to meet you. I shall be on the banks of the Jhelam on the 7th or 8th,
and my progress beyond that depends on the dawk being laid: but if that
goes right, I ought to join you in ten days at the furthest.
Believe me, my dear Mr. Macnaghten,
Yours sincerely,
ALEXANDER BURNES.
P.S.—I have thought it advisable to send a duplicate of this letter,
which Mr. Lord has been so good as to copy for me, by the Maharajah’s
dawk, as it prevents accidents, and may reach you sooner.
END OF VOL. I
LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING
CROSS.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] In most cases I have had the original letters and documents in
my possession—in the rest, authenticated copies. The translations
are official translations, verified, in some of the most important
instances, as in the treaties in Book V., by one of the most
accomplished Persian scholars in the kingdom.
[2] And again in the cold weather of 1798-99 he advanced as far as
Lahore, but was recalled by the invasion of Khorassan by the Persian
troops. Lord Wellesley had by this time succeeded to the government of
India. The danger was then considered sufficiently cogent to call for
an augmentation of the native army.
[3] I find this fact, which however is to be referred rather to
dread of the Mahrattas than to hatred of the British, stated, among
other answers to queries put in 1800-1 by Captain Malcolm to Mahomed
Sadik.—_MS._
[4] Of the two, perhaps, Lord Wellesley regarded the movements of the
Douranee monarch with the livelier concern. Sir John Shore wrote:
“Report speaks of an invasion of Hindostan by Zemaun Shah, and with
respect to his intention is entitled to credit.... The execution of
his intentions will be hazardous unless he can obtain the co-operation
of the Sikhs and hostages for the continuance of it; and I have great
doubt as to his success.” Lord Wellesley, two or three years later,
spoke of the threatened invasion “creating the liveliest sensation
throughout India;” and added, “Every Mahomedan, even in the remotest
region of the Deccan, waited with anxious expectation for the advance
of the champion of Islam.”
[5] Men who lived to occupy a space in history, as the Duke of
Wellington, Sir Barry Close, and Sir Thomas Munro. Malcolm was
Secretary to the Commission, and Munro his assistant.
[6] “Captain Malcolm,” he wrote to the Secret Committee, “returned from
his embassy in the month of May, after having completely succeeded
in accomplishing every object of his mission, and in establishing a
connection with the government of the Persian Empire, which promises to
the interests of the British nation in India political and commercial
advantages of the most important description.”—[_MS. Records._]
[7] A writer in the _Calcutta Review_, who betrays an acquaintance with
his subject such as could only have been acquired in the countries
of which he writes, or by the examination of an immense mass of
contemporary records, justly observes: “That the storm was dissipated
in the manner suggested by Lord Wellesley was creditable to his
lordship’s foresight, but was entirely independent of his measures. The
second expedition of Futteh Ali Khan into Khorassan in 1800, which drew
Shah Zemaun from Candahar to Herat, took place almost simultaneously
with Captain Malcolm’s journey from the south of Persia to the
capital. His majesty received the British mission at Subzewar; and the
subsequent proceedings of Shah Mahmood, which led, in the sequel, to
his dethronement, so far from originating in British instigation or in
Persian support, were in reality indebted for their success to their
entire independence of all foreign aid. As the minion of Persia, Shah
Mahmood could never have prevailed against his elder brother. As the
popular Douranee champion he was irresistible.”—[_Calcutta Review_,
vol. xii.] Malcolm was at Shiraz in June, 1800, when he received
intelligence of the Shah’s successes in Khorassan.
[8] _MS. Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm._
[9] Before Malcolm left Shiraz he began to have some misgivings on the
score of his lavish expenditure. “I trust I will not disappoint your
hopes,” he writes from that place, under date July 26, 1800, “but the
expense I have incurred is heavy, and it is on that score alone I am
alarmed. Not that it is one farthing more than I have to the best of
my judgment thought necessary to answer, or rather further, the ends
of my mission, and to support the dignity of the British Government;
but people sometimes differ in their opinions on such points. However,
‘All’s well that ends well.’”—[_MS. Correspondence of Sir John
Malcolm._]
[10] _Brigadier-General Malcolm to Lord Minto, October, 1810._
[11] Kishm is a large island, and Angani a small one at the entrance of
the Persian Gulf. They properly belonged to the Arabs. Kharrack is at
the further end of the Gulf, nearly opposite Bushire.
[12] _MS. Correspondence._—In another letter Malcolm says: “Had I to do
with men of sense and moderation I should not fear, but I have to deal
with a race that are possessed of neither.” The necessity of adopting
in all his negotiations the most flowery language, somewhat puzzled him
at first; but in time he fell into the right vein of discourse. On one
occasion, wishing to demonstrate the advantages of simplicity of style,
he produced a copy of an Indian treaty, when the Meerza, after reading
two articles of it, declared that he would “give in his resignation to
his sovereign rather than that such a document should be copied into
the records of the office over which he presided.”
[13] These treaties, which have never been officially published, are
printed for the first time I believe in the appendix to Vol. I., “Life
of Sir John Malcolm.”
[14] There was a considerable trade in horses; but rather through than
from Afghanistan. The animals were brought from Balkh and Toorkistan,
fattened at Caubul, and sold in India.
[15] “Five or six cafilas of this indigo leave the Derajat annually,
which on an average consist of seven hundred camels, each carrying
eighty Tabrizee maunds. These come into Persia by the route of Candahar
and Herat.”—[_Mahomed Sadik’s Answers to Captain Malcolm, 1800-1_
(_MS._).]
[16] And even this obligation ceased to be recognised by Ahmed Shah,
who paid the Douranee horsemen for their services, alleging that their
lands had been bestowed upon them as a free and unencumbered gift. In
Zemaun Shah’s time they held pay-certificates, available when they were
called out on active service, and realised, if they could, the amount
due to them by means of orders on Cashmere, Mooltan, and other outlying
provinces.—[_MS. Records—Rawlinson and Malcolm._]
[17] Or, more strictly, for every parcel of land demanding the services
of a single _kulba_, or plough; from which the division of land, and
the assessment founded upon it, took its name.
[18] To an elaborate report on the revenue system of Western
Afghanistan, especially as affecting the Douranee tribes, drawn up by
Major Rawlinson in 1842, I am indebted for much valuable information,
which will be found incorporated with subsequent portions of the
narrative.
[19] The authority for this, according to Malcolm’s informant, was the
Caubul records. Forster, who travelled in Afghanistan in the reign of
Timour Shah, says that his entire army did not exceed 30,000 men, nor
his revenue a million of our money. How these men contrived to pay
themselves, may be gathered from a passage in Forster’s Travels, which
is worth transcribing: “This day a body of Afghan cavalry encamped in
the environs of Akorah, and overspread the country like a swarm of
locusts, devouring and destroying wherever they went. It seemed as if
the land was invaded; they entered in a violent manner every village
within their scope, and fed themselves and horses at the expense of the
inhabitants. Such expeditions afford these hungry creatures almost the
only means of subsistence; for when inactive, they are often reduced
to such distress by the blind parsimony of their prince, that their
horses, arms, and clothes, are sold for a livelihood.” The same writer,
speaking generally of the Afghan army, says that he “felt a sensible
disappointment at seeing it composed of a tumultuous body, without
order or common discipline.”
[20] And even the character of Futteh Khan was at that time very little
understood and appreciated. He was described to Captain Malcolm as a
man of influence, but of low, dissipated habits, who spent all his
time in drinking wine and in smoking bang. It should be mentioned that
Prince Ferooz, Mahmoud’s brother, was associated in this enterprise. He
became master of Herat, whilst Mahmoud pushed on to Candahar.
[21] The Kuzzilbashes, of whom frequent mention will be made in the
course of this narrative, are Persian settlers in Afghanistan; many of
whom are retained in the military service of the state.
[22] Since this passage was written, I have had reason to think that
it ought to be accepted with some qualification. In October, 1840,
when Dost Mahomed was flitting about the Kohistan, and the greatest
anxiety prevailed among our political officers at Caubul, Shah Soojah
said to Sir William Macnaghten, just as he was taking leave after
an excited conference, “You know I have from the first expressed to
you a mean opinion of my own countrymen. If you want further proof,
look at that from my own brother.” The Shah then showed Macnaghten an
intercepted letter, bearing the seal of Shah Zemaun, to the address
of Sultan Mahomed Barukzye, purposing that, as Shah Soojah had made
over the country to the infidels, the Barukzyes and the Sikhs united
should make him (Shah Zemaun) King of Afghanistan.—[_Unpublished
Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._] This story may seem to be
at variance with the statement in the preceding page,—that “between a
blind king and a dead king there is no political difference;” but I
am acquainted with no Mahomedan law that excludes a blind prince from
the throne. The exclusion is based upon the popular assumption that
blindness disqualifies a man from managing the affairs of an empire.
If, however, in Mahomedan countries, there have been no exceptions to
this rule—of which I am doubtful—in the regal line, it is certain that
many provincial governments have been in the hands of men who have been
deprived of their sight. The case of Shah Allum, the blind King of
Delhi, is hardly to the point; for during the years of his darkness,
his royalty was only a name.
[23] This was in July, 1803. Shah Soojah’s own account of these
transactions, which forms part of the autobiography written by him at
Loodhianah in 1826-27, is contained in the following words:-“After
our arrival at Kazee, we had scarcely prepared our force, when Futteh
Khan’s army appeared; our troops immediately were drawn up in battle
array, and an attack made upon them. The battle lasted from the
morning to the evening prayer, when the enemy gave way, and retreated
in great disorder to the valley Advaz, and then to Kamran’s camp in
Candahar, where the drunkenness of the Kuzzilbash soldiery, and the
ill-treatment which the Soonee doctors received, soon disgusted all
our subjects, who entirely refused to give Kamran assistance. On
hearing this we immediately returned to our capital. Shah Mahmoud was
so disheartened by the news of our victory, that after swearing on the
Koran he would not again be guilty of treachery, he sent some of his
principal attendants to request the royal pardon, which we granted;
and had him conveyed from the outer to the inner fort with all due
respect to his rank. We then entered the Balla Hissar with regal
pomp, and seated ourselves on the throne of Caubul.” Mr. Elphinstone
says of this “victory,” that “Futteh Khan was at first successful; he
routed the party of the enemy which was immediately opposed to him,
and was advancing to the city, when the desertion of a great lord to
Soojah threw the whole into confusion: his own party then fell off
by degrees, till he found himself almost alone, and was compelled to
provide for his safety by a precipitate flight. Next morning Shah
Soojah entered Caubul in triumph. Mooktor-ood-Dowlah walked on foot by
the side of his horse, and many other Douranee ameers followed in his
train.”—[_Elphinstone’s “Caubul”—Appendix._]
[24] “While in Candahar,” writes Shah Soojah, “we received letters
from our beloved brother Shah-zadah Mooktor-ood-Dowlah, requesting
Prince Kaysur’s pardon, as his inexperience and the advice of Futteh
Khan and other rebels had led him from his duty. Out of respect to our
brother we agreed to this. Prince Kaysur being in Dehleh, Shah Zemaun
and Mooktor-ood-Dowlah went there and brought him into the presence.
Shah Zemaun then requested that we would give him Candahar once more,
and became security for his good behaviour in future. We agreed to
this in spite of our good judgment.” It was whilst still engaged
with the settlement of affairs at Candahar, not after their complete
adjustment, and Soojah’s subsequent expedition to Sindh (as stated by
Mr. Elphinstone), that ambassadors arrived at Bokhara to negotiate a
marriage between the Khan’s daughter and the Shah. “A suitable answer,”
says the Shah, “being given to the royal letter, and dresses of honour
being given to the ambassadors, we dismissed them with gifts. _Our
thoughts were then directed to the state of Candahar._” The point is
of little importance in Afghan history; and only worth noticing in
illustration of the difficulty of determining with precision, the dates
of different events, and the order in which they occurred. No two
narratives altogether agree—but except where Shah Soojah speaks of his
“victories,” we may regard him as a tolerably good authority in all
that relates to himself.
