[504] Wellington to Chas. Stuart, _Dispatches_, vi. 506.

D’Urban’s invaluable diary has the note. ‘Oct. 11: ’Tis

difficult to account for all this, which must be vexatious to

the Commander-in-Chief, who, aware of the importance of the

heights in front of Sobral, must have wished to keep them for the

present.... Oct. 12: In the morning the enemy was no more to be

seen, and what we should never have given up, we were fortunately

permitted to re-occupy. But at nightfall the French, with about

six battalions, retook the height and town of Sobral.’

[505] Of the nineteen casualties, nine belonged to the

newly-landed 71st, four to the German Legion, six to the company

of the 5/60th attached to Erskine. See Return in Record Office.

While this skirmish was in progress the main body of the French were

at last set in motion from Alcoentre. The 6th Corps advanced this

day (October 12) to Moinho de Cubo and Otta; the 2nd Corps, taking

a road more to the east, so as to lean towards the Tagus, arrived

at Carregado. Junot’s corps was encamped behind Sobral, Clausel’s

division having its advanced posts (Brigade Ménard) in the village,

while Solignac lay two miles to the rear. The weather was still

abominable, and all the movements were accomplished with great

fatigue and delay.

On this afternoon the French army suffered the loss of its most

brilliant and energetic cavalry officer. General Sainte-Croix, while

exploring the Tagus bank, north of Villafranca, in search of deserted

boats, was cut in two by a cannon shot from a British gunboat which

was watching his cavalry from the estuary. He was held to be the only

officer, except Colonel Pelet, who had any personal influence with

Masséna[506], and as that influence was always exerted on the side

of daring action, it is probable that the many French diarists who

deplore his death are right in considering that it may have had some

positive effect on the conduct of the campaign[507].

[506] Sainte-Croix had been the Marshal’s chief-of-the-staff

during the Wagram campaign, and was generally reputed to have

been responsible for some of the boldest moves made by Masséna’s

army during that period.

[507] That Fririon is correct in dating Sainte-Croix’s death

on the 12th, and Delagrave and others wrong in placing it on

the 16th, is proved by an entry in D’Urban’s diary of Oct. 15,

stating that it had just been discovered that the general killed

in front of Alhandra was called Sainte-Croix. Clearly then he was

dead before the 16th.

On the night of the 12th-13th Wellington had become convinced, and

rightly, that the great mass of Junot’s corps, visible behind Sobral,

constituted the main danger to his position. He therefore drew in

troops from his right, even calling down from Torres Vedras Picton,

in whose front no enemy was yet visible. From Monte Agraça to the

Portello redoubts he put in line four British divisions--Spencer,

Cole, Picton, and Campbell, along with Pack’s independent Portuguese

brigade; this last was placed in the great redoubt on Monte Agraça,

which dominated Sobral and all the lower hills. In reserve were two

more divisions--the 5th under Leith, and a temporary Portuguese

division consisting of the brigades of Coleman and Alex. Campbell.

Altogether 30,000 men were concentrated on this comparatively short

front of about four miles, besides the militia and artillery who

garrisoned the minor forts[508]. Junot, whose corps did not now

muster more than 12,000 men, did wisely to refrain from making any

serious attack. He was not, however, wholly quiescent: attempting to

extend his troops more to the right, to the west of Sobral, along

the undulating ground in the direction of the Upper Zizandre, he

got into touch with the outlying pickets of Cole’s division, which

stood beyond those of Spencer and Picton in the British line. The

first attack fell on the light companies of the 7th Fusiliers and the

newly-arrived Brunswick Oels battalion. When they were driven in,

Cole fed his fighting-line with the light companies of Hervey’s [late

Collins’s] Portuguese brigade. Finding his voltigeurs outnumbered,

Junot, in a similar fashion, sent up Gratien’s brigade from his

second division to reinforce his advance. Hence there ensued some

sharp skirmishing, which lasted several hours, till Cole drew back

his outpost line from the lower plateaux north of Sobral to the foot

of his fighting-position, on the heights below the Portello redoubts.

Junot had thus gained a mile of ground, but not ground that was of

any service to him for a regular attack on the Lines, since it was

merely part of the rolling upland that was dominated by Wellington’s

main position. The 4th Division lost twenty-five British and a

much larger number of Portuguese in this long bicker. Hervey the

Portuguese brigadier was wounded. The French casualties were probably

a little the larger[509].

[508] For his dispositions for resisting the suspected attack see

_Dispatches_, vi. pp. 507-9 of Oct. 13. The line running from

right to left was (1) Pack’s Portuguese in the great redoubt

facing Sobral, (2) 1st Division between the redoubt and Zibreira,

(3) Picton touching Spencer’s left, (4) Cole touching Picton’s

left, (5) Campbell (new 6th Division) on Cole’s left, reaching to

the Portello redoubts. Each of these divisions had one brigade in

reserve. A separate general reserve was formed by Leith behind

the right, and Coleman’s and Alex. Campbell’s Portuguese behind

the left.

[509] I find in the note to Gachot’s excellent editions of

Delagrave’s _Campagne de Portugal_ that the losses of the

French on this day were 157 men, those of the allies 139.

The last statement, one sufficiently probable in itself,

cannot be verified from any British source that I have found:

Wellington, annexed to the document on page 511 of vol. vi of

the _Dispatches_, gives the loss of Cole’s British brigades in

detail--they amount to twenty-five men only. But he does not

give details of Hervey’s Portuguese, though he mentions that the

brigadier was wounded, and that the two regiments (Nos. 11 and

23 of the Line) distinguished themselves. They may well have

lost the 124 men mentioned by Gachot, but I have no proof of

it. Vere’s usually accurate ‘Marches of the 4th Division’ gives

no figures for this day, nor does D’Urban’s _Diary_. Wellington

remarks that ‘the attack of this day on General Cole’s pickets

near Sobral was without much effect.’ It is certain, however,

that the British lost a little ground in front of the heights.

Martinien’s _Liste des officiers tués et blessés_, which I so

often find of use, shows that Junot’s corps lost two officers

killed and seven wounded. This, at the usual average, would imply

150-180 casualties.

On the same afternoon Reynier, with somewhat over a battalion of

infantry, made a detailed reconnaissance of Hill’s position in front

of Alhandra. He pressed in close enough to draw the fire of the

nearer redoubts, but halted when he had realized the strength of the

line opposite him, and reported to Masséna that he considered the

right wing of the allied position hopelessly impracticable for an

attack.

Next morning (October 14) the French Commander-in-Chief came up in

person from the rear. It is astonishing that he had made no earlier

attempt to judge with his own eye of the strength of Wellington’s

line of defence. He arrived at Sobral in time to witness a bitter

skirmish, the most important of all the engagements that took place

during the crucial days of the campaign of 1810. Spencer’s outposts,

as has been already mentioned, had on the 12th retired only some 200

or 300 yards from Sobral, and had taken up their position on the

other side of the ravine that divides that village from the lower

slopes of the Monte Agraça. Across the high-road the main picket,

furnished by the 71st regiment, had thrown up a barricade. Junot

considered this lodgement, so close to his line, as a thing that

ought not to be permitted. Accordingly he brought up his artillery,

which had only arrived from the rear on the previous night, to the

front of Sobral, and, after cannonading the barricade for a short

time, sent against it the _compagnies d’élite_ of the 19th of the

Line, supported by other troops of Ménard’s brigade. The first rush

of the attack carried the barricade and the line of stone walls on

each side of it. But the whole of the 71st was ready to sustain the

pickets, and with a fierce rush swept the assailants back across

the barricade, down the slope, and into the outer houses of Sobral.

From thence, of course, they had to retire, as a whole division was

fronting them; but they resumed their old position without being

pursued.

Junot refused to renew his attack, and Masséna, who had arrived

while the skirmish was in progress, did not direct him to go forward

again. It was clear that there was a very strong force in front of

the 8th Corps, and that the redoubts visible along the Monte Agraça

on the one hand and the Portello heights on the other were of the

most formidable description. Masséna’s senior aide-de-camp and chief

confidant, Pelet[510], thus describes the psychological situation:

‘On arriving at Sobral, instead of the “undulating accessible

plateaux” that we had been told to expect, we saw steeply scarped

mountains and deep ravines, a road-passage only a few paces broad,

and on each side walls of rock crowned with everything that could

be accomplished in the way of field fortifications garnished with

artillery; then at last it was plainly demonstrated to us that we

could not attack the Lines of Montechique with the 35,000 or 36,000

men[511] that still remained of the army. For, even if we had

forced some point of the Lines, we should not have had enough men

left to seize and occupy Lisbon.... It was clear that we must wait

for reinforcements[512].’ Another eye-witness, Junot’s aide-de-camp

Delagrave, in his _Memoir on the Campaign of 1810-11_, expresses

the same view in his single sentence, explaining that ‘the prince,

seeing that the enemy was better prepared and stronger than had been

believed, put an end to the combat, and on each side the troops

took up once more their original positions[513].’ The loss in this

combat--insignificant enough in itself, but decisive in that it

revealed to Masséna the uselessness of a further advance--was 67 on

the British side, about 120 on that of the French[514].

[510] For his position and character, see p. 209 of this volume.

[511] This figure is, of course, a ludicrous exaggeration.

Masséna had still more than 50,000 men. Even on Jan. 1, 1811,

after suffering two months more of untold privation, the Army of

Portugal was still 44,000 strong, plus sick and men detached.

[512] Pelet’s _Appendice sur la Guerre d’Espagne_, p. 323 of vol.

xxi of _Victoires et Conquêtes_.

[513] Delagrave, p. 100.

[514] Of the sixty-seven British casualties, thirty-eight were

in the 71st, the rest in the neighbouring brigades of the

1st Division. Noël--who had charge of the battery at Sobral,

estimates the French loss at 120--very probably the correct one,

as Martinien’s lists show one officer killed and six wounded,

all in Ménard’s brigade. This should mean 120-150 casualties.

Delagrave gives the higher figure of 200 killed and wounded,

probably an overstatement.

After putting a stop to the combat of Sobral, Masséna rode away

eastward, along the slopes of the upland that faces the Monte Agraça,

and as far as the knoll facing Arruda in the front of the Light

Division. Here he pressed so near the British front that a single

shot was fired at his escort from the redoubt No. 120 to warn him to

trespass no further. He saluted the battery by lifting his hat to it,

and went up the hill out of range[515]. Some of his aides-de-camp

continued the exploration till they touched Reynier’s vedettes near

Villafranca, but the Marshal himself returned to his head quarters at

Alemquer to think over the situation. There some sort of a council of

war was held that same night: Junot, it is said, urged the Chief to

try the effect of a bold dash at the English army arrayed in front

of Sobral. But he was talked down by Ney and Reynier, who argued

that such an attack would be insane, considering the weakness of

their corps and the strength of Wellington’s fortifications. Without

doubt they were right: even if Masséna had brought his whole three

corps to bear on Sobral, he had 10,000 men less than at Bussaco,

and Wellington 10,000 men more, leaving the garrisons of the forts

out of the question. The allies had 30,000 bayonets concentrated on

the threatened point, and could have brought up Hill, Craufurd, and

Hamilton’s and Le Cor’s Portuguese--20,000 men more--from the east

end of the Lines, the moment that it was clear that Reynier was no

longer in front of them. The position, owing to the forts, was far

stronger than Bussaco, and the French cavalry would have been as

useless on October 15 as it had been on September 27. The report

which Foy drew up for Masséna and presented to the Emperor gives the

whole gist of the matter: ‘The Marshal Prince of Essling has come to

the conclusion that he would compromise the army of His Majesty if

he were to attack in force lines so formidable, defended by 30,000

English and 30,000 Portuguese, aided by 50,000 armed peasants[516].’

[515] Masséna was clearly seen from the British Lines. Leith Hay,

a staff-officer of the 5th Division, noted ‘a crowd of officers

on horseback, dragoons with led horses, and all the cortége of

a general-in-chief’ (_Narrative_, p. 249), and saw the Marshal

dismount by the windmill above Sobral. He was watching from

Pack’s redoubt, on the hill just opposite, through his telescope,

about 2,000 yards from the French front. It is Jones who, on p.

40 of his _Lines of Torres Vedras_, gives the anecdote about the

Marshal’s salute.

[516] See Foy’s _Vie Militaire_, Appendix, p. 343.

An open assault on the Sobral position was now, indeed, the thing

that the British most desired. Wellington wrote, with his usual

ironical moderation, to his trusted lieutenant, Craufurd, that

‘he thought his arrangements had now made the position tolerably

secure[517].’ Among these last arrangements, it may be remarked,

was the drawing back of the 71st and the light companies of the

1st Division from the barricades on the near side of the ravine of

Sobral. They were moved a few hundred yards to the rear, nearer

to Zibreira. This was probably intended to encourage the French

to sally out from Sobral up the road, where everything was now in

order to receive them. Their advance was hourly expected; D’Urban,

Beresford’s Chief of the Staff, wrote gleefully on October 15, ‘Each

individual division has now more than sufficient troops to occupy the

space allotted to it, and the overplus forms a first reserve for each

respectively. If the force thus posted beats the attacking enemy, of

which there can be little doubt, our telegraphic communications will

bring down Craufurd from Arruda and Hill from Alhandra on to their

flank--and the affair will be complete. There is much appearance that

the enemy _will_ attack this position with his whole force--Alhandra

is far too strong for him. He cannot well retire, and it is hoped

that his distress for provisions will compel him to bring matters to

a speedy decision[518].’

[517] Wellington to Craufurd, _Dispatches_, vi. p. 517.

[518] D’Urban’s _Journal_, under Oct. 15.

