Shah of Persia whilst there was the least prospect of his success.
Pottinger’s opinion on the subject is worth quoting:-“The minister
throughout all the negotiations constantly addressed Mahomed Shah
as his sovereign, and called both Hadjee Akasy (the Persian prime
minister) and Alayar Khan (Asoof-ood-dowlah) his father. He also
invariably threw the blame of the defence on some one else, and
regretted being obliged to fight. He constantly talked of his being
bound in honour to serve his master, Kamran, but in inclination to
serve Mahomed Shah. He also invariably avoided mixing himself up
individually in any act decidedly hostile to Persian feelings or
prejudices; allowing some of his friends to act, and then, under (to
the Persians) a show of inquiry, sharing the advantages; so that
in reality very few tangible instances could be mentioned of his
hostility, and none but what, as a good talker, he could easily assert
were not so; and that he had taken the Persian side. He knew that
the King was aware that all the chiefs of the Persian army supported
themselves by the same means as he did; and in many instances without
adding the lip-loyalty which he always gave vent to—that, moreover,
he could say that he did not oppress the Persian people—that it was
the other chiefs who did so—that without aid, he could not check it
in his equals, who would otherwise join to overthrow him—that the
aylayats (wandering tribes) always acted so—that he would not desert
the cause of his patron and benefactor. In a despot, who only looks
in his followers for personal attachment, and prefers the hardiest
and most unscrupulous, less than this would have secured favour;
nay, more, among chiefs who support themselves in the same way, such
arguments would have secured popularity; and as parties also ran
high in the Persian camp, and he had secured the favour of the two
chiefs, both sides would have been anxious to secure so knowing and
powerful an assistant by exertions in procuring his liberty. Yar
Mahomed, with that shrewdness which characterises the Afghan nation,
saw the favourable position he was in, and availed himself of it to
the utmost. He had an overweening idea of the valour of his countrymen
in arms, and a corresponding low one of that of the Persians. From
having failed in a siege with his own people, he thought no other army
could succeed against his nation; and in the event of being taken, his
eyes, overlooking the danger to which the Persian wrath might expose
him, were dazzled with visions of the wealth, the power, and glory he
might acquire in the service of what he thought a rich and ill-managed
government. I do not mean to say that any persons had recommended this
plan to Yar Mahomed, or that it had been [_obscure in MS._]; but that
from the multitude of his counsellors, some recommending war, some
submission, this must have been the mean opinion; and, added to the
knowledge that, whether he defended himself or not, his life was in the
same danger, and that the promise of a Kajar was only to be trusted
as a last resource. He, therefore, addressed himself to the task of
defence; but, at the same time, took steps to secure his interest in
case of a reverse. I do not think that he could have succeeded in
the latter point but he, doubtless, had hopes of succeeding.”—[_MS.
Journal._]
[160] On the 10th of January, “money being wanted, the houses of the
Persian followers of Shere Mahomed were confiscated on a charge of
treason, in giving up Ghorian.”—[_Pottinger’s Journal: MS._]
[161] “The digging a gallery,” writes Pottinger, “under the wall, and
entering in the midst of the town, appeared a most capital plan, and
suited much better their cunning than any other. Consequently, they
were seriously alarmed, and for a time serious consequences resulted to
the Sheeah inhabitants; and many domiciliary visits were paid in search
of the gallery, whilst the ruins and empty houses were particularly
patrolled for many nights.”—[_MS. Journal._]
[162] _Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._ “No matter,” he adds, “how the
cowardice and meanness of these men might be despised, no one could
help pitying the wretchedness they were suffering. Even the better
class of the Afghans used to say, ‘Afsoos ast, lekin chi koonym’—‘It is
a pity, but what can we do?’ In the Pay Hissar (esplanade in front of
the drawbridge) were lying half a dozen Persian heads lately brought
in.”
[163] _MS. Journal of Eldred Pottinger._
[164] Contending emotions of sympathy, now with their co-religionists,
and now with their fellow-citizens, agitated the breasts of the
Heratees. “I went,” writes Pottinger, on the 2nd of February, “to see a
Sheeah: he was grieving over the fate which hung over him; one moment
cursing Mahomed Shah’s pusillanimity—the next, the Afghan tyranny. But
through the whole of his discontent, I observed he felt a sort of pride
and satisfaction in being the countryman of those who set the Persians
at defiance. But he appeared fully impressed with the idea that the
city must fall, whilst the Afghans I had just left were talking of
plundering Teheran with the aid of our artillery and infantry.”—[_MS.
Records._]
[165] _Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._
[166] Samson was a Russian in the Persian service, commanding a corps
of Russian refugees.
[167] “I then proceeded to Colonel Stoddart’s tent, whom I found in the
greatest astonishment possible, as his servants, taking up the general
report of my rank, had announced me as the Mooshtehid of Herat. He
had been undressed; and putting on his coat to do honour to the high
dignitary, gave me time to enter his tent before he could get out, so
we met at the door, where he overwhelmed me with a most affectionate
Persian welcome, to which I, to his great surprise, replied in English.
No one who has not experienced it, can understand the pleasure which
countrymen enjoy when they thus meet—particularly when of the same
profession, and pursuing the same object.”—[_Eldred Pottinger’s MS.
Journal._]
[168] They fired from this piece eight-inch shells full of lead, or
twelve or eighteen-pound shot, with an outer case of copper. These were
of so much value, that the garrison fought for them.
[169] The same man, a major in the army, whom Pottinger had first met
in the Persian camp.
[170] “The man,” says Pottinger, “was also instructed to say that
warning should be taken from our conduct in India, where we had
pretended friendship and trade to cover our ambition, and finally, by
such deceit, had mastered all India.”—[_MS. Journal._]
[171] It would be tedious to narrate all the details of the siege, and
difficult to render them intelligible, even to the scientific reader,
without the aid of a series of elaborate plans.
[172] “The point,” says Mr. M’Neill, “on which the negotiation broke
off was, I believe, the demand of the Shah, that Shah Kamran and
Yar Mahomed should wait upon him in his camp, and there make their
submission to him. I learn that the Persians did not, as on a former
occasion, require that a garrison of their troops should be admitted
into the town.”—[_Mr. M’Neill to Lord Auckland, April 11, 1838.
Published Correspondence._]
[173] _Mr. M’Neill to Lord Auckland, April 11, 1838. Papers relating to
Persia and Afghanistan._
[174] _Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._
[175] “Several men,” says Pottinger, “received bullets through the
hands and arms. One fellow, more fool-hardy than the rest, kept
brandishing his huge Afghan knife, after the others had complied
with the repeated orders to sheath their weapons, and had the knife
destroyed by a bullet, which struck it just above his hand. I had
gone down to the spot to see the mine sprung, and was sitting on the
banquette with the Wuzeer and a party of chiefs, who, whilst tea was
preparing, were bantering the man whose knife was broken, and who came
to beg a sword instead, when a bullet came in through a loophole over
my head, and, smashing a brick used for stopping it, lodged in Aga
Ruhem’s lungs, who was standing opposite—one of the splinters of the
brick at the same time wounding him in the face. The poor fellow was
an eunuch of Yar Mahomed’s, and was always to be seen wherever any
danger was. He died in two or three days. I had been but the moment
before looking through the top of the parapet, with my breast resting
against the loophole, watching the Persians, who were trying to
establish themselves in the crater of the mine, and the Afghans on the
counterscarp, who were trying to grapple the gabions and overset them,
so that the scene was very interesting; and I had not sat down with the
chiefs until Deen Mahomed Khan actually pulled me down by my cloak to
listen to the jokes passed on the man who had his knife destroyed; and
I thus escaped Aga Ruhem’s bullet.”—[_MS. Journal._]
[176] “I was much annoyed,” says Pottinger, “and told him he had
probably prevented the English ambassador interfering, and he excused
himself by saying that he acted so to make the Persians think he was
not solicitous for the English to interfere.”—[_MS. Journal._]
[177] “A horse,” says Pottinger, “was also given; but Major Todd was as
anxious not to accept presents, as the Afghans were to make them—so he
would not wait for the horse, notwithstanding they set about cutting
away the parapet of the _fausse-braie_, and making a ramp up the
counterscarp to get the nag out. The Wuzeer was obstinately bent upon
sending out the horse; but as there was no use in destroying a parapet
in the only entire work left, or making an easy road across the ditch,
when there were four practicable breaches.
* * * As soon as the Persians were gone, my people led the horses off
in another direction, and I told the workmen to stop and repair the
damage done, so that the Wuzeer did not know of the ruse till late in
the afternoon, when his master of the horse reported the return of
the horses. He immediately sent them to me, saying he had given them
to the English and would not take them. I told him I had not enough
of grain to keep them: and suggested that if he did not like to keep
them, they might be eaten. The people present, on the receipt of the
message, highly approved of the latter part; and Yar Mahomed gave to
the most clamorous the horse intended for the Persian, which was duly
roasted. I believe the other one underwent the same fate a few weeks
subsequently.”—[_MS. Journal._]
[178] “I was a good deal surprised on awaking at half-past six to
see the Envoy already up and busy writing. At seven, according to
engagement, I sent to let the Wuzeer know that his Excellency was ready
to receive him. Yar Mahomed was asleep when the message arrived; but
they awoke him, and he joined us in a short time with a whole posse of
chiefs. On my meeting him at the door he asked me was it customary for
our ministers not to sleep at night, declaring that he had scarcely
closed his eyes when he was told that Mr. M’Neill was waiting for
him; and further remarked, ‘I do not wonder your affairs prosper when
men of such high rank as your minister plenipotentiary work harder
than an Afghan private soldier would do even under the eye of the
Shah.’”—[_Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._]
[179] _Mr. M’Neill to Yar Mahomed—Published Correspondence._
[180] Pottinger explained to Kamran the manner in which Mr. M’Neill
had been deceived. “On the 24th,” he says, “I had an audience of
Shah Kamran to explain the manner in which the Persians had deceived
the British Envoy. His Majesty said that he never expected anything
else—that the Kajars have been noted for their want of faith ever
since they have been heard of—that his father and himself had several
times tried their promises, but always been miserably deceived.”—[_MS.
Journal._]
[181] _Pottinger’s MS. Journal._
[182] _Yar Mahomed to Mr. M’Neill_—_Published Correspondence._
[183] _Mr. M’Neill to Lord Palmerston_—_Published Correspondence._
Intelligence of Simonich’s movements soon reached the beleaguered
garrison. “We were told,” says Pottinger, “that Count Simonich had
reconnoitred the city, and had examined with a telescope from the top
of the Masula, and given his opinion that all the points attacked were
too strong to be taken; and that the only vulnerable side was the
eastern side.”
[184] “Notwithstanding,” says Pottinger, “that I might then be
considered a doubtful friend, it was never contemplated that I should
be kept out of their assembly.”—[_MS. Journal._]
[185] _Published Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan._
[186] The Gholam’s own account of the treatment he received from Hadjee
Khan is worth quoting:-“Hadjee Khan then turned to me, and threatened
me with instant death. I demanded the reason, but he gave me no other
answer than abuse, calling me a traitor and a rascal, and said that he
himself would be my executioner. He then began to unbutton his coat
sleeves, threatening me all the while, and every now and then half
unsheathing his dagger, ‘I will be your executioner myself,’ said
the Khan. ‘If there be an enemy to the English, I am the man—you are
a traitor and a rascal—your eyes shall be plucked out; the Shah has
ordered me to kill you; I will first cut off your hands. You must have
papers from Herat, and unless you instantly deliver them up, you shall
be cut to pieces.’ Hadjee Khan went on in this strain for a long time,
during which I was stripped nearly to my skin, the air being so cold
that water, on being exposed, instantly froze. I was silent under all
these threats and demonstrations, merely observing that, having such
a noble executioner as Hadjee Khan, I was content to die, and I hoped
the office would remain in his family.”—_Statement of Ali Mahomed
Beg._—_Published Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan._
[187] _Mr. M’Neill to Lord Palmerston: Meshed, June 25, 1838._
[188] The Jew’s synagogue had been devoted to this unholy use; but they
had contrived to accomplish its redemption.
