was the news of his approach to the Catalan capital which brought
O’Donnell back in haste from Tortosa. He concentrated the greater
part of his troops, on the hypothesis that the 7th Corps might be
intending to lay siege to the place. He brought down Campoverde’s
division from the north to join those of Ibarrola, Sarsfield, and
the Baron de Eroles, which were already on the spot. It soon became
known, however, to the Spaniards that Macdonald could not be bent
on siege operations, for he was bringing with him neither the
heavy artillery nor the enormous train of provisions that would be
required in such a case. He marched past Reus and Valls to Momblanch,
skirmishing all the way with O’Donnell’s detachments, and thence
to Lerida, which he reached on August 29. There he found Suchet
awaiting him for a conference. The orders from Paris, on which both
were acting, seemed to prescribe that Tortosa and Tarragona should
both be attacked[599]. But the General and the Marshal agreed that
their joint strength was not more than enough for one siege at a
time. They agreed that the 3rd Corps should undertake the leaguer of
Tortosa, and ‘the containing’ of the Valencian army, while the 7th
should cover these operations by keeping O’Donnell and the Catalans
fully employed. Suchet therefore drew his detachments southward from
Lerida and the plains of the Segre, handing over all that tract to
Macdonald. From this fertile region alone could the Marshal have
fed his corps, Central Catalonia being barren, and so overrun by
O’Donnell’s detachments that it was impossible to forage freely
within its bounds. Suchet undertook to provide for his own corps
during the siege of Tortosa by bringing up stores from Saragossa
and the valley of the Ebro, via Mequinenza. Macdonald lent him,
meanwhile, the weakest of his three divisions, 2,500 Neapolitans
under Pignatelli, who were to escort the siege-train for Tortosa
along the Ebro, when the autumn rains made the river navigable from
Mequinenza to the sea.
[599] See Suchet’s _Mémoires_, i. 196-7, and the dispatch from
Napoleon’s _Correspondance_ of July 25, 1810.
[Illustration: COINS CURRENT IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN 1808-14]
While Suchet was moving southward and making ready for the siege, the
Duke of Tarentum established himself with head quarters at Cervera
on the Barcelona-Lerida road, and brigades at Lerida, Agramunt, and
Tarrega, all in the plain; he was ready to fall upon O’Donnell’s
flank if the Catalans should make any attempt to succour Tortosa, by
marching from Tarragona along the roads parallel to the sea coast.
Meanwhile he had completely lost touch both with the garrison of
Barcelona and with Baraguay d’Hilliers in the Ampurdam. This was
the regular state of things during the Catalan war; for if the
French left detachments to guard a line of communication, they were
invariably cut off by the enemy; while, if they did not, the roads
were blocked and no information came through. So vigorous were the
somatenes at this moment, that small parties moving from Tarrega to
Cervera,--places only twelve miles apart, and in the middle of the
cantonments of the 7th Corps,--were not unfrequently waylaid and
destroyed. Macdonald, despite his well-known humanity, was forced to
burn villages, and shoot road-side assassins caught red-handed. He
lay in the position which he had taken up on September 4-6 for the
greater part of that month and the succeeding October, concentrating
at intervals a part of his forces for an expedition into the hills,
when the Catalans pressed him too closely. At the commencement of
his sojourn in the plains, he sent Severoli with an Italian brigade
to collect provisions in the valley of the Noguera Palleresa. This
raid led to dreadful ravaging of the country-side, but Severoli
returned with no spoil and many wounded. He had pushed his advance
as far as Talarn, skirmishing the whole way, and driving the
somatenes before him, but could accomplish nothing save the burning
of poor villages evacuated by their inhabitants. A week later other
expeditions scoured the mountain sides eastward, with little more
success[600].
[600] For details see Vacani, iv. pp. 307-8.
Meanwhile, though Macdonald imagined that he was not only protecting
Suchet’s northern flank, but also attracting the attention of
O’Donnell to himself, the enterprising Spanish general had contrived
an unwelcome surprise for him. He knew that he was not strong enough
to fight the 7th Corps in the open field, nor even to face Suchet
by making another attempt to relieve Tortosa--which place, for the
moment, was in no immediate danger. He therefore resolved to draw
Macdonald from his present position, by a blow at the corner of
Catalonia where the French were weakest.
The Marshal considered that Baraguay d’Hilliers was perfectly
safe in the northern region which he garrisoned, since no regular
Spanish force was now in arms in that direction. O’Donnell resolved
to undeceive him. Leaving the two divisions of Obispo and Eroles
to block the road from Macdonald’s post at Cervera to Barcelona,
with orders to retire into Tarragona if hard pressed, he ordered a
third division, that of Campoverde, to prepare for a forced march
to the north. At the same time a force, consisting of the British
frigate _Cambrian_ and the Spanish frigate _Diana_, convoying a
few transports with 500 men on board for disembarkation, sailed
from Tarragona, for a destination which was kept secret to the last
moment. The troops were under Doyle, the British commissioner in
Catalonia; Captain Fane of the _Cambrian_ was senior naval officer.
O’Donnell’s march was perilous: he had to pass close to the front
of the garrisons of Barcelona, Hostalrich, and Gerona, through a
most difficult and mountainous country, without giving any signs
of his presence; for, if his movement were discovered, Baraguay
d’Hilliers might concentrate his scattered brigades, and crush him
by force of numbers. The march, however, was carried out with
complete success, and on September 13 O’Donnell lay with 6,000
infantry and 400 horse at Vidreras, south of Gerona, while the naval
force was hovering off Palamos, the nearest point on the coast.
The rough region between Gerona and the sea was at this moment
occupied by half Rouyer’s division of troops of the Confederation
of the Rhine, under Schwartz--the ever-unlucky general whose name
was connected with the disasters of Bruch[601] and Manresa[602].
He had with him four weak battalions of the 5th (Anhalt-Lippe)
and 6th (Schwartzburg-Waldeck-Reuss) regiments, and a squadron of
cuirassiers: a force which, owing to the sickliness of the autumn
season, did not amount to much more than 1,500 men in all. But he
was so close to Gerona[603], where lay Rouyer’s other two regiments,
and some French troops, that he was not considered in any danger by
his superiors. Schwartz’s main duty was to prevent any communication
between the somatenes of the inland and the cruisers which were
always passing up and down the coast. Provoked by a recent raid at
Bagur, on September 10, where an English landing-party had stormed
one of his coast batteries, and captured the garrison of 50 men,
Schwartz had just strengthened all his posts along the shore. He
had only 700 men at his head quarters at La Bispal; the rest were
dispersed between Bagur, San Feliu, Palamos, and the connecting post
at Calonje. On the morning of the fourteenth he was stricken with
horror when his outposts informed him that they had been driven in by
Spanish infantry and cavalry in overwhelming force. He sent orders,
too late, for his troops on the coast to concentrate, and prepared
to fall back on Gerona with his whole force. But his messenger had
hardly gone when he was attacked by O’Donnell, who drove him into
the indefensible castle of La Bispal, which was commanded by a
neighbouring hill and the church tower of the village. After losing
some men shot down from these points of vantage, Schwartz surrendered
at nightfall, when the Spaniards were preparing to storm his refuge.
His defence cannot have been very desperate, as he had lost only
one officer and four men killed, and three officers and sixteen men
wounded. But this was only part of the disaster which befell the
German brigade that day: by a careful timing of the attacks Doyle
and Fane stormed Palamos with the landing-force at the same moment
that La Bispal was being attacked, while Colonel Fleires, with a
detachment of O’Donnell’s land troops, surprised San Feliu, and
Colonel Aldea with another cut off the companies at Calonje. In
all the Spaniards captured on that day one general, two colonels,
fifty-six officers, and 1,183 rank and file, with seventeen guns.
Schwartz’s brigade was absolutely destroyed; only a few stragglers
reached Gerona, from which no help had been sent, because O’Donnell
had turned loose all the somatenes of the region to demonstrate
against the place[604].
[601] See vol. i. p. 311.
[602] See this vol. p. 295.
[603] Only about eighteen miles distant.
[604] The best narrative of Schwartz’s disaster may be found in
the diary of the Lippe-Bückeburg officer Barkhausen, one of the
prisoners, pp. 110-15.
Without waiting for Rouyer and Baraguay d’Hilliers to assemble their
forces, O’Donnell departed from the scene of his exploits without
delay. He himself, having received a severe wound in the foot,
embarked with the prisoners on board Fane’s ships and returned to
Tarragona. Campoverde, with the land-force, retired hastily past
Gerona to the mountains of the north, retook Puycerda, beat up the
outposts of the French garrison of Montlouis on the frontier of
Cerdagne, and raised some contributions on the other side of the
Pyrenees. From thence he descended the Segre, and established himself
at Cardona and Calaf, facing Macdonald’s northern flank.
So thoroughly had the main body of the 7th Corps lost touch with
the troops left behind at Gerona and in the Ampurdam, that the news
of the disaster of La Bispal only reached Macdonald, via France and
Saragossa, more than a fortnight after it had happened. It alarmed
him for the safety of the north, but did not suffice to draw him
away from Suchet, as O’Donnell had hoped. The news that the Spanish
raiding division had disappeared from the neighbourhood of Gerona
encouraged him to remain in his present position, which alone made
the siege of Tortosa possible. Presently he was informed that a
considerable force had appeared in his own sphere of operations--this
being the same division of Campoverde which had done all the
mischief in the north. He therefore marched on October 18, with
two French and two Italian brigades, to attack this new enemy.
On the next day he occupied Solsona, where the Junta of Upper
Catalonia had hitherto been sitting. The place was found deserted
by its inhabitants, and was plundered; its great cathedral was
burnt--either by accident or design. On the twenty-first, however,
when the Marshal came in front of Cardona, he found the town, the
inaccessible castle above it, and the neighbouring heights, manned
by Campoverde’s division, strengthened by several thousand somatenes
of the district. The Italian general Eugenio marched straight at
the position, with Salme’s French brigade in support, despising his
enemy, and not waiting for the Commander-in-Chief and the reserves.
He met with a sharp repulse, for the Spaniards charged his columns
just as they drew near the crest, and hurled them down with loss.
Macdonald refused to throw in all his troops, and contented himself
with bringing off the routed brigade. He then returned to Solsona
and Cervera, much harassed in his retreat by the somatenes. It is
curious that he did not press the combat further, as he had a large
superiority of numbers over the Catalan division, and had not lost
much more than 100 men in the first clash[605]. But the position was
formidable, and the Marshal more than once in this campaign showed
himself averse to taking risks. Perhaps, also, he may have already
made up his mind to return to the east and abandon Suchet, since
it was at about this time that more disquieting information from
Baraguay d’Hilliers reached him by way of France.
[605] Martinien’s invaluable lists show only three Italian and one
French officer hurt, which agrees well enough with Vacani’s estimate
of 80 to 100 _hors de combat_.
This new budget of troubles contained two main items. The first was
that the August supplies thrown into Barcelona were nearly exhausted,
and that the town urgently required revictualling. The second was
that it was impossible to send on the necessary convoys, because of
the extreme activity of the somatenes, and the inadequate number
of troops left in Northern Catalonia. One considerable train of
waggons had been captured and destroyed near La Junquera, on the very
frontier of France, by the Baron de Eroles, who had now taken up
the command of the northern insurgents. Another was standing fast
at Gerona for want of sufficient escort, a third had been collected
at Perpignan, but dared not start. So pressing was the need for the
relief of Barcelona, that Macdonald made up his mind that he must
break up from his present cantonments--even at the risk of making the
siege of Tortosa impossible--and transfer himself to the north-east.
Accordingly, on November 4, he commenced a toilsome march by way of
Calaf, Manresa, and Hostalrich to Gerona, where he arrived in safety
on the 10th. Campoverde followed him, for some way, by parallel
paths along the mountains, but never dared to strike, the strength
of the 7th Corps when it marched in a mass being too great for him.