But both the cautious Commander-in-Chief and the eager head of the

Portuguese Staff were mistaken in estimating the position. They

had judged wrongly the character of Masséna, and his psychological

position of the moment. He would not attack; indeed, after October

14 he seems never to have had the least intention of doing so. The

lesson of Bussaco had not been lost, and he was no longer prepared

to assail, with a light heart, the Anglo-Portuguese Army posted

ready to receive him in a strong position. Probably the energetic

statement of Ney and Reynier that they dared not risk their men--that

the troops would be demoralized if ordered to advance for a second

slaughter--also had its effect on the Marshal. But Masséna was proud

and obstinate, and if he could not go forward, he shrank, for the

moment, from going back. On October 15 began the one phase of the

campaign which the British, from general down to subaltern, had least

expected. The French army began to show signs of intending to settle

down in front of the Lines, as if for a blockade. After a few more

attempts to feel the front of the Lines about Arruda and the valley

of Calandriz, which were so feeble that they did not even drive in

Craufurd’s outposts, the enemy began to fortify the front of his

position with field-works, and sent away the whole of his cavalry to

the rear--a sufficient sign that his offensive power was spent.

Masséna’s first dream of masking the Lines by a close blockade was

absolutely impracticable, considering the present state of his

supplies. The troops were already living on the gleanings of the

hastily-evacuated villages of the Lisbon Peninsula, which could not

last them for long, and would not even have sufficed for a week’s

consumption if Wellington’s decrees had been properly carried out. If

he was to feed his army from the thin resources left behind by the

Portuguese, Masséna would soon find it necessary to spread it far

and wide; since, if he kept it concentrated in front of Wellington,

it would soon go to pieces, exposed in bivouacs to the November

rains, and forced to draw its nourishment by marauding from afar. It

seems from the instructions which he gave to Foy at the end of the

second week of his stay in front of Lisbon, that the Marshal actually

contemplated clinging to his present advanced position till he should

receive reinforcements. He hoped that the 9th Corps would come up to

his aid from Old Castile, and that Mortier and the 5th Corps would

join him from Andalusia. But these were mere hypotheses: he was not

in touch with either Drouet or Mortier. Indeed, he had been cut off

from all communication with his colleagues since the day that he

crossed the Mondego. The 9th Corps, as a matter of fact, was only at

Valladolid, and showed no signs of moving on. Mortier had retired to

the mountains in front of Seville, after his successes over the army

of La Romana in September. Almeida was in a state of close blockade

by Silveira’s detachments from beyond the Douro. Ciudad Rodrigo was

in hardly better case, being strictly watched by Julian Sanchez and

his mounted guerrilleros, so that no one could get to or from it

without a very strong escort. Gardanne’s regiment of dragoons, left

behind by Masséna, was worn out in the effort to keep open the road

between Rodrigo and Salamanca[519]. From the Army neither Almeida nor

Rodrigo received a word of news from the 18th of September to the

15th of November. So effectually was the road closed, that rumours

were current of such divers characters as that Masséna had forced

the English to embark, and that he had been completely foiled, and

was marching back to Spain via Castello Branco. Paris was hardly

better informed: the only news that the Emperor got was that dribbled

out, four or five weeks later, by the English papers[520]. Hence

came ludicrous notices in the _Moniteur_, of which the worst was

one published on November 28, which stated that Coimbra had been

occupied by Masséna without a battle, that the army on October 1

had only 200 sick and 500 wounded since it had left Almeida, and

that no general or colonel had been killed or even hurt since the

invasion began! And this after twelve such officers had fallen at

Bussaco. That battle, we may remark, was presented ultimately to

French readers as ‘a demonstration executed by the brigades of Simon

and Graindorge in order to mask the great flank-march of the Prince

of Essling. But they had gone beyond their instructions, and brought

on a combat in which 200 men had been killed and 1,200 wounded.’

Fririon, the historian of the campaign, cannot restrain himself from

adding, ‘This is how history was written at that time; it was by

reports of this lying description that an attempt was made to calm

anxious families. Did no one reflect that, by deceiving them in this

way, the government made enemies of all those who trusted for a time

in the exactitude of the _Bulletins_, and lost their illusion soon

after, when they learnt the melancholy ends of their sons and their

brothers[521]?’

[519] For the miseries and dangers of life in Rodrigo, see the

_Memoirs_ of the Duchesse d’Abrantes. Her letter to Junot,

intercepted by Wellington, tells the same tale: it is to be found

in D’Urban’s collection of documents.

[520] See _Correspondance_, vol. xxi. pp. 262, 280, 338, &c.

[521] See Fririon, pp. 57-8.

The dearth of news from the front was not Masséna’s own fault. He

had sent back several aides-de-camp to find their way to Almeida,

but all had either been captured by the Ordenança or forced to turn

back. The best known of these was the young Mascarenhas, one of the

Portuguese traitors on the Marshal’s staff. He started from Coimbra

on October 3, with the Bussaco dispatch, disguised as a shepherd, but

was detected by a band of Ordenança, and sent as prisoner to Lisbon.

The Regency had him tried by court-martial, and as he was caught

without a uniform, he was condemned as a spy as well as a traitor,

and executed by the garotte in December[522].

[522] See above, p. 277.

There was a perfect cordon of Portuguese militia and irregulars

round Masséna’s rear in October and November. J. Wilson had come

down to Espinhal, and had his outposts in Leiria; Trant had returned

to Coimbra. They were in touch, by means of the Estrada Nova and

the garrison of Abrantes, with the Ordenança of Castello Branco,

and a Spanish detachment of three battalions under Carlos d’España,

which La Romana had sent to Villa Velha, at the same time that he

took his two divisions under La Carrera and Charles O’Donnell within

the Lines. On the side of the Atlantic the garrison of Peniche had

sent out a force of 300 men to Obidos, under Captain Fenwick, and

these joined hands with De Gray’s cavalry at Ramalhal, in front of

Torres Vedras. A few French parties which crossed the Monte Junta

to raid towards the sea coast were cut off either by Fenwick or by

the dragoons. But Masséna never sent any serious detachment in this

direction.

For just one month (October 14-November 14) Masséna maintained

his position in front of the Lines. The 8th Corps had thrown up

some earthworks on, and to the flanks of, the hill of Sobral, thus

assuming a defensive instead of an offensive position. The 2nd Corps

went back to Carregado, but left strong detachments in Villafranca.

By the dispositions of October 16 the 6th Corps remained with

its main body at Otta, far to the rear, and an advanced guard at

Alemquer. Ney was so placed that he could succour either of the other

corps if they were attacked. A brigade of Loison’s division was

pushed forward to the hill opposite Arruda[523]: in face of this last

Craufurd was adorning the front of his line with a luxury of abattis,

entanglements, and pitfalls, which would have made the hillside

inaccessible to even the most alert and vigorous person moving alone.

Formed troops could not have got past the first two or three traps.

[523] Ferey’s brigade, which had already faced Craufurd at

Bussaco.

But the most significant part of Masséna’s arrangements was to

be found in his rear: Montbrun’s cavalry reserve went back to

Santarem; thither also went the reserve artillery on the 17th, and

the hospitals on the 20th of October. At the same time each of the

corps was directed to send to Santarem all smiths, carpenters, and

other artificers that could be found in its ranks. They were told to

report to General Eblé, the officer commanding the artillery, who

had received from the Marshal a special mission--the construction of

boats and pontoons sufficient to bridge the Tagus or the Zezere. For,

if he were starved out in Estremadura, Masséna had it in his mind

that he might find it convenient either to cross into the Alemtejo,

or to force a way across the Zezere into the Castello Branco

district, in the hope of opening communication with Spain via Zarza

and Alcantara. Montbrun’s cavalry explored northward and eastward,

seeking for likely spots at which the Tagus might be bridged, and on

the other side reconnoitring the line of the Zezere, to see how it

was held. Not a boat could be found on the greater river; at Chamusca

a daring party of fifty men swam its broad current, for a dash at

some barks which were visible on the other side, but all were found

to have had their bottoms carefully knocked out and to be filled

with sand. Dejean, the officer who explored as far as Punhete on the

Zezere, found all the bridges broken, and the garrison of Abrantes

watching the fords, with strong detachments at Punhete and Martinchel.

Eblé found at Santarem that he had to create a pontoon equipage with

no materials at all to work from. There was raw iron in the bars and

balconies of houses, and raw timber in their floors and rafters, but

nothing else. His smiths had to start on the weary task of forging

saws and hammers, his carpenters had to turn housebreakers--in the

technical sense--to obtain planks and joists. His task was hard,

and would clearly take many weeks before it could be properly

accomplished.

Meanwhile time was all-important to Masséna, for every day the

country between Santarem and the Lines grew barer and yet more bare,

as the foragers of the three French corps worked their will upon it.

The men were already going into hospital by thousands, and dying

there. Junot’s conscript battalions, unsheltered from the rain in

their bleak bivouac above Sobral, suffered most--Ney’s and Reynier’s

men were (for the most part) housed if not fed. The Army, which had

65,000 men on leaving Almeida, and 55,000 after the loss of Coimbra,

had dwindled down to 50,000 effective sabres and bayonets by the

month of November[524].

[524] According to _Fririon_, p. 98, the morning state of Nov. 1

showed only 46,591 men effective. But the figures of that officer

are always a little lower than what I have found in the official

documents.

Wellington was already pondering on the possibility of taking the

offensive. He had received hundreds of deserters during the last

few weeks[525], and knew by their means of the miserable condition

of the enemy--of the fact that the cavalry had nearly all been sent

to the rear, and of the attempt that was being made to create a

bridge-equipage at Santarem[526]. His dispatches of October 27 and

November 3 to Lord Liverpool treat at length of the advantages and

disadvantages of assailing the French in their present position[527].

He sets forth the strength of his own army--29,000 British troops

present with the colours, after deducting sick and men detached,

24,000 Portuguese effective, and 5,000 of La Romana’s Spaniards,

making a total of 58,615. He refuses to contemplate the use of the

militia, infantry or artillery, in the field; considering their

behaviour at Bussaco and elsewhere, ‘I should deceive myself if I

could expect, or your Lordship if I should state, that any advantage

would be derived from their assistance in an offensive operation

against the enemy.’ On the other hand, he estimates Masséna’s

fighting force at 55,000 men--a slight miscalculation, for there

were only 50,000 effective at this moment, and of these 4,000

cavalry and one brigade of infantry were at Santarem and other

distant places, from which they could not have been withdrawn for a

battle suddenly forced upon their main corps. Masséna could really

have put no more than 44,000 men in line within twenty-four hours

of an alarm. Wellington then proceeds to argue that he must make a

frontal attack, for if he drew a very large force out of the Lines,

in order to assail the enemy’s flank by a wide encircling march,

‘the inevitable consequence of attempting such a manœuvre would be

to open some one or other of the great roads to Lisbon, and to our

shipping, of which the enemy would take immediate advantage to attain

his object.’ Accordingly ‘we must carry their positions by main

force, and in the course of the operation I must draw the army out

of their cantonments, and expose men and horses to the inclemencies

of the weather at this time of the year.’ Moreover, if Masséna were

defeated, it would cause Soult to evacuate Granada, raise the siege

of Cadiz, and come with 50,000 men to aid the army of Portugal.

‘So if I should succeed in forcing Masséna’s positions, it would

become a question whether I should be able to maintain my own, in

case the enemy should march another army into this country.’ Blake

and the garrison of Cadiz, when freed from Soult’s presence, would

certainly do nothing to help the general cause of the Allies. They

would neither come to Portugal, nor be able to make a serious advance

on Madrid, so as to draw off Soult in that direction. He therefore

concludes, that ‘When I observe how small the superiority of numbers

is in my favour, and know that the position will be in favour of the

enemy, I am of opinion that I act in conformity with the intentions

of His Majesty’s Government in waiting for the result of what is

going on, and in incurring no extraordinary risk.’ What he calls

‘the safe game’ is to keep on the strict defensive, hoping that the

enemy’s distress for provisions, and the operations of the militia

in his rear, may cause him either to make a desperate attack on the

Lines--in which he will be repulsed with awful loss--or else to make

such large detachments, to clear off the corps of Wilson, Trant, and

the rest, that it will become easy and safe to attack the remaining

army in its present position.

[525] The first morning note of D’Urban’s diary in November is

nearly always ‘more deserters arrived.’

[526] See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, _Dispatches_, vi. 554.

[527] See especially the longer dispatch of Nov. 3, on pp. 582-3

ibid.

Here, as when we considered the reasons which determined Wellington

to evacuate the Coimbra country at the end of September, we are

bound to recognize that he adopted an attitude of caution which he

would not have assumed in 1812 and 1813, when he had thoroughly

proved his army. The temptations to assail Junot’s isolated and

advanced position at Sobral were enormous. The 8th Corps had been

thrust forward into a re-entering angle of the British lines, in

which it could be attacked from the left flank as well as from

the front. It was wasting away daily from its privations, and had

apparently not more than 10,000 bayonets left--the cavalry of the

corps (Sainte-Croix’s old division) had been sent off to Santarem,

save one regiment. To sustain Junot the 6th Corps could eventually

be used, but only one brigade of it (that of Ferey) was in the first

line, and this depleted unit, which had been so thoroughly routed

at Bussaco, had its old enemy, Craufurd’s Light Division, in its

front. Of the rest of the 6th Corps, one division was at Alemquer,

eleven miles behind Sobral, the other at Otta, six miles behind

Alemquer[528]. It would have taken the one four or five hours, the

other nearly the whole of a short November day, to assemble and to

come up. Reynier could not quit Hill’s front without freeing the

latter’s two strong divisions for action. Meanwhile Wellington had

disposable, in Junot’s immediate front, the divisions of Spencer,

Cole, Leith, and Alex. Campbell [Picton had been sent back to Torres

Vedras], plus the Portuguese brigades of Pack, Coleman, and A.