[25] The number of Oriental names which it is necessary to
introduce—the repetition of incidents, greatly resembling each other,
of conquest and re-conquest, of treachery and counter-treachery, of
rebellions raised and suppressed—creates a confusion in the mind of the
European reader. It is difficult to interest him in these indistinct
phantasmagoric transitions. The events, too, which I have narrated
have been chronicled before. I have endeavoured, however, to impart
some novelty to the recital by following, and sometimes quoting,
Shah Soojah’s autobiography, which was not accessible to preceding
historians.
[26] Hadjee Khalil Khan reached Bombay on the 21st of May, 1802, and
was killed on the 20th of July.
[27] _MS. Correspondence._
[28] “I shall send,” wrote Major Malcolm, “Mr. Pasley with the Hadjee’s
body, which will not only be considered a high compliment, but be
useful in a thousand ways. It will preserve this transaction from the
_touch_ of Mr. Manesty and Mr. Jones. It will enable me to convey a
correct state of the feeling here on the subject to many respectable
Persians, and I shall obtain from Mr. P. a true account of the manner
in which the transaction is received in Persia. He will give Lovett
information which will secure him from error at the outset, and be
of the highest utility to him during his residence in India.”—[_MS.
Correspondence._] It is not certain, however, that the high compliment
here designed was duly appreciated by the Persians. Sir Harford Jones
(from whose “touch” the transaction was to be preserved) says that
“it seems to have escaped Marquis Wellesley that that which might be
considered a compliment at Calcutta, might in Arabia, Turkey, and
Persia, be regarded as so improper as almost to become an insult.....
The Persian moollahs as well as the Persian merchants at Bagdad, were
shocked, and on my applying to old Sulemein Pacha for certain honours
to be paid to the corpse, when removed from Bagdad to be carried to
Nejeef, he said, ‘Very well: as you desire it to be done, it shall
be done: but Hadjee Khalil Khan lived an infidel, and with infidels,
and was, therefore, destined to hell; he was, however, murdered by
infidels, and so became a _shahyde_ (martyr); but his former friends
have robbed him of this chance, by deputing an infidel to attend his
corpse to the grave; his fate, therefore, is now fixed, and you may
carry him to the devil in any manner you like best.’”—[_Sir Harford
Jones’s account of the transactions of H. M.’s mission to the Court
of Persia, &c. Note_ vii.] It is curious, but somewhat humiliating,
to read the different versions of the same transactions put forth by
Jones and Malcolm, and their respective adherents. For example, Sir
Harford Jones says that when the Hadjee’s body reached Bagdad, Mr.
Day, a Bombay civilian, who had been deputed to accompany it into the
interior, took fright at the plague, and abandoned his charge. “Mr.
Day’s alarm was so great,” he says, “as to become most tormenting to
himself, and most ridiculous and troublesome to us, who had stood the
plague the preceding year. I, therefore, re-shipped him for Bussorah
as soon as possible, and undertook to receive and execute such wishes
as the Khan’s relatives expressed to me.” Now the account given of
this matter by one of the gentlemen of Malcolm’s mission, sets forth
that “Jones had frightened away Mr. Day by alarming accounts of the
plague.”-“On this subject,” it was added, “I need make no remarks
to you, who know him so well. This might be improper, and would, I
imagine, be perfectly unnecessary.” I have dwelt upon these personal
matters at greater length than they deserve, because they illustrate
the feelings, on either side, with which Jones and Malcolm, at a later
and more important period, were likely each to have regarded the
parallel but antagonistic mission of the other to the Persian Court.
The bitterness which then overflowed was the accumulated gall of years.
[29] Especial instructions having been given to the British mission
to secure the appointment of a man of rank as successor to Khalil
Khan, the intrigues of Aga Nebee to obtain the appointment greatly
embarrassed our diplomatists in Persia. But it was acknowledged that
the aspirant was a man of good temper, good abilities, and more than
average respectability. He professed himself to be heart and soul the
friend of the English; and, doubtless, was perfectly sincere in his
attachment to their wealth and profusion. Like all his countrymen, he
was capable of profound dissimulation, and lied without the slightest
remorse. Knowing the views of the British functionaries with regard to
the succession, he sent through his brother to Mr. Lovett an account
of an interview he had had with the Shah, representing that he had
urged upon his majesty the propriety of appointing an elchee of high
rank as successor to Hadjee Khalil Khan, but that the king had insisted
upon appointing him. In the same letter an amusing attempt is made to
persuade Mr. Lovett to proceed to Teheran as an ambassador from the
British-Indian Government, “with handsome and splendid equipments, so
as to exceed by many degrees those with which Major Malcolm travelled:
for this is the particular wish of the king and his ministers, in order
that it may get abroad universally that the English had, for the sake
of apologising, made these new preparations far exceeding the former,
and that it is evident they highly regard the friendship of the king,
and were not to blame for the death of Hadjee Khalil Khan. His majesty,
too, when he hears of the splendour and greatness of your retinue, will
be much pleased, and most favourably inclined.... _Do not be sparing in
expenditure, or presents, or largesses. Every country has its customs;
and every nation may be won somehow or other. The people of Persia
in the manner above stated._” It is hard to say which is to be most
admired, the candour or the craft of this.—[_MS. Records._]
[30] Some French agents, under the feigned character of botanists, had
visited Teheran before Buonaparte invaded Egypt, and wished Aga Mahomed
Khan, the then ruler of Persia, to seize Bussorah and Bagdad. They also
endeavoured to stimulate the Shah to assist Tippoo Sultan against the
British, and endeavoured to obtain permission to re-establish their
footing at Gombroon. Had the emissaries appeared in a more openly
diplomatic character, they might have succeeded, for Aga Mahomed Khan
coveted the territory named, and might have been induced to co-operate
in an attack upon the Turkish dominions; but the doubtful character
of the agents thwarted their schemes, and he gave little heed to the
representations of the _savans_.—[See _Brigadier Malcolm to Lord Minto:
MS. Records_.]
[31] General Gardanne’s suite, according to Colonel Malcolm, consisted
of “twenty-five officers, two clergymen, a physician, some artillery
and engineer officers, thirty European sub-officers, and a number of
artificers.”—[_MS. Records._]
[32] Malcolm wrote from Bombay on the 15th of April, stating the
course of policy he intended to pursue, and the tone of remonstrance
he purposed to adopt, at the same time urging the Governor-General to
suspend the mission of Sir Harford Jones. In this letter he says that
he should despair, “from his knowledge of Sir Harford’s character and
former petty animosities on the same scene, of maintaining concord
and unanimity in the gulf one hour after his arrival. Sir Harford,”
he added, “is not in possession of that high local respect and
consideration in the countries to which he is deputed that should
attach to a national representative.”
[33] _MS. Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm._
[34] _MS. Records._—Copies of these letters were obtained by the
Mission, and are now before me. I do not find in them anything to give
colour to the suspicion that it was intended forcibly to detain Pasley
at Shiraz. But such appears to have been the impression at the time,
and may have been the case. Sir James Mackintosh, writing from Bombay
to his son-in-law, Mr. Rich, at Bagdad, counsels him to be prepared for
a rapid retreat, and adds, “Pasley was very nearly made prisoner at
Shiraz.”
[35] _MS. Records._
[36] “General Malcolm came round to Calcutta in August to communicate
the information he had been able to collect, leaving his secretary at
Abushire, who was obliged subsequently to quit the place to prevent his
person being seized by the Persian Government, instigated by the French
agents.”—[_From letter of Instructions sent by Supreme Government to
Mountstuart Elphinstone, in 1809._—_MS. Records._]
[37] Another passage from this letter is worth quoting in the
margin:-“What I doubt (for I presume to go no further), is, whether it
be for our interest to force on the course of events in the present
circumstances. You are a man of frank character and high spirit,
accustomed to represent a successful and triumphant government. You
must from nature and habit be averse to temporise. But you have much
too powerful an understanding to need to be told, that to temporise is
sometimes absolutely necessary, and that men of your character only can
temporise with effect. When Gentz was in England, in 1803 (during the
peace), he said to me, that ‘it required the present system, and the
late ministers;’ for nothing required the reality and the reputation
of vigour so much as temporising.”—[_Mackintosh to Malcolm, July 13,
1808._]
[38] The first letter appears to have been written on the 10th of
August. On the 22nd, Brigadier Malcolm landed at Calcutta. On the
same day a letter was sent to Sir Harford Jones, directing him to
wait for further orders, and on the 29th another and more urgent
communication was addressed to him, with the intent of annulling his
mission. It appears that in those days a letter took more than three
weeks to accomplish the journey between Calcutta and Bombay. The
Governor-General’s letter of the 10th of August must have reached the
latter place about the 5th of September. Jones says, “In seven days
from receiving Lord Minto’s letter, I embarked on board _La Nereide_,
and she, with the _Sapphire_, and a very small vessel belonging to the
Company, called the _Sylph_, sailed out of Bombay harbour for Persia on
the 12th of September, 1808.” Malcolm had calculated that the letter
of August 22nd would reach Bombay by September 13th; and that in all
probability Jones would not embark before that date. But, as usual, he
was over-sanguine.
[39] _MS. Correspondence._
[40] _MS. Correspondence._
[41] For example, in one of his minutes written about this time, he
says: “It appears doubtful whether the partition of European Turkey
will precede the French expedition to India. There appears to be
reason, by the late advices, to suppose that the consent of the Porte
may have been obtained to the passage of the French army. In this case,
the approach of the army may be earlier than on the former supposition,
and it will have less difficulty to encounter. The route of our
divisions must in this event be through the territory of Bagdad.... I
incline, under all the circumstances now known to me, to think that
the force stationed at Karrack should be greater than we before looked
to.”—[_MS. Records._]
[42] _MS. Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm._
[43] In one of these letters, written in February, 1809, it is said:
“I cannot venture to omit acquainting you that, in the event of
your not complying, without further reference or delay, with the
instructions conveyed in this letter, by closing your mission and
retiring from Persia, it has been determined, and measures have been
taken accordingly, to disavow your public character in that country
subsequent to your receipt of my letter of 31st of October.”—[_MS.
Records._]
[44] _MS. Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm_—_December 24, 1808._
[45] Mr. Lumsden wrote a minute (July 10, 1809), in which he says: “We
must either continue to employ at the Court of Persia an agent in whom
we have no confidence, who has studiously endeavoured to degrade the
authority of the Government of India, under whose orders he was placed;
or by deputing an agent of our own to Teheran, whilst he continues
there acknowledged by the Persian Government as the representative of
his Britannic Majesty, we may expose the public interest to danger from
the presence in Persia of two distinct authorities, who cannot act in
concert, but will, it is to be feared, necessarily counteract each
other, and occasion great perplexity to the Persian minister.” At the
same time, Mr. Colebrooke wrote: “Our situation as regards Sir H. Jones
is certainly difficult and embarrassing in the extreme. We are desirous
of fulfilling the engagements he has contracted, and of maintaining
the alliance concluded by him. And we are glad that he should continue
at the Court of Persia to watch the wavering counsels of that Court,
and to oppose the revival of French influence at it, until he can be
replaced by our own envoy; but by either re-accrediting him with the
Court, or silently executing his engagements, we acquiesce in the
continued degradation of this government.”—[_MS. Records._]
[46] On the details of Malcolm’s supplementary mission it is
unnecessary to dwell. Its political results are compressible into the
smallest possible space. It was, indeed, a mere pageant; and a very
costly, but not wholly a profitless one. It yielded a considerable
harvest of literary and scientific results, among the most important
of which may be mentioned Malcolm’s elaborate and valuable “History of
Persia” and the present Sir Henry Pottinger’s admirable “Account of
Beluchistan;” works which, it has been well said, “not only filled up
an important blank in our knowledge of the East, but which materially
helped to fix the literary character of the Indian services.”