It is probable that the Marshal would have had more trouble if
O’Donnell had been in the field, but that enterprising general was
not yet healed of the wound which he had received at La Bispal. It
had gangrened, and he had been sent to Majorca by his physicians,
who declared that a complete cessation from military work was the
only chance of saving his life. The interim command was turned over
in November to the senior Lieutenant-General in Catalonia, Miguel
Iranzo, a very poor substitute for the hard-fighting Spanish-Irish
general.
Macdonald, having joined Baraguay d’Hilliers, had now an imposing
mass of troops under his hand. Moreover, he got back the services of
his old divisional generals Souham and Pino, who arrived from sick
leave, and took over charge of the divisions lately in the charge of
Frère and Severoli. A great draft from France and Italy had rejoined
in their company. The Marshal was therefore able to collect the
fractions of the great convoy destined for Barcelona, and to conduct
it to that city after a slow and cautious march on November 25. He
then changed the battalions in the garrison of Barcelona, where he
left both Pino and Souham, sent back to the Ampurdam the troops he
had borrowed from Baraguay d’Hilliers, as escort for the returning
convoy, and marched for the second time to join Suchet; moving by way
of Momblanch, he got once more into touch with the Army of Aragon at
Falcet, near Mora, on December 12.
Thus the campaign came back, at mid-winter, to the same aspect
that it had shown in the first days of September. It has been the
wont of military critics to throw the blame for the lost three
months on Macdonald[606]. But this seems unfair: it is true that
he was absent from the post which he had promised to hold, for the
protection of Suchet’s rear, from November 4 to December 13. But why
had so little been done to forward the siege of Tortosa during the
time from September 4 to November 4--two whole months--while the
Marshal was in the covenanted position, and actually carrying out
his promise to contain the Catalans, and leave Suchet’s hands free
for the actual prosecution of the projected siege? The commander of
the Army of Aragon had been given two of the best campaigning months
of the year--September and October--and had no enemy about him save
the ever-unlucky Valencian army, the local somatenes of the Lower
Ebro, and the scattered bands of Villacampa in the hills of Upper
Aragon. It was only sixty miles from his base at Mequinenza, where
his siege-train had been collected months before, to the walls of
Tortosa, and he had brought up his field army before that place as
early as August. No doubt the country between Mequinenza and Tortosa
is rough, and its roads execrable, while water-transport along
the Ebro was rendered more difficult than usual by a rather dry
autumn, which kept the river low. But twenty-six heavy siege-guns
were got down to Xerta, only ten miles from Tortosa, as early as
September 5, during a lucky flood, while a considerable number more
were pushed to the front during the same month, by the land route,
formed by Suchet’s new military road from Caspe to Mora. It seems,
therefore, that Suchet’s inactivity in September and October can be
explained neither by laying blame on Macdonald, nor by exaggerating
the difficulties of transport. If, as he wrote himself, ‘Notre corps
d’armée se trouvait enchaîné sur le bas Ebre, sans pouvoir agir, et
son chef n’avait d’espoir que dans une crue d’eau et dans le secours
des circonstances[607],’ he was himself responsible for his failure,
either from over-caution or because he had undertaken a task beyond
his means. The real cause of his two months’ delay was the vigorous
action of the enemy. There was no danger from the disorganized
Valencian army, which only made a feeble attempt on November 26-27
to beat up the small force under General Musnier, which lay at
Uldecona to cover the blockade of Tortosa from the south; the attack,
led by Bassecourt, was driven off with ease. The real opponents of
Suchet were the irregular forces of the Catalans, and the Aragonese
insurgents in his rear. The former, though few in numbers, since
Macdonald was attracting their main attention, attacked every convoy
that tried to float down the gorge of the Ebro, and sometimes with
success. On the 15th of September they captured a whole battalion of
Pignatelli’s Neapolitans, which was acting as guard to some boats. On
other occasions they took or destroyed smaller or greater portions
of flotillas carrying guns or stores to Xerta, where the siege park
was being collected. But Villacampa’s Aragonese gave even greater
trouble; from his lair in the Sierra de Albaracin that enterprising
partisan made countless descents upon Suchet’s rear, and so molested
the garrisons of Upper Aragon, that the French general had repeatedly
to send back troops from his main body to clear the roads behind him.
Villacampa was beaten whenever he tried to fight large bodies, even
though he was aided by a General Carbajal, whom the Regency had sent
from Cadiz with money and arms, to stir up a general revolt in the
Teruel-Montalban region. The Polish General Chlopiski, detached in
haste from the blockade of Tortosa, broke the forces of Carbajal and
Villacampa in two successive engagements at Alventosa, on the borders
of Valencia (October 31), and Fuensanta, near Teruel (November 11).
The insurrection died down, Villacampa retired into his mountains,
and Chlopiski returned to the main army. But only a few days later
Suchet had to cope with a new danger: Macdonald having taken himself
off to Gerona, the Catalans were at last able to detach regular
troops to reinforce the somatenes of the Lower Ebro. A brigade under
General Garcia Navarro came up to Falcet, opposite Mora, and formed
the nucleus of a raiding force, which beset the whole left bank of
the Ebro, and made its navigation almost impossible. Suchet had
to detach against it seven battalions under Abbé and Habert, who
attacked Navarro’s entrenched camp at Falcet on November 12, and
stormed it. The Spanish general, who showed distinguished personal
courage, and charged valiantly at the head of his reserves, was taken
prisoner with some 300 men. The somatenes fled to the hills again,
and the regulars retired to Reus, near Tarragona, where they were out
of Suchet’s sphere of operations. It was just after this combat that
the unfortunate Army of Valencia made the useless diversion of which
we have already spoken[608]. It, at least, kept Suchet busy for a few
days. By the time that it was over, the greater part of the remaining
siege-material was ready at Xerta, the water-carriage down the Ebro
having become easy since Garcia Navarro’s defeat. When, therefore,
Macdonald’s arrival at Momblanch was reported at Suchet’s head
quarters, and an adequate covering-force was once more placed between
him and the Catalan army in the direction of Tarragona, the actual
leaguer of Tortosa could at length begin. It lasted, short though
it was, till the New Year of 1811 had come, and must, therefore, be
described not here but in the fourth volume of this work.
[606] See especially Napier, iii. 199.
[607] Suchet, _Mémoires_, i. 205.
[608] See previous page.
Thus six months had elapsed between the fall of Lerida and the
commencement of the next stage of the French advance in Eastern
Spain. If it is asked why the delay was so long, the answer is easy:
it was due not, as some have maintained, to Suchet’s slowness or to
Macdonald’s caution, but solely to the splendid activity displayed
by Henry O’Donnell, a general often beaten but never dismayed, and
to the tenacity of the Catalans, who never gave up hope, and were
still to hold their own, after a hundred disasters, till the tide of
success in the Peninsula at last turned back in 1812-13.
SECTION XXII: CHAPTER II
KING JOSEPH AND THE CORTES AT CADIZ: GENERAL SUMMARY
It only remains that we should deal shortly with the higher politics
of Spain during the last months of 1810--the troubles of King Joseph,
and the complications caused by the meeting of the Cortes at Cadiz.
Of the growing friction between the King and the commanders of the
‘military governments’ created by the Emperor in February, we have
already spoken[609]. Joseph did well to be angry when his dispatches
to Saragossa or Barcelona were deliberately disregarded by his
brother’s special orders. But things became worse, when he was not
merely ignored, but openly contemned. A few examples may suffice.
In the early summer a brigade sent out by Marshal Ney raided the
province of Avila, which was not included in any of the military
governments, raised requisitions there, and--what was still more
insulting--seized and carried off the treasure in the offices of the
civil intendant-general of the province[610]. Joseph wrote to Paris
that ‘the Emperor cannot be desirous that his own brother--however
unworthy--should be openly humiliated and insulted; that he asked
for justice, and abstained from any further comment’[611]. Napoleon
replied by placing Avila in the block of provinces allotted to the
Army of Portugal, and withdrew it for the time from the King’s
authority. It was soon after that he created Kellermann’s new
‘military government’ of Valladolid, thus taking another region
from under the direct authority of Joseph. Some months later
Kellermann asserted the complete independence of his viceroyalty,
by causing the judges of the high-court of Old Castile, which sat
at Valladolid, to take a new oath of allegiance to the Emperor of
the French, as if they had ceased to be subjects of the kingdom of
Spain[612]. Soult, too, continued, as has been shown before, to cut
off all revenues which the King might have received from Andalusia,
and Joseph’s financial position became even worse than it had been in
1809[613].
[609] See pp. 201-2 and 316.
[610] See p. 242.
[611] Joseph to Napoleon. Ducasse’s _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_,
vii. 278-9. The Emperor gave Avila back to the King in September, see
Nap. _Correspondance_, xxi. 126.
[612] See Miot de Melito’s Diary, Sept. 8, 1810.
[613] Joseph to Napoleon, Aug. 25, 1810. Ducasse, vii. 321, and
ibid., p. 332 of Sept. 12.
The summary of his complaints, containing a declaration that he
wished to surrender his crown to the Emperor, was drawn up as the
autumn drew near; it deserves a record; it is absolutely reasonable,
and confines itself to hard facts. ‘Since Your Majesty withdraws
Andalusia from my sphere of command, and orders that the revenues of
that province should be devoted exclusively to military expenses, I
have no choice left but to throw up the game. In the actual state
of affairs in Spain the general who commands each province is a
king therein. The whole revenues of the province will never suffice
to keep him; for what he calls his “absolute necessities” have
never been formally stated, and as the revenues rise he augments
his “necessities.” Hence it results that any province under the
command of a general is useless for my budget. From Andalusia alone
I hoped to get a certain surplus, after all military expenses had
been paid. But its command is given over to a general who would
never recognize my authority; and with the command, he gets the
administrative and governmental rights. Thus I have been stripped of
the only region which could have given me a sufficient maintenance.
I am reduced to Madrid [i.e. New Castile], which yields 800,000
francs per mensem, while the indispensable expenses of the central
government amount to 4,000,000 francs per mensem. I have around me
the wrecks of what was once a great national administration, with
a guard, the dépôts and hospital of the army, a garrison, a royal
household, a ministry, a council of state, and the refugees from
the rebel provinces. This state of affairs could not endure for two
months longer, even if my honour, and the consciousness of what is
due to me, would allow me to remain in this humiliating position.
Since the Army of Andalusia has been taken from me, what am I? The
manager of the hospitals and magazines of Madrid, the head jailer of
the central dépôt of prisoners!’ Joseph then states his conditions.
If he is allowed (1) to have a real control over the whole army;
(2) to send back to France officers, of whatever rank, notoriously
guilty of maladministration; (3) to reassure his Spanish partisans
as to rumours current concerning his own forced abdication and the
dismemberment of the monarchy; (4) to issue what proclamations
he pleases to his subjects, without being placed under a sort of
censorship, he will retain his crown, and pledge himself to reduce
all Spain, and ‘make the country as profitable to the interests
of France as it is now detrimental.’ If not, he must consider the
question of retiring across the Pyrenees and surrendering his
crown[614].
[614] Joseph to Napoleon, Aug. 9, Ducasse, vii. 307.
Napoleon could not give any such promises, and for good reasons:
he rightly distrusted his brother’s military ability, and knew
that--whatever was the title given to Joseph--men like Soult or
Masséna would disregard his orders. Apparently he considered that a
conflict of authorities in Spain, such as had been existing for the
last six months, was at least better than the concentration of power
in the hands of one indifferent commander-in-chief. It is doubtful
whether he did not err in his conclusion. Almost anything was better
than the existing anarchy, tempered by orders, six weeks late, from
Paris. But a second, and a more fatal, objection to granting Joseph’s
conditions was that the ‘rumours current concerning the dismemberment
of the Spanish monarchy’ were absolutely true. Napoleon was at
this moment at the very height of his wild craze for adding alien
and heterogeneous provinces to the French Empire, in the supposed
interest of the Continental System. It was in 1810 that he declared
Holland and the Valais, Hamburg and Bremen, Oldenburg and Dalmatia,
integral parts of his dominions. And Northern Spain was destined to
suffer the same fate. Mina and Rovira, Eroles and Manso, were to
wake some morning to find themselves French subjects! On October 12
the Emperor wrote to Berthier: ‘You will inform General Caffarelli,
in strict confidence, that my intention is that Biscay shall be
united to France. He must not speak of this intention, but he must
act with full knowledge of it. Make the same private communication to
General Reille about Navarre[615].’ Aragon, or at least the portion
of it north of the Ebro, and Catalonia were to suffer the same fate.