Campbell, with La Romana’s Spaniards also, if he should choose to

employ them--this, too, after leaving Craufurd to look after Ferey,

and Hill to keep Reynier in check. It is impossible not to conclude

that a sudden frontal and flank attack on Sobral with 30,000 men

must have enveloped and crushed the 8th Corps. Though its position

was good, its supports were too far off; Ney could not have come up

to Junot’s aid, before he was overwhelmed. Masséna was uneasy about

this possibility of disaster, and had issued orders on October 29

that if Junot and Ferey were attacked, they were to fall back on

Alemquer, while Ney was to bring up his reserves to that same place,

and Reynier to abandon his position in front of Alhandra and march

on Alemquer also[529]. But the weak point of this arrangement was,

that if Junot had been attacked at dawn, both in front and flank, by

an overwhelming force, he could never have got back to Alemquer, and

must have been cut off and battered to pieces close in the rear of

Sobral. The English frontal attack--Spencer, Leith, and Pack--would

have started at a distance of less than a mile from his position:

Cole and Campbell on the flank had only two miles to cover. Both

columns had a down-hill march before them till the line of rising

ground about Sobral was reached. How could the 8th Corps have got

away? Even an orderly retreat, with a fighting rearguard, would have

been impossible.

[528] Loison, to whom Ferey’s brigade belonged, had gone to the

rear with his other brigade.

[529] The whole dispatch may be found in Fririon, pp. 96-7. That

officer quite saw the danger of the position: see his comments on

pp. 99-100.

But if Junot’s 10,000 men had been destroyed behind Sobral,

Wellington would then have been in the position to push in between

Ney and Reynier, whose columns would just have been beginning to

near Alemquer. He might easily have driven them apart, and have

forced them to retire on Santarem or some such distant point, in

order to complete their junction. Even had they succeeded in joining,

Masséna would have had a demoralized army of little over 30,000 men

remaining. It is certain that he must have refused to fight, and have

started on a disastrous retreat either by Castello Branco, or more

likely by Thomar. For the latter direction would have brought him

to his base at Almeida--the former would have taken him through an

almost uninhabited country, to a part of Spain, the mid-Tagus, where

no French army was ready to receive or succour him.

It is impossible, therefore, to doubt that Wellington had a great

opportunity before him. Yet it is easy to see why he refused to take

it. A mere victory of the second class--the thrusting of Junot out of

his positions, not followed by the complete annihilation of the 8th

Corps--would have done no more for him than he himself stated in the

above-quoted dispatch of November 3. If Junot got away with the main

body of his troops, and joined Ney and Reynier, and if their united

army took up a defensive position at Santarem or elsewhere, Masséna

might still hang on to Portugal, till Soult brought up to his aid

the whole Army of Andalusia, or great reinforcements arrived from

Castile. Any chance--a fog, heavy rain, the rashness or stupidity

of some subordinate--might prevent the complete and instantaneous

success of the attack on Sobral. These things being taken into

consideration, Wellington resolved to lie still in the Lines, and to

let the weapon of starvation play for some time longer on the French.

He expected them to retire within a few days from sheer necessity, or

else to deliver the much desired attack on his impregnable position.

Masséna had found that the preparation of his bridge equipage at

Santarem would be a long business. He knew that his numbers were

shrinking every day in the most appalling fashion, not only from

deaths and invaliding, but from desertion. Yet he stood still for

a fortnight longer than his adversary had expected, and meanwhile

made a last desperate appeal for help to the Emperor. He had guessed

that all his previous attempts to communicate with Spain had failed

because his messengers had been sent without a sufficient escort, and

had fallen by the way. Accordingly, he told off a body of more than

500 men to bear his next letter, and gave the command of them to an

officer of well-known intelligence and resource--Foy, who had served

in all the three Portuguese campaigns, Junot’s of 1808, Soult’s of

1809, and this last of his own. Moreover, it was known that Napoleon

had confidence in his ability, though he was an old Republican, and

had actually been one of the few who had refused to sign the address

which was drawn up to ask the First Consul to declare himself Emperor

in 1804. Foy was given a whole battalion of infantry--the 4th of the

47th of the Line--with 120 mounted men. He was told to avoid the main

roads, to cross the Zezere, pass north of Castello Branco, and to try

to reach Spain by way of Sabugal or Penamacor. This was obviously a

difficult task, since the Ordenança were known to be abroad, even

in this rugged and deserted region. To cover Foy’s start, Montbrun

marched, with a brigade of dragoons and a couple of battalions of

infantry, to make a demonstration against Abrantes, and draw the

attention of its garrison from the upper Zezere. Montbrun forced

the passage of the river at Punhete, after a sharp skirmish, and

established his vanguard on the further side. He thus attracted to

himself all the forces which Lobo, the governor of Abrantes, could

spare outside his walls. Meanwhile (October 31) Foy passed the Zezere

higher up, at an unguarded ford, and marched by Cardigos and Sobreira

Formosa along the Castello Branco road. But he abandoned it before

reaching that town, and turned north, crossing the Serra de Moradal

by Fundão and Belmonte. From thence he reached Sabugal, and finally

Ciudad Rodrigo on November 8. He had been unmolested save by a body

of Ordenança, who cut off some of his stragglers. The passage of

his column, whose strength was exaggerated by rumour, caused Carlos

d’España to burn the bridge of Villa Velha, under the impression that

Foy intended to seize it, and open up communication southward with

Soult. He and Lobo reported to Wellington that Foy and Montbrun were

the van of a great force, which was about to overrun and occupy the

Castello Branco country[530]. But Masséna’s messenger had no other

object than to reach Castile with as great rapidity as possible, and

without fighting.

[530] Wellington also, on Lobo’s report, thought (_Dispatches_,

vi. 604) that Foy’s and Montbrun’s object had been to seize the

bridge of Villa Velha.

Arrived at Rodrigo, Foy gave over his escort to General Gardanne,

with orders to him to collect all the convalescents of the Army of

Portugal, and to draw out the garrison of Rodrigo and Almeida, if

Drouet was now in condition to take charge of these fortresses. This

should give him a force of 6,000 men, with which he was ordered to

cut his way to join the main army, to whom he was to bring a convoy

of ammunition, which was running desperately low at the front. How

badly Gardanne executed his charge we shall presently see.

Foy meanwhile, with a fresh dragoon escort, rode for Salamanca and

Valladolid, at which last place he was disgusted to find Drouet

and the bulk of the 9th Corps, whom he had expected to meet at

Rodrigo[531]. He met the general, and passed on to him Masséna’s

request that he would collect the whole of his 16,000 men, and march

on Almeida, and from thence down the Mondego to Coimbra, after which

he was to open up communication with the main army by Leiria or

Thomar. Drouet, assuming some of the airs of a commander-in-chief,

did not show the eagerness to carry out these directions which Foy

had hoped to find.

[531] Only part of Claparéde’s division had as yet even reached

Salamanca. Foy to Masséna, Nov. 8, from Rodrigo.

From Valladolid Foy rode straight through by post, braving guerrilla

bands and swollen rivers, through Burgos and Bayonne to Paris,

which he reached on the night of November 21. On the next day he

delivered his dispatches to the Emperor, and was put through two

hours of sharp cross-questioning by his master. The notes of this

conversation, taken down the same afternoon by the general, are

one of the most interesting documents for the study of Napoleon’s

psychology. Striding up and down his study, pouring out strings of

queries, rapid judgements, rebukes and laudations, even anecdotes and

screeds of political philosophy, the Emperor presented a wonderful

picture of restless and far-reaching intellectual activity. Foy put

in his excuses and explanations in the gaps of the Emperor’s tirades.

‘Why the devil did Masséna thrust himself into that muddle[532]

at Bussaco? Even in a plain country columns do not break through

lines, unless they are supported by a superior artillery fire.’ ‘And

the disgrace at Coimbra, where he has let his hospitals be taken

by 1,500 ragged rascals! To lose your hospitals is as disgraceful

as to lose your flags! In a regularly organized country--England,

for example--Masséna would have gone to the scaffold for that job.

The English are full of courage and honour: they defend themselves

well. Masséna and Ney did not know them, but Reynier, whom they had

beaten twice or thrice [Alexandria and Maida], ought to know them!

Wellington has behaved like a clever man: his total desolation of the

kingdom of Portugal is the result of systematic measures splendidly

concerted. I could not do that myself, for all my power. Why did not

Masséna stop at Coimbra, after Bussaco?’ ‘Because,’ faltered Foy,

‘supposing he had done so, Your Majesty would have reproached him

by saying “If you had only pushed straight on Lisbon the English

would have embarked.”’ ‘Very possible, indeed,’ replied the Emperor,

breaking into a broad smile. ‘Well, I wanted to drive them into the

sea: I have failed. All right; then I will have a regular campaign

in Portugal, and use them up. I can wear them down in the nature of

things, because England cannot compete in mere numbers with me.’ Then

followed an excursus into the characters of French generals--Junot,

Ney, Soult especially. Then a curious confession that he had made a

miscalculation in taking up the Spanish war: ‘I thought the system

easier to change than it has proved in that country, with its corrupt

minister, its feeble king, and its shameless, dissolute queen. But

for all that, I don’t repent of what I did; I had to smash up that

nation: sooner or later they would have done me a bad turn.’

[532] échauffourée.

Then comes the Emperor’s conclusion upon the present state of

affairs. ‘Masséna must take Abrantes--Elvas would be of no good to

us. The only way to get Wellington to make a forward move will be to

force him to try to raise the siege of Abrantes. As long as Masséna

stays in position opposite Lisbon, nothing is lost; he is still a

terror to the English, and keeps the offensive. If he retreats, I

fear great disaster for him. But why did he not take up some regular

plan of operations? The very day after he reconnoitred the Lisbon

lines, it was clear that he would never attack them. I will send

immediate orders for the 5th Corps [Mortier] to invade the Alemtejo.

Will they be obeyed? At that distance only those who choose carry out

my directions. [A hint at Soult’s selfish policy.] I tremble lest

Masséna may call Drouet down to him, and then get his communications

cut again. By communications I mean sure points, at two or three

marches distance, properly garrisoned and provisioned, where convoys

can rest and be safe. An army without open communications loses heart

and gets demoralized.... All the hope of the English is in that army

of Wellington’s! If we could destroy it, it would be a terrible blow

to them.’

The Emperor, pleased with Foy’s intelligent explanations of the

situation, created him a general of division, and told him to

rest for a month, and then return to Portugal. He sent for him to

administer a second catechism on the 24th, and then condescended to

explain his view of the situation, and his orders for the future.

He quite approved of Masséna’s resolve to hold out in front of the

Lines, and had already given Drouet directions to assemble his corps

at Almeida, and open up communications with the Army of Portugal--in

fact, the order to do so had been sent off as early as November 3,

and its bearer must have crossed Foy somewhere on the road[533].

Soult had also been ordered, two days before Masséna’s appeal

came to hand, to create a diversion in the direction of Spanish

Estremadura[534]. He was now sent a sharp reproof for having done

nothing, and more especially for having allowed La Romana to slip

away with two divisions to Lisbon unmolested[535]. But it seems clear

that no orders to concentrate his whole army and invade the Alemtejo

were sent him, and these were the only measures that could have

helped Masséna. Napoleon’s _obiter dictum_ that it would be no use to

besiege and capture Elvas shows a misapprehension of the situation. A

mere demonstration in Spanish Estremadura might call back La Romana,

but would not help the Army of Portugal to any appreciable extent. It

was not La Romana’s 8,000 men who formed the strength of the defence

of Lisbon. Wellington could have spared them without harm, and,

indeed, sent them away long before Masséna quitted Portugal.

[533] This is the order in _Correspondance_, 17,097. It goes on

to give Drouet detailed orders as to what he should do ‘aussitôt

que les Anglais seront rembarqués.’

[534] This had been sent off the day before Foy arrived, Nov. 20,

it is _Correspondance_, 17,146.

[535] _Correspondance_, 17,172, dated Nov. 28.

It may be added that (as facts were to show ere long) the mere

sending up of Drouet to the front was not nearly sufficient to put

Masséna in a position to incommode Wellington, more especially when

the 9th Corps was told to drop detachments at short intervals at

every stage after Almeida. By following these orders, indeed, Drouet

brought to the main army a mere 6,000 men on December 26, having

left the rest of his corps beyond the Mondego. His arrival was of

absolutely no use to the Prince of Essling. The one thing which could

have saved Masséna was the arrival, not of a small field force such

as Drouet or Mortier commanded, but of a large army, on the Lower

Tagus, and on its southern side. Such an army, as the disposition of

the French troops in Spain then stood, could only have been produced

if Soult had consented to abandon Granada, raise the siege of Cadiz,

and march with the greater part of the Army of Andalusia into the

Alemtejo, masking Badajoz and Elvas, and leaving a division or two

in Seville to keep Blake and the Spanish troops from Cadiz in check.

But the Duke of Dalmatia could never be induced to abandon two-thirds

of his Andalusian viceroyalty, in order to execute a movement whose

results, if successful, would mainly redound to the glory of Masséna.

Nothing short of a definite and peremptory order from Paris would

have made him call in Victor and Sebastiani, and evacuate Eastern

and Southern Andalusia. Such an order the Emperor did not send. His

dispatch of Dec. 4 only ordered that a corps of 10,000 men should

advance to the Tagus in the direction of Villa Velha and Montalvão,

to communicate with Masséna[536]. Soult undertook instead a blow at

Badajoz, in January, with a force of 20,000 men, while leaving Cadiz

still blockaded and Granada still held. Napoleon, therefore, must

take the blame of the final failure of the invasion of Portugal.