[47] It is just to Sir John Malcolm that his views of this question of
bribery, with reference to his proceedings and those of Sir H. Jones,
should be given in his own words: “Everything then,” he wrote, “with
Jones is a question of money. By cash alone all political questions are
decided—one article of a treaty he values at so much, another has its
price also. Is a French agent to be removed? the price of his dismissal
is as regularly settled as the price of a horse. The dismissal of
one (Monsieur Jouanin) has been purchased four times—three times by
advances of subsidy, and once with 50,000 piastres to monsieur himself;
and I suspect the convenient instrument of extortion is not yet far
from Tabruz. This is a country in which one cannot go on without a
large expenditure of money; but it should never form the basis of our
connection, as it now does; and if we add to our large annual bribe
(for a pecuniary subsidy over the application or which we have no
control, must be considered such) disbursements on every occasion where
Persia shows an inclination towards our enemies, we shall lose both our
money and our reputation.”—[_Brigadier Malcolm to Mr. Manesty, Feb. 23,
1810._ _MS._]
[48] From 1826 to 1835, however, the nomination of the Persian envoy
was again vested in the Indian Government; but the diplomatic control
was not relinquished by the Foreign-office.
[49] “I doubt,” wrote Lord Minto, “whether his jealousy would permit
him to admit, by treaty, our troops freely into his country, and to
consent that we should establish such posts both in front against the
enemy and elsewhere for the purpose of communication, as should render
us independent of his fidelity. If he does not accede to this, we shall
derive little benefit from his alliance.”—[_Minute of Lord Minto: MS.
Records._]
[50] A remarkably able paper, on the disposal of the subsidiary force
which, under the provisions of the defensive alliance with Scindiah,
that prince had agreed to receive, drawn up by Mr. Metcalfe, in
1804, conduced more, perhaps, than anything else to confirm Lord
Wellesley’s high opinion of the young civilian’s talents. On a
copy of it now before me is the following marginal note, written
in the Governor-General’s fine, bold, characteristic hand:-“This
paper is highly creditable to Mr. Metcalfe’s character and talents.
It may become very useful. A copy of it should be sent to the
Commander-in-Chief, and another to Major Malcolm.—W.”
[51] “The Rajah coupled his acquiescence in the proposed arrangements
of defence against an invading European army with the condition of
being permitted to extend his dominions over all the Sikh territories
between the Sutlej and the Jumna. He also provisionally demanded that
the British Government should not interfere in favour of the King of
Caubul in his aggressions against that monarch’s dominions—at the same
time shackling the advance of the British troops into his country, and
the establishment of the necessary depôts, with conditions which would
render any engagements with him for that purpose entirely inefficient
and nugatory. Even during the reference he made to government on these
demands, he crossed the Sutlej to attack the Sikh territories. The
extreme jealousy and suspicion of us evinced by the Rajah, together
with his own conduct and ambitious character, rendered it indispensably
necessary to resist his pretensions to sovereignty over the territories
on this side of the Sutlej, and the Rajah was required to withdraw his
army.”—[_Statement in Instructions to Mr Elphinstone: MS. Records._]
[52] “The point to aim at in our present transactions with the Rajah of
Lahore,” wrote Lord Minto, “appears to be that we should keep ourselves
as free as can be done without a rupture. I should, on this principle,
rather wish to protract than to accelerate the treaty.”—[_Minute of
Lord Minto: MS. Records._]
[53] “At the time when the proposal was made for the adjustment of
differences, the forces on both sides remained quiet in sight of each
other, when the news of the defeat of Junot (Duke of Abrantes) at
Vimiera, by the British army, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, was received
in the camps of General St. Leger and Colonel Ochterlony, and, as
usual, celebrated by royal salutes. The cause of this firing being
made known to Runjeet Singh, the salute was, by his special command,
repeated from all the artillery in his camp—a circumstance which,
whether it be attributed to politeness towards the British commanders,
with whom he was in treaty, or to a general condemnation of the system
of Buonaparte, was felt equally agreeable.”—[_Asiatic Annual Register._]
[54] An accidental collision between some of the Mahomedan sepoys of
Mr. Metcalfe’s mission, and a far superior body of Sikhs, in which the
inferiority of the latter was most unmistakeably demonstrated, had
no inconsiderable effect upon the mind of Runjeet Singh, who was a
spectator of the discomfiture of his countrymen.
[55] _MS. Records._
[56] Under date March 6, 1809.
[57] _MS. Records._ Another paragraph of these instructions is worth
quoting. “Although there is not now the same immediate exigency for
forming a friendly connexion with the Court of Caubul, yet that measure
is of importance, and contains an object of sound policy, in the event,
however remote, of either the French or any other European power
endeavouring to approach India by that route.”
[58] It is worthy of remark in this place, that Mr. Strachey, who
accompanied Mr. Elphinstone’s Mission in the capacity of secretary,
and who on this as on other occasions evinced the possession of a high
order of intellect, drew up a very able memorandum on the advantages of
forming a connexion with Bahwul Khan. In this paper there occurs the
following prescient passage:-“Bahwul Khan might also be induced, in the
event of actual hostilities, to invade the territories of Runjeet Singh
at any point we might suggest, and thereby form an important diversion,
whilst the British army would be advancing from another quarter of the
Sikh territory.”—[_MS. Records._]
[59] It is said that Mr. Elphinstone’s Mission received this hint
from an European deserter, named Pensley, who had been entertained,
in a military capacity, by Shah Soojah. They might have learnt the
lesson from Mr. Forster, who, twenty years before, had travelled in
Afghanistan. That enterprising gentleman, a civil servant of the
Company, found his beard of the greatest service. He suffered it to
grow for fifteen months, and had reason to regret that before he had
wholly shaken off Eastern associations, he allowed the razor to profane
it. Putting himself on board a Russian frigate in the Caspian, he
thought that he might reduce his face to its old European aspect; but
he tells us that “the Ghilan envoy, then proceeding on the frigate,
expressed a surprise to see me, whom he thought a Mahomedan, eating at
the same board with the Russian gentlemen; but when he saw a barber
commencing an operation on my beard, which I took the opportunity of
having shaved, he evinced great amazement and indignation; nor did he,
until repeatedly informed of my real character, cease his reprehension
of the act; during the process of which he threw on me many a look of
contempt. When the barber began to cut off the moustachios, he several
times, in a peremptory manner, required him to desist, and, seeing them
gone, ‘Now,’ said he, ‘of whatever country or sect you may be, your
disgrace is complete, and you look like a woman.’ Thus, after a growth
of fifteen months fell my beard, which in that period had increased
to a great magnitude, both in length and breadth, though it had been
somewhat shrivelled by the severity of the late winter. When you
advert to the general importance of an Asiatic beard, to the essential
services which mine had rendered, and to our long and intimate
association, I trust that this brief introduction of it to your notice
will not be deemed impertinent. This operation of cutting it ought,
however, to have been postponed till my arrival at Astracan.”
[60] It was the very costliness of these presents, and the lavish
expenditure of the entire Mission, that gave the death-blow to the old
system of diplomatic profusion. When the accounts of the Afghan and
Persian Missions came before the Governor-General in Council, Lord
Minto stood aghast at the enormous expenditure, and, in a stringent
minute, recorded “his deliberate opinion, that the actual expenditure
has far exceeded the necessity of the occasion—that the personal
expenses of the envoys might have been limited with respect both to the
nature and extent of the items composing them, and that the provision
of articles for presents to an extent so enormous as that exhibited in
the accounts of these Missions has been regulated by a principle of
distribution unnecessarily profuse.”—[_MS. Records._]
[61] It is to be regretted that Shah Soojah’s own notices of the
British Mission are very scanty. He says, in his autobiographical
narrative, “On receiving intelligence that the English ambassadors had
arrived at Kohat, we sent an appropriate party to meet and do them
honour. On their arrival, we gave them suitable dwellings, and ordered
their wants and wishes to be attended to. After a few days’ rest the
ambassadors came to the presence, and presented various articles of
European and Hindostanee workmanship, also many elephants with superb
accoutrements. Dresses of honour were conferred on all. We gave strict
orders that the Mission should be treated with every dignity, and
our most confidential Ameers waited on them.... We learned that Shah
Mahmoud had left Caubul, and halted at Chuk-Dilah. Hearing this, we
immediately reflected on the state of the Company’s ambassadors. We
resolved, first, to place them in a state and place of safety; and
proceed to punish the rebels; and then, if God would grant a victory,
we intended to return to treat them in a proper manner.”
[62] The Ameers had sent vakeels to Persia, seeking assistance against
Caubul; and the Persian ambassador had accompanied them on their return
to Sindh.
[63] Nor was this the only error into which Captain Seton had fallen.
That officer was instructed, before Mr. Elphinstone’s Mission had been
determined upon, to ascertain the practicability of sending an embassy
to Candahar or Caubul, by the route of Sindh; and upon the strength of
these instructions, had taken upon himself to address a letter to the
King of Caubul, expressing the desire of the British Government to form
an alliance with that monarch.
[64] I need scarcely write the names of Elphinstone and Pottinger—or
allude to their respective works. Of the former statesman I have
already spoken. The Lieutenant Henry Pottinger, who, early in the
century, accompanied the Sindh Mission, and was attached to General
Malcolm’s staff on his second visit to Persia, after passing, at a
later stage of his career, from the management of the wild tribes of
Beloochistan to play an intricate game of diplomacy with the flowery
courtiers of the Celestial Empire, and thence to the control of the
Caffre savages of Southern Africa, closed his public life in the more
commonplace government of Madras.
[65] The Shah says: “Mokhum Chund, on the part of Runjeet Singh,
informed us, that his master was anxious that we should proceed to
Lahore as soon as at liberty, and visit the residence of our seraglio
in that city; he also mentioned that his master’s fame would be
increased by our going. According to Futteh Khan’s petition, we agreed
to this, and marched towards Lahore with Mokhum Chund and other Singhs,
whilst Futteh Khan returned to Shah Mahmoud in Caubul.”
[66] Shah Soojah records that the faithful Rajah, on the King
announcing his determination to depart, “burst into tears. He urged
the dangers of the road, his wish to sacrifice his wealth for us, and
every excuse which affection could dictate, to prolong our stay.” “The
Rajah,” he adds, “accompanied us two marches, and at parting, which
took place in silence, tears stood in the eyes of both parties. We had
no dress of honour, no khillaut worth his acceptance, but he accepted
our thanks and blessing, and departed with every mark of grief.” Amidst
so much of selfish rapacity and dark ingratitude as marks these annals
of the Douranee Empire, it is a pleasure to chronicle such an episode
as this in the history of Shah Soojah’s fortunes. I am too willing to
believe the whole story to encourage any doubt of its authenticity.
The free use, indeed, which I have made of Shah Soojah’s autobiography
is sufficient proof of my belief in the general fidelity of the
narrative. It was written by the Shah’s Moonshee, under his Majesty’s
superintendence. I have quoted Lieutenant Bennett’s translation, as
published in the _Calcutta Monthly Journal_. It supplies, at the same
time, more interesting and more authentic materials of Afghan history
than are to be found elsewhere, and to the majority of readers is
probably as fresh as manuscript.
[67] “By an honorary or devotional vow of his mother he was consecrated
to the lowest menial service of the sacred cenotaph of Lamech.... This
cenotaph is known in the colloquial dialect of the country by the
appellation of Meiter Lam. In conformity with the maternal vow, when
the young aspirant became capable of wielding a brush, he was carried
to Meiter Lam by his mother, and instructed to exonerate her from the
consequences of a sacred obligation, by sweeping, for the period of a
whole day, the votive area included within the precincts of the holy
place inclosing the alleged tomb of the antediluvian, the father as he
is termed of the prophet Noah.”—[_General Halan._]
[68] There are varying accounts respecting the identity of this lady.