[189] An amusing illustration of the unsavoury condition of the city at
this time is given in Pottinger’s Journal. He had made the acquaintance
of a magician, and wished to have a specimen of his art. “People of
his class,” he writes, “are very careful of exposing themselves; and
are excessively suspicious and bigoted. It was therefore a long time
before I could venture to request a turn of his art. However, I at
last did so, but was disappointed at finding he was not a regular
practitioner; and as we had got now intimate he told me that he as yet
had not commenced the practice; that he wanted to pursue the science
allowed by the _Hudyth_; not the accursed magic—_Sihr Malown_; that
he wished but for power to summon the _gins_ and angels to his aid.
Though this was not exactly what I wanted, I should have been most
happy of an introduction to either of these classes; and, therefore,
not to lose my labour, I used my utmost endeavours to get my friend to
commence his incantations at once. He made many excuses. First, he had
not got clean clothes to change, as the scarcity had obliged him to
part with everything extra to buy grain whilst it was tolerably cheap.
This and sundry other excuses were easily overcome; but he evidently
wished to avoid the employment, or to make excuses for use when he
failed. As soon as one objection was overruled another was raised; but
I overcame all except that the stench of the dead bodies from the city
would prevent these spirits from venturing, except under extraordinary
strong incantations, within its walls; as angels and _gins_ are said to
be particularly fond of sweet odours, and excessively angered by the
contrary. The argument was a clencher, and no ingenuity could overturn
it, for certainly the smell was abominable, and in a calm, or when the
wind came from the southward, in which direction the greatest number
had been buried, the human kind could scarcely withstand the horrible
effluvia of putrid flesh.”—[_Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._]
[190] A few days afterwards, however, a party of some 600 or 700,
mostly old men, women, and children, were put out of the gates. “The
enemy,” says Pottinger, “opened a heavy fire on them until they found
out who they were, when they tried to drive them back with sticks and
stones; but Naib Dustoo, to whom the business was entrusted, liker a
fiend than a man, opened a fire upon the wretched citizens from the
works, and the Persians thus let them pass. From the besiegers’ fire
no one suffered, as a rising ground was between, but from that of the
garrison it is said several fell.”
[191] It was said that Mahomed Shah had come down in person to witness
the assault; but the Royal amateur was only the Shah’s brother, who,
attended by a party of idlers, and a small body of horse, was a
spectator of the defeat of his countrymen.
[192] “The assault on the gate of Candahar was repulsed, and the
Persians chased back into their trenches; but the danger at the
south-east angle prevented them following up the advantage. At the
south-west angle, or Pay-in-ab, the Persians can scarcely be said to
have attacked, as they never advanced beyond the parapet of their own
trenches. It was evidently a mere feint. At the western, or Arak gate,
a column composed of the Russian regiment, and other troops under
Samson, and those under Wully Khan, marched up to the counterscarp; but
Wully Khan being killed, and Samson carried off the field wounded, the
men broke and fled, leaving an immense number killed and wounded. The
latter were nearly all shot by idlers on the ramparts, or murdered by
the plunderers, who crept out to strip the slain. The other attack, on
the centre of the north-west face, was repulsed in like manner, after
reaching the counterscarp.”—[_Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._] Wully
Khan’s body was found on the following day, and his head was brought
into the city. On his person were found several letters relating to
the plan of assault, which satisfactorily proved that it had been
designed by the Russian officers in the Persian camp. There were two
letters among them from Mahomed Shah himself—one addressed to Wully
Khan, ordering him to conform to the plan of the Russian ambassador,
and another to Hadjee Meerza Aghassy, directing him to give similar
instructions to Wully Khan.
[193] There is nothing finer in the annals of the war in Afghanistan
than the heroic conduct of Eldred Pottinger on this 24th of June. But
I should as little discharge my duty as an historian, as I should
gratify my inclinations as a man, if I were not to say that I have
extracted, with some difficulty, from Pottinger’s manuscript journal,
the real history of the service that he rendered to his country on this
memorable day. The young Bombay artilleryman was endowed with a rare
modesty, which made him unwilling to speak or to write about himself.
In the copy of the journal before me he has erased, throughout the
entire record of this day, every entrance made in the first person; and
only by giving rein to a curiosity, which I should not have indulged,
or considered pardonable in any ordinary case, have I succeeded in
extracting the real history of an incident which has already, in one
or two incorrect shapes, been given to the world. Wherever Pottinger
had written in the original copy of his journal “I,” he had erased
the egotistical monosyllable, and substituted the words, “the people
about the Wuzeer,” or had otherwise disguised the record of his own
achievements. For example, the words, “I had several times to lay hold
of the Vizier, and point to him the men, who turned as soon as he did,”
are altered into, “the people about abused, and several times had
to lay hold of the Vizier, &c. &c.” What was thought of Pottinger’s
conduct beyond the walls of Herat, may be gathered from the fact,
that a few days afterwards a man came in from Kurookh, bringing some
important intelligence, who immediately on his arrival, went up to
Pottinger, seized his hands, kissed them, said he was indeed “rejoiced
that he had made so great a pilgrimage,” and spoke with enthusiastic
praise of the repulse of the Persian stormers.
[194] The loss upon the Persian side was very heavy. A large number of
officers, including several chiefs of note, were killed and wounded.
Mr. M’Neill wrote from camp near Teheran, to Lord Palmerston: “The
number of the killed and wounded of the Persian army is variously
stated; but the best information I have been able to obtain leads me
to believe that it cannot be less than 1700 or 1800 men. The loss in
officers, and especially those of the higher ranks, has been very great
in proportion to the whole number killed and wounded. Major-General
Berowski and Sirteps Wully Khan and Nebbee Khan, have been killed;
Sirteps Samson Khan, Hossein Pasha Khan, and Jaffier Kooli Khan, have
been wounded; and almost all the field-officers of these brigades have
been killed or wounded.” There is little doubt, however, that the
entire number of casualties is greatly overstated in this passage.
[195] “The Wuzeer told me the whole business hung upon me; that the
Persians made a point of obtaining my dismissal, without which they
would not treat. They were so pressing, that he said he never before
guessed my importance, and that the Afghan envoys who had gone to camp
had told him they had always thought me one man, but the importance
the Persians attached to my departure showed that I was equal to an
army. The Afghans were very complimentary, and expressed loudly their
gratitude to the British Government, to the exertions of which they
attributed the change in the tone of the Persians. They, however,
did not give the decided answers they should have done, but put the
question off by saying I was a guest. The Persians offered to be
security for my safe passage to any place I chose to go to.”—[_Eldred
Pottinger’s MS. Journal._]
[196] At one of these consultations, held on the 18th of July, “Deen
Mahomed,” said Pottinger, “proposed that each chief should bring what
he had to the Wuzeer. The Wuzeer proposed that each chief should
retain his own men. The Topshee-Bashee said: ‘As the Shah has money,
and won’t give it, we cannot force him; but if you allow me to seize
whom I like, and the chiefs give me their promise that they will not
interfere in favour of any one, I will undertake to provide the expense
of the men for two months.’ The chiefs immediately said ‘Done!’ and
had an agreement made out, and those present sealed it.... They were,
or appeared well satisfied with me; and the Wuzeer quoted my anxiety
and efforts as an example to those who had their women and children to
defend.”—[_Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._]
[197] _Colonel Stoddart to Mr. M’Neill. Correspondence relating to
Persia and Afghanistan._
[198] _Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._
[199] “Yar Mahomed is one of the most persuasive talkers I have met.
It is scarcely possible to talk with him and retain anger. He is ready
in a surprising degree, and is so patient under rebuke, that I never
saw him fail to quiet the most violent of his countrymen, when he
thought it worth his while. A person who disregards truth, and thinks
nothing of denying what he has asserted a few minutes before, is a
most puzzling person to argue with. Until you have thought over what
has been said, you cannot understand the changeable colours which pass
before you.”—[_Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._]
[200] _Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal._
[201] “It is my firm belief that Mahomed Shah might have carried the
city by assault the very first day that he reached Herat, and that
even when the garrison gained confidence, and were flushed with the
success of their sorties, he might have, by a proper use of the means
at his disposal, taken the place in twenty-four hours. His troops were
infinitely better soldiers, and quite as brave men, as the Afghans.
The non-success of their efforts was the fault of their generals. We
can never again calculate on such, and if the Persians again return,
they will do so properly commanded and enlightened as to the causes
of their former failure. Their material was on a scale sufficient to
have reduced a powerful fortress. The men worked very well at the
trenches, considering they were not trained sappers, and the practice
of the artillery was really superb. They simply wanted engineers, and a
general, to have proved a most formidable force.”—[_Eldred Pottinger’s
Report on Herat_: _Calcutta, July, 1840._ _MS. Records._]
[202] It will have been perceived that I have described the operations
of the siege of Herat, almost entirely as from within the walls. I
have done this partly, because I believe that the interest of such
descriptions is greatly enhanced when the reader is led to identify
himself more particularly with one contending party; and partly because
the outside movements of the Persian army have been already detailed
in the published letters of Colonel Stoddart and Mr. M’Neill, whilst
no account has ever yet been given to the public of the defensive
operations of the Heratees. I have already stated that my information
has been, for the most part, derived from the Manuscript Journals of
Eldred Pottinger.
[203] _Draft of a Note to be presented by the Marquis of Clanricarde to
Count Nesselrode. Published Papers._
[204] It is not very clear, however, that the Russian Government,
though doubtless discredited by the failure, regarded it as “a fatal
enterprise.” Russia had a double game to play. In the familiar language
of the turf, she “hedged.” Whether the Persians won or lost, she was
sure to gain something. The views of Russian statesmen have been thus
set forth, not improbably in the very language of one of them:
“Russia,” it is stated, “has played a very successful, as well as a
very safe, game in the late proceedings. When she prompted the Shah to
undertake the siege of Herat, she was certain of carrying an important
point, however the expedition terminated. If Herat fell, which there
was every reason to expect, then Candahar and Caubul would certainly
have made their submission. Russian influence would thus have been
brought to the threshold of India; and England, however much she
might desire peace, could not avoid being involved in a difficult and
expensive war, in order to avert more serious dangers. If, on the other
hand, England interfered to save Herat, she was compromised—not with
the mere court of Mahomed Shah, but with Persia as a nation. Russia
had contrived to bring all Persia to Herat, and to identify all Persia
with the success or failure of the campaign; and she had thus gravelled
the old system of partisanship, which would have linked Azerbijan
with herself, and the rest of the nation with her rival.”—[_Calcutta
Review._]
[205] _Count Nesselrode’s Instructions to Count Pozzo di Borgo_:
_November 1, 1839._
[206] Sir John Hobhouse’s answer is worth giving. “Very probably,
Baron; but however much I should regret the collision, I should have no
fear of the result.” I give this on the authority of a distinguished
writer on “Our Political Relations with Persia,” in the _Calcutta
Review_.