As has been shown above, from his own words, he was conscious that

he was too far from the scene of operation, and that mere ordinary

directions to his lieutenants might not be carried out with zeal. ‘Je

donne l’ordre. L’exécutera-t-on? De si loin obéit qui veut[537].’

But if this were so, it was surely necessary either that he should go

to Spain in person, or else--the more obvious alternative--that he

should appoint a real Commander-in-Chief in the Peninsula, who should

have authority to order all the other marshals and generals to obey

his directions, without malingering or appeals to Paris. Napoleon had

deliberately created a divided authority beyond the Pyrenees when he

set up his military governments, and instructed Suchet, Kellermann,

and the other governors to report directly to himself, and to pay no

attention to commands emanating from Madrid[538]. King Joseph, as

a central source of orders, had been reduced to a nullity by this

ill-conceived decree. Even over the troops not included in the new

viceroyalties he had no practical authority. Not he and his chief of

the staff, but Masséna, ought to have been entrusted with a full and

autocratic power of command over all the armies of Spain, if a true

unity of purpose was to be achieved.

[536] Berthier to Soult, Dec. 4, 1810.

[537] See above, p. 458.

[538] See pp. 201 and 284 above.

This necessary arrangement the Emperor utterly refused to carry out:

he sent rebukes to Drouet for hesitating to obey the orders of the

Prince of Essling, and he jested at the absurd conduct of Ney and

Junot in conducting themselves like independent generals[539]. But

these officers were in command of troops definitely allotted to the

Army of Portugal. Over the other generals of Spain he refused to

allow Masséna any control, and he continued to send them his own

ever-tardy instructions, which had often ceased to be appropriate

long before the dispatch had reached its destination. If we seek the

reasons of this unwise persistence in his old methods, we find that

they were two. The first was his secret, but only half-disguised,

intention to annex all the Spanish provinces north of the Ebro to

France, an insane resolve which led him to keep Suchet and Macdonald

in Aragon and Catalonia, as well as the governors of Navarre and

Biscay, out of the control of any central authority that he might

set up in Spain. The second was his jealousy of entrusting the vast

army south of the Ebro, far more than 250,000 men at the moment,

to any single commander. He remembered Soult’s absurd strivings

after royalty in Portugal; he knew that Masséna, though the best of

soldiers, was false, selfish, and ambitious; and he refused to hand

over to either of them a full control over the whole of the forces in

the Peninsula. It was even better, in his estimation, to leave King

Joseph a shadow of power, than to take the risk of giving overmuch

authority to one of the two able, but not wholly trustworthy,

marshals to whom he must otherwise have entrusted it.

[539] See the above-quoted conversation with Foy, in the latter’s

_Vie Militaire_, p. 109.

The war in Portugal, therefore, went on as a mere section of the

great contest in the Peninsula; the other and less important episodes

were not made wholly subordinate to it. And if this system continued

Wellington was free from any real danger. He knew it himself; he

studied diligently both the political position and the details of the

emplacement of the imperial armies in the Peninsula. He was fortunate

enough to secure whole budgets of French dispatches captured by the

Ordenança[540], and all that he read confirmed him in his conclusion.

‘I calculate,’ he writes on October 27, ‘that a reinforcement of

15,000 men would not now give the enemy so good an army as they had

at Bussaco. He lost 2,000 killed or taken there: Trant took 5,000

at Coimbra: above 1,000 prisoners have gone through this army: many

have been killed by the peasantry. They cannot have less than 4,000

sick[541], after the march they have made, and the weather to which

they are exposed. The deserters tell us that almost every one is

sick. From this statement you may judge of the diminution of their

numbers; and you will see that I have not much reason to apprehend

anything from [Drouet’s] “_quinze beaux bataillons_ which fought

at Essling”[542], and which cannot be here before the middle of

November. I do not think I have much to apprehend even if Mortier is

added to them. However, we shall see how _that_ will be.... All the

accounts which I receive of the distresses of the enemy for want of

provisions would tend to a belief that their army cannot remain long

in the position in which it is placed, and it is astonishing that

they have been able to remain here so long as this[543].’ That they

have succeeded in staying even a fortnight in front of the Lines is,

he adds, entirely the fault of the Portuguese government, for not

carrying out thoroughly the work of devastation. But, for the reasons

stated on an earlier page, Wellington was resolved not to take the

offensive, even against a foe whose ranks were beginning to grow

thin. Famine should do the work, and no lives should be wasted.

[540] See for example those noted in _Dispatches_, vi. 545, and

a whole series copied out in D’Urban’s journal in October and

November, 1810.

[541] A most modest estimate, for the returns of sick for the

second half of October in a document at the _Archives de la

Guerre_ give a total of 10,897 men in hospital.

[542] An allusion to a phrase in one of the captured dispatches.

[543] Wellington to Liverpool, October 27, pp. 545 and 555 of

vol. vi.

There remained only one danger: it was just possible that Soult,

even though Masséna had not yet suffered any disaster great enough

to make the evacuation of Eastern Andalusia imperative, might

send Mortier and some additional divisions of his other corps to

Spanish Estremadura, and make a dash at the Lower Tagus. Masséna’s

boat-building at Santarem, of which every deserter spoke, might

be intended to give him the materials for a bridge by which he

might communicate across the Lower Tagus with Soult. Wellington

accordingly resolved to keep a strict watch beyond the Tagus, and

to have a flying force ready, which could hinder the construction

of a bridge or a bridge head. With this object on November 2 he

sent over the Tagus General Fane, with his 1,500 Portuguese horse,

a battalion of Caçadores, and a few guns. All the North Alemtejo

Ordenança were called out to watch the river banks, and to lend what

small assistance they could to the cavalry. Fane discovered the

French dockyard at Santarem, and tried to fire it with rockets on

November 13. He failed, but the mere appearance of his little force

on the further bank of the Tagus had some good effect, since it

warned Masséna that an attempt to pass the broad river would not be

unopposed, and therefore made him more chary of attempting it. Fane,

being in touch with Abrantes on his right hand and with Lisbon on

his left, now formed, as it were, a section of the blockading screen

which was thrown round the whole French army.

Wellington had miscalculated the time which the French could afford

to spend in front of the Lines, without suffering actual starvation,

by about a fortnight. On November 10 Masséna gave orders for the

evacuation of his whole position, and a general retreat on Santarem,

because it had become absolutely impossible to stay any longer on the

ground facing Zibreira and Alhandra, unless the whole army was to

perish. The report from the 8th Corps may suffice to give in a few

words the condition of affairs, ‘General Clausel wishes to observe

that during the daytime he cannot count on any other troops save

those actually guarding the outpost line. The majority of the men are

absent on raids to the rear, to seek for maize and cattle. The last

detachment which came back to camp had been nine days away. Generals

and soldiers agree in stating that for some time it has only been

possible to collect a little corn with extreme difficulty. For eight

days the troops have been living on polenta (boiled maize flour)

alone, and of this they have received only half a ration. During

the last four days the 1st Division has received only one ration of

meat, which amounted to six ounces of goat’s-flesh. If the corps had

to make a retreat, it would have to abandon its sick and wounded for

want of carts, which the intendant-generals will not furnish[544].’

The condition of the 2nd and 6th Corps was only so far better that

they had to send their foragers a less distance, when seeking for the

scanty store which could still be gleaned from the hidden granaries

of the Portuguese.

[544] Fririon’s confidential report to Masséna, night of 8th-9th

of November.

But Masséna had no intention of retiring on Spain when he began to

issue orders for a general movement to the rear. Profoundly sensible

of the difficulties of a November retreat through the mountains,

trusting that he might block the British army by maintaining a bold

attitude in its front, and still hoping that large reinforcements

might reach him ere long from Drouet and Mortier, he had resolved

only to evacuate the Lisbon peninsula, and to retire no further than

to the flat and fertile lands between Santarem and the Zezere. In

the Plain of Golegão, as it is sometimes called, he hoped to feed

his army for many weeks more, for the region was still comparatively

full of resources, since it had only been exploited as yet by the

garrison of Santarem and the flying columns which had marched to

the Zezere. It was now his cherished hope that Wellington might

follow him into the plain-land, abandoning his defensive system,

and consenting to give battle in the open. The English might even

be induced to attack the French army when it should have taken up a

new and a strong position. In somewhat rash confidence the Marshal

professed himself certain of the result, even with his depleted army

of under 50,000 men, if Wellington would consent to fight. At the

worst, if starved out again or beaten in the field, he would retreat

on Spain by Castello Branco, for which purpose he had sent up the

greater part of his boat-train from Santarem to build a bridge over

the Zezere. He had also pushed part of Loison’s brigade of infantry

across that river at Punhete, and was holding with it a point

suitable for a _tête-du-pont_. A regiment of dragoons was attached to

this force: it skirmished not unfrequently with parties sent out to

reconnoitre from Abrantes, but with no serious result. For General

Lobo, the governor, had no intention of coming out with a large

detachment, in order to push the French advanced guard back over the

river. He had been ordered to keep to the defensive, and only sent

out occasional reconnaissances to see whether the enemy were still in

position.

Loison’s troops were now no longer the only large force which had

quitted the army in front of the Lines. Not only was Montbrun, with

the main body of the cavalry, watching the roads from the north,

but six battalions of infantry had been sent up from the 6th Corps

on November 8 to occupy Torres Novas and Thomar. If Wellington had

attacked the enemy behind Sobral on any day after that date, he

would have found Ney short of fourteen battalions[545] out of the

thirty-four which formed his corps. There would have been only 10,000

infantry ready to support Junot in the direction of Alemquer. But

this fact, of course, was unknown to the English general, who had

already made up his mind not to take the offensive. If it had come

to his knowledge, he might have attacked, even at the last moment,

with an enormous probability of inflicting on the enemy not the mere

repulse that he disliked to contemplate--on account of its ulterior

effects--but a crushing defeat, which might have hurled them out of

Portugal.

[545] Viz. 39th (3 batts.) and 69th (3 batts.) of Marchand’s

division at Thomar and Torres Novas, with Loison’s 66th (3

batts.), 82nd (2 batts.), and 26th (3 batts.). It will be

remembered that Reynier was, at the same time, minus the 4/47th,

sent as escort with Foy to Ciudad Rodrigo.

On November 10 Masséna ordered the hospitals of the 6th and 8th Corps

at Alemquer, and of the 2nd Corps at Azambuja, to be sent off to

Santarem. At the same time the intendants of the commissariat were

ordered to direct to the rear the meagre store of provisions which

was in their possession, loaded on the much depleted transport train

which still survived. On the 13th the reserve parks and the artillery

train of each corps were ordered to follow. On the 14th, at eight

o’clock in the evening, the infantry, many of whom lay in contact

with the British lines, acted on their marching directions. Ney’s

main body, which was out of sight of Wellington, was to move first;

then Junot and Ferey’s brigade, whose movement was most perilous--for

if their departure were discovered while they were on the hither side

of the defile of Alemquer, they ran a great risk of being enveloped

and destroyed. Reynier was to maintain his position at Villafranca

and Carregado, until it was reported to him that Junot and his corps

had passed Alemquer and reached Moinho de Cubo. For if the 2nd Corps

had gone off at an early hour, and its departure had been discovered,

Hill might have marched from Alhandra on Alemquer quickly enough to

intercept Junot at that point; and if Junot were being pursued at the

moment by the troops from his immediate front, the whole 8th Corps

might have been cut off.

On the night of the 14th, when the movement was commencing, Masséna

was favoured with the greatest piece of luck which had come to him

since the explosion of Almeida. A fog began to rise in the small

hours, and had become dense by the early morning. It caused some

difficulty to the retiring troops, and dragoons had to be placed at

every cross road to point out the right direction to the infantry

columns[546]. But it had the all-important result of permitting the

British outposts to see nothing at dawn. The limit visible to them

was less than 100 yards. It was only at ten o’clock in the morning

of the 15th that the mists were suddenly rolled up by an east wind,

and that the nearer outposts could see that the French sentinels

in front of them had disappeared. The first alarm was given by

Campbell’s 6th Division[547]. The news spread along the whole line

from west to east, and reached the Commander-in-Chief, who ascended

the hill in front of Sobral a few minutes later[548]. The ingenuity

of the enemy in concealing his departure had been great. Ferey’s

brigade, in front of Arruda, had erected a well-designed line of

dummy sentinels before the Light Division, which were not discovered

to be men of straw, topped with old shakos and bound to poles, till

the fog rolled off on the 15th[549].

[546] Delagrave, p. 123 and note.

[547] Londonderry, ii. pp. 51-2.

[548] His first dispatch, that to Craufurd, is dated at 10.20.

[549] See Leach’s _Diary_, p. 178.

Meanwhile the French had accomplished the first stage of their

retreat absolutely unmolested. Ney had retreated as far as Alcoentre;

Junot had passed the defile of Alemquer, and passed through Moinho

de Cubo to Aveira de Cima. Reynier, who had waited till Junot was in

safety before he withdrew at eight in the morning, reached Cartaxo

before the day ended. The first and most difficult stage of the

retreat had been finished without a shot being fired. What would

have happened had the night of the 14th been clear and starry, and

the morning sun had shone out on the 15th, so that Junot would have

been detected as he was passing Alemquer, and Reynier would have

been visible still in line of battle behind Villafranca, the French

diarists of the campaign prefer not to contemplate. Yet they mostly

continued to speak of Wellington as a mediocre general, who had all

the luck on his side.