Already justice was administered there in the name of the Emperor,
not in that of the King of Spain, and a coinage was being struck at
Barcelona which no longer bore the name of ‘Joseph Napoleon King of
Spain and the Indies[616].’
[615] _Correspondance_, xxi. p. 213.
[616] For a specimen, see the plate of coins in vol. ii, facing p.
478.
The line of argument which Napoleon adopted with regard to this
proposed annexation is very curious. His directions to his Foreign
Minister, Champagny, run as follows[617]: ‘Herewith I send you back
the Spanish documents with six observations, which are to serve as
the base for negotiation. But it is important that you should broach
the matter gently. You must first state clearly what are my opinions
on the Convention of Bayonne [viz. that the Emperor regards his
guarantee of the integrity of Spain as out of date and cancelled].
Then speak of Portugal[618], and next of the expense that this
country [Spain] costs me. Then let the Spanish envoys have time to
reflect, and only after an interval of some days tell them that I
must have the left bank of the Ebro, as an indemnity for the money
and all else that Spain has cost me down to this hour. I think that,
as in all negotiations, we must not show ourselves too much in a
hurry.’ The mention of Portugal means that the Emperor contemplated
making his brother a present of the Lusitanian realm, where Spain
was hated only one degree less than France, as a compensation for
Catalonia and the rest. On the same morning that Mina found himself
a Frenchman, all the Ordenança of the Beira hills were to discover
that they were Castilians! Mad disregard of national feeling could go
no further.
[617] Napoleon to Champagny, Sept. 9, 1810.
[618] I cannot find anywhere any authority for Napier’s strange
statement (iii. p. 261) that it was Almenara, and not Napoleon, who
started the idea that Portugal should be exchanged for the Ebro
Province. The nearest thing to it is that ‘M. d’Almenara déclare
formellement qu’il ne consente à aucune cession de territoire
espagnol, que cette compensation [Portugal] ne soit pas stipulée et
garantie; mais comme il est dans l’intention formelle du roi de ne
pas consentir à aucun démembrement, même avec une compensation plus
avantageuse, il n’aurait jamais ratifié un pareil traité.’ Ducasse,
_Correspondance_, vii. 190.
A letter to the French ambassador at Madrid explained at much greater
length the Emperor’s reasons for breaking the oath that he had sworn
to his brother at Bayonne, when he named him King of Spain. ‘When
the promise was made, His Majesty had supposed that he had rallied
to his cause the majority of the Spanish nation. This has proved not
to be the case: the whole people took arms, the new king had to fly
from Madrid, and was only restored by French bayonets. Since then he
has hardly rallied a recruit to his cause; it is not the King’s own
levies that have fought the rebels: it is the 400,000 French sent
across the Pyrenees who have conquered every province. Therefore
all these regions belong not to the King, but to the Emperor, by
plain right of conquest. He intends, for this reason, to regard the
Treaty of Bayonne as null; it has never been ratified by the Spanish
nation. One only chance remains to the King: let him prevail upon
the newly-assembled Cortes at Cadiz to acknowledge him as their
sovereign, and to break with England. If that can be done, the
Emperor may revert to his first intentions, and ratify the Treaty of
Bayonne, except that he must insist on a “rectification of frontiers
sufficient to give him certain indispensable positions”’--presumably
San Sebastian, Pampeluna, Figueras, Rosas, &c.[619]
[619] Napoleon to Laforest, ambassador at Madrid, Nov. 7.
The mere first rumour of his brother’s intentions, transmitted
by Almenara and the Duke of Santa-Fé, his ambassadors ordinary
and extraordinary at Paris, drove Joseph to despair. ‘The Spanish
nation,’ he wrote[620], ‘is more compact in its opinions, its
prejudices, its national egotism, than any other people of Europe.
There are no Catholics and Protestants here, no new and old
Spaniards; and they will all suffer themselves to be hewn in pieces
rather than allow the realm to be dismembered. What would the
inhabitants of the counties round London say if they were menaced
with being declared no longer English? What would Provençals or
Languedocians say if they were told that they were to cease to be
Frenchmen? My only chance here is to be authorized to announce that
the promise that Spain should not be dismembered will be kept. If
that is granted, and the generals who have misbehaved are recalled
to France, all may be repaired. If not, the only honourable course
for me is to retire into private life, as my conscience bids me,
and honour demands.’ On November 18, after having received more
formal news of the Emperor’s intentions from his envoys, Joseph
declared that the die was cast: he would return to his castle of
Mortefontaine, or to any other provincial abode in France that he
could afford to purchase, as soon as his brother’s resolve was made
public.
[620] Joseph to the Queen of Spain, Oct. 12. Ducasse,
_Correspondance_, vii. 355.
Yet the crisis never came to a head. The annexation of the Ebro
provinces was never published, though private assurances of their
impending fate were laid before the Spanish ministers and the King.
What caused the Emperor to hesitate, when all was prepared? The
answer may be found in his dispatch to Laforest on November 7: ‘I
need hardly warn you,’ he writes, ‘that these insinuations (the
ultimatum to the King) are to be made only on condition that the
French army has entered Lisbon, and that the English have taken to
their ships.’ And again, ‘The Emperor is acting in sincerity: if
in reality the capture of Lisbon, and an offer from the cabinet of
Madrid, might possibly decide the rebels to treat, His Majesty might
consent, &c., &c.’ It was the Lines of Torres Vedras which saved King
Joseph from abdication and Spain from dismemberment. The evacuation
of Portugal by Wellington was the indispensable preliminary to
the carrying out of the great annexation scheme: its completion
was deferred till the ominous silence of Masséna should be ended
by a triumphant dispatch proclaiming the capture of Lisbon. Since
that dispatch never came, Napoleon kept postponing his ultimatum.
Then followed the news, delivered at Paris by Foy on November 21,
showing that Masséna had been brought to a standstill. Even then the
Emperor’s plan was kept back, not abandoned. It was not till the Army
of Portugal had recoiled in despair and disarray to the banks of the
Coa that Napoleon abandoned his cherished scheme, and consented to
treat with his brother on reasonable terms. But Joseph’s visit to
Paris in the spring of 1811 and its consequences belong to another
chapter of this history. It must suffice here to point out that
he spent all the winter of 1810-11 in a state of mental anguish,
expecting every day to be forced to publish his abdication[621], and,
meanwhile, living a life of shifts and worries--selling his last
silver plate to feed his courtiers[622], and exchanging an endless
correspondence of remonstrances and insinuations with Soult and the
commanders of the ‘military governments’ of the North[623]. Even
from the military point of view he did not consider himself safe;
the Empecinado and other guerrillero chiefs carried their incursions
up to the very gates of Madrid; and La Mancha, from which, by the
Emperor’s orders, much cavalry had been withdrawn for the benefit of
Soult[624], was frequently raided by detachments from Blake’s Army of
Murcia. ‘À chaque instant du jour et de la nuit,’ wrote the unhappy
sovereign, ‘je suis exposé à monter à cheval pour défendre ma vie
contre les bandes exaspérées des insurgés, qui entourent Madrid:
cette ville est aux avant-postes[625].’
[621] See his letters to his wife in December 1810 and January 1811,
about his brother’s ‘mauvaises dispositions à mon égard.’
[622] He writes that at his most splendid State banquets nothing but
china is now to be seen on his table.
[623] The question of the Consuls and Soult (mentioned in an earlier
chapter) crops up again in Joseph to Berthier, Nov. 28.
[624] Napoleon to Berthier, Oct. 4, orders Digeon’s brigade of
Lahoussaye’s dragoons to cross the Sierra Morena, thus leaving the
king only four regiments of French cavalry in New Castile.
[625] Ducasse, _Correspondance_, vii. p. 361.
Meanwhile, the other government which claimed to be the legal
representative of Spanish nationality was even more truly ‘aux
avant-postes.’ The Cortes had assembled at Cadiz, where the booming
of the French cannon was perpetually heard, and where an occasional
shell from Villantroys’ celebrated mortars would plump harmlessly
into the sand of the Peninsula or the outskirts of the town itself.
The Cortes had opened its sessions on September 24, though less than
half its members had assembled. The difficulty of collecting them had
been very great, since all had to arrive by sea, and many had to come
from regions very remote, such as Asturias, Galicia, or Catalonia.
The assembly could not be called satisfactory or representative. The
scheme drawn up for its election by the commission that had sat in
the preceding winter was complicated. There was to be a deputy for
every 50,000 souls throughout Spain; but the form of selection was
indirect: the villages chose each one primary elector; the primary
electors met at the chief town of the district to choose a second
body of secondary electors; the secondary electors chose a final
committee for the whole province (_Junta provincial electoral_) and
these last, aided by the Governor, Archbishop, and Intendant of the
province, nominated the deputies. But this complicated system could
only work in the regions which were in the hands of the patriots.
Only Valencia, Murcia, Estremadura, the Balearic Isles, and Galicia
were wholly free at the moment. In Catalonia the capital, Barcelona,
and large tracts of the country were occupied by the French. In the
Asturias three-quarters of the province were held down by Bonnet.
The two Castiles, Andalusia (excepting Cadiz), Biscay, Navarre,
Leon, and Aragon were entirely or almost entirely in the hands of
the enemy. The delegates supposed to represent them were either
chosen in hole-and-corner meetings of insurgent juntas lurking in
some remote fastness, or--where even this semblance of local election
was not possible--by nomination by the Regency, or in wholly casual
assemblies of the natives of those districts who chanced to be in
Cadiz at the time. The representatives of Madrid, for example,
were chosen in this fashion by the body of exiles from that city
meeting in the spacious courtyard of a large public building[626].
The result of this informal and irregular method of choice was that
many provinces purported to be represented by deputies who had no
real local influence therein, but had chanced to commend themselves
to the insurgent juntas, or to the persons--in some cases a mere
handful--who happened to have fled from that particular region to
Cadiz. It is said that the very names, and much more the persons, of
a good many of the deputies were absolutely unknown to their supposed
constituents. Most of all was this the case with the members of
the Cortes who were supposed to represent Spanish America. It had
been decreed by the late Central Junta that the colonies formed an
integral part of the Spanish monarchy, and were therefore entitled to
representation. But the modest number of twenty-six members allotted
to them were elected at Cadiz, by a committee of Americans nominated
by the Regency from those who happened to be resident in that town.
Most of the deputies were out of touch with the people beyond the
seas, of whom they were theoretically the delegates.
[626] Argüelles, _Cortes de Cadiz_, p. 160.
This fact was specially unfortunate when the first symptoms of
discontent and sedition in Buenos Ayres, Mexico, and the Caraccas
had begun to show themselves. Though few realized it as yet, the
insurrection of Spanish America was just about to break forth. The
least foreseen of all the results of Napoleon’s aggressions in Old
Spain was that the colonies, which had been called upon to take their
part in the national war against the French, and had been promised
a share in the administration of the empire, should accept the
show of freedom and equality that was offered in a serious spirit.