[207] For a very interesting and ably written summary of the progress
of Russia in the East, and an elaborate investigation of the question
of the possibility of a Russian invasion of India, see Mr. Robert
Bell’s excellent “History of Russia.” It was written before the British
crossed the Indus—before Russia entangled herself in the steppes,
and England in the defiles of Central Asia. Neither country now,
remembering these disasters, thinks of the meeting of the Sepoy and the
Cossack without a shudder.
[208] I may as well mention here that the chasm between Persia and
Great Britain, created by the events narrated in this chapter, was
not bridged over until the spring of 1841, when Ghorian was given
back to the Heratees. Before the close of that year, Mahomed Shah
was collecting a great army, and contemplating extensive operations,
the object of which, according to Sir John M’Neill, though disguised
under the name of operations against Khiva, was another assault upon
Herat.—[_Sir John M’Neill to Sir Alexander Burnes: January 5, 1842.
MS._] This letter was written more than two months after Burnes had
fallen a victim to the policy which I am now about to elucidate. Sir
John M’Neill wrote: “I have now to inform you, that since the arrival
of Count Medem, the new Russian Minister, about a month ago, the Shah
has given orders for collecting an army in the spring, about two months
hence, which is intended to be numerous, and to be accompanied by two
hundred pieces of Artillery; and he announces his intention to march
in the direction of Meshed, for the purpose of attacking Khiva. The
advance of the Shah with such an army to Meshed, may produce some
commotion in Afghanistan, as you will no doubt hear of his proposing
to go to Herat; and I conclude, therefore, that you will be prepared
to put down any movements that may be caused by the rumour of his
approach, and for any ulterior measures that may be necessary.” But
in a postscript, dated January 6, the very day on which the British
commenced their lamentable retreat from Caubul, he added: “Since
writing the preceding lines, some circumstances which have come to my
knowledge, lead me to think it quite possible that the Shah may not
follow out his intention of going with an army into Khorassan, and it
is even possible that no army may be sent in that direction; but I am
still of opinion, that it is considerably more probable that a force
will be sent, than that it will not; and if a large army should march
to Meshed, its objects will, I think, have reference rather to Herat
than to Khiva.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]
[209] _Mr. M’Neill to Captain Burnes._ _MS. Records._
[210] Id. ibid.
[211] Count Simonich’s letter was intercepted, and taken to M’Neill by
one Meer Mahomed, whom M’Neill subsequently placed at the disposal of
Burnes.
[212] _“Captain Wade to J. R. Colvin” Esq., June 27, 1837._ _MS.
Records._
[213] _Private Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes._
[214] See Harlan’s account of the reception of these presents. I see no
reason to question its veracity.
[215] Lord William Bentinck is said to have exclaimed, “What! Lord
Auckland and Macnaghten gone to war! The very last men in the world I
should have suspected of such folly!”
[216] In the preceding year he had written to Sir Charles Metcalfe,
“You are quite right in believing that I have not a thought of
interference between the Afghans and the Sikhs. I should not be sorry
to see strong, independent, and commercial powers established in
Afghanistan; but short of Persian or Russian occupation, their present
state is as unsatisfactory as possible, with national, family, and
religious feuds so inveterate as almost to make one party ready to
join any invader against another. It is out of the question that we
can ever gain direct power or influence amongst them.”—[_Life of Lord
Metcalfe_, vol. ii. p. 307.] It was upon the basis of this assumption
that he subsequently reared the delusive project of re-establishing
“the integrity of the Douranee Empire.”
[217] “Of plans, of this nature, that of granting our aid or
countenance in concert with Runjeet Singh, to enable Shah
Soojah-ool-Moolk to re-establish his sovereignty in the Eastern
division of Afghanistan, under engagements which shall conciliate
the feelings of the Sikh ruler, and bind the restored monarch to the
support of our interests, appears to me to be decidedly the most
deserving of attention. Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk and Maharajah Runjeet
Singh would probably act readily upon such a plan, it being similar to
that in which they were before engaged, but which failed principally
from the want of pecuniary aid, and the absence of our active sanction
and support. In such an enterprise (which both from past experience,
and from the circumstance that it would be undertaken in resistance
of an attempt to establish _Sheeah_ supremacy in the country, would,
we believe, have many partisans in Afghanistan) Runjeet Singh would
assist by the employment of a portion of his troops, and we by some
contribution in money, and the presence of an accredited agent of
the government, and of a sufficient number of officers for the
direction of the Shah’s army.”—[_Minute of Lord Auckland’s, Simlah,
May 12, 1838_—_MS. Records._] A portion of this minute is given in
the published correspondence. The passage quoted, and indeed, all the
latter and more practical portion of it, is omitted.
[218] _Minute of Lord Auckland—Unpublished portion_: _MS. Records._
[219] It is worth while to quote some passages from this letter of
instructions; only a grandiloquent passage setting forth generally the
pacific views of Lord Auckland, and the power of the British Government
having been inserted in the Blue Book. “You can then, as you observe
the disposition of the Maharajah, listen to all he has to say, or, in
the event of his showing no disposition to commence the conference,
you can state to him the views of your own government—that two courses
of proceeding had occurred to his lordship—the one that the treaty
formerly executed between his Highness and Shah Soojah should be
recognised by the British Government—that whilst the Sikhs advanced
cautiously on Caubul, accompanied by British agents, a demonstration
should be made by a division of the British army occupying Shikarpoor
with Shah Soojah in their company, to whom the British Government would
advance money to enable him to levy troops and purchase arms, and to
whom also the services of British officers should be lent, that the
same opportunity should be taken of securing to the Maharajah what it
had been customary for him to receive from the Scindhians, and that
with regard to Shikarpoor, the supplementary article in the treaty now
proposed (and which with a second supplementary article relating to
Herat is annexed to this despatch) should be substituted for Article
IV. in the former treaty—that in the event of his Highness agreeing
to this convention, the Governor-General would be prepared to ratify
it, unless circumstances should intermediately have occurred to induce
his Lordship to alter his views as to its expediency, and that in the
event of the convention being ratified by his Lordship, the descent on
Shikarpoor, for temporary occupation, should be directed as soon as due
preparations could be made, and the season will permit. If his Highness
also approved of this convention, and agreed that the operations of
the allies should be conducted in concert with each other, by means
of British agents in the camp of each, the Governor-General would be
prepared to enter into a general defensive alliance with his Highness
against the attacks of all enemies from the westward.
“You will, at the same time, propound the only other course of
proceedings which, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the case
admits of, which is to allow the Maharajah to take his own course
against Dost Mahomed Khan without any reference to us. Should his
Highness show a decided preference for this course, you are authorised
to tell him at once, that he is at liberty to follow it; but you should
point out to him the possibility of defeat, by the combined army of
the Persians and Afghans, and you will, as far as you can consistently
with propriety, impress upon him the necessity of caution, and of
using Afghan rather than Sikh influence or agency. Should he wish
to make an instrument of Shah Soojah, you will apprise him that the
Governor-General attaches too much importance to the person of the
ex-King to admit of his going forth, otherwise than with the almost
assured certainty of success; but that the ex-King will be permitted to
proceed to Caubul with a view of being re-instated in his sovereignty,
should the Sikhs succeed in taking Caubul, and that arrangement be
desired by his Highness.
“Of the relative advantages which may be derived from these two plans,
you will be better able to judge after you shall have fully opened
them, with the consideration which each has to recommend it to the
Maharajah. His Highness may possibly be unwilling to commit his troops
in the passes of the Khybur, and he may strongly feel the difficulty
which religious and natural animosity will oppose to any measure mainly
resting on Sikh power and Sikh influence. He may not, therefore, reject
the plan that stands first in this paper; and there can be little
doubt that, for ultimate efficiency, and for bringing greater weight
and greater strength to bear in concert upon the objects in view,
that this plan should have the preference; but it is cumbrous, and a
considerable time may elapse before it can be set in motion; and if
it might conciliate Afghan opinion on one hand, on the other it might
impair with the Sikhs that cordiality which would be so essential to
the success of co-operation. His Lordship, on the whole, is disposed
to think that the plan which is second in order is that which will be
found most expedient.”—[_MS. Records._]
[220] Captain Osborne, Lord Auckland’s nephew and military secretary
Captain George Macgregor, of the artillery, one of his aides-de-camp,
whose name has since become associated with some of the most honourable
incidents of the Afghan war; and Dr. Drummond, accompanied Macnaghten.
[221] _MS. Records._
[222] Lieutenant (since Colonel) Mackeson was one of the assistants to
the Governor-General’s agent on the north-west frontier. Whilst Burnes
was at Caubul he was directed to remain at Peshawur; a place with
which his name has since become historically, and now most painfully,
associated. Some two months before the arrival of Macnaghten’s Mission,
he joined Runjeet Singh’s camp and travelled with the Maharajah through
different parts of the Sikh Empire. Runjeet conversed freely with
the young officer regarding the progress of Burnes’s negotiations at
Caubul, the mission of Vickovich, and other matters connected with the
politics of Afghanistan. Rumours had then reached him of the designs of
the British Government to invite him to co-operate in measures for the
overthrow of the Barukzye Sirdars. He discussed the subject with little
reserve; and it was evident that the project had little attraction for
him.
[223] I should not have thought that the drift of this passage could be
misunderstood. And yet it has been said with reference to it [_Hume’s
Memoir of Henry Torrens_] that although I have “emphatically denounced
the disgraceful act of mutilating official papers,” I have “no single
word of censure for diplomatic falsehoods,” but have declared that
“diplomacy _should not be_ subjected to the test of truth.” I said that
it “is not intended to be,” not that “it should not be,” subjected to
such a test. Every writer must be permitted to choose his own weapons
of attack. At one time he may employ invective; at another, sarcasm;
and the latter may express as strong a detestation of falsehood and
baseness as the former. Both in a previous and a subsequent chapter
I have expressed my opinion of the manner in which Lord Auckland and
his ministers misrepresented the conduct of Dost Mahomed; and in the
present passage I do not seek to exculpate Macnaghten, by insinuating
my belief that diplomacy is, in its general intent and practice,
shamefully destitute of honesty and truth.
[224] The greater part of the proposed treaty was substantially
and literally the same as that negotiated in 1833—but some
supplementary articles were added to it. One of these recognised the
independence of the Ameers of Sindh (Runjeet thereby withdrawing all
claims on Shikarpoor), in consideration of the payment by them of
compensation-money to the amount of twenty lakhs of rupees; and another
recognised the integrity of Herat.
[225] Runjeet was always doubtful whether his soldiers would not shrink
from attempting to force the Khybur Pass. He told Mackeson, before
the arrival of Macnaghten’s Mission, that the Khalsa entertained
very strong prejudices against that kind of warfare, of which it may
be added, both he and his chiefs had the vaguest possible idea. He
believed that to force the Khybur Pass was to push a column of troops
into it, somewhat as you would push them over a narrow bridge, the men
in the rear stepping over the bodies of their slaughtered comrades.
He had no notion of turning the pass by flank movements—of crowning
the heights on each side—and accomplishing by skilful dispositions
what could not be done by brute force without a dreadful sacrifice
of life. Subsequently, at his interviews with the officers of the
British Mission, he reverted to this subject. He said that he had
never tried the Khalsa at such work; that he doubted whether they
could be induced to march over the corpses of their countrymen; and
asked whether British troops could be depended on for such service.