On the night of the 15th the British Commander-in-Chief had to draw

his deductions from the facts before him. Three things were possible:

Masséna might have been so thoroughly starved out and broken in

spirit, that he might be intending to retire on Spain, either via

Thomar and the Mondego, or by his new bridge on the Zezere and the

route of Castello Branco. Or he might be proposing to cross the Tagus

by means of the boats and pontoons still remaining at Santarem, to

seek unwasted fields in the Alemtejo and a junction with Mortier. Or,

again, he might merely be abandoning a position that was no longer

tenable, in order to take up a new one--perhaps at Santarem, perhaps

at Thomar, but very possibly at and about Abrantes, whose siege he

might be contemplating[550].

[550] Wellington to Fane, Nov. 15: ‘The enemy retreated last

night. He intends either to retire across the Zezere into Spain,

or across the Tagus into Spain, or across the Zezere to attack

Abrantes. The last is possible, as I last night received an

account that on the 9th they had a considerable reinforcement

coming on the frontier at Beira Alta.’

On the whole Wellington thought it probable that the last-named plan

was the one which Masséna intended to adopt. A retreat on Spain

would not only be difficult and dangerous, but inconsistent with the

Marshal’s obstinate and courageous temper. It was much more likely

that he would endeavour to hold out in Portugal, and meanwhile to

cover his partial discomfiture by a bold stroke, such as the siege of

Abrantes, which would still give an offensive air to his movements,

and would also throw on the British army the responsibility of

relieving the fortress. Such a course, it will be remembered, was

what Napoleon recommended to Foy[551]. ‘There is still a chance that

the enemy may take up and try to keep a position at Santarem,’ wrote

Wellington to Fane on the night of the 15th, ‘endeavouring to keep

his rear open, and to get a communication with Ciudad Rodrigo across

the Zezere.’ But he was inclined to think that Abrantes was Masséna’s

goal. He therefore directed Fane to transfer his cavalry to the point

opposite Abrantes on the south bank of the Tagus, and requested

Carlos d’España to enter the place and strengthen the garrison. He

intended to pass over Hill’s two divisions to strengthen Fane, and

for that purpose directed Admiral Berkeley to prepare all the boats

of the fleet to ferry Hill across to Salvaterra, on the south bank

of the Tagus, from whence his force could join Fane, and either

reinforce Abrantes, by means of its bridge of boats, or join in the

pursuit of Masséna if he were about (an unlikely chance) to retire on

Spain by way of his bridge over the Zezere[552] and Castello Branco.

[551] See p. 457 above.

[552] All from the orders issued at 10.30 in the morning ‘from

the hill in front of Sobral’. _Dispatches_, vi. 623.

Meanwhile all was still uncertain, and it was Wellington’s first task

to find out what roads the enemy had taken in his retreat. He did

not on the 15th order his whole army to leave the Lines in headlong

pursuit. Only Spencer, Craufurd, and Hill were directed to march

that afternoon. The former, with a cavalry regiment out in his front,

occupied Sobral, and pushed its vanguard forward to Alemquer by the

high road. The second left Arruda, climbed the low hills in front of

him, where Ferey had been encamped for the last month, and felt his

way to Alemquer, by the bad road which his immediate adversary had

taken eighteen hours before. Hill followed the great _chaussée_ along

the Tagus bank, by Villafranca and Castanheira, and reached Carregado

before dark. He was warned to be in readiness to cross the river, by

means of Admiral Berkeley’s boats, at the earliest possible moment,

in case the French should have built a bridge at Santarem to enable

them to cross into the Alemtejo.[553]

[553] All from the orders issued at 10.30 in the morning ‘from

the hill in front of Sobral’. _Dispatches_, vi. 623.

The advancing troops found the French camps, and the villages where

the more fortunate battalions had been quartered under cover, in the

most dreadful condition. ‘The Alemquer road was covered with horses,

mules, and asses which had perished from want of forage. We passed

many French soldiers lying dead by the road-side, whose appearance

indicated that disease and want of food had carried them off. Every

house in every town or village was thoroughly ransacked[554].’

‘Alemquer had been entirely sacked, the windows and doors torn down

and burnt, as well as most of the furniture; china, pier-glasses, and

chandeliers all dashed to pieces with the objectless fury of savages.

They had left many miserable fellows behind, who were too ill to

march: these were, of course, put to death by the Portuguese whenever

we happened to miss finding them out. We found several peasants whom

the French had murdered and left upon the road, and also several

French killed by the Portuguese. It was a dreadful sight to see

so many fine towns and villages sacked, and without a creature in

them.’[555]

[554] Leach’s _Journal_, p. 179.

[555] George Simmons’s _Journal_, pp. 121-2.

On the 15th none of the enemy had been seen save the dead and the

abandoned sick. The traces of their retreat, however, showed that all

had gone off by the roads towards Santarem. On the 16th Wellington

moved more troops out of the Lines, to support Hill, Craufurd, and

Spencer, in the event of the enemy showing fight. Slade’s horse

followed Spencer, Pack’s Portuguese followed Craufurd; Picton, Leith,

Cole, and Campbell were left in the Lines, which Wellington still

disliked to leave wholly unguarded while he was not yet certain of

the ultimate intentions of the French. The advanced guard picked up

about 300 prisoners this day--partly marauders, partly debilitated

men who could not keep up with their regiments during a second stage

of hard marching. Next day (November 17) it was evident that the

enemy was being overtaken: Anson’s cavalry brigade, which had reached

the front on the preceding night, cut up a number of small parties

of the French rearguard--the 16th Light Dragoons alone captured two

officers and 78 men, not stragglers, but belated pickets and convoy

guards. One of their exploits was long remembered--Sergeant Baxter,

with five men only, came on an infantry outpost of 50 men, who had

stacked their arms and were cooking. Bursting in upon them, he

captured an officer and 41 men, though some of the Frenchmen had got

to their muskets and wounded one of his troopers.[556]

[556] For a full description of the doings of the 16th on this

day, see Tomkinson, pp. 59-60.

On the afternoon of the 17th the enemy’s rearguard was at last

discovered, drawn up on a heath outside the village of Cartaxo. It

consisted of one of Reynier’s divisions, which Craufurd was preparing

to attack, when the Commander-in-Chief came up, and refused him leave

to begin the combat, because neither Hill nor Spencer was within

supporting distance of him. Opinions differed as to whether an attack

would have led to a repulse by superior numbers, or to the capture

of the French division, which had a bridge and a long causeway--a

most dangerous defile--in its rear[557]. Probably Craufurd was not

in quite sufficient strength to be certain of success: he had but

six strong battalions[558], a battery, and the 16th Light Dragoons

in his company. The enemy had the eleven weak battalions of Merle’s

division, and two regiments of cavalry: probably 1,000 bayonets and

300 sabres in all more than Craufurd could command. But an attack

made with vigour, when half the French had begun to retire across

the defile, might have had considerable results. Merle’s division

was, however, allowed to retire unmolested in the evening, while the

Light Division took up quarters for the night at Cartaxo. Reynier

drew back the whole of his corps next morning to the environs of

Santarem, which he had been directed to defend. Meanwhile the 8th

Corps had reached Pernes with one division, and Alcanhede with the

other and its cavalry: these were the points at which Junot had been

ordered to stay his retreat. The bulk of the 6th Corps was at Thomar,

but Loison’s division had been kept in the neighbourhood of the

Zezere[559], and part of Marchand’s infantry and Ney’s corps-cavalry

were at Cabaços. The retreat was thus ended, for Masséna was in

possession of the new ground on which he intended to maintain himself

for the winter, and he was prepared to accept a defensive battle if

Wellington should push him any further. His left flank near the Tagus

(Reynier’s corps) was advanced: his right flank (Junot’s corps) much

‘refused.’ Ney was forming the central reserve.

[557] Leach thinks, with William Napier (iii. 41), that

Wellington acted wisely in refusing Craufurd leave to attack (p.

180). Tomkinson, another eye-witness, thinks that an opportunity

was missed (pp. 60, 61).

[558] Having now received the Brunswick Oels Jägers, the Light

Division was six battalions strong, not its usual five. Its

strength about this time was some 4,000 bayonets. Merle’s

division was about 5,000 strong: it had dwindled to 4,200

effectives before December was out. Thus the English and Caçadore

battalions averaged 650 men, the French 450 only, so that the

strength was not very unequal. But only 2,500 of Craufurd’s

troops were British.

[559] There its main body was now joined by Ferey’s brigade,

which had been detached for some weeks.

Unfortunately for himself the British Commander-in-Chief received, on

the night of the 17th, confusing intelligence, which led him to the

false conclusion that the enemy was still retiring, and was aiming

either for Abrantes or for the borders of Spain. This news was sent

by Fane, who from the other bank of the Tagus had observed French

columns and convoys marching eastward from Santarem towards the

Zezere[560], and wrongly inferred that the main army was making for

this direction, and that only a rearguard had been left in Santarem.

He was also influenced by the fact, reported from Abrantes, that

Masséna had cast a second bridge over the Zezere near Punhete, as if

to give him a quicker chance of passing that river. In consequence

of this news, Wellington directed Hill to cross the Tagus at Vallada

with his own division, Hamilton’s Portuguese, and the 13th Light

Dragoons, in order to strengthen Abrantes if it were assailed, or to

fall on the flank of the French, if they were merely passing that

fortress on their retreat to Spain. Thus he deprived himself of

14,000 men on the right bank of the Tagus, where alone troops were

really needed. To make up for Hill’s absence, Leith’s and Cole’s

divisions were called out of the Lines, where they had rested till

this moment (18th November)[561]. But they were two marches off,

and Wellington had for the moment in his front line only Craufurd,

Spencer, Pack’s Portuguese, and Slade’s and Anson’s cavalry, a force

of some 16,000 men. Reynier was in his immediate front at Santarem,

with 13,000 men of all arms. Junot’s corps at Alcanhede and Pernes

was twelve miles away, and about 11,000 strong: the greater part of

his men could have been brought up in half a day’s march. Ney was too

distant to come up in less than 24 hours, and then only with half his

corps, as Loison and one of Marchand’s brigades were far away. But if

Wellington had attacked Santarem on the 19th the Duke of Elchingen

would have appeared next morning.

[560] Probably Ferey’s brigade marching to join Loison and trains

following it, and certainly Reynier’s trains which he had sent

off towards Golegão. See _Dispatches_, vi. 629.

[561] _The Diary of the Marches of the 4th Division_, by its

Assistant Quarter-Master, Charles Vere, settles the date. For

Leith’s start on the same morning, see Leith-Hay’s _Narrative_,

i. p. 269.

Craufurd was as strongly convinced as his chief that there was

nothing in front of him but a rearguard on the night of the 18th, and

he even doubted whether the last of the French would not withdraw at

midnight. It was this that induced him to make the curious personal

exploration mentioned by Napier (iii. 63)[562], when, followed by

a single sergeant only, he pushed along the causeway in the small

hours of the morning, ran into the French picket, and escaped as if

by miracle the volley that was fired at him. The picket reported to

Reynier that they had been seriously attacked, had killed three of

their assailants, and had heard the groans of wounded dragged away

by the survivors. Craufurd and his sergeant retired, thoroughly

convinced that the causeway had not been evacuated.

[562] Napier, however, dates the General’s escapade wrongly.

It took place on the night of the 18th-19th, where it is duly

related in the diary of George Simmons (p. 117), and not on the

21st as Napier implies. I have a copy of Delagrave’s _Campagne

de Portugal_, which once belonged to Napier; he has written a

sarcastic note on the bottom of page 111, commenting on the

ridiculous account of the event which appeared in the French

narratives. He adds that the sergeant’s name was McCurry, and

that ‘the sergeant had sense enough to hold his tongue, but

Craufurd spoke out, and so drew the fire of the enemy’s picket.’

It was undoubtedly fortunate for the British Commander-in-Chief that

his habitual caution prevented him from making a serious attack

on the force at Santarem, under the impression that it was a mere

rearguard, left behind to detain him while the enemy’s main body

was pushing for Abrantes. Reynier’s position was very formidable.

The town of Santarem, surrounded by an old mediaeval wall, stands

on a lofty height above the Tagus, with a narrow suburb--where the

French dockyard had been established--along the lower edge of the

hill. But this was only the third and last line of the defensive

position. In front of it lay low alluvial ground, inundated by the

rain which had been falling during the last fortnight, and barely

passable save by the _chaussée_ from Lisbon. The plain was cut in

two by the Rio Mayor, a deep muddy stream at this time of the year,

and to reach Santarem a narrow bridge over this obstacle had to be

passed. Just where the _chaussée_ leaves the marsh, to climb towards

the town, was a long knoll, completely commanding the road: on this

Reynier had placed a battery with infantry supports. This force must

be driven in by the British, and the only practicable way to reach it

was by forcing a passage along the causeway, for the marsh between

the road and the Tagus turned out, when explored, to be practically

inaccessible to formed troops, though individuals might wade through

it in a few places. Behind the advanced French knoll were the

foot-hills of the lofty ridge on which Santarem lies. The enemy

were visible upon it, working hard at the construction of a line of

_abattis_ from the olive-trees which cover its slopes. Behind this,

again, was the town itself, hastily prepared for defence.

On the morning of November 19th the British advanced guard was on the

edge of the swampy plain; Craufurd’s Light Division occupied the near

end of the long bridge over the Rio Mayor, and skirmished with the

French outposts, who refused to retire from the further side. Spencer

came up more to the left, and further inland, Pack’s Portuguese

reached the upper course of the Rio Mayor. Neither Leith nor Cole had

yet arrived at the front, so that the force available for an attack

was no more than 16,000 men. Nevertheless, Wellington, still hoping

that he had only a rearguard in front of him, made dispositions for a

demonstration against the enemy’s front, which was to be turned into

a real attack if he showed want of strength. Craufurd was directed to

advance across the swamp near the Tagus, if he found it practicable.

Pack was to cross the upper Rio Mayor, and turn the hostile right.