Mr. Vigne says that she was daughter of Timour Shah, and sister to Shah
Mahmoud. Mohun Lall, probably with more correctness, places her in a
lower generation—asserting that she was the sister of Prince Kamran,
and the wife of Prince Malik Quasim, son of Ferooz-ood-Deen. There is
something rather perplexing in these relationships. As Ferooz-ood-Deen
was the brother of Shah Mahmoud, if Mr. Vigne’s account be correct, his
son was the nephew of the lady in question.
[69] So Shah Soojah—who, however, does not allude to the outrage
committed by Dost Mahomed. He merely says, “After the Kujjar campaign,
Futteh Khan grew ambitious, and determined to take into his own hands
the reins of government, and for this purpose resolved to ensnare
Prince Kamran, who, hearing of the plot, seized Futteh Khan, put out
his eyes with the point of a sharp dagger, and after performing on him
an operation similar to the African mode of scalping, placed him in
confinement.”—[_Autobiography._]
[70] _Calcutta Review._ This passage, with many others of the present
chapter, is taken, with some additions and curtailments, from a
biography of Dost Mahomed Khan, written a few years ago by the author
of this work. As the article was the result of much research, and
written at least with the greatest care, I do not know that I can much
improve upon it. Of the circumstances attending the death of Futteh
Khan, an elaborate account is given by Captain James Abbott in his
“Journey to Khiva.” He received the story from Sumund Khan, “who had
been much about the person of Shah Kamran.” I subjoin the closing scene
of this tragic episode:-“Futteh Khan was brought into a tent, pitched
between Herat and the river, (?) in which sat a circle of his mortal
foes. They commenced by each in turn accusing him of the injuries
received at his hands, and heaping upon him the most opprobrious
epithets. Atta Mahmoud Khan then stepped up to him, and seizing one of
his ears, cut it off with his knife, saying, ‘This is for such and such
an injury done to such an one of my relatives.’ Shahagaussie Newaub
cut off the other ear. Each, as he wreaked this unmanly vengeance upon
the victim, whom he would have crouched to the day before, named the
wrong of which it was the recompence; thus depriving him of the highest
consolation the mind of man can possess under torment—the conscience
void of offence. Another of the barbarians cut off his nose; Khana
Moolla Khan severed his right hand; Khalook Dad Khan his left hand, the
blood gushing copiously from each new wound. Summurdar Khan cut off
his beard, saying, ‘This is for dishonouring my wife.’ Hitherto the
high-spirited chief had borne his sufferings without either weakness or
any ebullition of his excitable temper. He had only once condescended,
in a calm voice, to beg them to hasten his death. The mutilation of
ears and nose, a punishment reserved for the meanest offences of
slaves, had not been able to shake his fortitude; but the beard of a
Mahomedan is a member so sacred, that honour itself becomes confounded
with it; and he who had borne with the constancy of a hero the taunts
and tortures heaped upon him, seemed to lose his manhood with his
beard, and burst into a passion of tears. His torments were now drawing
to a close. Gool Mahomed Khan, with a blow of his sabre, cut off his
right foot, and a man of the Populzye tribe severed the left. Attah
Mahomed Khan finished his torments by cutting his throat.”
[71] This was in 1818. See close of the last chapter. “Azim Khan,”
says Shah Soojah, in his autobiography, “sent us a fawning petition,
informing us that he had collected all Futteh Khan’s relations,
comprehending the whole of the Barukzye tribe, and swearing, by
everything sacred, that he and the other chiefs had taken an oath
of fidelity to us their lawful king, entreated that we would march
immediately to Peshawur, where he would join the royal standard with
all the troops and the treasury of Cashmere. We sent for Mr. Murray,
and ordered him to make the Resident of Delhi acquainted with this,
and inform us of their opinion. This opinion he gave us, some days
afterwards, namely, ‘That for political reasons no assistance could be
given, but that we were at liberty either to depart or remain in the
asylum allotted to us.’ Two years had been passed in ease, and we now
determined to make an attempt to reascend our throne.”
[72] Shah Soojah attributes his defeat to an accidental explosion of
gunpowder. “Our attendants,” he says, “only amounted to 300, with two
guns, but they had taken up an advantageous position on a bridge,
near the garden. The Meer Akhor charged us with his horse; but the
first fire from the cannon made him bite the dust, when an unfortunate
accident happened. A large quantity of powder had been brought to be
divided among the matchlock men. This caught fire, by which fifty men
were blown up and others wounded. Resistance was now in vain, and we
escaped with difficulty to the Khybur hills.”
[73] The story is worth giving in a note, as eminently characteristic
of Afghan history. Dost Mahomed, who had proclaimed Sultan Ali king,
advised that prince to murder Shah Ayoob; and Azim Khan advised Shah
Ayoob to murder Sultan Ali. Sultan Ali indignantly rejected the
proposal; Shah Ayoob consented, on condition that Azim Khan would
return the compliment, by assassinating Dost Mahomed. This was agreed
upon. Sultan Ali was strangled in his sleep. Shah Ayoob then called
upon Azim Khan to perform his part of the tragedy; but the minister
coolly asked, “How can I slay my brother?” and recommended a renewal of
the expedition to Shikarpoor.
[74] Azim Khan does not appear to have recognised the strength of Dost
Mahomed’s character; and to this grand error must be attributed his
premature death. Shortly before the expedition to the Sikh frontier,
he had not only contemptuously declared that he did not require the
services of his brother, but had actually laid siege to Ghuzni. Azim
Khan’s batteries caused great slaughter; but Dost Mahomed could not be
persuaded to open the gates of the fortress. A negotiation took place;
and the brothers embraced. But they never forgave each other.
[75] “One Haji Ali,” says Mr. Masson, “who is reported to have shot the
Prince, despoiled the Shah of his raiments and clad him in his own;
then by the Sirdar’s orders, placed him behind himself on a horse and
carried him off to the Burj Vazir. A singular spectacle was offered to
the people of the city as Haji Ali bore the degraded monarch along the
streets; but they had become familiar with extraordinary events, and
regarded them with apathy. The Sirdars, when they had given the orders
consequent on the feat they had performed, returned to their dwellings
in the city with the same composure after the deposition of a monarch,
as if they had been enjoying a morning ride.” The unfortunate puppet
subsequently found his way to Lahore, where Runjeet Singh allowed him a
monthly pension of 1000 rupees.
[76] Masson.—Mr. Vigne says, that Dost Mahomed and Shere Dil Khan were
the cherry-eaters. We do not pretend to determine the point.
[77] “The days,” says General Harlan—and the truth of the statement
is not to be questioned-“That Dost Mahomed ascended the musnud,
he performed the ‘Toba,’ which is a solemn and sacred formula of
reformation, in reference to any accustomed moral crime or depravity
of habit. He was followed in the Toba by all his chiefs, who found
themselves obliged to keep pace with the march of mind—to prepare for
the defensive system of policy, this assumption of purity, on the
part of the Prince, suggested. The Toba was a sort of declaration of
principles; and the chiefs, viewing it in that light, beheld their
hopes of supremacy in imminent hazard.... In later life the Ameer
became sensible of the advantages arising from learning. Although
knowledge of literature among Mahomedan nations is confined to a
contracted sphere, at least the reputation of theological science
was essential to the chief, on whom had been conferred the title of
Ameer-ul-Mominin, or Commander of the Faithful. To escape the humility
of dependence upon subordinate agents, more especially the secretaries
necessarily employed in all revenue and judicial transactions, he
tasked his mind with the acquisition of letters, and became worthy, by
his industry and success in the pursuit, of the greatest respect of
the great, as he commanded the admiration of the vulgar, who are ever
accustomed to venerate the divinity of wisdom.”
[78] Among other stipulations was one, that “the heir-apparent of the
Shah shall always attend his highness with a force, having also his
family along with him; that he shall be treated with distinction, and
expected to accompany the Maharajah in all his journeys.” Another
demand put forth by Runjeet was for the delivery to him of the
sandalwood gates of Somnauth (or Juggernauth, as the Maharajah called
them), destined afterwards to confer such celebrity upon the Indian
administration of Lord Ellenborough. Shah Soojah’s answer to the demand
is worth quoting:-“Regarding the demand of the portals of sandal at
Ghiznee, a compliance with it is inadmissible in two ways: firstly, a
real friend is he who is interested in the good name of his friend. The
Maharajah being my friend, how can he find satisfaction in my eternal
disgrace? To desire the disgrace of one’s friend is not consistent
with the dictates of wisdom. Secondly, there is a tradition among all
classes of people that the forefathers of the Sikhs have said that
their nation shall, in the attempt to bring away the portals of sandal,
advance to Ghiznee; but having arrived there, the foundation of their
empire shall be overthrown. I am not desirous of that event. I wish for
the permanence of his highness’s dominion.”
[79] “The Sindhians have agreed to pay a contribution of either five or
seven lakhs of rupees to farm the Shikarpoor territory for a settled
annual sum from Shah Soojah, and to provide him with an auxiliary
force, the Shah taking hostages from them for the entire execution of
these articles.”—[_Captain Wade to Mr. Macnaghten, March 5, 1834._]
[80] Not the minister—but a Persian adventurer of the same name, who
afterwards obtained service in Bokhara.
[81] Mr. Vigne says that he had this from Campbell himself. The word
indicates more properly a plundering attack; but is employed here to
signify an irregular descent, or rush, upon the enemy.
[82] Shah Soojah, when on his way to Shikarpoor, in 1833, had entered
into a treaty with Runjeet Singh, by one of the articles of which he
ceded Peshawur to the Sikhs. But Runjeet Singh was by no means inclined
to wait until the Shah had established his title to give away any
portion of the Afghan dominions; so he sent his grandson, Nao Nehal
Singh, a boy, who then “took the spear into his hand” for the first
time, to take possession of the place.
[83] He had been recommended by some to assume the titles of royalty,
but he replied, that as he was too poor to support his dignity as a
Sirdar, it would be preposterous to think of converting himself into a
King.
[84] General Harlan.
[85] Harlan originally went out to China and India as supercargo of a
merchant vessel. He left his ship at Calcutta, and obtained service, as
a supernumerary, on the medical establishment of the Company. He was
posted to the artillery at Dum-Dum, and afterwards accompanied Major
(now Sir George) Pollock to Rangoon. He does not appear to have earned
a very good name during his connexion with the Company’s army, which
he soon quitted, and obtained service with Runjeet Singh—afterwards to
seek the patronage of Dost Mahomed, whom he had so foully betrayed.
[86] It would appear that Dost Mahomed, instigated by Meerza Samad
Khan, seized Mr. Harlan, as well as the Fakir Aziz-ood-een, who was
also sent as an ambassador into the Ameer’s camp. The Ameer endeavoured
to throw the odium of the act upon Sultan Mahomed, hoping thereby to
ruin him utterly in the opinion of the Sikhs; but Sultan Mahomed,
after having taken a number of oaths on the Koran, pledging himself
to compliance with the Ameer’s wishes, sent back the prisoners (or
_hostages_, as Dost Mahomed called them) to the Maharajah’s camp. Mr.
Harlan himself, however, says nothing about this. Mohun Lal says that
“the appalling news (of the treachery of Sultan Mahomed) wounded the
feelings of the Ameer most bitterly. There were no bounds to the sweat
of shame and folly which flowed over his face, and there was no limit
to the laughter of the people at his being deceived and ridiculed.
His minister, Meerza Samad Khan, was so much distressed by this sad
exposure of his own trick, and still more by the failure of his plan
in losing the Fakir, that he hung down his head with great remorse and
shame, and then, throwing away his state papers, he exclaimed, that he
would avoid all interference in the government affairs hereafter.”