He added, that the Sirdars whom he had sent to command his troops at
Peshawur, had often urged him to suffer them to move through the Khybur
upon Jellalabad; but that he had uniformly refused to listen to their
proposals.—[_MS. Notes._]
[226] Runjeet put in a claim for more than a moiety of the
tribute-money of twenty lakhs of rupees that was to be wrung from the
Ameers of Sindh and divided between him and the Shah; and he asked also
for the transfer of Jellalabad to his own rule. The latter demand was
steadfastly refused; but an arrangement was effected with regard to
the former, at the expense of the Ameers of Sindh; Runjeet receiving a
larger amount without detriment to the Shah.
[227] _Mr. Macnaghten to Government. Camp, near Lahore, June 20 1838_:
_MS. Records._ Captain Cunninghame [_History of the Sikhs_], says that
Runjeet was informed that the expedition for the restoration of Shah
Soojah would be undertaken, whether the Maharajah chose to share in
it or not. “That Runjeet Singh,” the author adds in a note, “was told
he would be left out if he did not choose to come in, does not appear
on public record. It was, however, the only convincing argument used
during the long discussions, and I think Major Mackeson was made the
bearer of the message to that effect.” But this is stated somewhat too
broadly. Runjeet Singh was not told that the British, in the event of
his refusing to co-operate with the Shah, would undertake by themselves
the restoration of Shah Soojah, but that they _might_ be compelled
to do so in self-defence. Mackeson told Runjeet, as Macnaghten had
before told the Fakir Aziz-ood-een, that in order “to guard against any
reproach of reserve or concealment, hereafter,” it was right “to inform
him now of the possibility that might occur of our being compelled,
in self-defence, to take our own measures to ward off approaching
danger, and use our own troops to restore Shah Soojah to the throne.”
The Maharajah, receiving this communication as though he had not been
prepared for it by the Fakir Aziz-ood-een, told Mackeson at once to
prepare the treaty. “Not immediately understanding,” says Mackeson, in
his memorandum of this interview, “to what treaty he might allude, I
asked the Fakir whether that with the supplementary articles presented
by Mr. Macnaghten to the Maharajah’s approval was the one alluded
to. The Maharajah observed, ‘That one;’ and the Fakir recalled his
attention to the point by asking how the question of Jellalabad was to
be settled; to which his Highness replied, that if the Sikhs could not
be allowed to hold possession of Jellalabad, some other arrangement
could be made, which would have the effect of making the Khalsa-jee
act in cordial co-operation—that the friendship between the Sikhs and
the British was great, and had lasted many years—that the British and
Sikh Governments had no care, and were both able to act independently,
but that they had a care for the mutual friendship which had lasted so
long. The Fakir hinted to me to suggest some other mode to supersede
that of the Sikhs holding possession of Jellalabad. I observed that
it now rested with the Maharajah to suggest any plan that might have
occurred to his mind. After some further conversation, Runjeet Singh
said that an annual tribute of two lakhs of rupees from Shah Soojah
would satisfy him for the non-possession of Jellalabad; and this
granted, he was willing to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah.
The British agents objected to the payment of tribute, as it would be
an acknowledgment of inferiority on the part of the Shah; but they
consented that the two lakhs should be paid, in the shape of a subsidy,
Runjeet Singh undertaking to keep up a force on the frontier, at the
call of the Afghan monarch.”—[_Lieutenant Mackeson’s Memorandum of a
conversation with the Maharajah, Runjeet Singh, at Lahore, 23d of June,
1838_: _MS. Records._]
[228] Mackeson was the general messenger on the part of the British
agent, as was the Fakir Aziz-ood-een, or Kishen Chund, on the part of
the Maharajah. These functionaries were constantly going backwards and
forwards, in the frightful heat, to communicate the suggestions or
replies of their respective chiefs.
[229] It is probable that the demand for Jellalabad was intended to be
refused, in order that the refusal might strengthen Runjeet’s claims to
increased pecuniary compensation; for before the arrival of the Mission
he was in the habit of speaking of Jellalabad as a possession not to be
coveted by the Khalsa.
[230] Moollah Shikore was at this time the Shah’s agent and
confidential adviser in exile. Further mention will be made of him in a
subsequent portion of the narrative.
[231] _Memorandum, by Lieut. Mackeson, of Mr. Macnaghten’s Interview
with Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, at Loodhianah, on the 15th of July, 1838_;
_MS. Records._
[232] _Lieutenant Mackeson’s Memorandum_: _MS. Records._
[233] “Who would, however,” it was added, “not interfere with the full
exercise of his authority over his subjects.”
[234] “He mentioned having a few days before sent an emissary to
Kamram to conjure him, for the honour of the Afghans, to hold out
for two short months, and he would hear of miracles worked in his
favour.”—[_Lieutenant Mackeson’s Memorandum_: _MS. Records._]
[235] Some anxiety was expressed by the Shah lest Prince Timour should
be consigned entirely to the guidance of the Sikhs, but he was assured
that the presence of British officers in his camp would effectually
prevent this.
[236] It will be more convenient for purposes of reference to
append, as a note to each article, Macnaghten’s replies to these
several points, as given at the subsequent interview: “With regard
to the _first_ article,” he writes, “I told the Shah that he might
make his mind perfectly at ease, as the British Government had no
intention or wish to interfere between his Majesty and his family and
dependents.”—[_Mr. Macnaghten to Government, July 17, 1838_: _MS.
Records._]
[237] “With regard to the _second_ article, I pointed out to the Shah,
that the conquest of Shikarpoor would be directly opposed to one of
the articles of the treaty. To the rest of the article I could only
say that it would be naturally the wish of the British Government to
witness the consolidation and extension, to their proper limits, of his
Majesty’s dominions.”—[_MS. Records._]
[238] “On the subject of the _third_ article, I observed that, of
course, the Shah did not mean to include the territories ceded to
Runjeet Singh by the new treaty, and that the mention of Shikarpoor was
inadmissible.”—[_MS. Records._]
[239] “The _fourth_ article I stated would doubtless be approved by the
Governor-General.”—[_MS. Records._]
[240] “The wish, I said, expressed in the _fifth_ article would be
scrupulously attended to.”—[_MS. Records._]
[241] “With respect to the objection urged in the _sixth_ article, to
making money-payments to Maharajah Runjeet Singh, I reiterated the
arguments formerly used, to show the distinctions between a tributary
and a subsidiary obligation. These arguments, it will be observed,
had due weight with his Majesty, for in the written article he brings
forward the objection as one that may occur to the world, not as one
to which he himself attaches any importance. Ultimately, however,
his Majesty admitted that it would be impossible to satisfy all
unreasonable objections, and that to those who understood the subject,
and whose opinions alone were to be valued, the reciprocal nature of
the subsidiary obligation would be sufficiently obvious. With regard
to the objection specified in this article, founded on the anticipated
want of means, I gave his Majesty encouragement to hope that the
British Government would not permit him to be in distress for the means
of discharging his necessary pecuniary obligations.”—[_MS. Records._]
[242] “The _seventh_ article, I observed, was at variance with the
proposed provisions in the new treaty regarding Shikarpoor. His
Majesty, after some conversation, agreed to expunge the article, as
well as to exclude the mention of Shikarpoor in other places where
it had been introduced from his paper of requests; but he seemed to
set great value on his claim to Shikarpoor and the Sindh possessions
generally. The Ameers, he observed, had no legitimate title to their
dominions but what they derived from him. Shikarpoor, he said, he was
particularly desirous to obtain possession of, as being an appropriate
place of refuge and escape for his family in case of reverses; but he
ultimately admitted that the object would be sufficiently secured to
him so long as the British influence prevailed with the Ameers.”—[_MS.
Records._]
[243] “On the very delicate subject introduced into the last article,
I observed to his Majesty that its connexion with the treaty generally
did not seem to me to be obvious, but that I would nevertheless bring
it to the notice of the Governor-General, who would, I felt persuaded,
take it into consideration with the same anxious desire to gratify his
Majesty in this as in all other matters.”—[_MS. Records._]
[244] _MS. Records._
[245] _Mr. Macnaghten to Government, July 17, 1838_: _MS. Records._
[246] Many of these letters were promptly responded to, and in some
instances voluntary tenders of service were made by chiefs discontented
with the Barukzye rule. Among others, Khan Shereen Khan, chief of the
Kuzzilbashes, wrote to Shah Soojah declaring his intention to join
his standard. “Since we have been so unfortunate,” said the chief,
“as to be far from your royal household, it is only known to God how
wretchedly we pass our days. We have now resolved, as soon as the
troops of your Majesty arrive on the frontier, to lose no time in
waiting upon your Majesty and proving our fidelity by sacrificing
ourselves in your service. For God’s sake do not make this letter
public.” Even before it was known that there was any intention on
the part of the Shah to attempt to regain his kingdom, many of the
chiefs, either offended by Dost Mahomed’s alliance with the Persians,
or warned by the failure of Burnes’s Mission of the danger of clinging
any longer to a falling house, wrote to the Shah, beseeching him to
return. “The faggots,” it was said, “are ready. It merely requires the
lighted torch to be applied.” It is remarkable that one of the first
to tender his services to the Suddozye Prince was that very Abdoollah
Khan, Achetzkye, who was the prime mover of the insurrection at Caubul,
which brought about the restoration of the Barukzyes.—[_Captain Wade
to Mr. Macnaghten, June 5th, 1838_: _MS. Records._] At this time the
Shah was restricted from corresponding with his Afghan friends; but
Captain Wade, whilst reporting to government the receipt of the letters
from Abdoollah Khan and others, recommended that the restriction should
be removed. The Shah seems to have laid before the British agent, in
perfect good faith, all the letters he received from Afghanistan whilst
a pensioner on the British Government.
[247] _Mr. Macnaghten to Government, July 17, 1838_: _MS. Records._
[248] It was, as I have shown, the first wish of the Governor-General
that the Sikhs should undertake, single-handed, the invasion of
Afghanistan (see Lord Auckland’s Minute and instructions to Mr.
Macnaghten in the preceding chapter). Macnaghten, on his way to
Runjeet’s Court, wrote to Mr. Masson: “You will have heard that I
am proceeding on a mission to Runjeet Singh; and as at my interview
with his Highness it is probable that the question of his relations
with the Afghans will come on the _tapis_, I am naturally desirous of
obtaining the opinion of the best-informed men with respect to them.
Would you oblige me, therefore, by stating what means of counteraction
to the policy of Dost Mahomed Khan you would recommend for adoption;
and whether you think that the Sikhs, using any (and what?) instrument
of Afghan agency, could establish themselves in Caubul?”—[_Masson’s
Narrative_, vol. iii.] A letter, with a similar suggestion, was sent
to Captain Burnes, of whose reception of the project I shall speak
more in detail. The matter is further noticeable as an indication of
the unwillingness of Lord Auckland to interfere more actively in the
politics of Afghanistan.
[249] In this revised edition of the present work, I am bound to state
that Mr. Henry Torrens, whose early death, in 1852, is an event to be
deplored far beyond the circle of his own private friends, emphatically
denied, on reading these statements, and the comments made upon them by
the local press of India, his participation in the evil counsels which
led Lord Auckland astray. I am bound to give currency to Mr. Torrens’s
explanations, which will be found in the Appendix to the present
volume, with such comments of my own as they seem to demand.