Spencer was formed at the entrance of the bridge and causeway,

and ordered to charge up the _chaussée_ at the French centre, and

the battery commanding the road, so soon as he should see that

the flanking divisions were making good progress. Fortunately for

Wellington the attack was never delivered: more rain during the night

had made the marsh so waterlogged that Craufurd, who had crossed the

Rio Mayor by a narrow wooden bridge near Valle, came to a stand in

the slush, though a few of his skirmishers pushed far enough forward

to engage the enemy’s pickets on the other side. Pack’s Portuguese

on the left flank got across the river with much difficulty, but

their guns were absolutely stuck in the mud far to the rear, and the

brigadier sent back word to Wellington that he should advance no

further without special orders. The 1st Division had not yet begun

to move. Thereupon the Commander-in-Chief called back both Craufurd

and Pack, and gave up his plan. It is clear that he had nourished

some intention of attacking in earnest, for he wrote to Hill that

afternoon: ‘I did not attack Santarem this morning, as the artillery

of the left wing (Pack) had lost its way, and I am rather glad that

I did not attack, as the enemy have there undoubtedly a very strong

post, and we must endeavour to turn it. And if they [the main body]

have not retired across the Zezere or towards the Alva, they must be

too strong for us here.’

It is obvious that both Wellington’s and Masséna’s strategy on the

18th and 19th November is exposed to criticism. Why had the British

General only 16,000 men to the front on these days, when he was

risking a general action with the French? One of two courses must

have been adopted by the enemy: either he must be marching hard for

the Zezere, and intending to retire into Spain, or he must be merely

changing his ground, and proposing to fight at Santarem, or in front

of Abrantes, or elsewhere. In either case it was strange tactics for

Wellington to take the field with 16,000 men (deducting Hill on the

other side of the Tagus), while he left Leith and Cole two or three

marches behind, and still kept the divisions of Picton, Campbell, and

Le Cor, and the unattached Portuguese brigade of Coleman and Alex.

Campbell--20,000 men--unmoved within the Lines. For if the enemy was

flying, there was no need to leave such a force of regulars to guard

positions which the French could not be intending to attack. While

if the other hypothesis was correct, and Masséna, with an army which

Wellington still reckoned at 50,000 men, was in a fighting mood,

and ready to give battle if he saw an advantageous opportunity, it

was still more inexcusable to leave behind 20,000 men, who would be

wanted for the decisive struggle.

On the other hand, the French Marshal was taking a terrible

risk also. Supposing Wellington had been leading his whole

force--deducting Hill--for a resolute attack on the Santarem

positions, which was the most probable course for him to adopt, he

might have had not only the 16,000 men that he had actually brought

forward, but Leith and Cole with 11,000 more, and Picton and the

other 20,000 men left in the Lines, a force, if the cavalry be thrown

in, of full 50,000 sabres and bayonets. If Wellington had left

Craufurd and Pack to block the marshy southern exit from Santarem,

which was as difficult for Reynier as for his adversaries, he might

have thrown 40,000 men into the empty space of twelve miles between

Reynier and Junot, have driven away the latter’s 11,000 men, and

surrounded Reynier’s 13,000 in Santarem. Ney could not have got up

in time to prevent this. The 2nd Corps would either have had to

surrender, for it had hardly any food, or to cut its way out with

disastrous losses[563].

[563] The emplacement of the Anglo-Portuguese army is given as

follows by Beresford’s Quarter-Master-General, D’Urban, on the

night of the 18th-19th, showing its complete dislocation:--

Light Division, Pack, and Slade’s and Anson’s cavalry--before

Santarem.

1st Division--Cartaxo.

2nd Division--passing the Tagus at Vallada.

5th Division--Alemquer.

4th Division--Sobral.

6th Division--Ribaldeira (in the Lines).

3rd Division, and Coleman’s and Alex. Campbell’s

Portuguese--Torres Vedras.

Le Cor’s Division--Alhandra (in the Lines).

Reynier saw this perfectly, and was in an agony of mind on the 18th

and 19th. He wrote urgent appeals to Masséna, for permission to

abandon Santarem on the former day, pointing out that if his front

was practically inaccessible, because of the swamps, his right might

be turned by the upper Rio Mayor, where he had only a single regiment

in observation, to face what might be an overwhelming strength of

British troops, who might be preparing to cut in between him and

Junot. He sent all his train, sick, and wounded to Golegão[564],

and besought leave to follow them. When he received a peremptory

reply, to the effect that he was to hold Santarem to the last, he

came to the conclusion that he was to be sacrificed in order to

allow the other two corps to escape unmolested. When Pack advanced

on the 19th he sent the report that he was turned by 10,000 British

troops--Pack had but 3,000 Portuguese--and that Clausel with Junot’s

nearest division was too far off to succour him. He prepared to

suffer a disaster, and to die fighting[565]. He ordered his troops to

surround Santarem, in rear as well as in front, with a double line of

_abattis_, and continued to strengthen and repair its old walls.

[564] It was their march, visible from the other side of the Tagus,

which helped to deceive Fane as to the general movements of the

French army.

[565] See Delagrave, 128-30, and Gachot’s excellent notes thereon.

Nothing, therefore, could exceed Reynier’s relief when Pack and

Craufurd halted, and Spencer did not move at all, after the firing

had begun upon the 19th. On the next morning the British army

was still stationary, save that a cavalry reconnaissance, pushed

northward from Pack’s position on the upper Rio Mayor, discovered

Junot’s outposts in the direction of Alcanhede and Pernes, and

reported to Wellington that the enemy was in strength, with all arms,

in this direction. Leith’s division came up this morning, raising

the British force to 21,000 men, but this, as the Commander-in-Chief

now saw, was not sufficient to enable him to deal with two corps

d’armée, of which one was in an inaccessible position and now

stockaded up to the eyes. He halted, and sent, very tardily, orders

for Cole to join in haste, and for Campbell’s division to come up

from the Lines. But even thus he was too weak to strike. Hill was now

at Almeirim, half way to Abrantes on the other side of the Tagus.

Fane had actually entered Abrantes, and sent news that the enemy was

making no forward movement from the Zezere. Thus at last Wellington

discovered that he must have practically the whole French army in his

front, while his own forces were in a state of terrible dispersion.

On the 21st he wrote a dispatch to Lord Liverpool which shows that

he had given up all intention of pushing Masséna further. ‘Although

the enemy have moved large bodies of troops eastward from Santarem,

I have not heard that any large body has crossed the Zezere....

Their army being collected between Santarem and the Zezere, they are

in a situation to be able to maintain themselves in their strong

position till the reinforcements, which I know are on the frontier,

can join them. For this reason, and because I am unwilling to expose

to the inclemencies of the weather a larger body of troops than is

absolutely necessary to press upon the enemy’s rear, and to support

my advanced guard, I have kept in reserve a considerable proportion

of the allied army--some of them still in their cantonments in the

Lines, our fortified position. I have ordered General Hill to halt

the head of his corps at Chamusca [on the other side of the Tagus,

fifteen miles south of Abrantes] till the enemy’s movements have

been decided.... The rain, which has been very heavy since the 15th,

has so completely filled the rivulets and destroyed the roads, that

I have hitherto found it impossible to dislodge the enemy from his

position at Santarem, by movements through the hills on his right

flank. Possibly the bad state of the roads has also been the cause

of his remaining at Santarem so long.... The enemy’s army may be

reinforced, and they may again induce me to think it expedient,

in the existing state of affairs in the Peninsula, to resume my

positions [the Lines]. But I do not believe that they have it in

their power to bring such a force against us as to render the contest

a matter of doubt[566].’

[566] Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 26, 1810.

In a supplementary dispatch, dated the same day, Wellington adds:

‘At first I thought the enemy were off, and I am not quite certain

yet that they are not going.... I am convinced that there is no man

in his senses, who has ever passed a winter in Portugal, who would

not recommend them to go now, rather than to endeavour to maintain

themselves upon the Zezere during the winter, or than attack our

position, whatever may be the strength of their reinforcements.’

There were, indeed, men in the French camp who advised Masséna to

continue his retreat, but he had no intention of taking up a timid

policy after braving so many passed dangers. He had resolved to

maintain himself between Santarem and the Zezere, and to call down

Drouet and other reinforcements[567], in the hope that, ere the

winter was over, the Emperor might find means to strengthen him to

a force which, with the co-operation of Soult from Andalusia, would

enable him finally to resume the offensive, and make a second and

more formidable attack upon the Lines. In adopting this resolve he

was, though as yet he knew it not, carrying out the instructions

which the Emperor was at this very moment (November 22) dictating

to Foy at Paris. But Wellington had not written at random when he

reminded Lord Liverpool of the terrors of a Portuguese winter, and

in the end the Prince of Essling was forced to begin on the 1st of

March, with under 40,000 men of his original force, the retreat which

he might have commenced on November 20 with over 50,000[568].

[567] Notably the column of Gardanne, of which we shall speak

presently.

[568] Including sick in each case, and excluding reinforcements

received later.

The scheme for starving out the French, which Wellington had

devised early in 1810, and begun to execute in September, was now

transferred to a different area. Masséna had been able to endure

for a month in front of the Lisbon Lines: the question now was

whether he would be able to live so long in the land between the

Rio Mayor and the Zezere. Wellington could not be sure of his data,

in calculating the day when exhaustion would once more compel the

French to shift their ground. It was only certain that the plain of

Golegão, and the Thomar-Torres Novas country, had not been devastated

by the Portuguese government even with the same energy that they

had displayed in the Lisbon Peninsula. And there, as the British

Commander-in-Chief complained, not half the necessary work had been

done. Yet something had certainly been accomplished; the population

had nearly all been withdrawn, the mills destroyed, the corn buried

or sent over the Tagus. Trusting to these facts, and to the rains

and frosts of the oncoming winter, Wellington hoped that Masséna

would finally be reduced to a disastrous retreat by sheer privation.

‘Though it is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to

remain in this country so long, and it is an extraordinary instance

of what a French army can do[569].’

[569] _Dispatches_, vii. 59.

Resolved to take no further offensive action, and to let famine do

its work, Wellington, on November 24, gave orders for the army to

draw back and go into winter quarters, leaving only Craufurd and Pack

in touch with the enemy in front of Santarem, and Spencer in support

of them at Cartaxo. Of the other divisions, Hill remained behind the

Tagus at Chamusca and Almeirim, with his own troops and Hamilton’s

Portuguese. Picton and the 3rd Division retained their old post at

Torres Vedras, with Coleman and Alex. Campbell’s Portuguese near

them. Cole remained at Azambuja, in rear of Spencer. Leith was sent

back to Alcoentre, Campbell’s 6th Division was placed at Alemquer,

behind Leith. Le Cor’s Portuguese stayed at Alhandra, within the

Lines.

‘The army thus placed,’ writes D’Urban, the Quarter-Master-General,

on this day, ‘at once takes care of Abrantes (by means of Hill),

observes the enemy at Santarem (with Craufurd and Pack), has a

division on the higher Rio Mayor road to turn the enemy’s right, if

this become expedient (Leith’s to wit), and still “appuis” itself

on the Lines, its retreat into which is secured by its echelloned

position. Means are ready to pass General Hill back to the right bank

of the Tagus, with such celerity, that his divisions can be counted

upon for the order of march or battle on this side of the river as

certainly as if he were already there[570].’

[570] D’Urban’s _Diary_, under Nov. 24.

Masséna, on the other hand, also remained nearly quiescent for many

days, the only important change which he made in the cantonments

of his army being that he moved in Clausel’s division closer to

Santarem, to fill the dangerous gap between the 2nd and 8th Corps,

which had existed on November 18. On the 22nd and 23rd he pushed

forward, against Pack’s Portuguese and Anson’s light cavalry, a

considerable force, consisting of Clausel’s whole division and six

squadrons from the 8th Corps, and General Pierre Soult with two

cavalry regiments and three battalions from the 2nd Corps. After some

lively but bloodless skirmishing, the allied troops retired behind

the Rio Mayor, evacuating the village of Calares beyond the stream,

and drawing in their cavalry pickets, which had hitherto held some

ground on the further bank. This affair confirmed Wellington in his

conclusion that nearly the whole French army was now concentrated on

the Santarem-Pernes line, and made him more reluctant than ever to

take the offensive.

Meanwhile Montbrun’s cavalry, supported by small detachments from

the infantry of Ney’s corps, had pressed somewhat further to the

north, in order to occupy a broader tract of land from which the army

might feed itself, a task that grew harder every day. From his head

quarters at Ourem and from Cabaços, on the Thomar-Coimbra road, he

continued to send out strong reconnaissances in every direction, of

which some occasionally pushed as far as Leiria on the road towards

Coimbra, and others scoured the left bank of the lower Zezere and

the Nabao. The limit of their excursions was fixed by the fact that

Wilson’s brigade of Portuguese militia still lay at Espinhal, and,

though it was reduced by desertion and sickness to 1,500 men, was

reported to Montbrun as a serious force, with which he had better not

meddle. Trant’s troops at Coimbra--a weak militia division--were also

estimated at much over their real strength. It was not till later

that sheer starvation drove the French further afield, and revealed

to them the weakness of the _cordon_ of inferior troops which hemmed

them in upon the northern side.

The blockade of the French army, therefore, remained still unbroken,

and its communication with the north was as absolutely interrupted

in the end of November as in the beginning of October. One attempt

to break through the screen of Portuguese irregulars had been made

in November, but of its failure Masséna had as yet no knowledge.