The Americans demanded that they should no longer be treated as
subjects and tributaries of the mother country, but recognized as
possessing rights and interests of their own, which must be taken
into consideration when the general governance of the dominions
of Ferdinand VII was in question. And these rights and interests
included not only a claim to such self-government as other Spanish
provinces possessed, but a demand that their commercial and economic
needs should no longer be subordinated to the convenience of the
mother country. The colonies could not see why the monopoly of all
their trade should be left in the hands of the merchants of Old
Spain. They wished to traffic on their own account with Great Britain
and the United States. This claim was one which no inhabitant of Old
Spain could view with equanimity. The monopoly of South American
commerce had always been believed to be the most essential item in
the greatness of the realm. It had been preserved almost as strictly
in the eighteenth century as in the seventeenth or sixteenth. The old
_Asiento_, which gave Great Britain a minute share in that commerce,
had been conceived to be a humiliation and a disgrace to the king who
granted it. Spain had fought more than once to preserve the American
monopoly--it is only necessary to allude to the war of ‘Jenkins’s
Ear’ to show what she was prepared to face in its defence.
And now, when the mother country was in such desperate straits, the
questions of American self-government and American trade were raised
in the crudest form. Great Britain had provoked the distrust of her
Spanish allies by many of her acts, even when they were done in good
faith and with no ulterior motive. But the most irritating of all
was the request, which had been already made more than once in a
tentative fashion, for a measure of free trade with South America.
Wellington had recommended that the point should not be pressed,
when Spain was in her extremity; but it was inevitable that since
nearly all British subjects, and nearly all Americans, were desirous
to see the old barriers removed, the question should crop up again
and again. The opening of the American trade was the only return
that Spain could make for the aid that Great Britain had now been
giving her for more than two years of war. When Canning in 1809 wrote
that ‘in questions of commerce any proper occasion must be used to
recommend a more enlarged and liberal policy than has hitherto been
acted upon in Spain,’ it is easy to see what was in his mind. The
ministers in power in 1810 were mostly of the same opinion. But to
ask for free trade with America in the year when Hidalgo was making
his first rising in Mexico, and the _cabildos_ on the Rio de la Plata
were quietly substituting municipal self-government for the ancient
autocratic rule of their viceroys, was to provoke acute suspicion.
In 1806-7 Great Britain had backed Miranda and other colonial
separatists, either with the hope of getting a footing for herself
in South America, or at least with that of establishing republics
which would grant her all the commercial privileges that she asked.
The successive Spanish governments of 1808-10 could never convince
themselves that the scheme had been completely dropped, and mistook
British demands for open trade with America for a desire to sever the
discontented colonies from their mother country. The most unpopular
act of the Regency of 1810 was their decree of May 7, issued, as
all Spaniards held, in base subservience to their allies, which had
granted England and Portugal a certain limited right of exchanging
their products with the colonies, on paying the heavy customs-due of
ten and a half or fifteen and a half per cent[627]. So great was the
cry raised against it in Cadiz that the Regency was cowardly enough
to cancel it on June 22, under the pretext that it had not been
ratified in a session at which all its members were present!
[627] For details see Schepeler, iii. p. 691. The goods must also be
carried in Spanish vessels, so the grant was not a very liberal one!
But it was not the American question alone which lay as a source of
danger before the newly-assembled Cortes, nor was it the American
deputies alone who misrepresented their constituents. Speaking
in general, it may be said that the whole assembly showed a
disproportionate number of liberals, when the relative numbers of the
democratic and the conservative parties throughout Spain were taken
into consideration. The events of the next ten years were to show
that the _Serviles_, as their opponents called them, were really in a
majority in the whole country-side and in many towns. If that had not
been so, Ferdinand VII could not have restored autocratic government
with such ease when the Peninsular War was over. Reactionaries of
the blackest dye, who would have liked to restore the Inquisition,
and would have put back the press into the shackles which it had
endured before 1807, were probably in a clear majority in the nation.
The clerical interest was in many ways the mainstay of the War of
Independence, and the clergy, with very few exceptions, would gladly
have gone back to the system of the eighteenth century[628]. The
majority of the old official class sympathized with them, and the
peasantry were almost everywhere under their control. On the other
hand, the liberals, if all shades of them were reckoned together,
had a clear majority in the Cortes, both because the regions which
were properly represented in that assembly chanced to be those
in which they were most numerous, and because they had secured a
disproportionate number of the seats belonging to the lost provinces,
which had been filled up by more or less fictitious elections within
the walls of Cadiz. That town itself was the least conservative place
in Spain, and the refugees who had served as electors because they
happened to be on the spot, were not drawn from the bulk of the
population--were neither priests nor peasants,--but mainly came from
those sections of the upper and middle classes where liberal opinions
had made more progress.
[628] Liberal clergy of the type of the journalist Blanco-White
(Leucadio Doblado) were rare exceptions.
The Cortes on the whole was a democratic body: Spain, on the whole,
was reactionary. The number of those who hated Napoleon because they
regarded him as the enemy of the Church, the jailer of the Pope,
and the breaker-up of old laws, was much greater than that of those
who hated him because he was the embodiment of autocracy, and the
foe of all free self-government. Intense national pride was common
to both parties, and all could unite against a foe whose aim was
the dismemberment of Spain. But the union was made difficult by the
fact that men who had imbibed, more or less consciously, some of the
‘Principles of 1789’ had to co-operate with men who looked back on
the régime of Philip II as a Golden Age. ‘I can see no prospect of
Liberty behind the crowd of priests who everywhere stand foremost to
take the lead of our patriots. I cannot look for any direct advantage
from the feeling which prompts the present resistance to Napoleon,
as it arises chiefly from an inveterate attachment to the religious
system whence our present degradation takes source. If the course
of events enables us to attempt a political reform, it will be by
grafting the feeble shoots of Liberty upon the stock of Catholicism,
an experiment which has hitherto, and must ever, prove abortive’
wrote a desponding Liberal[629]. How could the writer of such words
and his friends work cordially in company with such fanatics as
the Estremaduran deputy who, in one of the earlier sessions of the
Cortes, proposed the astonishing motion that, in spite of all that
had happened since 1807, ‘the Inquisition remains in full possession
of its ancient authority, and can make free use of all the powers
which it has ever enjoyed in the past[630].’ There were others
who objected to the use of the dangerous word ‘constitution,’ and
even to the phrase _las leyes de España_, as implying an authority
independent of the crown[631].
[629] Doblado’s Letters, p. 392.
[630] Motion by one Francisco Maria Riesco, deputy, and formerly
Inquisitor, at Llerena in Estremadura. Argüelles’s _Las Cortes de
Cadiz_, p. 209.
[631] See below, p. 520.
When it is remembered that the form in which the Cortes had been
summoned was new and experimental, that the elections had been--even
according to that form--irregular, that no single member was
accustomed to parliamentary usages, that the parties represented in
it held views of the most divergent kinds, the wonder is not that
the assembly displayed many weaknesses, but that it did no worse.
Observers of a pessimistic frame of mind had feared that it would
break up altogether after a few stormy sittings. ‘It was too full,’
wrote the regent Lardizabal, ‘of youths, and of men who yesterday
were mere adventurers, without any practice in command, knowledge
of business, or experience of the world. Whole provinces were
represented by deputies whom they had not chosen, and were expected
to conform to a constitution, and to accept sweeping reforms, made
by men to whom they had given no mandate, faculty, or authority to
take such changes into consideration. For neither the Regency, nor
even the King, had the legal right to nominate deputies: no one could
choose them save the provinces or cities which were integral parts of
the nation, and no one could claim to represent a province save the
men to whom that same province had given powers, and instructions to
act in conformity with its wishes.’
This motley assembly, so many of whose members were of doubtful
legitimacy, held its opening session on September 24, 1810. The
meeting-place was not within the walls of Cadiz itself, but in the
large suburban town of La Isla, in the centre of the great island
of Leon, which forms the outwork of the city. It was hoped that
the six miles which separated its sitting-place from Cadiz would
prevent interruption by popular demonstrations, such as had been so
pernicious to the French chamber during the Revolution. The Cortes
had as their home the large but bare theatre of San Fernando, which
had been roughly fitted up with benches and tribunes. After high
mass had been celebrated by the old Cardinal Bourbon, the only male
member of the royal family who was not in captivity[632], the Regency
declared the session opened, and then withdrew, after a brief speech
by the Senior Regent, the Bishop of Orense, who bade the assembly
constitute itself in due form and elect its president and secretaries.
[632] He was of the same branch as the Countess of Chinchon,
Godoy’s wife, being son of Luis, youngest child of Philip V, by a
quasi-morganatic marriage with a lady of the name of Vallabriga.
This was done with no delay; the president chosen was a Catalan,
Ramón Lazaro de Dou, while the two secretaries were Evaristo Perez de
Castro and Manuel Lujan. Both of them were well known to entertain
Liberal opinions, and their choice marked the predominance of their
party in the Cortes. Sitting till midnight was long past, the
assembly passed six decrees drawn up by Muñoz Torrero, one of the
few clerical deputies who held Liberal views, and Manuel Lujan. By
these the Cortes declared itself in possession of supreme power in
the State, but resolved that, of the three branches of authority--the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial--it intended to take
only the first-named under its own charge, handing over the executive
to the late Regency, and the judicial to the ordinary courts of law.
The Regency should be responsible to the Cortes for all its acts of
administration, and liable to be called to account. It was ordered
to make an instant oath of obedience to the assembly, ‘recognizing
the sovereignty of the nation represented by the deputies of this
general and extraordinary Cortes.’ This Castaños and the other
regents did with an ill grace, all save the Bishop of Orense, who
misliked the oath, contending that its terms spoke of the nation
as being sovereign in its own right, without consideration of the
King’s indefeasible majesty[633]. He would not swear, and so vacated
his place. He did not lose much by his early dismissal, for on
October 28 the Cortes abruptly deposed his four colleagues--Castaños,
Lardizabal, Saavedra, and Escaño--and replaced them by a new Regency
of three members. These were Joaquim Blake, that most unlucky of
generals; Admiral Cisgar, then commanding the Cartagena squadron,
who passed as an able administrator; and an obscure naval captain,
Pedro Agar, of whom little was known save that he was American born,
and might, therefore, theoretically represent the colonies. The
change in regents was decidedly for the worse as far as character and
ability went. Apparently the Cortes were jealous of an administration
whose power was older than their own, and had not originally been
created by them. They wished to have an executive more entirely
dependent on themselves. Some of the Liberals pretended that the
old regents were plotting to hold a sort of ‘Pride’s Purge’ of the
Cortes, and to restore themselves to power. But of this no proof
was ever given[634]. Considering the difficult times which they had
passed through, and their well-intentioned if rather feeble attempt
to serve the state, Castaños and his colleagues deserved a better
fate than arbitrary dismissal, without thanks, and with a tacit
accusation of treason laid to their charge.
[633] ‘Que la nación era soberana _con el rey_, desde luego prestaría
el juramento pedido. Pero si se entendía que la nación era soberana
_sin el rey_, y soberana de su mismo soberano, nunca se sometería á
tal doctrina.’ See more of his argument in Toreno, ii. 225.
[634] Compare Toreno’s insinuation against the Regent Lardizabal (ii.
213), to whom he ascribes a definite plot, with Arteche’s defence and
eulogy of the late Regency, ix. 109-11.
Between the time of the first assembly of the Cortes and the change
in the Regency an infinite number of subjects had been dealt with.
The Liberal majority, led by Agustin Argüelles, had decreed liberty
of the Press in all political discussions, but very illogically
refused it for discussions on matters of religion. They had abolished
all feudal rights and privileges of nobility. They passed a decree
of amnesty for all rebels in America who should lay down their
arms, and proposed many projects for improving the position of the
Colonies, few of which, unfortunately, happened to bear any relation
to the chief grievances under which the South Americans conceived
themselves to be labouring. The insurrection still went on, and,
though the mother country was placed in such a desperate condition,
troops were actually withdrawn from the Murcian army to sail with
General Elio, who was directed to restore order at Buenos Ayres and
in the provinces of the Rio de la Plata. Discussions continued,
with much heat and a considerable amount of eloquence, on many
other points, during the early days of the Junta. The subjects of
debate were generally constitutional, occasionally financial. It was
worthy to be observed that the two topics on which all the deputies
rallied together were the question of opposition to the French, and
the question of the defence of their own sovereign rights. Even the
majority of the _Serviles_ would join with the Liberals whenever any
doubt was raised with regard to the right of the Cortes to arrogate
to itself the title of Majesty or the attributes of supreme power.