[250] Mr. Masson says (_Narrative_, vol. iii., p. 495) that Burnes told
him that the expedition across the Indus “had been arranged before
he reached Simlah, and that when he arrived Torrens and Colvin came
running to him and prayed him to say nothing to unsettle his Lordship;
that they had all the trouble in the world to get him into the
business, and that even now he would be glad of any pretext to retire
from it.” I was for a long time, very sceptical of the truth of this
story; and I do not now vouch for it. But I know that some men, with
far better opportunities than my own of determining the authenticity of
the anecdote, are inclined to believe it.
[251] Runjeet was very anxious to obtain Burnes’s private opinion
regarding the state of politics in Afghanistan, and the course which
it was expedient for the Maharajah to adopt. The Fakir Noor-ood-deen
had two or three conferences with Burnes upon these points. The
whole history of the negotiations with Dost Mahomed were gone over
and reported, from notes taken down at the time, by the Fakir to the
Maharajah. Runjeet declared himself very grateful for this information;
and sent again to ask Burnes to tell him, not as a public functionary,
but as a private friend, whether the restoration of Shah Soojah would
be really to his advantage. Burnes’s answer was in the affirmative; and
Runjeet seems to have been, to some extent, influenced by it.—[_Captain
Burnes to Mr. Macnaghten, Lahore, June 20th, 1838_: _MS. Records._]
I do not know whether this letter has ever been made public from any
private source. Like almost everything else relating to the proceedings
at Lahore and Loodhianah in June and July, 1830, it was studiously
suppressed by government.
[252] _To Mr. Macnaghten, June 2, 1838._
[253] Burnes had originally written, “Of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk,
personally, I have, that is as ex-King of the Afghans, no very high
opinion;” but he had scored out the words. I quote the passages in the
text from a copy, the accuracy of which is certified by two Justices
of the Peace at Bombay. This letter was cited by Sir John Hobhouse in
the House of Commons, in verification of the assertion that Burnes had
recommended the course adopted by Lord Auckland. That I may not be
myself accused of garbling, I give the letter entire in the _Appendix_.
[254] With reference to the final offers of Dost Mahomed to hold
Peshawur, conjointly with Sultan Mahomed, tributary to Lahore (Jebbar
Khan acting as the Ameer’s representative), Captain Wade wrote: “They
seem to be in some accordance with the overture made by Runjeet Singh
to Dost Mahomed before Captain Burnes’s arrival at Caubul, as reported
in my despatch of the 8th of August last, and appear, as far as I
can judge of them at present, to be more reasonable than his former
overtures, though the Maharajah’s opinion of their operation on the
Peshawur branch of the family remains to be disclosed. I am ready, with
the sanction of the Governor-General, to communicate the proposition
now made to Runjeet Singh, and to support by every argument that I can
use the expediency of its acceptance by him.”—[_Captain Wade to Mr.
Macnaghten, March 3, 1838._]
[255] _Captain Wade to Mr. Macnaghten_: _MS. Records._ Captain Wade’s
letters have been garbled almost as shamelessly as Captain Burnes’s.
[256] In 1837, he had written to Sir Charles Metcalfe, “Every advance
you might make beyond the Sutlej to the Westward, in my opinion adds to
your military weakness.... If you want your empire to expand, expand
it over Oude or over Gwalior, and the remains of the Mahratta empire.
Make yourselves complete sovereigns of all within your bounds. _But let
alone the Far West._”—[_Life of Lord Metcalfe_, Vol. ii. p. 306.]
[257] The 2nd, 5th, 16th, 27th, 28th, 31st, 35th, 37th, 42nd, 43rd,
48th, and 53rd regiments.
[258] The principal staff-officers were Major P. Craigie, Deputy
Adjutant-General; Major W. Garden, Deputy Quartermaster-General;
Major J. D. Parsons, Deputy Commissary-General; Major Hough, Deputy
Advocate-General; and Major T. Byrne, Assistant Adjutant-General of
Queen’s Troops.
[259] _Captain Wade to Mr. Macnaghten, Loodhianah, September 23rd,
1838_: _MS. Records._
[260] “We are now planning a grand campaign,” he wrote on the 22nd of
July, “to restore the Shah to the throne of Caubul—Russia having come
down upon us. What exact part I am to play I know not, but if full
confidence and hourly consultation be any pledge, I am to be chief.
I can plainly tell them that it is _aut Cæsar aut nullus_, and if I
get not what I have a right to, you will soon see me _en route_ to
England.” On the 23rd of August he wrote: “Of myself I cannot tell
you what is to become. The commander-in-chief wants to go and to
take me—but this will not be, and I believe the chief and Macnaghten
will be made a commission—Wade and myself political agents under
them. I plainly told Lord Auckland that this does not please, and I
am disappointed. He replied that I could scarcely be appointed with
the chief in equality, and pledged himself to leave me independent
quickly, and in the highest appointment. What can I do when he tells
me I am a man he cannot spare. It is an honour, not a disgrace to
go under Sir Henry; and as for Macnaghten, he is secretary for all
India, and goes _pro tem_. Besides, I am not sorry to see Dost Mahomed
ousted by another hand than mine.”—[_Private Correspondence of Sir
A. Burnes._] These letters were written to his brother. In another
letter addressed to Captain Duncan, also on the 23rd of August, Burnes
wrote: “Of my own destinies, even, I cannot as yet give an account. I
go as a Political Agent with the Shah, but whether as _the_ Political
Agent remains to be seen. I find I bask in favour, but Sir Henry Fane
is to go, and he must be the Agent; but it is even hinted that they
will place a civilian with him, and employ me in advance. Be it so.
I succeed to the permanent employ after all is over.... The chief
wishes to go, and to take me with him, and I am highly obliged for his
appreciation.”—[_Private Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes_: _MS._]
[261] See Burnes’s correspondence, quoted in a preceding note.
[262] Lord Auckland, with characteristic kindliness, exerted himself
to allay any feelings of mortification that may have welled up in
Burnes’s mind; and the latter wisely revoked his determination to be
_aut Cæsar aut nullus_. The extracts from Burnes’s letters, given in
a preceding note, explain the motives that induced him to forego his
original resolve; and the following passage, from another private
letter, shows still more plainly the feelings with which he regarded
the considerate conduct of the Governor-General, of whom he writes: “‘I
mean, therefore,’ continued he (Lord Auckland), ‘to gazette you as a
Political Commissioner to Kelat, and when the army crosses, to regard
you as an independent political officer to co-operate with Macnaghten.’
Nothing could be more delicately kind, for I have permission, if I
like, to send an assistant to Kelat. I start in a week, and drop down
the Indus to Shikarpoor, where, with a brace of Commissaries, I prepare
for the advance of the army and the disbursement of many lakhs of
rupees. I care not for the responsibility; I am firm in the saddle, and
have all confidence. I think you will hear the result of my negotiation
to be, that the British flag flies at Bukkur.”—[_Private Correspondence
of Sir A. Burnes._]
[263] I do not mean that the entire Press of India and England
condemned it; but I believe that, at the time it had very few genuine
supporters: and I know that now it has fewer still.
[264] Among others the Duke of Wellington, who wrote to Mr. Tucker: “I
don’t know that while the siege of Herat continued, particularly by
the aid of Russian officers and troops, even in the form of deserters,
the Government of India could have done otherwise than prepare for its
defence.”—[_Life and Correspondence of Henry St. George Tucker._]
[265] The facts may be briefly repeated in a note. M’Neill recommended
the consolidation of Afghanistan under Dost Mahomed. Burnes recommended
the same course. Wade recommended the government to rely upon the
disunion of the Barukzye Sirdars, and was opposed to consolidation of
any kind.
[266] The responsibility of this famous manifesto belongs to Lord
Auckland, though some of his colleagues in the government at home have
declared themselves willing to share it with him. Sir John Hobhouse,
in 1850, told the Official Salaries Committee, in reply to a question
on the subject of the Afghan war, that he “did it himself;” and so far
as the announcement went entirely to acquit the East India Company
of taking part in the origination of the war, it is to be accepted
as a laudable revelation of the truth; but although Lord Palmerston
and Sir John Hobhouse saw the expediency of extricating the British
Government from the difficulties into which the conduct of Mahomed
Shah had thrown them, by encouraging a demonstration from the side of
India, the expenses of which would be thrown upon the Indian exchequer,
they are to be regarded rather as accessories after, than before, the
fact. The truth is, that Lord Auckland had determined on the course
of policy to be pursued, not before the India Board despatches were
written, but before they were received. Sir John Hobhouse stated in the
House of Commons (June 23, 1842) that Lord Auckland “must not bear the
blame of the measure; it was the policy of government; and he might
mention that the despatch which he wrote, stating his opinion of the
course that ought to be taken in order to meet expected emergencies,
and that written by Lord Auckland, informing him that the expedition
had already been undertaken, crossed each other on the way.” When the
Whig ministry went out of office in the spring of 1839, it was believed
that the Peel cabinet would repudiate the Simlah manifesto, and direct
a considerable modification of the measures which were to follow the
declaration of war. The bedchamber _émeute_ arrested the formation of
the Peel ministry; and it was at least surmised, that it was in no
small measure to save Lord Auckland, and to escape the disgrace of a
public reversal of their Indian policy, that the Whigs again took the
reins of government. After this, Sir John Hobhouse never neglected
an opportunity of publicly identifying himself with Lord Auckland’s
policy, and was not deterred, even by the disastrous termination of the
war, from bravely declaring that he was the author of it.
[267] In a despatch from the Court of Directors to the
Governor-General, dated September 20, 1837, there occurs this
remarkable passage:-“With respect to the states west of the Indus,
you have uniformly observed the proper course, which is to have no
political connection with any state or party in those regions, to
take no part in their quarrels, but to maintain so far as possible a
friendly connection with all of them.”
[268] A general assurance had been given to Runjeet Singh, in reply
to a difficulty started by himself, that if the allies met with any
reverses, the British Government would advance to their aid; but he
had failed to elicit from Macnaghten any more specific promise of
co-operation.
[269] Shah Soojah himself said that there would be little chance of his
becoming popular in Afghanistan, if he returned to the country openly
and avowedly supported, not by his own troops, but by those of the
Feringhees. Even the less overt assistance of an infidel government
was likely to cast discredit upon the undertaking in the eyes of “true
believers.” The Shah talked about the bigotry of the Mahomedans; but it
was plain that he had his misgivings on the subject. “During a visit,”
says Captain Wade, “which I paid to the Shah, the day before yesterday,
he informed me that some Mahomedans of Delhi had been writing to him,
to inquire how he could reconcile it to his conscience, as a true
believer in the Koran, to accept the assistance of a Christian people
to recover his kingdom. The Shah said that he contemplated with pity
the bigotry of these people, and began to quote a passage of the
Koran to prove their ignorance of its doctrines with reference to the
subject on which they had presumed to address him. Having a day or two
previously received information that the Newab of Bhopal had made a
particular request of his Lordship to be permitted to place a party
of his kinsmen and retainers at the service of the British Government
on the present occasion, from the desire which he had to testify his
deep sense of gratitude to it for the manner in which it had watched
and protected the interests of their family in every necessitude of
their political existence, I mentioned the circumstance to his Majesty,
to show the different views that prevailed among the followers of
the faith, both with regard to their duty to the state and to their
religion.”—[_Captain Wade to Mr. Macnaghten, October 5, 1838_: _MS.