When Foy reached Rodrigo, on his way to Paris, he had handed

over his escort of one battalion of infantry and 120 horsemen to

General Gardanne, who was ordered to strengthen them with all the

convalescents of the Army of Portugal, and with the garrisons of

Almeida and Rodrigo also, if these last had now been relieved by

troops of Drouet’s 9th Corps. At the head of 6,000 men, as Masséna

calculated, he could cut his way to join the main army, escorting

a great train of munitions, of which both the artillery and the

infantry at the front were lamentably in need. Gardanne could not

gather in the Almeida garrison, as that place was still blockaded

by Silveira’s Portuguese. But with the two battalions from Rodrigo,

added to Foy’s late escort, and a mass of convalescents, he had

collected some 5,000 men by November 20[571], the day on which he

marched by the Sabugal-Belmonte-Fundão route towards Punhete and

the lower Zezere. He was cursed with dreadful weather, followed

and harassed by all the Ordenança of the Castello Branco country,

hampered by his heavy convoy, and much troubled by the disorderly

convalescents, who were largely professional malingerers. But he got

as far as Cardigos on the Sobreira-Formosa road, only fifteen miles

from Punhete, where Loison was awaiting him on the Zezere. Here he

was brought to a stand (November 27) by the flooded and bridgeless

stream of the Codes. No news had reached him from Masséna, while he

was assured by Portuguese deserters, who probably were sent out to

deceive him by the governor of Abrantes, that the Marshal had not

only evacuated his position before the Lines, but was retreating on

Spain via the Mondego. They added that Hill had just reached Abrantes

with 10,000 men, and was about to march against him. Thereupon

Gardanne hastily turned back, reached Penamacor by forced marches

on November 29, and from thence retired to Rodrigo, having lost 400

men and 300 horses by disease and fatigue during his ill-conducted

expedition. If he had pushed forward fifteen miles further on the

28th, he would have got into touch with Loison, and reached Masséna’s

head quarters in safety. Wellington, not without reason, professed

himself unable to comprehend this strange march and countermarch. ‘I

do not exactly understand this movement[572],’ and ‘if this march

was ordered by superior authority, and was connected with any other

arrangements, it had every appearance of, and was attended by all the

consequences of, a precipitate and forced retreat[573].’

[571] Belmas’s figures (i. 137) given here must be about correct,

not the 2,000 of Fririon, and _Victoires et Conquêtes_. For the

two Rodrigo battalions were 1,500 strong, Foy’s escort 600, and

Gardanne took with him some of his own dragoon regiment, beside the

convalescents.

[572] _Dispatches_, vii. p. 20, to Craufurd.

[573] Ibid., p. 36, to Lord Liverpool.

Here, then, we leave Masséna and his army, cantoned in the space

between the Rio Mayor and the Zezere, still destitute of news from

France, and still entirely ignorant whether or no any endeavour

was being made to relieve them. Of their further doings during the

three months that ended on March 1, 1811, we shall tell elsewhere.

Suffice it to say that, despite many dangers and risks, Wellington’s

scheme of starvation was played out to the end, and achieved complete

success. Of the privation and losses that the French suffered, and

the atrocities that they committed, of the difficulties of the

British Commander-in-Chief--with an obstinate enemy still in front of

him, a factious Regency and a half-starved population behind him in

Lisbon, and a disquieting prospect that Soult might take a hand in

the game--the fourth volume of this work will give full details.

SECTION XXII

END OF THE YEAR 1810

CHAPTER I

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH AND EAST OF SPAIN (JULY-DECEMBER 1810)

While tracing the all-important Campaign of Portugal, down to

the deadlock in front of Santarem, which began about the 20th of

November, 1810, and was to endure till the 1st of March in the

succeeding year, we have been obliged to leave untouched events,

civil and military, in many other parts of the Peninsula during the

autumn. Only the Andalusian campaigns have been carried down to

November: in Northern Spain we have traced the course of affairs

no further than September[574]: in Eastern Spain no further than

August[575]. Moreover, little has been said of the general effect on

the French occupation caused by the division of supreme authority

which Napoleon sanctioned in the spring[576], or of the importance of

the long-deferred meeting of the Spanish Cortes, which assembled at

Cadiz in the autumn. With these points we must deal before proceeding

to narrate the campaigns of 1811.

[574] See pp. 270-1.

[575] See pp. 200-1 and 315-16.

[576] See pp. 312-14.

The survey of the military operations, none of which were

particularly important, must precede the summary of the political

situation, with regard to King Joseph on the one side and the

Cortes on the other. For the acts of the King and the Cortes had an

influence extending far beyond the months in which they began, and

were, indeed, main factors in the Peninsular struggle for years to

come. But the doings of the armies in Galicia and Asturias on the

one flank, in Catalonia and Valencia on the other, can easily be

dismissed in a few pages: they were but preliminaries to the greater

operations in the spring of 1811.

We may first turn to the north-west. When Masséna plunged into

Portugal in September 1810, and was lost to the sight of his

colleagues and subordinates for nearly three months, the situation

left behind him was as follows:--Leon and Old Castile, as far as the

Galician foot-hills and the Cantabrian sierras, were held down by

Serras and Kellermann with some 12,000 men--a force none too great

for the task that lay before them. The latter general had charge

of the provinces of Valladolid, Toro, and Palencia, as one of the

‘military governors’ recently appointed by the Emperor. He gave

himself absurd airs of independent authority, and took little more

heed of the orders of Masséna than of those of King Joseph, for whom

he showed a supreme contempt. General Serras’s troops were more

definitely part of the Army of Portugal. They were in charge of the

provinces of Zamora, Leon, and Salamanca, thus covering Kellermann’s

government on the outer flank, and taking care of the borders both of

Galicia on the Spanish and of Tras-os-Montes on the Portuguese side.

To cover this long front Serras had only eleven battalions[577],

and two provisional regiments of dragoons--some 9,000 men. Out of

this force he had to find garrisons for Astorga, Leon, Benavente,

Zamora, and several smaller places. Kellermann, who was intended

to serve as a reserve for Serras, as well as to guard the central

dépôts at Valladolid, had only two regiments of dragoons (part of

his original division) and three infantry battalions, making 3,000

men in all[578]. Both of them were directed to keep in close touch

with Bonnet, who, at the head of his old troops, the four regiments

which never came south of the Cantabrian hills till the Salamanca

campaign[579], kept a precarious hold on Central and Eastern Asturias

with 9,000 men.

[577] Viz. 113th Line (2 batts.), 4th of the Vistula (2 batts.),

one battalion each of the 12th Léger and 32nd and 58th Line, four

‘provisional battalions’ (Nos. 2, 4, 5, 7), and two provisional

regiments of dragoons. Total on Sept. 15, 9,524 men, of whom 1,000

were cavalry.

[578] Two Swiss battalions, one battalion of the Garde de Paris, and

the 5th and 17th dragoons. Total, 1,300 cavalry and 1,700 infantry.

[579] Line regiments (each of 4 batts.), Nos. 118, 119, 120, 122, and

a squadron of the 21st Chasseurs, 9,298 men.

There were also present in the circumscription of Serras’s and

Kellermann’s command the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo (two battalions)

and Gardanne’s five squadrons of dragoons, which Masséna had left

behind, in the vain hope that they would keep the line clear between

Almeida and Salamanca. This force added 2,500 men to the total of the

French troops in Leon.

If the French were left rather weak in this direction, the same was

not the case in the region further east. From Burgos to the Bidassoa

the country-side was full of troops in the latter half of September,

when the Army of Portugal had gone westward. In the Government of

Burgos were the two infantry divisions of the Young Guard, under

Roguet and Dumoustier, with their two cavalry regiments, making

11,464 sabres and bayonets. Navarre was occupied by 8,733 men,

Biscay by 8,085. The little province of Santander was held by three

provisional battalions 3,500 strong. But this permanent garrison,

making over 31,000 men, was at the moment supplemented by Drouet’s

9th Corps, for whose arrival at the front Masséna had waited so long

and so vainly. On September 15 its commander, its head quarters, and

Claparéde’s division, were at Vittoria: Couroux’s division and the

cavalry brigade of Fournier were echelloned between Vittoria and

Bayonne. The whole corps mustered over 18,000 sabres and bayonets.

Fifty thousand men, therefore, adding the permanent garrisons to

the advancing corps of Drouet, were between Burgos and Bayonne, and

there were yet a few more troops to come forward from the interior of

France, for Caffarelli was bringing up another division, which had

the official title of the ‘Division of Reserve of the Army of Spain,’

and consisted of four provisional regiments of infantry and two

cavalry regiments, with a strength of 8,000 men[580]. It was ordered

to be at Bayonne by October 20, and formed the nucleus of the force

which in the next year was styled the ‘Army of the North’.

[580] See _Correspondance_, xxi. 106. On Sept. 13, the date of the

dispatch creating Caffarelli’s division, one of its regiments was

forming at Limoges, another at Blois, another at Bordeaux, the fourth

at Orleans.

Without counting this last unit, which was only in process of

formation in September, Napoleon had between the Galician frontier

and Bayonne no less than 72,000 men[581]. What had his enemies to

oppose to this formidable host, whose strength was considerably

greater than that of the force with which Masséna invaded Portugal?

Of regularly organized troops the number of Spaniards and Portuguese

opposed to them was absolutely insignificant. Silveira in the

Tras-os-Montes had six regiments of militia and one of the line--this

last being the 24th, the absconding garrison of Almeida. The whole

made under 7,000 men, including an incomplete cavalry regiment. Mahy

in Galicia had recruited up the depleted divisions which La Romana

had left with him in the spring to a strength of 12,000 men, mostly

raw and untrustworthy; for the best regiments had been destroyed at

the siege of Astorga. The remains of the army of Asturias, which had

suffered so many defeats at the hands of Bonnet during the spring and

summer, consisted of about 6,000 men, of whom half, under Barcena

and Losada, were holding the western end of the province, behind

the Navia river, with head quarters at Castropol, while the rest

lurked in the higher valleys of the Cantabrian Sierra, rendering

Bonnet’s communication with Serras in Leon insecure, and sometimes

descending to the coast, to make a sudden attack on one of the

small garrisons which linked the French garrison in Oviedo with

that at Santander. Of these roving bands the chief leader was the

adventurous Porlier, the _Marquesito_[582], as the Asturians called

him, who won a well-deserved reputation for his perseverance and

never-failing courage. The 25,000 men of Silveira, Mahy, and the

Asturian army were the only regular troops opposed to the 75,000

French in Northern Spain. How came it, then, that the enemy was held

in check, and never succeeded in pushing on to the support of Masséna

any force save the two divisions of Drouet? The answer is simple: the

French garrisons were fixed down to their positions partly because

of Napoleon’s entire lack of naval power, partly because of the

unceasing activity of the guerrilleros, who were far more busy in

1810 than at any preceding time. As to the first-named cause, it may

be said that the 20,000 French in Asturias, Santander, and Biscay

were paralysed by the existence of a small Anglo-Spanish squadron

based on Corunna and Ferrol. As long as this existed, every small

port along the whole northern coast of Spain had to be garrisoned,

under penalty of a possible descent from the sea, which might cut the

road from Oviedo to San Sebastian at any one of a hundred points, and

provide arms and stores for the guerrilla bands of the mountains.

Many such expeditions were carried out with more or less success in

1810. The first and most prosperous of them took place in July, when

Porlier, putting his free corps of some 1,000 men on transports, and

convoyed by the British commodore Mends, with a couple of frigates,

came ashore near the important harbour of Santona, drove out the

small garrison, and then coasted along in the direction of Biscay,

destroying shore-batteries and capturing as many as 200 men at one

point and another. Of the peasantry of the coast, some enlisted in

Porlier’s band, others took to the hills on their own account, when

they had been furnished with muskets from the ships. The Marquesito

repeated his raid in August, but this time stopped on shore, and put

himself at the head of the local insurgents, who made so strong a

head in the country about Potes and the upper Pisuerga, that Serras

marched against him with almost the whole of his division[583],

and spent September in hunting him along the sides of the sierras.

But though aided by troops lent by Bonnet, and by detachments from

Burgos, the French general could never catch the adroit partisan,

who, when too hard pressed, returned to the central mountains of the

Asturias.

[581] Viz. Kellermann, 3,000; Serras, 9,000; Bonnet, 8,000; Young

Guard, 11,500; Biscay, 8,000; Navarre, 8,500; Santander, 3,500; 9th

Corps, 18,000; Masséna’s Garrisons, 2,500.

[582] As being nephew to the Marquis of La Romana.

[583] See pp. 270-1.

Pleased with the exploits of Porlier, the Cadiz Regency resolved

to keep up the game, and sent up to Corunna Colonel Renovales,

the officer who had for so long made head against Suchet in the

mountains of Aragon[584]. He was authorized to requisition a brigade

from Mahy’s army, and the more seaworthy ships from the arsenal of

Ferrol. Applications for naval assistance had also been made to the

British Admiralty, and Sir Home Popham came, with four frigates and a

battalion of marines, to assist in a systematic raid along the coasts

of Asturias and Biscay. The joint expedition started from Corunna on

October 14, with a landing force of 1,200 Spanish and 800 British

bayonets on board. On the 16th it drew in to land near the important

harbour of Gijon, where Bonnet kept a force of 700 men, who depended

for their succour on the main body of his division at Oviedo. But the

French general chanced to be hunting Porlier further to the east,

and had left the Asturian capital almost ungarrisoned. Hence, when

Porlier unexpectedly appeared before Gijon on the inland side, having

eluded his pursuer, and the ships threw the landing force ashore,

the French battalion had to fly. Several ships, both privateers and

merchantmen, with a considerable amount of military stores, fell

into the hands of Porlier and Renovales. This exploit drew down on

them the whole French force in the Asturias, for Bonnet concentrated

every man and musket on Gijon. But the Anglo-Spanish squadron, having

thus drawn him westward, sailed in the opposite direction, and,

after threatening Santona, was about to touch at Vivero, when it was

scattered by a hurricane from the Bay of Biscay. A Spanish frigate

and brig, an English brig, and several gunboats and transports were

dashed on the rocky coast, and lost with all hands. This disaster,

which cost 800 lives, compelled Renovales to return to Corunna

(November 2). But the raid had not been useless; it had compelled

Bonnet to evacuate many posts, distracted the garrisons of Santander

and Biscay, and even induced Caffarelli to march down to the coast

with his newly-arrived division, the ‘Reserve of the Army of Spain.’