When, for example, the Bishop of Orense refused to take the oath of
obedience, several clericals of most reactionary views took part
against him; and when a few weeks later the Marqués del Palacio,
named as a deputy-regent during the absence of Blake, also displayed
reluctance to swear to the same form on similar grounds, he did not
receive the report that he had expected from the reactionaries.
Indeed, he was put under arrest for some time, without, as it seems,
any attempt to protect him being made by the _Serviles_. Like the
Bishop of Orense, he ended by swallowing his scruples and accepting
the prescribed formula[635].
[635] Toreno, ii. pp. 222-3.
A similar desire to assert its own absolute supremacy impelled the
Cortes to refuse to countenance two dynastic intrigues which came
from different quarters. The eldest daughter of Charles IV, Carlotta,
Princess of the Brazils and wife of the Regent João of Portugal,
was the nearest of kin to Ferdinand VII who had escaped Napoleon’s
claws in 1808. She was of opinion that she had a good right to
expect the Regency during her brother’s captivity at Valençay, and
her agents repeatedly urged her claims, both during the days of the
first Regency and after the Cortes had assembled. Sousa-Holstein,
the Portuguese ambassador, naturally lent them his aid, and she
had Spanish partisans, though few of them were persons of good
reputation. Yet, by constant persuasion and promises, Carlotta’s
representatives actually succeeded in inducing great numbers of the
deputies to pledge themselves to push her interests. It is said
that, at one time or another, a full half of the members had given
the intriguers encouragement. But to do this, and to make a formal
attempt to pass a decree conferring the Regency on her, were very
different things. When overt action was urged by her agents, or their
partisans in the Cortes, nothing came of the attempt. The assembly
was naturally unwilling to surrender its own sovereignty, and to
introduce a court and its intrigues into Cadiz. It must be added
that João of Portugal had no liking for his wife’s scheme, that
Wellington saw its disadvantages[636], and that the great bulk of
the Spaniards would have resented the whole affair, as a Portuguese
intrigue, if it had ever been laid before the nation as a definite
proposal.
[636] See Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Nov. 4, 1810:--‘If the
Princess of the Brazils be the person appointed regent, the Court
will be inundated with intriguers of all nations, and attended by
other evils.’
The second dynastic scheme which was running its course at this time
was engineered by another branch of the Spanish royal house. The
restless and unscrupulous Queen Caroline of Sicily could not forget
that if Carlotta of Portugal was the nearest relative of the captive
King, yet her husband Ferdinand was his nearest male kinsman, save
the princes in Napoleon’s hands. She availed herself of this fact
to urge that one of her children would be a very suitable person to
be entrusted with power in Spain, and thought of her younger son
Prince Leopold as a possible candidate for the Regency. But since he
had not the necessary reputation or age, the Queen soon fell back
upon her son-in-law Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, the exiled son
of the infamous Philippe Égalité. He had not only a good military
record for his services at Jemappes and elsewhere in the early
Belgian campaigns, but was universally known as a man of ability.
Unfortunately, he had fought on the Republican side in 1792--a thing
hard to forget, and certain to cause suspicion: and his ability was
always displayed for purposes of self-interest, and savoured of
unscrupulousness.
Nevertheless, Orleans had already made overtures to the old Regency
in the spring of 1810, and had been promised by them a command on the
borders of Catalonia. They had failed to keep the pledge, and he now
appeared at Cadiz, and wished to present himself before the Cortes
and plead his cause. He took small profit thereby, for the assembly
regarded him and his relatives as suspicious persons, refused to
give him an audience when he presented himself before its doors, and
politely but firmly insisted that he should return to Sicily in a
few days--an order which he was forced to obey. ‘Whether it was that
he was a Frenchman, though a Bourbon, or whether it was that he had
once been a Republican, though he had ceased to be one, or whether
it was that he was a prince of the royal house, and therefore
distasteful to the newly-assembled Cortes, who were secretly inclined
to democratic views, the majority viewed him with disfavour[637].’ On
October 3 he set sail for Palermo.
[637] See Galiano, quoted by Arteche, ix. 76.
At the end of 1810 we leave the Cortes still indulging in fiery
constitutional debates, still busy in asserting its own supreme
power, and curbing many attempts at self-assertion in the new Regency
which it had created. With the English government it was not on the
best of terms: though it decreed the erection of a statue to George
III as the friend and deliverer of Spain--a monument which (it need
hardly be said) was never erected--it was very slow to seek or
follow the advice of the allied power. It clamoured for subsidies,
but refused the opening of the South American trade--the only return
that could be given for them. Money in hard gold or silver Great
Britain could no longer supply--for the years 1810-11 were those
when the paper-issues of the Bank were our sole currency; cash had
almost disappeared, and could only be procured by offering six pounds
or more in notes for five guineas. But the Spaniards did not want
paper, but gifts or loans in gold or silver. They got no more of
the precious metals--Great Britain had none to spare, and found it
almost impossible even to procure dollars to pay Wellington’s army in
Portugal. All that was given after 1809 was arms and munitions of war.
English observers in the Peninsula were not well pleased with the
first months of the rule of the Cortes. ‘The natural course of
all popular assemblies,’ wrote Wellington to his brother, Henry
Wellesley, now minister at Cadiz, ‘and of the Spanish Cortes among
others, is to adopt democratic principles, and to vest all the
powers of the State in their own body. This assembly must take care
that they do not run in that tempting course, as the wishes of the
nation are decidedly for monarchy. Inclination to any other form of
government would immediately deprive them of the confidence of the
people, and they would become a worse government, and more impotent,
because more numerous, than the old Central Junta.’ A few weeks later
he doubted whether even a Regency under Carlotta of Portugal, with
all its disadvantages, would not be better than mere democracy[638].
[638] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, from Cartaxo, Nov. 21, 1810.
Vaughan, on the spot at Cadiz, gave quite a different view of the
situation, but one equally unfavourable to the Cortes as a governing
power. ‘It is full of priests, who (united with the Catalans) are
for preserving the old routine, and adverse to everything that can
give energy and vigour to the operation of government. Fanaticism
and personal interest direct their opinions.... Be assured that the
Cortes is, as at present constituted, anything but revolutionary or
Jacobinical.... If there is not soon some new spirit infused into it,
it will become an overgrown Junta, meddling with every paltry detail
of police, and neglecting the safety of the country--and the Regency
will be content to reign (very badly) over Cadiz and the Isla[639].’
[639] Charles Vaughan to Charles Stuart, Feb. 27, 1811.
There was much truth in both these verdicts, though Vaughan
underrated the force of self-interest in driving a popular assembly
to claim all power for itself, while Wellington underrated the
dead-weight of clerical conservatism, which was the restraint upon
that tendency. Both were right in asserting that, whatever the Cortes
might be, the mass of the nation had no wish to set out on the path
of Jacobinism. They both perceived the danger that the Cortes might
turn itself into a constitutional debating society, and at the same
time prevent any really efficient executive from being established.
Such was its actual fate. Except that Spain now possessed a
governing authority which, with all its faults, had infinitely more
pretension to claim a legal mandate from the people than any of
its predecessors, the situation was not greatly changed. From the
military point of view, as we shall see in the next volume, the
aspect of the Peninsula was in no degree improved. The same blunders
that had marked the administration of the old Provincial Juntas, of
the Supreme Central Junta, and of the first Regency, continued to
exhibit themselves under the rule of the Cortes.
APPENDICES
I
THE SPANISH FORCES AT THE SIEGE OF GERONA
The original garrison under the command of Alvarez consisted of the
following units. The first column gives the strength on May 6, the
second the number that remained on Dec. 11, 1809, the day of the
surrender.
Regiment of Ultonia (three batts.) 800 250
Regiment of Borbon (three batts.) 1,300 360
Voluntarios de Barcelona, 2nd batt. 1,125 378
1st battalion of the Miqueletes of Vich 600 250
1st & 2nd batts. ” Gerona 1,120 380
Squadron of San Narciso 108 50
Regular Artillery 278 140
Men of the 2nd batt. of the Miqueletes of Gerona
drafted into the artillery 240 100
Sailors drafted into the artillery 130 90
Sappers 22 10
----- -----
Total of the original garrison 5,723 2,008
_Reinforcements received August 17_:
Miquelete battalion of Cervera 500 320
Draft for the 1st battalion of Vich 300 200
Draft for the 2nd battalion of Gerona 100 50
_Reinforcements brought in by Garcia Conde on Sept. 1_:
Regiment of Baza (2 batts.) 1,368 1,074
1st and 2nd Miqueletes of Talarn 900 390
2nd Miqueletes of Vich 300 100
Picked companies of Santa Fé, Iliberia,
Voluntarios de Tarragona 180 106
----- -----
3,648 2,240
Add 1,100 irregulars of the ‘Crusade.’ Losses unknown.
Of 9,371 men engaged first and last in the defence, only 4,248
survived.
II
THE FRENCH FORCES AT THE SIEGE OF GERONA
The following were the losses of the three divisions which conducted
the siege of Gerona during its first three months, down to Sept. 15,
1809:--
(1) REILLE’S Original Siege Corps:
_Strength on_ _Strength on_
Division Verdier: _June 1._ _Sept. 15._ _Losses._
French Brigade: _Rank & file._ _Rank & file._
32nd Léger (one batt.) 846 489 357
16th Line (one batt.) 730 324 406
2nd ” ” 490 205 285
56th ” ” 684 449 235
German Brigade:
Würzburg (two batts.) 1,519 649 870
1st of Berg (two batts.) 1,310 705 605
2nd ” ” 1,313 604 709
Division Morio:
2nd Westphalians (two batts.) 1,009 340 669
3rd ” ” ” 1,446 491 955
4th ” ” ” 832 534 298
4th Light Infantry (one batt.) 300 269 31
Division Lecchi:
Velites of the Italian Guard 461 50 411
5th Italian Line (two batts.) 820 280 540
1st Neapolitans (two batts.) 765 172 593
2nd ” ” ” 1,119 322 797
------ ----- -----
13,644 5,883 7,761
Of these 6,666 were returned as sick or wounded, and 1,495 as dead or
missing. Probably 300 were deserters.
The Artillery counted on the first date (June 1): _Officers._ _Men._
From the 7th corps 11 961
Siege-Train from France 36 1,362
The engineers and sappers were 12 314
The cavalry (28th chasseurs, and five squadrons of
Italian horse) 51 771
--- -----
110 3,408
Adding these figures to those of the infantry the total of the Siege
Army was 17,162 men.
(2) The Covering Army, under ST. CYR in person, consisted on June 1
of the following troops:
SOUHAM’S Division:
Brigade Bessières: _Men._
1st Léger (three batts.) 1,965
3rd ” (one batt.) 639
24th Dragoons (three squadrons) 597
Brigade Espert:
42nd Line (three batts.) 2,406
67th ” (one batt.) 644
PINO’S Division:
Brigade Mazzuchelli:
1st Italian Léger (three batts.) 1,359
4th Italian Line ” 1,580
Brigade Fontane:
2nd Italian Léger (three batts.) 1,507
6th Italian Line ” 1,427
7th Italian ” (one batt.) 477
Cavalry Brigade Palombini (Italian Chasseurs
and Dragoons, six squadrons) 912
CHABOT’S Division:
7th Line (two batts.) 1,034
93rd ” (one batt.) 687
3rd Provisional Chasseurs 498
------
Total of the Covering Army 15,732
On Dec. 31 the Siege Army showed 6,343 infantry, 2,390 engineers,
artillery, &c. The Covering Army had still 11,666 men. But two
battalions and some drafts had joined from France, so that the total
loss was more than that indicated by these figures.