[87] The authorities consulted in the preparation of this chapter are
the published works of Burnes, Conolly, Vigne, Masson, Mohun Lal,
Harlan, &c.; the autobiography of Shah Soojah; and the manuscript
reports of Colonel Rawlinson. To the latter I am indebted for much
valuable information relative to the Douranee tribes.
[88] Russia refused to accept the formal mediation of Great Britain;
but the good offices of the ambassador were employed with success.
[89] “Poor Captain Christie and Lieutenant Lindsay,” says Sir Harford
Jones, “by their indefatigable perseverance had brought, when I left
Persia, the one, several of the regiments of the Prince’s infantry,
and the other, the corps of horse artillery, considering the shortness
of the time they had been employed, to a state of perfection that was
quite astonishing. And what is equally to the credit of these gallant
officers, they were both adored by the officers and men under their
tuition; though in the beginning they had often been obliged to treat
the latter with a degree of severity that could not then have been
practised with safety at Constantinople. The Prince Royal, however, had
much merit in this respect, for whenever a punishment was inflicted and
complained of to him, he invariably gave the offender a double portion
of it, and by this means soon put an end to complaint.”—[_Sir Harford
Jones’s Account of the Transactions of His Majesty’s Mission to the
Court of Persia, 1807-1811._] Malcolm took with him to Persia, as a
present from the Indian Government to the Shah, twelve field-pieces,
with harness and all necessary equipments for horse artillery.
[90] Captain Christie was an officer of the Bombay army, selected
for employment in Persia, by General Malcolm, on account of his high
reputation for gallantry and personal activity, and his thorough
acquaintance with the native character. Associated with Pottinger, on
their first entry into Beloochistan, he afterwards diverged to the
northward, and, in the guise of a horse-dealer, penetrated through
Seistan to Herat, and thence, by the way of Yezd and Ispahan, reached
the northern regions of Persia. A great part of the line which he
thus traversed had never before, and has never, I believe, since been
explored by an European traveller. Stories of Christie’s extraordinary
personal strength and prowess, are current to the present day in the
north of India and in Persia. In the latter country, indeed, he was
adored by the soldiery, and his name is still a household word among
the old officers of the Azerbijan army. He was killed at the head of
his famous Shegaughee brigade, in the night attack which was made by
the Russians on the Persian camp at Aslandooz, in November, 1812.
Lieutenant Lindsay was an officer of the Madras Horse Artillery,
and, to scientific attainments of no ordinary extent, added the most
imposing personal appearance. He was six feet eight inches in height
(without his shoes), and thus realised, in the minds of the Persians,
their ideas of the old heroes of romance. After many years’ service
in Persia, he resigned his appointment in the Indian service, and,
succeeding to the estate of Kincolquhair, settled in Scotland as
Lindsay Bethune. In 1834 he was again sent to Persia by the British
Government, with a view to his employment in the expected war of the
succession, and was thus enabled, in the following year, to add to
his former laurels, by leading (on the death of Futteh Ali Shah) the
advanced division of the Persian army from Tabreez to Teheran, and
subsequently quelling a very serious rebellion against the authority of
Mahomed Shah, that was set afoot in the south of Persia by the Prince
of Shiraz and his sons. For this service, on his return to England, he
was rewarded with a baronetcy, and in 1836 he was a third time sent
out with a Major-General’s commission, to take command of the Persian
army. Owing, however, to the misunderstanding which arose out of the
advance upon Herat, the Persian Government on this occasion declined to
employ him, and he finally retired from military life in 1839. He lived
more than ten years after this; and at the close of his life, again
travelled in Persia, revisiting the scenes of his former exploits. But
death overtook him before he could return.
[91] _Sir Gore Ouseley to the Court of Directors_: _March 21,
1812._—[_MS. Records._]
[92] _MS. Records._ Sir Gore Ouseley’s treaty is not given in the
collection of treaties in the published “Papers relating to Persia and
Afghanistan.” In another article of this, which does not appear in the
subsequent treaty, the amount of the allowances to be granted by the
Shah to the British officers serving in Persia is laid down.
[93] Of this article it has been said by an experienced writer: “The
obligation which we contracted in the 9th article, to abstain from
interference in the event of a possible contest between the Afghans
and Persians, is hardly intelligible. Such a proposal could not have
proceeded from Great Britain; and if proceeding from Persia, it
indicated that desire of territorial extension which was more fully
developed in the sequel, and which, when developed, compelled us
on general grounds to repudiate the treaty altogether.”—[_Calcutta
Review_, vol. xii.]
[94] The explanation of this failure, given by the same experienced
writer, is worth quoting:-“If it be remembered that when the system
is affected with chronic paralysis, the attempt is vain to restore
any particular member to a healthy action, it will be understood
that, to a nation devoid of organisation in every other department
of government, a regular army was impossible. It thus happened that,
notwithstanding the admirable material for soldiery which were offered
by the hardy peasantry of Azerbijan, and the still hardier mountaineers
of Kermanshah—notwithstanding the aptitude of the officers to receive
instruction—notwithstanding that a due portion of physical courage
appertained generally to the men—the disciplined forces of Persia,
considered as an army, and for the purpose of national defence, were,
from the epoch of their first creation, contemptible. Beyond drill and
exercise, they never had anything in common with the regular armies of
Europe and India. System was entirely wanting, whether in regard to
pay, clothing, food, carriage, equipage, commissariat, promotion, or
command; and under a lath-and-plaster government like that of Persia,
such must have been inevitably the case. At the same time, however, a
false confidence arose of a most exaggerated and dangerous character;
the resources of the country were lavished on the army to an extent
which grievously impoverished it at the time, and which has brought
about at the present day a state of affairs that, in any other quarter
of the world, would be termed a national bankruptcy; above all, the
tribes—the chivalry of the empire, the forces with which Nadir overran
the East from Bagdad to Delhi, and which, ever yielding but ever
present, surrounded, under Aga Mahomed Khan, the Russian armies with
a desert—were destroyed. Truly then it may be said that in presenting
Persia with the boon of a so-called regular army, in order to reclaim
her from her unlawful loves with France, we clothed her in the robe of
Nessus.”—[_Calcutta Review_, vol. xii.] See also _Correspondence of Sir
John Malcolm_.
[95] The characteristic words of the Russian manifesto, announcing
these events, are worth quoting:-“Obliged to pursue the enemy through
a country without roads, laid waste by the troops which were to have
defended it; often opposed by nature itself; exposed to the burning sun
of summer, and the rigour of winter; our brave army, after unparalleled
efforts, succeeded in conquering Erivan, which was reputed impregnable.
It passed the Araxes, planted its standards on the top of Ararat,
and penetrating further and further into the interior of Persia, it
occupied Tabreez itself, with the country depending on it. The Khanate
of Erivan, on both sides of the Araxes, and the Khanate of Nakhichevan,
a part of the ancient Armenia, fell into the hands of the conquerors.”
[96] This fortress, together with the surrounding country, to the
extent of three wersts and a half, was ceded to Russia.
[97] Sir Harford Jones.
[98] The Duke of Wellington wrote to Mr. Canning, in Nov., 1826,
“It will not answer to allow the Persian monarchy to be destroyed,
particularly upon a case of which the injustice and aggression are
undoubtedly on the side of the Russians.” Sir John Malcolm, to whom
the Duke sent a copy of this letter, wrote, “You certainly are right.
There is a positive claim in faith for mediation.” Mr. Canning,
however, affected to doubt whether there had been any aggression
against Persia. “Does not the article,” he asked, “which defines the
_casus fœderis_ to be aggression against Persia, limit the effect of
the whole treaty, and the aim of the sixth article, which promises our
mediation? Are we bound even to mediate in a case in which Persia was
the aggressor.”—[_Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm_, vol.
ii. pp. 452-455.]
[99] A writer in the _Foreign Quarterly Review_, who, if not Sir John
M’Neill himself, has unblushingly appropriated, without acknowledgment,
a large portion of the pamphlet on the “Progress and present position
of Russia in the East,” published some three or four years before,
says: “Assuredly Prince Abbas Meerza relied strongly upon this (the
4th article of the treaty), and without it would never have engaged in
the contest he provoked; we are bound in justice to say, and we say
it on good authority, wantonly and in defiance of the feelings of the
Persian Government and King. But though Persia had fairly executed
all her share of the treaty in question, the English minister, when
called upon to fulfil this condition, hesitated, hung back, negotiated,
and delayed under every possible pretext, while he could not deny the
faith or the claim of Persia. It was clear, however, to all the parties
that Mr. Canning only sought a means of escaping the fulfilment of
the stipulations. He was hard pressed by the reluctance to engaging
in a war with Russia, represented as too probable by the minister of
that power at the British Court, and by the dexterity of a first-rate
female diplomatist, to whom, indeed, the management of the matter was
fairly confided by the Russian Court, and whose influence was fatally
effective in this and the Turkish questions. In affecting to adhere
simply to the policy of his predecessors, Mr. Canning forgot the
immense difference and disgrace of refusing the fulfilment only at the
time when, and because, the need was urgent. He could not foresee that
Persia must become, if further humbled, the tool of Russia against the
East; if he had, no earthly power would have balanced against his duty.
He did not even perceive that the crisis to Persia had arrived; and
contented himself with a double sacrifice to vanity, in assuming to
arbitrate against a sovereign prince, and hearing his praises resounded
by the lips of successful beauty.”
[100] “A letter has been received in town from Persia, which has
excited a good deal of talk in the bazaar, and the substance of which
we give merely as a rumour of the day. It states that Prince Abbas
Meerza has ordered 30,000 men to march upon Herat, and that this
movement is only preparatory to an advance upon India in conjunction
with Russia. This is probably a mere rumour or the echo of a lie—but
‘coming events cast their shadows before,’ and many of these rumours,
combined with the tone which now and then breaks out in the Russian
journals, show but too well the turn of men’s thoughts and wishes, and
should warn us to be prepared.”—[_Bombay Gazette, August 25, 1832._]
About the same time, Dr. Wolff, who was then travelling in Central
Asia, wrote: “It is remarkable that there is a current belief, not
only throughout Khorassan, but, as I found it afterwards, throughout
Toorkistan even to Caubul, that Abbas Meerza had married a Russian
Princess, and adopted the Russian religion; and that 50,000 Russians
would come to Khorassan by way of Khiva, and assist Abbas Meerza in
conquering Khorassan. So much is true that Russia has written to Futteh
Ali Shah, offering him 5000 men for taking Khorassan, and putting down
the chupow—_i.e._, plundering system of the Toorkomans; and I hope to
prove it to a certainty that Russia will be very soon the mistress
of Khiva, under the pretext that the King of Khiva has 8000 Russian
slaves, whilst I know by the most authentic reports that there are not
above 200 Russian slaves and 60 Russian deserters at Khiva.”—[_Calcutta
Christian Observer, September, 1832._] It was stated at one time that
Russia had consented to yield her claim to the balance of the indemnity
money remaining then due by Persia, on condition of the latter joining
in an expedition against Khiva.
[101] Abbas Meerza gratefully acknowledged the assistance he received
from Captain Shee, Mr. Beek, and M. Berowski, the Pole, of whom
subsequent mention will be made. At the siege of Koochan a sergeant
of the Bombay Horse Artillery, named Washbrook, directed the mortar
batteries, which mainly conduced to the reduction of the place.
[102] Nor did he scruple outwardly to evince the relative degrees
of respect which he entertained for the two nations in the persons
of their representatives. On one occasion, for example, when the
Russian envoy, Count Simonich, was returning from an excursion, the
foreign minister went out to meet him, but demurred to paying the same
compliment to the British ambassador.—[_MS. Records._] This incident,
however, which created some sensation in the Calcutta Council-Chamber,
may have had its source in the private feelings of Meerza Massoud, the
foreign minister, who, having long resided at St. Petersburgh, was a
mere creature of the Russian State.