Serras, too, had drawn up the greater part of his scattered division

to the north-west, thus leaving the borders of Galicia and the

Tras-os-Montes hardly watched. This enabled Mahy to send down troops

into the plain of Leon, and to establish something like a blockade

around Astorga. But all the operations of the Captain-General of

Galicia were feeble and tentative. He passed among his countrymen as

an easy-going man, destitute of energy or initiative[585]. Silveira,

in the Tras-os-Montes, a more active but a more dangerous man to

entrust with troops, took advantage of Serras’s absence to cross the

Douro, invest Almeida, and cut the communication between that place

and Ciudad Rodrigo[586].

[584] See pp. 10-11.

[585] See for this verdict both Arteche and Toreno.

[586] See p. 447.

Such was the effect of the sea-power, even when it was used sparingly

and by unskilful hands. The raids along the northern coast had kept

Bonnet and the troops in Santander and Biscay fully employed; they

had distracted Serras, Caffarelli, and even the garrisons of the

province of Burgos. They had saved Mahy and Silveira from attack,

and had lighted up a blaze of insurrection in the western hills of

Cantabria which, thanks to the energy of Porlier and his colleague

Louga, was never extinguished.

Meanwhile the mass of French troops between Burgos and Pampeluna--the

9th Corps, the Young Guard Divisions, and the garrison in

Navarre--had been ‘contained’ by an enemy of a different sort. Here

the influence of the British naval supremacy was little felt: it

was due to the energy of Spaniards alone that the 38,000 men under

Drouet, Roguet and Dumoustier, and Reille were prevented during the

months of September, October, and November from doing anything to

help Masséna. Old Castile, Navarre, and the lands of the Upper Ebro,

were kept in a constant turmoil by a score of guerrillero chiefs,

of whom the elder Mina was the leading figure. We have already had

occasion to speak of the exploits of his relative, ‘the Student’ as

he was called, to distinguish him from his uncle, and have noted his

final capture by Suchet[587]. Francisco Espoz y Mina had rallied the

relics of his nephew’s band, and began his long career of raids and

counter-marches in April 1810. His central place of refuge was the

rough country on the borders of Navarre and Aragon, where he kept his

main dépôt at the head of the valley of Roncal; but he often ranged

as far afield as Biscay and the provinces of Soria and Burgos. Almost

from his first appearance he obtained a mastery over the other chiefs

who operated on both sides of the Upper Ebro, having won his place by

the summary process of seizing and shooting one Echeverria, ‘who,’

as he writes, ‘was the terror of the villages of Navarre, which he

oppressed and plundered in a thousand ways, till they complained

to me concerning him. I arrested him at Estella on June 13, 1810,

caused him to be shot with three of his principal accomplices, and

incorporated his band (600 foot and 200 horse) with my own men[588].’

Mina was the special enemy of Reille, then commanding in Navarre,

but he also attracted the attention of Drouet, one of whose divisions

was entirely absorbed in hunting him during the autumn of 1810.

This was the main cause of the non-appearance of the 9th Corps at

Rodrigo and Salamanca, when Masséna was so anxiously awaiting its

arrival. Mina’s lot during this period was no enviable one: he was

beset on all sides by flying columns, and was often forced to bid his

band disperse and lurk in small parties in the mountains, till the

enemy should have passed on. Sometimes he was lurking, with seven

companions only, in a cave or a gorge: at another he would be found

with 3,000 men, attacking large convoys, or even surprising one of

the blockhouses with which the French tried to cover his whole sphere

of activity. The Regency, admiring his perseverance, gave him, in

September, the title of ‘Colonel and Commandant-General of all the

Guerrilleros of Navarre.’ He asserts with pride, in his memoir, that

he was at one and the same time being hunted by Dorsenne, commanding

at Burgos, Reille from Navarre, Caffarelli and his ‘division of

Reserve of the Army of Spain,’ by D’Agoult, Governor of Pampeluna,

Roguet, commanding the Young Guard, and Paris, one of Suchet’s

brigadiers from the Army of Aragon. Yet none of the six generals,

though they had 18,000 men marching through his special district,

succeeded in catching him, or destroying any appreciable fraction of

his band.

[587] See p. 286.

[588] See Mina’s _Extracto de su Vida_, published in London, during

his exile, in 1825.

There is no exaggeration in this; his services were invaluable during

the campaign of Portugal, since he was wearing out a French force of

five times his own strength in fruitless marches, under winter rains,

and over roads that had become all but impassable. The archives of

the French War Office show lists of officers by the dozen killed or

wounded ‘dans une reconnaissance en Navarre,’ or ‘dans une rencontre

avec les bandes de Mina,’ or ‘en combat près de Pampelune,’ during

the later months of 1810. Wellington owed him no small gratitude,

and expressed it to him in 1813, when he entrusted him with much

responsible work during the Campaign of the Pyrenees. The suffering

inflicted on the provinces of the Upper Ebro by Mina’s activity

was of course terrible: the French destroyed every village that

sheltered him or furnished him with recruits, and were wont to shoot

every prisoner from his band that they caught, till he began to

retaliate by corresponding or greater numbers of executions from the

considerable number of prisoners in his hands. In 1811 this barbarous

system was in full swing on both sides, but it was put to an end by

mutual agreement in 1812. In addition to the woes that Navarre and

its neighbours suffered under the French martial law, and by the

monstrous requisitions imposed upon them to feed the mass of troops

forming the flying columns, they had also to maintain the patriotic

bands. Mina declares that he always took rations for his men, but

avoided levying money contributions on the peasantry, depending

on his booty, the rents of national and ecclesiastical property,

on which he laid hands, on fines inflicted on ‘bad Spaniards,’ i.

e. those who had done anything to help his pursuers, and on ‘the

custom-houses which I established upon the very frontier of France;

for I laid under contribution even the French custom-house at Irun,

on the Bidassoa, which engaged to deliver, and actually paid to my

delegates, 100 gold ounces (about £320) per month.’ By this strange

secret agreement private goods passing Irun and the other frontier

posts were guaranteed against capture in the district which Mina’s

bands infested[589].

[589] Mina’s _Breve Extracto_, p. 39.

Eastward of Mina’s sphere of activity the guerrilleros were more

numerous but less powerful. Among the chief of them was Julian

Sanchez, who, with a mounted band of 300 to 500 lancers--infantry

would have been easily caught in the plain of Leon--busied himself

in cutting the communication between Salamanca, Ciudad Rodrigo,

Zamora, and Valladolid, and was Kellermann’s chief tormentor. He was

in regular communication with Wellington, and sent him many captured

dispatches and useful pieces of information. In Old Castile the

priest Geronimo Merino, generally known as ‘El Cura,’ was the most

famous and most active among many leaders. It was his band, aided by

that of Tapia, also a cleric, which on July 10, 1810, fought a most

daring and desperate action at Almazan, near Soria, with two French

battalions of marines, who were marching, the one to join Masséna

the other to join Soult. It cost the enemy no less than 13 officers

_hors de combat_, as the Paris archives show[590], and over 200

men, though the guerrilleros were finally beaten off. In October he

surprised and captured an enormous convoy of corn and munitions of

war, whose loss put the French garrison of Burgos in considerable

straits for some weeks. He waged with Dorsenne the same horrible

contest of retaliation in the shooting of prisoners which Mina was

at the same time carrying on with the generals in Navarre. There

were many other bands in Old Castile, those of Abril, Tenderin,

Saornil, Principe, and others, of whom some are accused by their own

colleagues of being more harmful to the country-side than to the

French, from their reckless and miscellaneous plundering, and their

refusal to combine for any systematic action[591]. Yet even the worst

of them contributed to distract the activity of the French garrisons,

and to retard the communication of dispatches and the march of

isolated detachments. Under the easy excuse that it was dangerous

to move any small body of men along the high-roads, the French

commanders of every small town or blockhouse detained for weeks,

and even months, drafts on their way to the south or the west, with

the result that the number of recruits received at Madrid, Seville,

or Salamanca never bore any proper proportion to the total that had

crossed the Bidassoa.

[590] Martinien’s lists show seven officers hit in the 44th Équipage

de Marine, which joined Masséna in the next month, and six in the

Bataillon D’Espagne, which was on its way to Cadiz.

[591] See Arteche, ix. 241.

Northward from Old Castile, on the skirts of the mountains of

Santander and Biscay, the dominating personality among the

guerrilleros was Louga, who afterwards rose to some distinction as a

commander of regular troops. His special task was the cutting of the

communications between Burgos and Bilbao, and Bilbao and Santander;

but he often co-operated with Porlier, when that restless partisan

made one of his descents from the Asturian mountains, either on to

the coast region or on the southern skirts of the Cantabrian sierras.

On the whole, there were probably never more than 20,000 guerrilleros

in arms at once, in the whole region between the Sierra de Guadarrama

and the shore of the Bay of Biscay. They never succeeded in beating

any French force more than two or three battalions strong, and were

being continually hunted from corner to corner. Yet, despite their

weakness in the open field, their intestine quarrels, their frequent

oppression of the country-side, and their ferocity, they rendered

good service to Spain, and incidentally to Great Britain and to all

Europe, by pinning down to the soil twice their own numbers of good

French troops. Any one who has read the dispatches of the commandants

of Napoleon’s ‘military governments,’ or the diaries of the officers

who served in Reille’s or Dorsenne’s or Caffarelli’s flying columns,

will recognize a remarkable likeness between the situation of affairs

in Northern Spain during 1810 and 1811 and that in South Africa

during 1900 and 1901. Lightly moving guerrilla bands, unhampered by a

base to defend or a train to weigh them down, and well served as to

intelligence by the residents of the country-side, can paralyse the

action of an infinitely larger number of regular troops.

In the north-east of Spain, where the French were engaged not with

mere scattered bands of guerrilleros, but with two regular armies,

O’Donnell’s Catalans and Caro’s Valencians, the fortune of war took

no decisive turn during the autumn of 1810, though one dreadful blow

to the Spanish cause--the loss of Tortosa--was to fall in the winter

which followed.

We left Suchet in August 1810, established in his newly-conquered

positions at Lerida and Mequinenza, master of all the plain-land of

Aragon, as well as of a strip of Western Catalonia, and only waiting

for the co-operation of Macdonald and the 7th Corps to recommence

his operations[592]. That co-operation, however, was long denied

him. The Emperor’s last general orders, which had reached Suchet in

June, briefly prescribed to him that the conquest of the city and

kingdom of Valencia was his final object, but that he must first

break the Spanish line by capturing Tortosa, the great fortress

of the Lower Ebro, and Tarragona, the main stronghold of Southern

Catalonia[593]. For both these latter operations he was to count

on the aid of Macdonald and the Army of Catalonia[594]. Relying on

this support, Suchet, after less than a month had elapsed since the

capture of Mequinenza, had pushed his advanced guard down the Ebro,

till it was at the very gates of Tortosa. One detachment even passed

the town, and seized the ferry of Amposta, the only passage of the

Ebro near its mouth, actually cutting the great road from Tarragona

to Valencia, and only leaving the bridge of Tortosa itself open,

for the linking of the operations of Caro and O’Donnell. Meanwhile

Suchet was preparing his siege-train at Mequinenza, and waiting for a

rise in the Ebro, which would commence to become navigable with the

arrival of the autumn rains, in order to ship his guns down-stream to

their destined goal. He was at the same time making the land route to

Tortosa passable, by repairing the old military road from Caspe to

Mora and Tivisa, which had been constructed during the wars of the

Spanish Succession, but had long ago fallen into ruin.

[592] See pp. 300-9.

[593] _Correspondance_ under May 29.

[594] _Correspondance_ under Sept. 16.

Suchet was quite aware that by thrusting a comparatively small

force--he had only brought up 12,000 men--into the near neighbourhood

of Tortosa, he was risking the danger of being attacked at once by

the Army of Valencia from the south and O’Donnell’s Catalans from

the north. But he trusted that Macdonald and the 7th Corps would

keep the latter--the more formidable enemy--employed, while he had

a well-founded contempt for the generalship of Caro, who had always

proved himself the most incompetent and timid of commanders. But

Macdonald arrived late, having been forced to spend the whole summer,

as has been already related[595], in his triple revictualling of

Barcelona, and meanwhile the Valencian army came to the front. Its

leading division, under Bassecourt, threatened Morella, on Suchet’s

flank, early in August, hoping to draw him away to defend this

outpost. But a single brigade under Montmarie sufficed to turn back

the Valencian detachment, and Suchet kept his positions. O’Donnell

meanwhile, vainly hoping for solid help from Caro, had joined the

division of his army which was kept at Falcet[596], and after

threatening Suchet’s head quarters at Mora on July 30, so as to

distract his attention, suddenly turned aside and entered Tortosa

with 2,500 men. Calling out all the troops available for a sortie,

he issued from the town on August 3, and beat up the outposts of the

division under Laval, which was in observation before his gates.

But though the Catalans fought fiercely, and drove in the first

French line, they were not strong enough to push the enemy away from

Tortosa. O’Donnell should have brought a heavier force if he intended

to accomplish his end. Shortly after he returned to Tarragona,

whither he was called by the movements of Macdonald.

[595] See p. 311.

[596] See p. 313.