III
DEL PARQUE’S ARMY IN THE TAMAMES-ALBA DE TORMES CAMPAIGN, OCT.-NOV.
1809
MORNING STATE OF NOVEMBER 20
_Officers._ _Men._
Vanguard Division, Major-General Martin de la Carrera:
*Principe (three batts.), *Saragossa (three batts.),
*1st of Catalonia, *2nd of Catalonia, *Gerona,
*Barbastro, ‡Escolares de Leon, ‡Vittoria, ‡Monforte
de Lemos, ‡Voluntarios de la Muerte, one battery
field artillery 363 7,050
1st Division, Major-General Francisco Xavier Losada:
†Granaderos Provinciales de Galicia (two batts.),
*Leon (two batts.), *1st and 2nd of Aragon,
*Voluntarios de la Corona (two batts.), ‡Regimento
del General, ‡1st and 2nd of La Union, ‡Betanzos
(two batts.), ‡Orense, ‡Compañía de Guardias
Nacionales, one battery field artillery 351 7,985
2nd Division, Major-General Conde de Belveder:
*Rey (1st and 2nd batts.), *Zamora (1st and 2nd
batts.), *Seville (1st and 2nd batts.), *Toledo
(1st and 3rd batts.), *Hibernia (two batts.),
*Voluntarios de Navarra, ‡Santiago, ‡Lovera (two
batts.), one battery field artillery 344 6,415
3rd Division [Asturians], Major-General Francisco Ballasteros:
*Navarra (three batts.), *Princesa (two batts.),
†Oviedo, ‡Covadonga, ‡Villaviciosa, ‡Candas y
Luanco, Castropol, ‡Pravia, ‡Cangas de Tineo,
‡Grado, ‡Infiesto, ‡Lena, one battery field
artillery 368 9,623
5th Division [Leonese], Brigadier-General Marquis de Castrofuerte:
‡Tiradores de Ciudad Rodrigo, ‡2nd of Ciudad Rodrigo,
‡Voluntarios de Fernando VII, †Leon, †Logroño,
†Toro, †Valladolid, one battery field artillery 245 5,912
Head-Quarters’ Guard: Batallón del General 40 897
[N.B.--The 4th Division, Galician troops under Mahy
about 7,000 strong, and the garrison of Ciudad
Rodrigo, 3,817 bayonets, were never brought up to
the front.]
Cavalry Division, the Prince of Anglona:
*Borbon, *Sagunto, ‡Granaderos de Llerena 83 1,053
(With only 868 horses.)
*Reyna, *Provisional Regiment[640], ‡Cazadores de
Ciudad Rodrigo (incomplete units, lately reformed),
with one horse-artillery battery 46 500
[640] This Provisional regiment received the name of ‘2nd of
Algarve’ in December.
The artillerymen and a few companies of sappers are
included in the divisional totals.
----- ------
Total 1,840 39,435
From this total of 41,275 men there were to be deducted, on Nov. 20,
sick 5,601, absent 1,573, detached (from the 5th Division) 1,279, so
that the total of efficients under arms was 32,822.
* Old line regiments. † Old militia regiments. ‡ New levies.
IV
FRENCH LOSSES AT TAMAMES, OCT. 18, 1809
The detailed return of the losses of the 6th Corps at Tamames has
not been preserved. Marchand merely states that he lost 1,300 men.
But the subjoined list of losses of officers, taken from Martinien’s
invaluable tables, shows sufficiently well which were the units that
were hard hit:--
1st Division: _Killed._ _Wounded._
Brigade Maucune:
{6th Léger 1 6
{69th Ligne 2 4
Brigade Marcognet:
{39th Ligne 4 12
{76th Ligne 7 15
-- --
14 37
2nd Division:
Brigade Labassée:
{25th Léger 3 8
{27th Ligne - 2
59th Ligne - 3
Cavalry:
15th Dragoons - 2
15th Chasseurs 1 1
État-Major - 2
-- --
4 18
Total 18 killed, 55 wounded.
At the average rate of 21 men hit per officer, which prevailed during
the Peninsular War, this total of 73 officers ought to imply a total
loss of about 1,533 men. But Marchand’s 1,300 is probably correct.
V
THE PARTITION OF THE ARMY OF ESTREMADURA IN SEPTEMBER 1809
[N.B.--‘bon’ is Spanish contraction for _batallón_.]
The way in which the old army of Cuesta was divided in September 1809
has never been worked out; nor has the composition of Areizaga’s
army of La Mancha, after it had been joined by the Estremaduran
reinforcements, ever been reconstructed. A search in the Madrid War
Office, in which I was assisted by the kindness of Captain Figueras,
has produced the following two documents:--
(1) A list of Albuquerque’s army without any figures of strength save
the general total, as follows:
Cuerpos que quedaron constituendo el Cuerpo de Ejercito de
Estremadura, de 12,000 hombres. Oct. 1, 1809.
*Reales Guardias Walonas (4º batallón). [Late in garrison at Badajoz.]
‡Osuna (2 batallones). [Late of Iglesias’s Division.]
‡Velez Malaga (3 batallones). ” ”
‡Voluntarios Extrangeros (1 bon). ” ”
†Provincial de Burgos ” ” ”
‡Tiradores de Merida ” [Late of Zayas’s Division.]
†Provincial de Truxillo ” ” ”
‡2ndo de Antequera ” [Late of Portago’s Division.]
†Provincial de Badajoz ” ” ”
‡Leales de Fernando VII (2 bones). [Late in garrison at Badajoz.]
‡Voluntarios de Plasencia (1 bon) ” ”
‡Voluntarios de Zafra ” ” ”
‡Voluntarios de La Serena ” ” ”
Caballería--Comandante General el Brigadier Baron de Carondelet.
*Calatrava, *Villaviciosa, *Voluntarios de España, ‡Cazadores
Perseguidores de Andalucia, ‡Cazadores de Sevilla.
*Borbon, ‡Cazadores de Llerena and *Sagunto have marched for Ciudad
Rodrigo under the Prince of Anglona.
(2) A second document gives, as having marched under Eguia to join
the Army of the Centre in La Mancha, the following corps:
*Real Marina (1º y 2º batallones). [Late of Bassecourt’s Division.]
*Africa (3º bon). ” ”
*Murcia (1º y 2º bones). ” ”
*Reyna (1º bon). ” ”
*2ond de Mallorca (1º bon). [Late of Iglesias’s Division.]
*Cantabria (1º, 2º, 3º bones). [Late of Zayas’s Division.]
*Badajoz (1º, 2º bones). [Late of Portago’s Division.]
†Provincial de Toledo (1 bon). ” ”
*Cazadores de Barbastro (1 bon). [Late of the Vanguard Division.]
*Voluntarios de Valencia (2º bon). ” ”
‡Tiradores de Estremadura (1 bon). ” ”
Provincial de Plasencia
Caballería
*Reales Carabineros, *Rey, *Reyna, *Infante, *Pavia, *Almanza, *1º y
2º Usares de Estremadura, ‡Cazadores de Madrid, ‡Cazadores de Toledo,
‡Carabineros y Lanceros de Estremadura.
30 piezas de Artillería.
This leaves unaccounted for, of Cuesta’s old army, the following
corps: *2º de Voluntarios de Cataluña, *Campo Mayor, ‡Cazadores de
Valencia y Albuquerque, ‡Canarias, †Provincial de Guadix, *Irlanda
(two batts.), *Jaen, ‡3º de Sevilla, ‡2º de Voluntarios de Madrid,
‡Voluntarios de la Corona, †Provincial de Sigüenza, Granaderos
Provinciales.
Of these Jaen, Corona, Madrid, and the grenadiers certainly went with
Eguia to La Mancha. Irlanda went to Del Parque at Ciudad Rodrigo, 2º
de Cataluña went to Cadiz to recruit. There are left Campo Mayor,
Canarias, 3º de Sevilla, Provincial de Sigüenza, Provincial de
Guadix, Cazadores de Valencia y Albuquerque. Probably they formed the
division of 6,000 men which the Junta is said to have deducted from
the army of Estremadura for its own protection, and to have withdrawn
to the borders of Andalusia in September. At any rate we find in
November Campo Mayor, Canarias, and Provincial de Guadix serving
again in the army of Albuquerque. But I cannot be sure that some of
the others did not accompany Eguia (like Jaen and Corona), though not
mentioned in the document no. 2.
* Old regular units. † Old militia units. ‡ New levies.
VI
AREIZAGA’S ARMY IN THE OCAÑA CAMPAIGN
No detailed ‘morning state’ of this army has been preserved, but the
names and gross totals of the divisions are on record in documents at
the Madrid War Office. So far as I can make it out, the organization
of the army must have been nearly as follows:--
INFANTRY DIVISION
Vanguard Division, General José Zayas: _Officers._ _Men._
Voluntarios de Valencia, 2nd of Majorca, Provincial
de Plasencia, Voluntarios de España, Granaderos
Provinciales, Cantabria (seven batts.) 210 5,768
1st Division, General L. Lacy:
Burgos, 1st of España, Provincial de Cordova, 1st of
Loxa, Alcala, 1st of Seville, Provincial de Chinchilla
(nine batts.) 328 7,420
2nd Division, General Gaspar Vigodet:
Corona, Ordenes Militares, 1st of Guadix, Ronda,
Alcazar, Ciudad Real (nine batts.) 288 6,797
3rd Division, General P. Giron:
1st and 2nd Spanish Guards, 2nd of Cordova, Bailen,
Provincial de Jaen, Provincial de Toledo (eight batts.) 200 5,034
4th Division, General Francisco Castejon:
1st of Malaga, 5th of Seville, 2nd of Loxa, Bujalance,
Cazadores de Velez Malaga, Xeres, 3rd of Cordova
(eight batts.) 236 6,151
5th Division, General T. Zerain:
Cazadores de Barbastro, 2nd of España, 2nd of Seville,
2nd of Madrid, Provincial de Granada, 3rd Walloon
Guards (seven batts.) 209 5,677
6th Division, General N. Jacomé:
Badajoz, Provincial de Malaga, Tiradores de Estremadura,
Jaen, Provincial de Ecija (?), 4th of Seville (?),
Alpujarras (?) (nine batts.?) 312 7,325
7th Division, Brigadier-General F. Copons:
Murcia, Real Marina, Africa, Reyna (six batts.) 197 4,927
Troops not included in any division:--Granaderos del
General, Compañía de Buen Orden, Compañías Sueltas -- 778
------ ------
1,980 49,877
CAVALRY
Commanded by General Manuel Freire.
1st Division, Brigadier-General Juan Bernuy: }
Rey, Infante, Voluntarios de Madrid, Almanza, Carabineros }
y Lanceros de Estremadura }
2nd Division, Brigadier José Rivas: }
Cazadores de Toledo, Pavia, 1st and 2nd Hussars of Estremadura } 5,766
3rd Division, Brigadier Miguel March: }
Montesa, Reyna, Santiago, Principe, Cordova, Alcantara }
4th Division, Colonel V. Osorio: }
Cazadores de Granada, Granaderos de Fernando VII, Farnesio, }
Lusitania, España }
60 guns with artillerymen, about 1,500
Sappers, &c., no figures given, perhaps 600
------
General Total 59,723
The materials from which the above organization has been
reconstructed are: (1) Rolls of Venegas’s army, before it was joined
by Eguia’s reinforcements. (2) Roll of the reinforcements led by
Eguia (printed in Appendix No. V). (3) Gross totals of each division,
without list of their component battalions, preserved in the Madrid
War Office. (4) A morning state of the army taken on Dec. 1: in
this the divisions of Lacy and Zayas are amalgamated, and that of
Jacomé has disappeared, its wrecks having been distributed among the
remaining six divisions. (5) The regimental annals in the Conde de
Clonard’s great history of the Spanish army. Unfortunately this only
serves for the regular regiments, there being no record of the fates
of the militia battalions or the newly-raised volunteer regiments.