[103] _Mr. Ellis to Lord Palmerston: Teheran, November 13,
1835._—[_Published Papers relating to Persia and Afghanistan._]
[104] The officer whom he proposed to send was Lieutenant Todd, of the
Bengal Artillery, who held the local rank of Major in Persia, and who
had long been employed in instructing the artillery of the Persian army.
[105] The Russian minister had urged the King to undertake a winter
campaign against Herat. But Count Nesselrode always resolutely
maintained that Simonich had endeavoured to persuade the Shah not to
proceed against Herat at all; and Simonich told the same story in his
letters to his own government.
[106] Though we need not seek the causes of this expedition in anything
either nearer or more remote than the ambition of the young Shah and
the intrigues of the Russian Government, a pretext was put forth by, or
for Persia, of a more plausible kind. It was urged that the Heratees
had carried off and sold into slavery the subjects of the Persian
Shah. There is no doubt of the fact. But it was never put prominently
forward by the Shah, who always urged that Herat had no right to be
independent. Another pretext, but a weak one, for undertaking the war
was also alleged. Hulakoo, son of the Prince of Kerman, after his
father was taken and blinded, and Kerman occupied by the Shah’s troops,
fled to Herat, and from thence endeavoured to excite disturbances in
Kain, Khaf, and Eastern Kerman.
[107] Kamran had threatened Candahar on more than one occasion; and at
the end of 1835, Mr. Masson reported to the Supreme Government that the
Sirdars of that place, despairing of obtaining any assistance from Dost
Mahomed, had sent an emissary to the Bombay Government, offering to
cede their country to the British!—[_MS. Records._] I merely give this
as a report sent down by the English news-writer.
[108] “I share with you,” he wrote to Sir Charles Metcalfe, in
September, 1836, “the apprehension of our being at no distant date
involved in political, and possibly military operations upon our
western frontier; and even since I have been here, more than one event
has occurred, which has led me to think that the period of disturbance
is nearer than I had either wished or expected. The constitutional
restlessness of the old man of Lahore seems to increase with his age.
His growing appetite for the treasures and jungles of Sindh—the obvious
impolicy of allowing him to extend his dominions in that direction—the
importance which is attached to the free navigation of the Indus, most
justly I think, and yet perhaps with some exaggeration from its value
not having been tried—the advance of the Persians towards Herat, and
the link which may in consequence be formed between Indian and European
politics,—all lead me to fear that the wish which I have had to confine
my administration to objects of commerce, and finance, and improved
institutions, and domestic policy, will be far indeed from being
accomplished. But as you say, we must fulfil our destiny; and in the
mean while I have entreated Runjeet Singh to be quiet, and in regard to
his two last requests have refused to give him 50,000 musquets, and am
ready to send him a doctor and a dentist.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]
[109] Moorcroft seems to have been upheld only by the kindly
encouragement of Sir Charles (then Mr.) Metcalfe, who, as Resident
at Delhi, took the greatest interest in his enterprise, and afforded
him all possible assistance. He attributed the unwillingness of our
Government to explore the countries beyond our frontier, to some vague
apprehension of alarming the Sikhs. “It is somewhat humiliating,” he
wrote to Metcalfe, “that we should know so little of countries which
touch upon our frontier; and this in a great measure out of respect for
a nation that is as despicable as insolent, whose origin was founded
upon rapine, and which exists by acquiring conquests it only retains by
depopulating the territory.”—[_MS. Correspondence_.]
[110] “The greatest apathy,” says Mr. Sterling, “prevailed, and the
members of the government could not be roused to take an interest
in the subject. The knowledge that I had been in these interesting
countries produced no desire for intelligence regarding them, and my
reception gave no encouragement for the production of it. Neglect
had been preceded by the deprivation of my appointment. I was no
longer collector of Agra; that situation had been disposed of nearly
two months prior to my reaching the Presidency: my return was deemed
hopeless, and my death anticipated.”
[111] Sir William Napier says, that “an enlightened desire to ascertain
the commercial capabilities of the Indus induced Lord Ellenborough,
then President of the India Board of Control, to employ the late Sir
Alexander Burnes to explore the river in 1831, under pretence of
conveying presents to Runjeet Singh.” But the enlightenment of this
measure was questioned at the time by some of the ablest and most
experienced of our Indian administrators. At the head of these Sir
Charles Metcalfe emphatically protested against it. In October, 1810,
he recorded a minute in Council, declaring “the scheme of surveying the
Indus, under the pretence of conveying a present to Runjeet Singh,”
to be “a trick unworthy of our government, which cannot fail when
detected, as most probably it will be, to excite the jealousy and
indignation of the powers on whom we play it.” “It is not impossible,”
he added, “that it may lead to war.”—[_MS. Records._] These opinions
were repeated privately in letters to Lord William Bentinck, and, at a
later date, to Lord Auckland. Metcalfe, indeed, as long as he remained
in India, never ceased to point out the inexpediency of interfering
with the states beyond the Indus.
[112] And doubtless, very absurd and uncalled for the jealousy was
considered in those days. As Burnes ascended the Indus, a Syud on
the water’s edge lifted up his hands, and exclaimed, “Sindh is now
gone, since the English have seen the river, which is the road to
its conquest.” Nearly twenty years before, Sir James Mackintosh had
written in his journal: “A Hindoo merchant, named Derryana, under the
mask of friendship, had been continually alarming the Sindh Government
against the English mission. On being reproved, he said that although
some of his reports respecting their immediate designs might not be
quite correct, yet this tribe never began as friends without ending
as enemies, by seizing the country which they entered with the most
amicable professions.” “A shrewd dog,” said Mackintosh; but he did not
live to see the depths of the man’s shrewdness.
[113] He was promised, too, the reversion of the office of minister.
[114] Burnes, when in England, had endeavoured to impress the Court
of Directors with an idea of the expediency of sending him out as
commercial agent to Caubul; but Mr. Tucker, who was then in the chair,
could see only the evils of such a measure. “The late Sir Alexander
Burnes,” he wrote some years afterwards, “was introduced to me in 1834
as a talented and enterprising young officer, and it was suggested
that he might be usefully employed as a commercial agent at Caubul,
to encourage our commerce with that country and to aid in opening
the river Indus to British industry and enterprise.... I declined
then to propose or to concur in the appointment of Lieutenant Burnes
to a commercial agency in Caubul, feeling perfectly assured that it
must soon degenerate into a political agency, and that we should as a
necessary consequence be involved in all the entanglement of Afghan
politics.”—[_Memoirs of H. St. George Tucker._] Mr. Grant, who was then
at the Board of Control, concurred in opinion with Mr. Tucker; Sir
Charles Metcalfe also wrote a minute in council, emphatically pointing
out the evils of this commercial agency.
[115] Mr. Percival Lord of the Bombay Medical Establishment, joined the
Mission _in transitu_. Mohun Lal also accompanied it.
[116] Avitabile, an Italian by birth, was a General in the service of
Runjeet Singh, and at that time Governor of Peshawur.
[117] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir Alexander Burnes._
[118] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes._
[119] And, on the 30th December, Burnes, with reference to this
promised sympathy, wrote, in the following words, to Mr. Macnaghten.
The passage was not published in the official correspondence. It was
thought better to suppress it:-“The present position of the British
Government at this capital appears to me a most gratifying proof of
the estimation in which it is held by the Afghan nation. Russia has
come forward with offers which are certainly substantial. Persia has
been lavish in her promises, and Bokhara and other States have not been
backward. Yet, in all that has passed or is daily transpiring, _the
chief of Caubul declares that he prefers the sympathy and friendly
offices of the British to all these offers, however alluring they may
seem, from Persia or from the Emperor_—which certainly places his good
sense in a light more than prominent, and, in my humble judgment,
proves that, by an earlier attention to these countries, we might have
escaped the whole of these intrigues, and held long since a stable
influence in Caubul.”—[_Ungarbled Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes._]
[120] “As I approached Caubul,” he wrote to a private friend, on the
5th of July, “war broke out with the Afghans and Sikhs, and my position
became embarrassing. I was even ordered by express to pause, and while
hanging on my oars another express still cries _pause_, but places a
vast latitude in my hands, and ‘forward’ is my motto—forward to the
scene of carnage, where, instead of embarrassing my government, I feel
myself in a situation to do good. It is this latitude throughout life
that has made me what I am, if I am anything, and I can hardly say how
grateful I feel to Lord Auckland.... I have not as yet got the replies
to my recommendation on our line of policy in Caubul, consequent on a
discovered intrigue of Russia, and on the Caubul chief throwing himself
in despair on Perso-Russian arms. I have at last something to do, and I
hope to do it well.”—[_Private Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes._]
[121] _Ante, page 186._ In a letter to another correspondent, written
about the same time, Burnes says: “With war came intrigues, and I
have had the good fortune to find out all the doings of the Czar and
his emissaries here, where they have sent letters and presents. After
proving this, I plainly asked the Governor-General if such things
were to be allowed, and I got a reply a week ago, altering all my
instructions, giving me power to go on to Herat, and anywhere, indeed,
I could do good. The first exercise of the authority has been to
despatch a messenger to Candahar, to tell them to discontinue their
intercourse with Persia and Russia, on pain of displeasure—and not
before it was time, for a son of the chief of that city, with presents
for the Russian ambassador, is ready to set out for Teheran.”—[_Sir
A. Burnes to Captain Jacob_—_Caubul, 29th of October, 1837_: _MS.
Correspondence._]
[122] “The chiefs of Candahar,” he wrote a few days afterwards, to a
private friend, “had gone over to Persia. I have detached them and
offered them British protection and _cash_ if they would recede, and
if Persia attacked them. I have no authority to do so; but am I to
stand by and see us ruined at Candahar, when the Government tell me
an attack on Herat would be most unpalatable. Herat has been besieged
fifty days, and if the Persians move on Candahar, I am off there with
the Ameer and his forces, and mean to pay the piper myself. We have
good stuff—forty-six guns and stout Afghans, as brave as regular
troops need be. I am on stirring ground, and I am glad to say I am
up to it in health and all that, and was never more braced in my
life.”—[_Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes_—_privately printed._]
[123] _Mr. W. H. Macnaghten to Captain A. Burnes_—_Camp Bareilly,
20th January, 1838._ The letter from which this passage is taken
consists of twenty-four paragraphs, of which three only appear in the
published correspondence. There seems, indeed, to have been a studious
suppression of the entire history of the offers made to the Candahar
chiefs, and of the censure which they called down upon Captain Burnes.
Lord Auckland subsequently, with praiseworthy candour, admitted that
the best authorities at home were of opinion that the measure which had
evoked these expressions of the severe displeasure of his Lordship, was
the very best that could have been adopted.
[124] I have given the vulgar orthography of the name. His real name
was Viktevitck, or Wiktewitch.