Records._]
[270] The meeting was agreed upon before the British Government had
determined to cross the Indus; and Runjeet complained of its tardy
accomplishment, on the ground of the expense that he was obliged to
incur in keeping his troops together.
[271] It is generally acknowledged that nothing could have been more
orderly or more creditable both to the regiments and their commanding
officers, than the style in which all the components of the “Army of
the Indus” made their way to Ferozepore. Captain Havelock, an excellent
authority on such points, says: “A force has never been brought
together in any country in a manner more creditable and soldier-like
than was the Bengal portion of the Army of the Indus.”
[272] Captain Havelock says the 28th—Colonel Fane, the 29th.
[273] _Captain Havelock’s Narrative_—from which this description has
been mainly written. _Colonel Fane’s Five Years in India_; and _Mr.
Stocqueler’s Memorials of Afghanistan_ also contribute some details.
[274] “It is worthy of notice that a strange accident befel the old
Maharajah in the tent containing the larger gifts of the British
Government. He was not very firm on his legs at any time, but here he
had the misfortune to stumble over a pile of shells, and fell prostrate
before the British guns.”—[_Havelock’s Narrative._] Remembering how the
Sikh Empire fell before the British guns at Goojrat, we may at least
observe that this was a curious type of the destiny then awaiting the
great kingdom founded by Runjeet Singh.
[275] _Stocqueler’s Memorials of Afghanistan._
[276] For an account of the manœuvres both of the British and Sikh
divisions, see _Captain Havelock’s Narrative_.
[277] These brigades consisted of the 3rd Buffs, the 2nd, 27th, 5th,
20th, and 53rd Regiments of Native Infantry. Captain Havelock and
other military authorities have condemned this decision by lot. It
is said that the principle of selection should have been adhered to
on the reduction, as well as on the formation of the force. “Sir
Henry Fane,” says Captain Havelock, “need not thus have distrusted
or paid so poor a compliment to his own sagacity and impartiality;
the one had seldom been at fault in India or in Europe, the other was
above suspicion. Sortilege, after all, did little for the army in one
instance; for it sent forward to the labours of the campaign, the 13th
Light Infantry, then as ever zealous, indeed, and full of alacrity, but
even at Ferozepore shattered by disease; the spirit of its soldiers
willing, but unequal to the task; whilst it doomed to inactivity the
Buffs, one of the most effective European corps in India.” This is the
impartial testimony of an officer of the 13th Light Infantry. It was
written immediately after the first campaign of the Army of the Indus.
No writer would now regret the chance which sent Sale and Dennie into
Afghanistan, and associated the name of the 13th Light Infantry with
some of the most illustrious incidents of the war.
[278] _Colonel H. Pottinger to Government_: _Published Papers relating
to Sindh._
[279]
“Just and necessary!”
——Earth is sick,
And Heaven is weary of the hollow words
Which States and Kingdoms utter when they talk
Of truth and justice.
[280] I do not intend to enter into the politics of Sindh more than
is absolutely necessary to the elucidation of the history of the war
in Afghanistan; but it ought to be mentioned here that the harsh
and unjust treatment of the Ameers in 1838-39 has been defended or
extenuated upon the grounds of an alleged traitorous correspondence
with Mahomed Shah of Persia. A letter from one of the Ameers to the
“King of Kings” was intercepted, but Colonel Pottinger declared that it
was of no political importance, but simply an ebullition of Sheeahism,
addressed to Mahomed Shah as Defender of the Faith.—[_Correspondence
relating to Afghanistan._] A letter, also said to have been written by
the Persian King to two of the Ameers (Mahomed Khan and Nussur Khan),
acknowledging the receipt of letters from them, and exhorting them to
look to him for protection, was forwarded from Khelat to Runjeet Singh,
who sent it in through Captain Wade to the Governor-General. But Major
Todd, who by this time had joined Shah Soojah at Loodhianah, “did not
hesitate to pronounce it, from its style and language, to be a palpable
fabrication.”—[_Captain Wade to Mr. Macnaghten, October 24, 1838._ _MS.
Records._]
[281] _Captain Wade to Mr. Macnaghten, Nov. 8 and 9, 1838._ _MS.
Records._
[282] Shah Soojah’s force passed through Ferozepore on the 2nd.
Major Todd accompanied the Shah. Macnaghten joined the royal camp at
Shikarpoor.
[283] It had been no easy matter to provide carriage-cattle for
that immense assemblage. The camels, which constituted the bulk of
the beasts of burden, had been mostly drawn on hire from Bekaneer,
Jaysulmer, and the northern and north-western provinces of India; but
the country had been so drained, that at last it became necessary to
indent upon the brood-camels of the government stud at Hissar.
[284] This road, some 280 miles in length, had been prepared, under
Mackeson’s directions, to facilitate the march of our troops.
[285] As the army advanced, the Khan, to whose court Mackeson had been
despatched to conclude a treaty of protective alliance, exerted himself
to assist the enterprise, and exhibited the most friendly feeling
towards Shah Soojah. He gave the Shah two guns—made him a present of
money—sent a party of irregular horse, under one of his chief officers,
to escort him through the Bahwulpore dominions; and allowed the
officers of the Shah’s contingent to recruit their regiment from the
ranks of his own regular infantry. The Shah’s regiments were in this
way raised to their full strength, six hundred men having been drawn
from the Bahwulpore army.—[_MS. Notes._]
[286] Captain Havelock.
[287] Some of the Shah’s troops were very unreasonable in their
expectations and their complaints. The raw levies of horse, just
recruited from the grain districts of Upper India, made violent
complaints because they found that to the westward barley was the food
of horses.
[288] Sir Henry Fane was much pleased with the economy of Bahwul
Khan’s Court. Though not on an extensive scale, it was perhaps, better
ordered, on the whole, than that of any native potentate at the time.
[289] The cession of Bukkur was extremely distasteful to Meer Roostum.
It was calculated to lower him in the eyes both of the other Ameers and
of his own subjects; and Burnes, fearing that he would be dissuaded by
his relatives, made the stipulation for the surrender of the place a
separate article of the treaty, in order that the Ameer might conceal
it from them if he feared that they would remonstrate against it. When
Burnes despached Mohun Lal to Khyrpore, to deliver the treaty and the
separate article, “face to face,” to the Ameer, and to demand his
acceptance of its terms, “the consternation,” says Burnes, “caused
by this public declaration, was very great. The Ameer first offered
another fort in its stead; next, to find security that our treasure
and munitions were protected; but the Moonshee, as instructed, replied
to all that nothing but the unqualified cession of the fortress of
Bukkur, during the war, would satisfy me. He said it was the heart
of his country, his honour was centred in keeping it, his family and
children would have no confidence if it were given up, and that if I
came to Khyrpore the Ameer could speak in person to me many things. To
this I had instructed the Moonshee to say, that it was impossible till
he signed the treaty, as I asked a plain question and wanted a plain
answer.”—[_Published Papers._] Earnestly was Meer Roostum entreated by
his family not to sign the treaty, but to resist the unjust demand.
Greatly perplexed and alarmed, he wrote a touching letter of entreaty
to Burnes; but by this time his doom was sealed. It was useless for
him any longer to struggle against his fate; so on the morning of
the 24th of December he sent for Mohun Lal, told him that Burnes had
been the first and best friend of the Khyrpore state, but that he had
made an unexpected demand upon him, and that his good name would be
irrecoverably lost if Lord Auckland did not seize upon Kurachee, or
some other place from the Hyderabad family; who were our enemies, and
now triumphing, whilst he, our dearest friend, was thus depressed. If
they were suffered to escape, he said, that his only course would be to
commit suicide. “With this,” wrote Burnes to Government, “and saying
_Bismillah!_ (in the name of God) he sealed the treaty and the separate
article in the presence of Ali Morad Khan, Meer Zungee, Soolaman Abdur,
and about twenty other people.” A day or two afterwards, Burnes himself
called on Meer Roostum and received his submission in person. The poor
old man, declaring that he was irretrievably disgraced, asked what he
could now do to prove the sincerity of his friendship for the British
Government. “The answer to this declaration,” wrote Burnes, “was
plain—to give us orders for supplies, and to _place all the country
as far as he could at our command_—_and he has done so as far as he
can._”—[_Burnes to Government: Khyrpore, Dec. 28, 1838._ _Published
Papers._]
[290] “The aspect of affairs to the south being anything but
satisfactory, the Commander-in-Chief intimated to me, in the presence
of General Cotton, that the passage of the army across the Indus,
even had the bridge been ready, which it will not be for ten days,
was inexpedient, whilst matters were unadjusted at Hyderabad—that it
was further his decided opinion that a portion of the army should at
once march down towards Hyderabad. Participating entirely in these
sentiments, as far as political matters were concerned, I felt myself
bound to give the fullest effect to the views of his Excellency, and
notify the intended movement of the troops to the south to Meer Roostum
Khan.”—[_Sir A. Burnes to Government: Rohree, January 28, 1839._ _MS.
Records._]
[291] Some days after Cotton’s force had moved down the river, a
requisition came for a troop of horse artillery, a detachment of
cavalry, and a brigade of infantry.—[_Havelock’s Narrative._]
[292] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[293] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[294] _Ibid., Feb. 5, 1839._
[295] See _Outram’s Rough Notes_.
[296] Their share was twenty lakhs of rupees, a moiety of which was
paid down. Seven more lakhs, making up the gross amount to be paid by
the Talpoor Princes, were paid by the Ameer of Khyrpore.
[297] “The city of Hyderabad,” says Dr. James Burnes, in his _Visit to
the Court of Sindh_, an interesting and valuable work, “is a collection
of wretched low mud hovels, as destitute of the means of defence as
they are of external elegance or internal comfort; and even the boasted
stronghold of the Ameer, which surmounts their capital, is but a
paltry erection of ill-burnt bricks, crumbling gradually to decay, and
perfectly incapable of withstanding for an hour the attack of regular
troops.”
[298] Kennedy.
[299] “Sir Willoughby,” wrote the Envoy to Mr. Colvin, on the 24th
of February, “made his appearance in camp yesterday morning. He is
evidently disposed to look upon his Majesty and his disciplined
troops and myself as mere cyphers. Any hint from me, however quietly
and modestly given, was received with hauteur; and I was distinctly
told that I wanted to assume the command of the army; that he, Sir
Willoughby, knew no superior but Sir John Keane, and that he would
not be interfered with, &c., &c. All this arose out of my requesting
1000 camels for the use of the Shah and his force. Sir Willoughby was
ably backed by the Commissariat officers. My arguments were urged
throughout in the most mild and conciliatory tone. I was determined
on no account to lose my temper; and we parted at a late hour last
night very good friends. I told him I was the last man in the world
who would presume to interfere with his military arrangements; but I
found it requisite to tell him, during one of our conversations, that
if he thought it for the good of the service to leave Shah Soojah in
the lurch, without the means of moving, I should esteem it my duty, as
a political officer, to protest most strongly against the arrangement,
and that the Governor-General would determine which of us was right.
Sir Willoughby dined with me, and at dinner the important despatches
from the Governor-General and yourself, dated the 5th instant,
were put into my hands. We discussed their contents in my private
tent afterwards—present Sir W. C. Todd, and Burnes.”—[_Unpublished
Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._]
[300] Havelock.