I am specially uncertain about the Cavalry and the 6th Division
(Jacomé), which seems to have been composed of those Estremaduran
units which had not been organized as the ‘Vanguard’ and ‘7th
Division.’ But it almost certainly had some Andalusian regiments
added. I mark them with a (?).
VII
THE FRENCH ARMY OF SPAIN ON JAN. 15, 1810
FROM A DOCUMENT IN THE ARCHIVES NATIONAUX AT PARIS
-----------------------++-------------------++---------+---------+---------++---------
||Present under Arms.|| | | ||
|+------------+------+|Detached.| Sick. |Prisoners|| Total.
||Officers.| Men. || | | ||
-----------------------++---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
1st CORPS (MARSHAL || | || | | ||
VICTOR): || | || | | ||
1st DIVISION (Ruffin) || | || | | ||
at Almagro: || | || | | ||
9th Léger, 24th || | || | | ||
Line, 96th Line || | || | | ||
(3 batts. each) || 120 | 4,306 || 96 | 991 | -- || 5,513
|| | || | | ||
2nd DIVISION (Darricau)|| | || | | ||
at Daymiel: || | || | | ||
16th Léger, 8th Line,|| | || | | ||
45th Line, 54th || | || | | ||
Line (2 batts. || | || | | ||
each) || 15 | 5,744 || 287 | 1,893 | 29 || 8,110
|| | || | | ||
3rd DIVISION (Villatte)|| | || | | ||
at Membrilla: || | || | | ||
27th Léger, 63rd || | || | | ||
Line, 94th Line, || | || | | ||
95th Line (3 batts.|| | || | | ||
each) || 21 | 6,124 || 156 | 589 | 3 || 7,087
|| | || | | ||
LIGHT CAVALRY BRIGADE || | || | | ||
(Beaumont) at || | || | | ||
Villanueva de los || | || | | ||
Infantes: || | || | | ||
2nd Hussars, 5th || | || | | ||
Chasseurs || 45 | 778 || 254 | 27 | 23 || 1,127
|| | || | | ||
DIVISION OF DRAGOONS || | || | | ||
(Latour-Maubourg) at || | || | | ||
El Moral: || | || | | ||
1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, || | || | | ||
14th, 26th Dragoons|| 96 | 2,164 || 633 | 76 | 61 || 3,030
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY AND TRAIN || 33 | 1,747 || 252 | 144 | 2 || 2,178
DETACHMENTS on the || | || | | ||
march to join || 4 | 1,019 || -- | -- | -- || 1,023
|| | || | | ||
ÉTAT-MAJOR || 112 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 112
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Corps Total || 782 | 21,882 || 1,678 | 3,720 | 118 || 28,180
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
2nd CORPS (GENERAL || | || | | ||
HEUDELET, vice || | || | | ||
SOULT): || | || | | ||
|| | || | | ||
1st DIVISION (Merle) at|| | || | | ||
Talavera: || | || | | ||
2nd Léger, 36th Line,|| | || | | ||
4th Léger, 15th || | || | | ||
Line (3 batts. || | || | | ||
each) || 231 | 5,718 || 238 | 660 | -- || 6,847
|| | || | | ||
2nd DIVISION (Heudelet)|| | || | | ||
at Talavera: || | || | | ||
17th Léger, 47th, || | || | | ||
70th, 86th Line (3 || | || | | ||
batts. each), 31st || | || | | ||
Léger (4 batts.) || 290 | 7,035 || 227 | 920 | -- || 8,472
|| | || | | ||
LIGHT CAVALRY DIVISION || | || | | ||
(Soult): || | || | | ||
1st Hussars, 22nd || | || | | ||
Chasseurs, 8th || | || | | ||
Dragoons, Chasseurs|| | || | | ||
Hanovriens || 79 | 787 || 191 | 36 | -- || 1,093
|| | || | | ||
DIVISION OF DRAGOONS || | || | | ||
(Lahoussaye): || | || | | ||
17th, 18th, 19th, || | || | | ||
27th Dragoons || 58 | 1,171 || 242 | 66 | 8 || 1,545
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY, TRAIN, AND || | || | | ||
ENGINEERS || 15 | 664 || 71 | 44 | -- || 794
|| | || | | ||
ÉTAT-MAJOR || 79 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 79
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Corps Total || 752 | 15,375 || 969 | 1,726 | 8 || 18,830
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
|| | || | | ||
3rd CORPS (GENERAL || | || | | ||
SUCHET): || | || | | ||
1st DIVISION (Laval) at|| | || | | ||
Montreal: || | || | | ||
14th and 44th Line, || | || | | ||
2nd of the Vistula || | || | | ||
(2 batts. each) || | || | | ||
[3rd of the Vistula|| | || | | ||
absent and not || | || | | ||
counted] || 119 | 4,171 || 280 | 290 | 488 || 5,348
|| | || | | ||
2nd DIVISION (Musnier) || | || | | ||
at Alcañiz: || | || | | ||
114th, 115th, 121st || | || | | ||
Line (3 batts. || | || | | ||
each), 1st of the || | || | | ||
Vistula (2 batts.) || 203 | 6,970 || 212 | 813 | 267 || 8,465
|| | || | | ||
3rd DIVISION (Habert) || | || | | ||
at Fraga: || | || | | ||
5th Léger, 116th Line|| | || | | ||
(2 batts. each), || | || | | ||
117th Line (3 || | || | | ||
batts.) || 136 | 4,193 || 8 | -- | -- || 4,757
|| | || | | ||
CAVALRY BRIGADE || | || | | ||
(Boussard): || | || | | ||
4th Hussars, 13th || | || | | ||
Cuirassiers || 77 | 1,822 || 229 | 44 | -- || 2,172
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY, TRAIN, AND || | || | | ||
ENGINEERS || 28 | 1,179 || -- | 66 | -- || 1,273
|| | || | | ||
GARRISON TROOPS at || | || | | ||
Tudela, Saragossa, || | || | | ||
Jaca, &c., including || | || | | ||
the 3rd of the || | || | | ||
Vistula and 3 batts. || | || | | ||
of Chasseurs des || | || | | ||
Montagnes || 132 | 4,030 || 187 | 186 | -- || 4,535
|| | || | | ||
ÉTAT-MAJOR || 80 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 80
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Corps Total || 775 | 22,365 || 916 | 1,819 | 755 || 26,630
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
|| | || | | ||
4th CORPS (GENERAL || | || | | ||
SEBASTIANI): || | || | | ||
1st DIVISION: || | || | | ||
58th Line (3 batts.) || 57 | 1,573 || 98 | 550 | 1 || 2,279
[28th, 32nd, 75th || | || | | ||
Line left at || | || | | ||
Madrid] || -- | -- || -- | -- | -- || --
|| | || | | ||
2nd DIVISION (Laval): || | || | | ||
9 German batts. || | || | | ||
(absent at Segovia,|| | || | | ||
on march to Bayonne|| | || | | ||
with the prisoners || | || | | ||
of Ocaña) || -- | -- || -- | -- | -- || --
|| | || | | ||
3rd DIVISION (Werlé) at|| | || | | ||
Ocaña: || | || | | ||
4th, 7th, 9th Poles || | || | | ||
(2 batts. each) || 130 | 4,679 || 112 | 1,177 | 50 || 6,148
|| | || | | ||
LIGHT CAVALRY BRIGADE || | || | | ||
(Perreymond) at || | || | | ||
Ocaña: || | || | | ||
10th and 27th || | || | | ||
Chasseurs, and || | || | | ||
Polish Lancers || 62 | 1,289 || 390 | 89 | 109 || 1,939
|| | || | | ||
DIVISION OF DRAGOONS || | || | | ||
(Milhaud) at Velez: || | || | | ||
5th, 12th, 16th, || | || | | ||
20th, 21st Dragoons|| 104 | 1,617 || 250 | 216 | 128 || 2,315
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY, TRAIN, AND || | || | | ||
ENGINEERS || 14 | 555 || 20 | 45 | -- || 634
|| | || | | ||
ÉTAT-MAJOR || 45 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 45
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Corps Total || 412 | 9,713 || 870 | 2,077 | 288 || 13,360
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
|| | || | | ||
5th CORPS (MARSHAL || | || | | ||
MORTIER): || | || | | ||
1st DIVISION (Girard) || | || | | ||
at El Moral: || | || | | ||
34th, 40th, 64th, || | || | | ||
88th Line (3 batts.|| | || | | ||
each) || 201 | 6,839 || 228 | 1,683 | -- || 8,951
|| | || | | ||
2nd DIVISION (Gazan) at|| | || | | ||
El Moral: || | || | | ||
21st and 28th Léger, || | || | | ||
100th and 103rd || | || | | ||
Line (3 batts. || | || | | ||
each) || 219 | 6,414 || 212 | 1,432 | 10 || 8,287
|| | || | | ||
CAVALRY DIVISION || | || | | ||
(Marisy) at || | || | | ||
Granatuela: || | || | | ||
10th Hussars, 21st || | || | | ||
Chasseurs, 13th and|| | || | | ||
22nd Dragoons || 81 | 1,458 || 391 | 411 | 11 || 2,352
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY AND TRAIN || 17 | 741 || 50 | 135 | 3 || 946
|| | || | | ||
PROVISIONAL REGIMENT of|| | || | | ||
2 squadrons each of || | || | | ||
13th and 22nd || | || | | ||
Dragoons, on march to|| | || | | ||
join their corps || 31 | 557 || -- | -- | -- || 588
|| | || | | ||
ÉTAT-MAJOR || 54 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 54
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Corps Total || 603 | 16,009 || 881 | 3,661 | 24 || 21,178
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
|| | || | | ||
6th CORPS (MARSHAL || | || | | ||
NEY): || | || | | ||
1st DIVISION (Marchand)|| | || | | ||
at Ledesma: || | || | | ||
6th Léger (2 batts.),|| | || | | ||
39th, 69th, 76th || | || | | ||
Line (3 batts. || | || | | ||
each) || 163 | 5,908 || 31 | 943 | 132 || 7,177
|| | || | | ||
2nd DIVISION (Mermet) || | || | | ||
at Alba de Tormes: || | || | | ||
25th Léger (2 || | || | | ||
batts.), 27th and || | || | | ||
59th Line (3 batts.|| | || | | ||
each), 50th Line || | || | | ||
(2 batts.) || 201 | 6,656 || 10 | 714 | 4 || 7,585
|| | || | | ||
3rd DIVISION (Loison) || | || | | ||
on the march: || | || | | ||
26th and 82nd Line || | || | | ||
(4 batts. each), || | || | | ||
66th Line (3 || | || | | ||
batts.), Légion du || | || | | ||
Midi and Légion || | || | | ||
Hanovrienne (2 || | || | | ||
batts. each), 15th || | || | | ||
Léger, 32nd Léger || | || | | ||
(1 batt. each), 2 || | || | | ||
provisional batts. || 302 | 11,948 || 543 | 1,652 | 142 || 14,587
|| | || | | ||
CAVALRY DIVISION || | || | | ||
(Lorges): || | || | | ||
3rd Hussars, 15th || | || | | ||
Chasseurs, 15th, || | || | | ||
25th Dragoons || 108 | 2,314 || 60 | 132 | 2 || 2,616
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY, TRAIN, || | || | | ||
ENGINEERS || 24 | 1,120 || 6 | 78 | 2 || 1,230
|| | || | | ||
DRAFTS, on the march || | || | | ||
from Bayonne to || | || | | ||
Salamanca || 156 | 5,636 || 506 | -- | -- || 6,298
|| | || | | ||
ÉTAT-MAJOR || 79 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 79
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Corps Total || 1,033 | 33,582 || 1,156 | 3,519 | 282 || 39,572
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
|| | || | | ||