[125] The first information relative to the fact of Vickovich’s
mission to Caubul was accidentally obtained by Major Rawlinson, when
on his way to the camp of Mahomed Shah, who was then marching upon
Herat. The circumstances, as set forth in a private letter, from that
officer himself, are not unworthy of narration:-“_Teheran, November 1,
1837._ I have just returned from a journey of much interest. M’Neill
had some business in the Persian camp which he thought I might help
to arrange, and I was bid accordingly to make my way to the ‘Royal
Stirrup,’ with all convenient despatch. I was obliged to ride day and
night, as the post-horses on the road, owing to the constant passage
of couriers, were almost unserviceable, and yet I was only able, after
all, to accomplish the distance of something more than 700 miles in
a week. The last morning of my ride I had an adventure. Our whole
party were pretty well knocked up, and in the dark, between sleeping
and waking, we had managed to lose the road. As morning dawned, we
found ourselves wandering about on the broken plain which stretches
up from Subzewar to the range containing the Turquoise mines, and
shortly afterwards we perceived that we were close to another party
of horsemen, who were also, apparently, trying to regain the high
road. I was not anxious to accost these strangers, but on cantering
past them, I saw, to my astonishment, men in Cossack dresses, and one
of my attendants recognised among the party a servant of the Russian
Mission. My curiosity was, of course, excited, and on reaching the
stage I told one of my men to watch for the arrival of the travellers,
and find out who they were. Shortly afterwards the Russian party rode
up, inquired who I was, and finding I was a British officer, declined
to enter the Khan, but held on their road. In such a state of affairs
as preceded the siege of Herat, the mere fact of a Russian gentleman
travelling in Khorassan was suspicious. In the present case, however,
there was evidently a desire for concealment. Nothing had been heard
of this traveller by our Mission at Teheran. I had been told, indeed,
absurd stories on the road, of a Muscovite Prince having been sent
from Petersburgh to announce that 10,000 Russians would be landed at
Asterabad, to co-operate with the Shah in reducing Herat; and this
was evidently the man alluded to, but I knew not what to believe,
and I thought it my duty, therefore, to try and unravel the mystery.
Following the party, I tracked them for some distance along the high
road, and then found that they had turned off to a gorge in the hills.
There at length I came upon the group seated at breakfast by the side
of a clear sparkling rivulet. The officer, for such he evidently was,
was a young man of light make, very fair complexion, with bright eyes
and a look of great animation. He rose and bowed to me as I rode up,
but said nothing. I addressed him in French—the general language of
communication between Europeans in the East, but he shook his head. I
then spoke English, and he answered in Russian. When I tried Persian,
he seemed not to understand a word; at last he expressed himself
hesitatingly in Turcoman, or Uzbeg Turkish. I knew just sufficient of
this language to carry on a simple conversation, but not enough to be
inquisitive. This was evidently what my friend wanted, for when he
found I was not strong enough in Jaghatai to proceed very rapidly, he
rattled on with his rough Turkish as glibly as possible. All I could
find out was, that he was a _bonâ fide_ Russian officer, carrying
presents from the Emperor to Mahomed Shah. More he would not admit;
so, after smoking another pipe with him, I remounted, and reached the
Royal Camp beyond Nishapoor before dark. I had an immediate audience
of the Shah, and in the course of conversation, mentioning to his
Majesty my adventure of the morning, he replied, ‘Bringing presents
to me! why, I have nothing to do with him; he is sent direct from the
Emperor to Dost Mahomed, of Caubul, and I am merely asked to help him
on his journey.’ This is the first information we have ever had of a
direct communication between Petersburgh and Caubul, and it may be of
great importance. The gentleman made his appearance in camp two days
after my arrival, and I was then introduced to him by Mons. Goutte,
as Captain Vitkavitch. He addressed me at once in good French, and in
allusion to our former meeting, merely observed, with a smile, that ‘It
would not do to be too familiar with strangers in the desert.’ I was so
anxious to bring back to M’Neill intelligence of this Russian Mission
to Caubul, that I remained but a very few days in camp; and here I am
again in Teheran, after a second gallop of 750 miles, accomplished this
time in about 150 consecutive hours.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]
[126] A few days afterwards, in one of those undress communications
from which we often gather more significant truth than from the more
formal official documents, Burnes wrote to a private friend: “We are in
a mess here. Herat is besieged, and may fall; and the Emperor of Russia
has sent an envoy to Caubul, to offer Dost Mahomed Khan money to fight
Runjeet Singh!!!!! I could not believe my eyes or ears; but Captain
Vickovich—for that is the agent’s name—arrived here with a blazing
letter, three feet long, and sent immediately to pay his respects to
myself. I, of course, received him, and asked him to dinner. This is
not the best of it. The Ameer came over to me sharp, and offered to do
as I liked, kick him out, or anything: but I stood too much in fear
of Vattel to do any such thing: and since he was so friendly to us,
said I, give me the letters the agent has brought; all of which he
surrendered sharp; and I sent an express at once to my Lord A., with a
confidential letter to the Governor-General himself, bidding him look
what his predecessors had brought upon him, and telling him that after
this I knew not what might happen, and it was now a neck-and-neck race
between Russia and us; and if his Lordship would hear reason, he would
forthwith send agents to Bokhara, Herat, Candahar, and Koondooz, not
forgetting Sindh. How all this pill will go down I know not, but I know
my duty too well to be silent.”—[_Private Correspondence of Sir A.
Burnes._]
[127] Mohun Lal says that he translated the Persian copy of the
letter from the Emperor, but that he lost the translation during the
insurrection of 1841-42. “It plainly acknowledged,” he states, “the
receipt of the Ameers letter, and assured him that all the Afghan
merchants shall be well received in the empire of Russia, justice and
protection shall be extended towards them, and their intercourse will
cause to flourish the respective states.”—[_Life of Dost Mahomed_,
vol. i. p. 300.] Masson declares that it was a forgery, seal and
all, alleging in proof, that it bore no signature. To this Mohun Lal
replies, that the absence of the royal signature is a proof rather of
the genuine than the counterfeit character of the document. The reasons
given are not very conclusive, as regards the general usage of the
Czar; but, under the circumstances of the case, he would have been more
inclined to omit than to attach the signature. The following is the
translated letter; it was excluded from the published papers:
“A.C. In a happy moment, the messenger of your Highness, Meerza Hosan,
reached my Court, with your friendly letter. I was very much delighted
to receive it, and highly gratified by its perusal. The contents of the
letter prove that you are my well-wisher, and have friendly opinions
towards me. It flattered me very much, and I was satisfied of your
friendship to my everlasting government. In consequence of this, and
preserving the terms of friendship (which are now commenced between you
and myself) in my heart, I will feel always happy to assist the people
of Caubul who may come to trade into my kingdom. On the arrival of your
messenger I have ordered him to make preparations for his long journey
back to you, and also appointed a man of dignity to accompany him on
the part of my government. If it pleases God, and he reaches safe,
he will present to you the rarities of my country, which I have sent
through him. By the grace of God, may your days be prolonged.—_Sent
from St. Petersburgh, the capital of Russia, on the 27th of April, 1837
A.D., and in the 12th year of my reign._”
[128] An attempt, in the published Blue Book, was made to conceal
the fact of the receipt of these letters, and to make it appear
that Burnes acted entirely upon his own responsibility. The genuine
letter commenced with the following words:-“I have now the honour to
acknowledge the receipt of your (the Political Secretary’s) letters
of the 25th of November and 2nd of December last, which reached me
about the same time, and conveyed the views of the Right Honourable
the Governor-General regarding the overtures made by Dost Mahomed,
&c., &c.” In the published version the letter commences with the word
“regarding.”
[129] Burnes, commenting on the Newab’s proposal, observes: “The
observations coming from the Newab Jubbar Khan are the more remarkable,
since he is devoted to his brother, Sultan Mahomed Khan, and would
rejoice to see him restored to Peshawur. They consequently carried with
me a conviction that the Ameer’s fears are not groundless, and that
they will deserve all due consideration before government entered upon
any measures for attaching this chief to its interests.” This passage
was, of course, suppressed. Whether any attempt was made to bring about
a settlement of the Peshawur question on the basis of this proposal, I
have not been able to ascertain. But Captain Wade, considering it by no
means unreasonable, declared his willingness, with the consent of the
Supreme Government, to urge it upon the acceptance of Runjeet. It is
doubtful, however, whether, even if Runjeet had consented to it, Sultan
Mahomed would have fallen into the arrangement, although Jubbar Khan
declared his ability to reconcile the brothers.
[130] Lord Auckland’s offers to restrain Runjeet from attacking the
country of the Sirdars were laughed at by them. Jubbar Khan said that
they indicated very little knowledge of the state of Afghanistan; for
that, “so far from the proffered protection from Runjeet being of the
value stated, the Maharajah never sought to attack Caubul, and that
hitherto all the aggression had been on the part of the Ameer, and
not the ruler of Lahore.” He added with undeniable truth, that “it
appeared we valued our offers at a very high rate, since we expected,
in return, that the Afghans would desist from all intercourse with
Persia, Russia, Toorkistan,” &c. “Were the Afghans,” he asked, “to
make all these powers hostile, and receive no protection against the
enmity raised for their adhering to the British?” “As for Peshawur,”
he added, “being withheld from the Ameer, it might be got over; and he
believed he did not overrate his influence with Sultan Mahomed Khan,
when he stated that he might bring about a reconciliation between
him and the Ameer; but he must say that the value of the Afghans
had indeed been depressed, and he did not wonder at the Ameer’s
disappointment.”—[_Ungarbled Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes._]
[131] “The Meerza made nearly the same observation as the Newab about
the expectations which the Ameer had cherished of doing service for the
British, and devoting himself to it; that it was not the adjustment
of Peshawur affairs that dissipated his hopes, but the indifference
to his sufferings and station, which it was now clear we felt.” The
Meerza truly said that Dost Mahomed had often written to the British
Government about his affairs, and that in reply they answered him about
their own.—[_Ungarbled Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes._]
[132] It is probably of this meeting, or one shortly preceding it,
of which General Harlan, who has not much regard for dates, speaks
in the following passage. Harlan had by this time quitted Runjeet
Singh’s camp, and taken service with Dost Mahomed:-“The document (Lord
Auckland’s ultimatum) was handed to me amongst others. I satisfied
myself, by the Governor-General’s signature, of its authenticity,
surveying the contents with extreme surprise and disappointment. Dost
Mahomed was mortified, but not terrified.... The Governor-General’s
ultimatum was handed round, and an embarrassing silence ensued. A
few minutes elapsed, when Abdul Sami Khan recalled the party from
abstraction.... _He_ proclaimed that the Governor-General’s ultimatum
left no other alternative than the dismission of the English agent, for
the spirit of the Kuzzilbash party was supercilious and unyielding,
though full of duplicity.... Nieb Mahomed Ameer Khan, Akhondzadeh,
openly opposed the Kuzzilbash party, and urged many weighty arguments
in favour of a pacific settlement of the Ameer’s relations with the
British Government, which had now assumed a position so inauspicious.
He concluded his oration with these words, addressing the Ameer:
‘There is no other recourse for you but to introduce Mr. Harlan in
the negotiations with Mr. Burnes, and he, through his own facilities
and wisdom, will arrange a treaty according to their European usage,
for the pacific and advantageous settlement of your affairs;’ and to
this proposition the council _unanimously_ assented.” The proposition,
it appears, was made to Burnes; but Burnes declined the honour of
negotiating with the doctor-general. Harland says that he then wrote
to the British envoy, offering to “negotiate upon his own terms;” but
Burnes sent “a reply personally friendly,” but “evincing a deficiency
of knowledge of first principles concerning the rights of independent
powers in political negotiations.” Burnes says nothing about this in
his official or private letters.
[133] Mr. Masson says, that before its departure the Mission had fallen
into contempt, and that the assassination of Burnes was talked of in
Caubul. He explains too, what, according to his account, were the real
causes of Burnes’s departure without his companions; but it does not
come within our province to investigate Masson’s charges against the
envoy.
[134] Overtures had been made to Runjeet by Vickovich, who offered to
visit the Maharajah’s Court. But British influence at this time was
too strong at Lahore for the Russian to make way against it. Runjeet,
however, who was not ignorant of the Russo-phobia then rampant amongst
us, turned the Cossack’s overtures to some account, and probably
pretended more uncertainty on the score of the answer to be returned
to him than he in reality felt. Mackeson, to whom the business of
counteracting the designs of Vickovich was entrusted, managed it with
great address, and won from the Maharajah a promise to have nothing to
do with the Muscovite agent. But the knowledge that the Russian agent
was, as it were, knocking at the gates of Lahore, made our authorities
especially anxious to conciliate the Maharajah, by refraining from
entering into any negotiations with Caubul which might possibly give
umbrage to Runjeet.