[301] “The conduct of the officers of the Khelat chief has been most
creditable and praiseworthy. Syud Mahomed Sheriff, the Governor of
Gundava, and Moolla Ramzan, a slave of the Khan, have attended me the
whole way, procured a band of eighty of the natives to escort us, and
they likewise addressed the Ameers and the neighbouring Beloochee
tribes to attempt at their peril to molest us. Such has been the
confidence thus given, that a great body of the migratory inhabitants
from Cutchee availed themselves of our escort to ascend into
Afghanistan.”—[_Burnes to Macnaghten: March 16, 1839._ _MS. Records._]
[302] See _Havelock’s Narrative_.
[303] _Hough’s Narrative of the Operations of the Army of the Indus._
[304] Captain Havelock says: “From the 28th of March, the loaf of the
European soldier was diminished in weight, the Native troops received
only half instead of a full seer of _ottah_ (that is a pound of flour)
_per diem_, and the camp-followers, who had hitherto found it difficult
to subsist on half a seer, were of necessity reduced to the famine
allowance of a quarter of a seer.”
[305] “The Khan, with a good deal of earnestness, enlarged upon the
undertaking the British had embarked in—declaring it to be one of vast
magnitude and difficult accomplishment—that instead of relying on
the Afghan nation, our government had cast them aside and inundated
the country with foreign troops—that if it was our end to establish
ourselves in Afghanistan, and give Shah Soojah the nominal sovereignty
of Caubul and Candahar, we were pursuing an erroneous course—that
all the Afghans were discontented with the Shah, and all Mahomedans
alarmed and excited at what was passing—that, day by day, men returned
discontented, and we might find ourselves awkwardly situated if we did
not point out to Shah Soojah his errors, if the fault originated with
him, and alter them if they sprung from ourselves—that the chief of
Caubul was a man of ability and resource, and though we could easily
put him down by Shah Soojah, even in our present mode of procedure, we
could never win over the Afghan nation by it.”—[_Burnes to Macnaghten:
Khelat, March 30, 1839._ _MS. Records._]
[306] _Burnes to Macnaghten: Khelat, April 2, 1839._
[307] The Shah and his Contingent moved from Shikarpoor on the 7th of
March.
[308] “His Majesty the Shah is naturally anxious to occupy a prominent
position in our movements, and it is very desirable, on political
grounds, that he should do so: I trust, therefore, that your Excellency
will see fit to attend to his Majesty’s wishes in this particular, and
to authorise his being in advance with at least a portion of his own
troops, after the junction of the several divisions shall have been
effected, or rather after you have made your final arrangements for
the order of our advance. This you will observe will be conformable to
the wishes of the Governor-General, as expressed in the accompanying
extracts. His Lordship never contemplated the leaving behind any
portion of the Shah’s force, except in the case of opposition being
shown by Sindh and Khelat.”—[_Mr. Macnaghten to Sir J. Keane:
Shikarpoor, Feb. 27, 1839._ _Unpublished Correspondence._]
[309] “I am exceedingly obliged to you for the attention you have paid
to my suggestions regarding the Shah’s troops; but your want of camels
is so pressing, that I feel it impossible to retain the 1000 camels
placed at my disposal. Deeply as I regret, on political grounds, the
necessity of leaving behind any portion of the troops of his Majesty, I
feel that any scruples on this score must give way to the more urgent
exigencies of the public service.”—[_Mr. Macnaghten to Sir J. Keane:
Shikarpoor, March 3, 1839._ _Unpublished Correspondence._]
[310] _Mr. Macnaghten to Sir W. Cotton: March 15, 1839._ _Unpublished
Correspondence._
[311] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[312] From Bagh, Macnaghten wrote to the Governor-General’s Private
Secretary: “This is a wretched country in every respect. It may be said
to produce little else but plunderers; but with the knowledge we now
have of it, we may bid defiance to the Russian hordes as far as this
route is concerned. Any army might be annihilated in an hour by giving
it either too much or too little water. The few wells that exist might
easily be rendered unavailable, and by just cutting the Sewee bund the
whole country might be deluged.”—[_Mr. Macnaghten to Mr. Colvin: Camp
Bagh, March 22, 1839._ _Unpublished Correspondence._]
[313] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[314] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[315] The head-quarters of the 2nd brigade were left in garrison at
Quettah, under General William Nott, of the Company’s army, who, at
a later period, so distinguished himself in command of the troops at
Candahar. Whilst Sir Willoughby Cotton was commanding the Bengal army
in chief, Nott had commanded a division; but when Sir John Keane joined
the Bengal column, Cotton fell back to the divisional command, and
Nott returned to the brigade to which he had originally been posted.
Out of this much controversy arose; the command of the other division
of the “Army of the Indus” having been conferred on General Willshire,
of the Queen’s army, a junior major-general, but an older officer and
lieutenant-colonel.
[316] Foremost among these was the notorious Hadjee Khan, Khaukur,
whose sudden defection broke up the Barukzye camp, just as
Rahun-dil-Khan and Mehr-dil-Khan were meditating a night attack on
the Shah’s Contingent. He joined the Shah on the 20th of April, and
from this time the Sirdars saw that their cause was hopeless. Further
mention of this chief will be found in a subsequent chapter.
[317] I have not attempted in this chapter to give a minute account
of the march of the three columns of the invading army to Candahar.
It is no part of my design to render this work conspicuous for the
completeness of its military details. I do not underrate their
importance; but the operations of the Army of the Indus have already
been so minutely chronicled, that I have only to refer the reader to
the works of Havelock, Kennedy, and Hough. The real history of the
march is to be found in the records of the Commissariat department. The
difficulty of obtaining carriage and supplies was almost unprecedented,
and the expenditure incurred was enormous. There were two different
Commissariat departments (the Bengal and the Shah’s) sometimes to be
found bidding against one another. Everything was paid for at a ruinous
price. The sums paid for the hire and purchase of carriage-cattle were
preposterous; and the loss incurred by government from the deaths
of the animals may be surmised, when it is stated that the number
of deaths between Ferozepore and Candahar has been estimated at not
less than 20,000. Large sums, too, were often paid for demurrage. For
example, on one batch of camels hired from Bekanier and Jaysulmere,
44,000 rupees were paid for demurrage and remuneration for losses
before they reached the place (Shikarpoor) at which their services were
required, or were even seen by our Commissariat officers.—[_MS. Notes._]
[318] _Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten._
[319] Captain Havelock, who is by no means disposed to take an
unfavorable view of the policy out of which emanated the assembling
of the Army of the Indus, says: “Unless I have been deceived, all the
national enthusiasm of the scene was entirely confined to his Majesty’s
immediate retainers. The people of Candahar are said to have viewed the
whole affair with the most mortifying indifference. Few of them quitted
the city to be present in the plains; and it was remarked with justice,
that the passage in the diplomatic programme which presented a place
behind the throne for ‘the populace restrained by the Shah’s troops,’
became rather a bitter satire on the display of the morning.” Compare
Dr. Kennedy’s version of these proceedings. All the private accounts I
have received, confirm the truth of the printed narratives.
[320] Kennedy.
[321] Where they remained as guests of Mahomed Shah until the
withdrawal of the British from Afghanistan.
[322] As at Herat, the four principal streets meet in the centre of the
city, and at their junction are covered over with a great dome. The
picturesque accessories of Candahar are by no one so well described
as by Lieutenant Rattray, in his letter-press accompaniments to his
admirable series of “Views in Afghanistan.” With true artistic feeling,
he writes; “Viewing Candahar from without, or at a distance, there is
no peculiarity in its structure to strike the eye, as nothing appears
above the long, high walls, but the top of Ahmed Shah’s tomb, the
summits of a few minarets, and the upper parapets of the citadel. But
the interior, as seen from the battlements, cannot fail to delight.
Its irregular mud-houses, partly in ruins, varied with trees and
minarets; the square red-brick dwellings, with doors and windows of
Turkish arches; the lofty habitations of the Hindoo; the tents pitched
here and there on the flat house-tops; the long terraces crowded with
people, busied in their various callings in the open air; the dung
and mud-plastered hut of the Khaukur, with his heavy, wild-looking
buffaloes tethered round it; the high enclosures of the different
tribes; the warlike castles of the chieftains; the gaily-decorated
palace of some great Douranee Lord, with its fountains, squares,
and court-yards; and the domed houses of the other inhabitants, the
bazaars, mosques, turrets, and cupolas, rising up in the midst of
stupendous and inaccessible mountains,—from the whole rise a panorama
pleasing to look upon.”
[323] Kennedy. The author adds: “Shah Soojah had sheltered himself in
one, Mr. Macnaghten in another, and Sir Alexander Burnes in a third.
The latter had been rebuilt by one of the chiefs of Candahar for his
favourite wife. It had an air of magnificence and grandeur where it
stood: but in the Mogul Serai of Surat, or in Ahmedabad, would be
passed unobserved.”
[324] See _ante_, page 332.
[325] “Facts regarding our Political Relations with Herat, and the
Conduct of Yar Mahomed Khan, from November, 1837, to February, 1841,”
by Dr. J. S. Login, attached to the Heratee Mission.
[326] Lieutenant North, of the Bombay Engineers, and Drs. Login and
Ritchie, also accompanied them. The Mission left Candahar on the 21st
of June, and reached Herat on the 25th of July.
[327] Havelock.
[328] Inverarity and Wilmer. The former was murdered; the latter
escaped with his life.
[329] A convoy of camels laden with grain had been for some time
expected from the southward, under the charge of a Lohanee merchant,
named Surwar Khan. Some efforts had been made by the enemy to
intercept this convoy, or to corrupt the Lohanee chief; and it is
said that nothing but the determined fidelity of the leader of the
Irregular Horse sent to escort it into Candahar, saved the convoy
from being carried off to the Barukzyes. It reached Candahar, but
there a new difficulty presented itself. The camel-drivers refused to
proceed. There were 20,000 maunds of grain now at the disposal of our
Commissariat officers; but the contumacy of these men was now likely
to render it wholly useless. Surwar Khan had contracted to bring the
convoy to Candahar; but the camel-drivers, afraid of the vengeance of
Dost Mahomed, refused to proceed any further. There was no contending
against this; so the supplies were made over to the Commissariat, and
stored at Candahar, where a detachment of our troops was left.
[330] The Kohistan is the hill country to the north of Caubul, lying
between the capital and the Hindoo-Koosh.
[331] This was the account of the Ameer’s tactics given by Hyder Khan.
Mohun Lal, upon whose authority I instance it, was in daily personal
communication with the Prince after his capture, and ought to be well
informed upon this point.
[332] “The town,” says Lieutenant Rattray, “stands on the extreme point
of a range of hills, which slope upwards and command the north-east
angle of the Balla Hissar, near which is perched the tomb of Belool the
Wise, among ruined mosques and grave-stones. As a city, it will not
bear comparison with Caubul or Candahar; and a previous visit to the
bazaars of either would spoil you for the darkened narrow streets and
small charloo of Ghuznee. However, it possesses snug houses and capital
stabling, sufficient for a cavalry brigade, within its walls; and in
the citadel, particularly, the squares and residences of its former
governors were in many instances spacious and even princely in their
style and decorations.”
[333] The enemy, dislodged from the garden, retreated to an outwork,
whence they directed a heavy fire upon our people, and did some
mischief among them. Captain Graves, of the 16th Native Infantry, and
Lieutenant Homrigh, of the 48th, were wounded.