7th CORPS (MARSHAL || | || | | ||
AUGEREAU): || | || | | ||
1st DIVISION (Souham) || | || | | ||
at Vich: || | || | | ||
1st Léger and 42nd || | || | | ||
Line (3 batts. || | || | | ||
each), 7th Line (2 || | || | | ||
batts.), 3rd Léger || | || | | ||
and 93rd Line (1 || | || | | ||
batt. each), 24th || | || | | ||
Dragoons, 3rd || | || | | ||
Provisional || | || | | ||
Chasseurs || 169 | 5,213 || 397 | 2,627 | 57 || 8,463
|| | || | | ||
2nd DIVISION (Pino) at || | || | | ||
Massanet: || | || | | ||
Italians: 1st and 2nd|| | || | | ||
Léger, 4th, 5th, || | || | | ||
6th Line (2 batts. || | || | | ||
each), 7th Line (1 || | || | | ||
batt.), and || | || | | ||
Dragoons of || | || | | ||
Napoleon || 238 | 6,346 || 201 | 2,409 | 93 || 9,287
|| | || | | ||
3rd DIVISION (Verdier) || | || | | ||
at Besalu, including || | || | | ||
the remains of || | || | | ||
Morio’s and Lecchi’s || | || | | ||
late divisions: || | || | | ||
French--32nd Léger, || | || | | ||
2nd, 16th, 56th || | || | | ||
Line (1 batt. || | || | | ||
each); || | || | | ||
Neapolitans--1st || | || | | ||
and 2nd Line (2 || | || | | ||
batts. each); || | || | | ||
Westphalians--2nd, || | || | | ||
3rd, and 4th Line || | || | | ||
(2 batts. each), || | || | | ||
1st and 2nd of || | || | | ||
Berg, and Würzburg || | || | | ||
(2 batts. each), || | || | | ||
and Valais, Ducal || | || | | ||
Saxon, and La Tour || | || | | ||
d’Auvergne (1 batt.|| | || | | ||
each), with 2nd || | || | | ||
Neapolitan Light || | || | | ||
Horse || 334 | 6,009 || 486 | 7,190 | 299 || 14,318
|| | || | | ||
4th DIVISION (Duhesme) || | || | | ||
at Barcelona: || | || | | ||
French--7th Line (2 || | || | | ||
batts.), 37th and || | || | | ||
112th Line (1 batt.|| | || | | ||
each), 2nd Swiss (1|| | || | | ||
batt.), Chasseurs || | || | | ||
des Montagnes (1 || | || | | ||
batt.), 5th Italian|| | || | | ||
Line (2 batts.), || | || | | ||
_Bataillon || | || | | ||
Départemental_, and|| | || | | ||
3rd Provisional || | || | | ||
Cuirassiers || 240 | 5,971 || 33 | 2,056 | 87 || 8,387
|| | || | | ||
HEAD-QUARTERS GUARD || | || | | ||
(1 batt. French 67th)|| 17 | 527 || 12 | 260 | 4 || 820
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY, TRAIN, || | || | | ||
ENGINEERS || 44 | 1,346 || 43 | 708 | 27 || 2,168
|| | || | | ||
DRAFTS marching from || | || | | ||
Perpignan to || | || | | ||
Barcelona || 32 | 1,608 || -- | -- | -- || 1,640
DRAFTS at Perpignan, || | || | | ||
&c. || 127 | 6,125 || -- | -- | -- || 6,252
ÉTAT-MAJOR || 137 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 137
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Corps Total || 1,338 | 33,145 || 1,172 | 15,250 | 567 || 51,472
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
|| | || | | ||
8th CORPS (GENERAL || | || | | ||
JUNOT): || | || | | ||
|| | || | | ||
1st DIVISION (Clausel) || | || | | ||
at Burgos: || | || | | ||
22nd Line (4 batts.),|| | || | | ||
14th, 19th, 25th, || | || | | ||
28th, 34th, 36th, || | || | | ||
50th, 75th Line (1 || | || | | ||
batt. each) || 241 | 9,105 || 541 | 890 | -- || 10,777
|| | || | | ||
2nd DIVISION (Lagrange)|| | || | | ||
at Burgos: || | || | | ||
65th Line (4 batts.),|| | || | | ||
2nd, 4th, 12th, || | || | | ||
15th Léger, 32nd, || | || | | ||
46th, 58th, 121st, || | || | | ||
122nd Line (1 batt.|| | || | | ||
each) || 195 | 8,688 || 668 | 701 | 91 || 10,343
|| | || | | ||
3rd DIVISION (Solignac)|| | || | | ||
at Burgos: || | || | | ||
15th, 47th, 70th, || | || | | ||
86th Line (2 batts.|| | || | | ||
each), Régiment || | || | | ||
Irlandais, Régiment|| | || | | ||
de Prusse (2 batts.|| | || | | ||
each) || 135 | 6,925 || 573 | 398 | 43 || 8,074
|| | || | | ||
CAVALRY DIVISION (Ste. || | || | | ||
Croix): || | || | | ||
3 provisional || | || | | ||
brigades of 2 || | || | | ||
squadrons each from|| | || | | ||
16 dragoon || | || | | ||
regiments || 255 | 5,193 || 31 | -- | -- || 5,479
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY, TRAIN, || | || | | ||
ENGINEERS || 30 | 1,614 || 4 | 62 | -- || 1,710
|| | || | | ||
DETACHMENTS forming || | || | | ||
garrison of Burgos || 12 | 714 || 4 | 132 | 4 || 866
|| | || | | ||
ÉTAT-MAJOR || 88 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 88
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Corps Total || 956 | 32,239 || 1,821 | 2,183 | 138 || 37,337
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
TOTAL OF THE EIGHT ARMY|| | || | | ||
CORPS || 6,651 | 184,310 || 9,463 | 33,955 | 2,180 || 236,559
-----------------------++---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
TROOPS NOT FORMING PART OF THE EIGHT ARMY CORPS
-----------------------++-------------------++---------+---------+---------++---------
||Present under Arms.|| | | ||
|+------------+------+|Detached.| Sick. |Prisoners|| Total.
||Officers.| Men. || | | ||
-----------------------++---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
(1) DIVISION DESSOLLES || | || | | ||
(Reserve) in march || | || | | ||
for Andalusia: || | || | | ||
12th Léger (4 || | || | | ||
batts.), 43rd, || | || | | ||
51st, 55th Line (3 || | || | | ||
batts. each) || 229 | 8,125 || 1,277 | 960 | 50 || 10,641
|| | || | | ||
(2) GOVERNMENT OF || | || | | ||
NAVARRE (Dufour): || | || | | ||
Garrison entirely || | || | | ||
composed of drafts, || | || | | ||
dépôts, and || | || | | ||
provisional units || 177 | 8,335 || 192 | 972 | -- || 9,676
|| | || | | ||
(3) GOVERNMENT OF || | || | | ||
BISCAY (Valentin): || | || | | ||
One batt. each of || | || | | ||
118th, 119th, 120th|| | || | | ||
Line, 3 _régiments || | || | | ||
de marche_, and 6 || | || | | ||
‘_Bataillons || | || | | ||
auxiliaires_’ || 329 | 14,943 || 2,299 | 1,834 | -- || 19,405
|| | || | | ||
(4) PROVINCES OF || | || | | ||
VALLADOLID AND || | || | | ||
PALENCIA || | || | | ||
(Kellermann): || | || | | ||
Kellermann’s Division|| | || | | ||
of Dragoons, 3rd, || | || | | ||
6th, 10th, 11th || 131 | 3,077 || 165 | 123 | 47 || 3,543
2nd, 3rd, 4th Swiss || | || | | ||
(1 batt. each), || | || | | ||
Garde de Paris || 80 | 1,690 || -- | -- | -- || 1,770
|| | || | | ||
(5) PROVINCE OF || | || | | ||
SEGOVIA: || | || | | ||
Laval’s German || | || | | ||
Division, detached || | || | | ||
from the 4th Corps,|| | || | | ||
Nassau, Hesse, || | || | | ||
Baden, Holland (2 || | || | | ||
batts. each), || | || | | ||
Frankfurt (1 || | || | | ||
batt.), and || | || | | ||
Westphalian || | || | | ||
Chevaux-Légers, || | || | | ||
with French || | || | | ||
detachments || | || | | ||
garrisoning Segovia|| 204 | 4,203 || 1,730 | 3,371 | 231 || 9,739
|| | || | | ||
(6) MADRID AND NEW || | || | | ||
CASTILE: || | || | | ||
1st DIVISION OF THE 4th|| | || | | ||
CORPS: || | || | | ||
28th, 30th, 72nd Line|| | || | | ||
(2 batts. each) || 125 | 4,123 || 90 | 1,710 | 35 || 6,083
|| | || | | ||
CAVALRY BRIGADE: || | || | | ||
26th Chasseurs, 3rd || | || | | ||
Dutch Hussars || 41 | 765 || 208 | 50 | 32 || 1,096
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY, ENGINEERS, || | || | | ||
TRAIN || 49 | 1,472 || 83 | 107 | -- || 1,711
|| | || | | ||
PROVISIONAL BATTALIONS || | || | | ||
newly arrived at || | || | | ||
Madrid || 77 | 4,784 || -- | 37 | 91 || 4,989
|| | || | | ||
ÉTAT-MAJOR AT MADRID || 38 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 38
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Total in Madrid and || | || | | ||
New Castile || 330 | 11,144 || 381 | 1,904 | 158 || 13,917
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
(7) SANTANDER (Bonnet):|| | || | | ||
118th, 119th, 120th, || | || | | ||
122nd Line (3 || | || | | ||
batts. each) || 225 | 6,839 || -- | 646 | 232 || 7,972
|| | || | | ||
(8) IMPERIAL GUARD: || | || | | ||
|| | || | | ||
1st DIVISION YOUNG || | || | | ||
GUARD (Roguet): || | || | | ||
4 Regiments of || | || | | ||
Infantry, 1st || | || | | ||
Provisional || | || | | ||
Regiment of Cavalry|| 190 | 6,424 || 76 | 299 | -- || 6,989
|| | || | | ||
2nd DIVISION YOUNG || | || | | ||
GUARD (Dumoustier): || | || | | ||
4 Regiments of || | || | | ||
Infantry, 2nd || | || | | ||
Provisional || | || | | ||
Regiment of Cavalry|| 227 | 6,945 || 386 | 143 | -- || 7,701
3rd Provisional || | || | | ||
Regiment of Cavalry|| 39 | 674 || -- | -- | -- || 713
|| | || | | ||
ARTILLERY, TRAIN, || | || | | ||
ENGINEERS || 40 | 1,854 || -- | -- | -- || 1,894
|| | || | | ||
ÉTAT-MAJOR || 8 | -- || -- | -- | -- || 8
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Total Imperial Guard || 504 | 15,897 || 462 | 442 | -- || 17,305
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
(9) TROOPS AT BAYONNE || | || | | ||
or near it and on the|| | || | | ||
march for Spain: || | || | | ||
Neuchâtel (1 batt.), || | || | | ||
Marines (2 batts.), || | || | | ||
20 squadrons of || | || | | ||
Gendarmes, Artillery,|| | || | | ||
Train, Engineers || 357 | 12,939 || 318 | 47 | -- || 13,661
|| | || | | ||
(10) ARRIÈRE-GARDE DE || | || | | ||
L’ARMÉE DE PORTUGAL || | || | | ||
[troops designated || | || | | ||
for service, who have|| | || | | ||
not yet marched], || | || | | ||
afterwards forming || | || | | ||
Drouet’s 9th Corps || 267 | 16,148 || -- | -- | -- || 16,415
|+---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Grand Total || 9,484 | 287,650 || 16,287 | 44,254 | 2,898 || 360,603
-----------------------++---------+---------++---------+---------+---------++---------
Of whom 324,996 are actually in Spain, and of these 262,051 are
‘Present under arms’ with the colours.
VIII
MUSTER-ROLL OF MASSÉNA’S ARMY OF PORTUGAL
ON SEPT. 15, 1810, JAN. 1, 1811, AND MARCH 15, 1811
From returns in the Archives Nationaux at Paris.