[135] What befel the unhappy agent after this, it is painful to
relate. When he returned to Persia, in 1839, after giving a full
report of his mission to M. Duhamel, the new minister at Teheran, he
was instructed to proceed direct to St. Petersburgh. On his arrival
there, full of hope, for he had discharged the duty entrusted to him
with admirable address, he reported himself, after the customary
formality, to Count Nesselrode; but the minister refused to see him.
Instead of a flattering welcome, the unhappy envoy was received with a
crushing message, to the effect that Count Nesselrode “knew no Captain
Vickovich, except an adventurer of that name, who, it was reported,
had been lately engaged in some unauthorised intrigues at Caubul and
Candahar.” Vickovich understood at once the dire portent of this
message. He knew the character of his government. He was aware of the
recent expostulations of Great Britain. And he saw clearly that he
was to be sacrificed. He went back to his hotel, wrote a few bitter
reproachful lines, burnt all his other papers, and blew out his brains.
[136] Arthur Conolly. The correctness of this description is confirmed
by Eldred Pottinger, in his unpublished journal. I have been obliged
to write it in the past tense. “The late war,” says Pottinger, “and
its consequences have so changed the entire neighbourhood of the city,
that, under its present appearance, it would not be recognised by its
former visitants. Moreover, the city and its surrounding places have
been so well described by Lieut. A. Conolly, that I need not repeat the
description.”—[_Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._]
[137] Of these bazaars Pottinger writes: “The interior of the city is
divided into four nearly equal divisions, by two streets which, at
right angles, cross each other in the centre of the city. The principal
one joins the gate of Candahar to the Pay-i-Hissar, and was formerly
covered by a succession of small domes, springing from arches which
cross the streets. About two-thirds of this magnificent bazaar still
remain; but so choked up with rubbish, and so ruinous, that it has
lost much of its attraction to the eye. This bazaar was about 1300
yards long and 6 in width. The solidity of the masonry of this work
should have insured its stability; but unfortunately the arches are all
defective—not one has a keystone. They are built, as all others in this
country are, with a vacancy at the apex, filled merely with bits of
broken bricks, ... The whole of the lower floors on each side are used
as shops.”—[_Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._]
[138] Conolly says: “The town itself is, I should imagine, one of the
dirtiest in the world.... No drains having been contrived to carry off
the rain which falls within the walls, it collects and stagnates in
ponds which are dug in different parts of the city. The residents cast
out the refuse of their houses into the streets, and dead cats and dogs
are commonly seen lying upon heaps of the vilest filth.”—[_Conolly’s
Journey to the North of India._]
[139] _Report of Major Eldred Pottinger to the Supreme Government of
India on the defences of Herat. Calcutta: July, 1840._—[_MS. Records._]
[140] _Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._
[141] Eldred Pottinger, from whose manuscript journal the materials of
this chapter are mainly drawn, gives a remarkable illustration of the
manner in which justice was then administered. “During this period,” he
says, “a Heratee detected a noted robber in his outhouse, and with the
aid of his neighbours arrested him. In the morning, when taken before
the Sirdar by the cutwal, to request the order for punishment might be
given as the case was proved, the robber declared, that on hearing the
citizen call for aid, he had run to his help, and, being immediately
laid hold of, made prisoner and accused. He also accused the cutwal of
being a partner in the plan. The young Sirdar, with an acumen to be
wondered at but not described, decided that his was the truth of the
story—sold the accuser, and so severely fined the witnesses, that they
were reduced to poverty and debt to the soldiers—the sure precursor of
slavery. He then gave the thief, who was his own servant, a _khelat_
(or dress of honour) and released him. Under such a governor the misery
of the people would require a more eloquent pen than mine to narrate.”
[142] It need scarcely be said that the Persians are generally of the
Sheeah, and the Afghans of the Soonee sect. At Herat the rulers and
the soldiery were Soonees, whilst the shopkeepers and other peaceful
citizens were Sheeahs. The oppression of the Sheeahs by their Afghan
masters was one of the circumstances by a reference to which Mahomed
Shah sought to justify his invasion of Herat.
[143] Pottinger says that “he was much devoted to field-sports, and
spent the greater part of his time in their pursuit. He was an unerring
shot with a matchlock; he could divide a sheep in two by a single cut
of his sabre, and with a Lahore bow send an arrow through a cow.”—[_MS.
Journal._]
[144] Yar Mahomed was the nephew of Atta Mahomed, an influential Sirdar
of the Alekozye tribe, who was Minister to Shah Mahmoud and Hadjee
Feroz, and afterwards of Shah Kamran. This man left two sons, Deen
Mahomed and Sultan Mahomed; but neither possessed the same capacious
mind and energetic character which distinguished their cousin Yar
Mahomed, who was always, more or less, at enmity with them, and at last
drove them out of Herat, in 1841.
[145] Pottinger says, with reference to this ill-judged movement, that
“the Wuzeer played away the last stake of his master by which he could
have hoped to recover his former dominions or to defend his present.
Indeed, after-events have shown that the body of cavalry which he
thus frittered away and destroyed was strong enough to have prevented
the Persian army leaving its own frontier.” There was, however, some
compensation which, whether the result of the siege or not, is worth
mentioning, in the fact that when Herat was attacked by the Persians,
many of the old garrison of Jowayn came to the assistance of their
former enemies.
[146] It is doubted by some, whose opinions are entitled to the highest
respect, whether either Kamran or Yar Mahomed ever really contemplated
an expedition for the recovery of Candahar and Caubul; but it is
certain that they talked about it. In the letter which Kamran sent to
Mahomed Shah, by Futteh Mahomed Khan, he expressed a “hope of obtaining
the favour of his Majesty, so that with the aid of the well-wishers
of Persia he might subdue his hereditary dominions, and overwhelm his
rebellious enemies;” and in a message which Pottinger was commissioned
to deliver to the Persian monarch, it was distinctly declared that
Futteh Mahomed Khan had been sent to Teheran to beg for aid towards the
recovery of Kamran’s paternal kingdom.
[147] Among these was M. Euler, the Shah’s European physician.
[148] “I have heard him,” writes one who knew Pottinger well, “describe
how on two occasions, when challenged about not praying or turning
towards Mecca, he silenced all questioning by appealing to the usage of
India.”—[_Private Correspondence._]
[149] Pottinger, who is provokingly chary, in his journal, of
information about himself, does not say whether he appeared at
these interviews in his true character of a British officer; but I
conclude that he did not, on these occasions, attempt to conceal
his nationality. Nor does it seem that, in his intercourse with the
higher class of Heratees, he wore any disguise; for we soon find him
taking part in a conversation about Arthur Conolly, and addressed as a
countryman of that fine-hearted young Englishman. I cannot transcribe,
without a glow of pleasure, the following passage in Pottinger’s
journal:-“I fell in with a number of Captain Conolly’s acquaintances.
Every person asked after him, and appeared disappointed when I told
them I did not know him. In two places I crossed Mr. Conolly’s
route, and on his account received the greatest hospitality and
attention—indeed, more than was pleasant, for such liberality required
corresponding upon my part; and my funds were not well adapted for any
extraordinary demand upon them. In Herat, Mr. Conolly’s fame was great.
In a large party, where the subject of the Europeans who had visited
Herat was mooted, Conolly’s name being mentioned, I was asked if I knew
him, and on replying, ‘Merely by report,’ Moollah Mahomed, a Sheeah
Moollah of eminence, calling to me across the room, said, ‘You have a
great pleasure awaiting you. When you see him, give him my salutation,
and tell him that I say he has done as much to give the English nation
fame in Herat, as your ambassador, Mr. Elphinstone, did at Peshawur;’
and in this he was seconded by the great mass present.”—[_Eldred
Pottinger’s MS. Journal._]
[150] Better known by his title of Asoof-ood-dowlah. He was the head
of the _Yukhaw-bash_ division of the Kajjar tribe, and, according to
the heraldry of the clans, was thus of higher rank than the Shah,
who was merely the chief of the _Ashagha-bash_, or younger branch.
Futteh Ali Shah, to stanch an old tribe feud, had married his son and
heir-apparent, Abbas Meerza, to the heiress of the rival branch, an
Mahomed Shah being the issue of this marriage, the Asoof-ood-dowlah was
his maternal uncle. The Asoof was Governor of Khorassan, with almost
independent powers, from 1835 to 1847. He is now in exile at Baghdad.
[151] As the army approached Herat some important captures were made.
Among others, the secretary of the Asoof-ood-dowlah was carried off,
with all his papers.
[152] This was Yar Mahomed’s first angry view of the case; but it may
be doubted whether Shere Mahomed Khan was fairly to be censured for the
loss of Ghorian. Of small dimensions, and unfurnished with bomb-proofs,
the place was ill calculated to sustain the heavy vertical fire of shot
and shell which the Persian artillery poured into it. A magazine and
storehouse took fire; and at the time of its surrender Colonel Stoddart
pronounced it to be quite untenable.
[153] Shums-ood-deen Khan of Herat was a Populzye nobleman of very good
family, and in great favour with Shah Kamran before the commencement
of the siege of Herat. His sister was the Shah’s favourite wife, and
he was entirely in his Majesty’s confidence. A position of so much
power, however, made Yar Mahomed his enemy, and it was to escape the
minister’s persecution that he deserted to the Persian camp on the
approach of the invading army. Had he remained in the city, he would
certainly have been imprisoned or assassinated, for the Shah was
powerless to protect him. It was surmised, indeed, that his Majesty
counselled, or at any rate connived at, his flight, as his only means
of escape.
[154] Of this barbarous custom of bringing in the heads of the enemy,
Pottinger speaks with becoming indignation. “I have not thought it
necessary,” he writes in his journal, “to recount the number of heads
that were brought in daily, nor indeed do I know. I never could speak
of this barbarous, disgusting, and inhuman conduct with any temper.
The number, however, in these sorties was always insignificant, and
the collecting them invariably broke the vigour of the pursuit, and
prevented the destruction of the trenches. There is no doubt great
terror was inspired by the mutilation of the bodies amongst their
comrades. But there must have been, at least, equal indignation—and
that a corresponding exaltation was felt by the victors at the sight
of these barbarous trophies, and the spoils brought in.”—[_MS.
Journal._] As rewards were always given for these bloody trophies,
the garrison were naturally very active in their endeavours to obtain
them. Sometimes their avarice outstripped both their honesty and their
nationality. On one occasion, after an unsuccessful sortie, an Afghan
brought in a pair of ears. A cloak and some ducats were given him as
a reward for his butchery. Before any questions could be put to the
fellow, he suddenly vanished. About half an hour afterwards, another
man, covered with mud, made his appearance with a head in his hand. The
Wuzeer, thinking it looked as though it had no ears, ordered one of his
retainers to examine it. On this the bearer of the ghastly trophy threw
it down, and ran away with all the speed he could command. The head
was picked up by one of the Wuzeer’s retainers, and found to be that
of a comrade, who had fallen during a sortie of the preceding night.
The fellow was pursued, and soundly beaten and kicked—but the more
successful bringer-in of the ears was not to be found, though several
rough unscrupulous fellows were told by the Wuzeer that they might
possess themselves of both cloak and ducats if they could.
[155] _MS. Journal of Eldred Pottinger._
[156] “The enemy’s fire being directed to the parapet at all points,
the rubbish began to shelter the foot of the escarp. Strong working
parties commenced building up backs to the rampart at the point fired
at, so that the body of the old rampart may become a parapet, and the
summit of the new back a terre-pleine from which to defend the breaches
when formed.”—[_MS. Journal of Eldred Pottinger._]
[157] “A great number of these shells are carved out of slate-rock, and
their chamber contains little more than a bursting charge. Hence they
are unable to do much execution.”—[_MS. Journal of Eldred Pottinger._]
[158] “They made,” says Pottinger, “but a beggarly appearance.”