[334] There has been so much bitter controversy on this unhappy
subject, that I have not written this bare outline of the event without
instituting inquiries among those who were most likely to have had some
personal cognizance of it. That I have rightly characterised these
murders I know, for I have the evidence of one who saw the butchery
going on. An officer of the highest character writes, in reply to my
inquiries: “As regards what is called the Ghuznee massacre, I was
walking one day in camp, and came upon the King’s tents, at the rear of
which I saw a fearfully bloody sight. There were forty or fifty men,
young and old. Many were dead; others at their last gasp; others with
their hands tied behind them; some sitting, others standing, awaiting
their doom; and the King’s executioners and other servants amusing
themselves (for actually they were laughing and joking, and seemed
to look upon the work as good fun) with hacking and maiming the poor
wretches indiscriminately with their long swords and knives. I was so
horrified at coming so suddenly on such a scene of blood, that I was
for the instant as it were, spell-bound. On inquiry, I ascertained
that the King had ordered this wholesale murder in consequence of one
of the number (they were, or were said to be, all _Ghazees_, who had
shortly before been taken prisoners) having stabbed, in his Majesty’s
presence, a Pesh-Khidmut, or body-attendant of the King. My friend and
I made our exit; and he went direct to the Envoy’s tent and reported
the circumstance.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]
[335] The advance consisted of the light companies of the four European
regiments; the remaining companies composed the other sections of the
storming columns. The regiments were: the 2nd, the 13th, and 17th
(Queen’s), and the Company’s European Regiment.
[336] Hough says: “Lieutenant Durand was obliged to scrape the hose
with his finger-nails, finding the powder failed to ignite on the first
application of the port-fire.”
[337] Havelock. Hough says: “The explosion was heard by nearly all.”
[338] Havelock.
[339] Captain Peat.
[340] I give the circumstances of Sale’s escape in the words of Captain
Havelock, who has detailed them with trustworthy minuteness. “One of
their number rushing over the fallen timbers, brought down Brigadier
Sale by a cut in the face with his sharp _shunsheer_ (sabre). The
Afghan repeated his blow as his opponent was falling; but the pummel,
not the edge of his sword, this time took effect, though with stunning
violence. He lost his footing, however, in the effort, and Briton and
Afghan rolled together amongst the fractured timbers. Thus situated,
the first care of the Brigadier was to master the weapon of his
adversary. He snatched at it, but one of his fingers met the edge of
the trenchant blade. He quickly withdrew his wounded hand, and adroitly
replaced it over that of his adversary, so as to keep fast the hilt
of his _shunsheer_. But he had an active and powerful opponent, and
was himself faint from the loss of blood. Captain Kershaw, of the
13th, aide-de-camp to Brigadier Baumgardt, happened in the _mêlée_
to approach the scene of conflict: the wounded leader recognised and
called to him for aid. Kershaw passed his drawn sabre through the body
of the Afghan; but still the desperado continued to struggle with
frantic violence. At length, in the fierce grapple, the Brigadier for
a moment got uppermost. Still retaining the weapon of his enemy in
his left hand, he dealt him with his right a cut from his own sabre,
which cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows. The Mahomedan
once shouted, ‘_Ne Ullah!_’ (Oh! God!) and never moved or spoke
again.”—[_Captain Havelock’s Narrative._]
[341] Havelock. The colour of the 13th was first planted by the hand of
Ensign Frere—a nephew of John Hookham Frere.
[342] Havelock. The military historian attributes the forbearance of
the soldiery to the fact, that no spirit rations had been served out to
them during the preceding fortnight. “No candid man,” he says, “of any
military experience, will deny that the character of the scene, in the
fortress and the citadel, would have been far different if individual
soldiers had entered the town primed with arrack, or if spirituous
liquors had been discovered in the Afghan depôts.”
[343] I have been assured by an officer on the staff of the Shah’s
army, that he was near his Majesty at the taking of Ghuznee, when under
fire, and that he exhibited great coolness and courage. He is said by
my informant, who was close beside him, to have sate “as firm as a
rock, not showing the slightest alarm either by word or gesture, and
seeming to think it derogatory to his kingly character to move an inch
whilst the firing lasted.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]
[344] Mohun Lal says: “Captain John Conolly conducted them, with every
mark of deference, to a house in the town, where it fell to my lot to
provide them with everything necessary which they wanted: and that
responsible charge of them I had for a long time, and executed it to
the satisfaction of the ladies, until they were sent to India.”—[_Life
of Dost Mahomed._]
[345] Captain Tayler, Brigade-Major of the 4th Brigade. Mohun Lal
says that “Major Macgregor found him concealed with an armed party
in the tower, waiting for the night.” Mr. Stocqueler (_Memorials
of Afghanistan_) attributes the honour of the capture to Brigadier
Roberts, who directed Captain Tayler to proceed to the house.
[346] “The Sirdar, mounted on a small horse, and accompanied by a few
of his companions, was conducted by Major Macgregor to the tent of the
Commander-in-Chief. Sir Alexander Burnes and myself were sent for, and
as soon as the Sirdar saw him he felt a little easy in his mind; and
discovering me with him, the expression of his countenance was at once
changed, and he asked me for a glass of water. Lord Keane allowed him
to remain in my tent, under the charge of Sir A. Burnes. I clothed him
with my own clothes every day, and he partook of my meals.”—[_Mohun
Lal’s Life of Dost Mahomed._]
[347] Outram.
[348] Whether this step was taken by Dost Mahomed on his own account,
or whether it was recommended or agreed to by his principal partisans,
does not very clearly appear.
[349] Mohun Lal says that the Newab, who had acted with the greatest
friendliness towards Burnes and his Mission, and was known to have been
at the head of the English party in Caubul, begged that the wife of
Hyder Khan might be given up to him; but preferred the request in vain.
He sought an interview, too, with his nephew; and it would have been
granted to him, but the official references caused delay, and the Newab
took his departure without seeing the Sirdar. He said significantly to
the Envoy, in the course of conversation, “If Shah Soojah is really
a King, and come to the kingdom of his ancestors, what is the use of
your army and name? You have brought him, by your money and arms, into
Afghanistan. Leave him now with us Afghans, and let him rule us if he
can.”
[350] Havelock.
[351] General Harlan, who was at Caubul at this time, has written
an account of the desertion of Dost Mahomed by his followers at
Urghundeh, which only wants a conviction of its entire truth to
render it extremely interesting. According to this writer, the Ameer
was not only deserted, but plundered by his followers at the last.
“A crowd of noisy disorganised troops,” he says, “insolently pressed
close up to the royal pavilion—the guards had disappeared—the groom
holding the Prince’s horse was unceremoniously pushed to and fro—a
servant audaciously pulled away the pillow which sustained the
Prince’s arm—another commenced cutting a piece of the splendid Persian
carpet—the beautiful praying rug of the Prince was seized on by a
third.... ‘Take all,’ said he, ‘that you find within, together with the
tent.’ In an instant the unruly crowd rushed upon the pavilion—swords
gleamed in the air and descended upon the tent—the canvas, the ropes,
the carpets, pillows, screens, &c., were seized and dispersed among the
plunderers.”
[352] The names of many of them were subsequently associated with the
later incidents of the war. They were Captains Wheler, Troup, Lawrence,
Backhouse, Christie, and Erskine; Lieutenants Broadfoot, Hogg, Ryves,
and Dr. Worral. Captains Tayler and Trevor joined them on the 8th.
[353] Outram says he was a melon-seller.
[354] See the “Life of Hadjee Khan Khaukur, the Talleyrand of the
East,” published originally in the _Delhi Gazette_. It is attributed
to the pen of Arthur Conolly. The writer adds: “In the camp of those
chiefs conspiracies against Shah Soojah and his allies were daily
agitated. Their letters formed the pride, the comfort, the hope, and
the amusement of the Caubul Court.... Sometimes it was proposed by the
traitors to attack the English camp in concert with the Ghilzyes at
night. Fear prevented this plot ripening; but had the army met with
a repulse, it would undoubtedly have been attacked in rear. At last,
at a full meeting—I have it from the lips of one present at it—it was
determined to join Dost Mahomed _en masse_. At this meeting were the
Hadjee Khan, Hadjee Dost, Fyztullub Khan, Noorzye, and many others.
They had been deceived by a false report of a partial action of
cavalry the day before; the opportunity had arrived, they thought, for
giving us the _coup de grace_. Hardly had the conclave separated, when
intelligence was received of the capture of Ghuznee. It need hardly
be said that, a few hours afterwards, Hadjee Khan and the rest were
congratulating his Majesty on the splendid victory.”
[355] Akbar Khan, who had by this time been withdrawn from the defence
of the Khybur line, and had joined his father’s camp prostrated by
sickness.
[356] Others, however, thought that his failure was fortunate, it being
only too probable, in their opinion, that, if he had come up with the
fugitive, his little party would have been overwhelmed by the followers
of the Ameers and the traitorous Afghan horsemen whom Hadjee Khan had
taken with him.
[357] He was confined at Chunar, where he seems to have borne his
imprisonment with considerable philosophy.
[358] “With regard to the ordnance captured at Urghundeh, the guns
were of all calibres, chiefly below 6-pounder—one a 17-pounder, and
a few of different sizes, between 17 and 12-pounders.... The number
of shot left at Urghundeh was 4270, of various sizes.... The shot is
hammered iron, and so uneven, that, unless weighed, their weight could
not be told. They are chiefly much under 6-pounder shot.... With regard
to the other stores taken at Urghundeh, nothing was of the slightest
service, except the old iron of the carriages, and the axle-trees,
also good as old iron only, and to which purpose they have been
appropriated.”—[_Lieutenant Warburton to Sir W. H. Macnaghten; Caubul,
August 15, 1841._ _MS. Records._]
[359] “Onward,” says Captain Havelock, “moved the force, and an
hour had not elapsed since the day broke when it came full upon the
abandoned ordnance of the fallen Barukzye. Twenty-two pieces of various
calibre, but generally good guns, on field carriages, superior to
those generally seen in the armies of Asiatic Princes, were parked in
a circle in the Ameer’s late position. Two more were placed in battery
in the village of Urghundeh, at the foot of the hills.... The route by
which we had advanced was flanked by a deep, impracticable ravine, on
which the Afghan left would have rested: there their artillery had been
parked, and would probably from this point have swept the open plain,
and searched the narrow defile by which we would have debouched upon.
Their front was open for the exertions of a bold and active cavalry,
and here the Ameer might at least have died with honour.”
[360] Havelock.
[361] I am indebted for this, as for much else, to Captain Havelock.
There is but little in the pages of the military analist to disturb the
gravity of the historical inquirer, but it is impossible to restrain
a smile at the happy wording of the following: “Let me not forget to
record that Moonshee Mohun Lal, a traveller and an author, as well
as his talented master, appeared on horseback on this occasion in a
new upper garment of a very gay colour, and under a turban of very
admirable fold and majestic dimensions, and was one of the gayest as
well as the most sagacious and successful personages in the whole
_cortége_.”
[362] Burnes was of this opinion: he erred on that point in common with
many others; but his views from first to last were in favour of making
the Dost our ally.—H.T.
[363] Here Sir A. Burnes had inserted the words, “I have—that is, as
ex-King of the Afghans, no very high opinion;” and had drawn his pen
through them. He had also originally written the word “Of” to begin the
sentence, instead of “As for.”
* * * * * *
Transcriber’s note:
Obvious errors were corrected.