CHAPTER II.

[April-August, 1839.]

Arrival at Candahar—The Shah’s Entry into the City—His

Installation—Nature of his Reception—Behaviour of the Douranees—The

English at Candahar—Mission to Herat—Difficulties of our

Position—Advance to Ghuznee.

On the 25th of April, Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk re-entered the chief city

of Western Afghanistan. As he neared the walls of Candahar, riding

in advance of his Contingent, some Douranee horsemen had gone out

to welcome him; and as the cavalcade moved forward, others met him

with their salutations and obeisances, and swelled the number of his

adherents. It is said that some fifteen hundred men, for the most part

well dressed and well mounted, joined him before he reached the city.

Accompanied by the British Envoy, his Staff, and the principal officers

of his Contingent, and followed by a crowd of Afghans, the Shah entered

Candahar. There was a vast assemblage of gazers. The women clustered

in the balconies of the houses, or gathered upon the roofs. The men

thronged the public streets. It was a busy and an exciting scene.

The curiosity was intense. The enthusiasm may have been the same. As

the royal _cortège_ advanced, the people strewed flowers before the

horses’ feet, and loaves of bread were scattered in their way. There

were shouts and the sound of music, and the noise of firing; and the

faces of the crowd were bright with cheerful excitement. The popular

exclamations which were flung into the air have been duly reported.

The people shouted out, “Welcome to the son of Timour Shah!” “We look

to you for protection!” “Candahar is rescued from the Barukzyes!” “May

your enemies be destroyed!” It was said, by some who rode beside the

Shah, to have been the most heart-stirring scene they ever witnessed

in their lives. Thus greeted and thus attended, the King rode to the

tomb of Ahmed Shah, and offered up thanksgivings and prayers. Then the

procession returned again through the city, again to be greeted with

joyous acclamations; and “the eventful day,” as the Court chroniclers

affirmed, “passed off without an accident.”

The welcome thus given to the Shah, on his public entry into his

western capital, filled Macnaghten with delight. The future appeared

before him bright with the promise of unclouded success. It seemed to

him that the enthusiastic reception of the Shah would be a death-blow

to the hopes of Dost Mahomed, and that in all probability the Ameer

would fly before us like his brothers. It was encouraging intelligence

to communicate to the Governor-General; so on his return from the royal

progress through the city, Macnaghten sate down and wrote thus to Lord

Auckland:

Candahar, _April 25, 1839._

We have, I think, been most fortunate in every way. The Shah made a

grand public entry in the city this morning, and was received with

feelings nearly amounting to adoration. I shall report the particulars

officially. I have already had more than one ebullition of petulance

to contend with. The latest I send herewith, and I trust that a soft

answer will have the effect of turning away wrath. There are many

things which I wish to mention, but I really have no leisure. Of this

your Lordship may judge, when I state that for the last three days I

have been out in the sun, and have not been able to get my breakfast

before three in the afternoon. I think it would be in every way

advantageous to the public interests if, after Shah Soojah gains

possession of Caubul, I were to proceed across the Punjab to Simlah,

having an interview with Runjeet Singh, and giving him a detail of

all our proceedings; perhaps getting him to modify the treaty in

one or two respects. I have broached the subject of our new treaty

to his Majesty, but my negotiations are in too imperfect a state to

be detailed. Of one thing I am certain, that we must be prepared to

look upon Afghanistan for some years as an outwork yielding nothing,

but requiring much expenditure to keep it in repair. His Majesty has

not yet nominated a Prime Minister, nor has he as yet, I believe,

determined his form of administration. His new adherents are all

hungry for place; and in answer to their premature solicitations, he

tells me that he has informed them that, since it took God Almighty

six days to make heaven and earth, it is very hard they will not allow

him, a poor mortal, even the same time to settle the affairs of a

kingdom. I am gratified at being able to assure your Lordship that

the best feeling is manifested towards the British officers by the

entire population here, and I devoutly hope that nothing may occur to

disturb the present happy state of things. Dost Mahomed will, I doubt

not, take himself off like his brothers, though not, perhaps, in quite

so great a hurry, when the intelligence reaches him of the manner in

which Shah Soojah has been received at Candahar. The Sirdars have

carried off my elephants, and I am informed that the animals proved of

the greatest service to them in crossing their ladies over a deep and

rapid river not far from this. We have heard nothing since our arrival

here of the embassy from Herat. If I go to Simlah from Caubul, Sir A.

Burnes could be left to officiate for me, and in case of my return he

might go to Candahar and relieve Major Leach, who might be left there

in the first instance.

I remain, my Lord, yours, &c.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN.[318]

Encouraged by the presumed “adoration” of the people, it was now

determined to give them another opportunity of testifying the

overflowing abundance of their loyalty and affection. So the 8th of

May was fixed upon for a general public recognition of the restored

sovereign, on the plains before Candahar. Both columns of the British

army had now arrived. The troops were to pass in review-order before

the king; and other ceremonial observances were to give _éclat_ to the

inauguration. Upon a raised platform, under a showy canopy, sate the

restored monarch of the Douranee Empire. He had ridden out at sunrise

under a royal salute. The troops had presented arms to him on his

ascending the musnud, and a salute of a hundred and one guns had been

fired in honour of the occasion. Around him were the chief military and

political officers of the British Government. Everything went off as

it had been ordered and arranged, and most imposing was the spectacle

of the review-march of the British troops. But the King had then been

a fortnight at Candahar, and the curiosity of the people had subsided.

There was no popular enthusiasm.[319] The whole affair was a painful

failure. The English officers saluted the King; and the King made a

speech about the disinterested benevolence of the British Government.

Greatly pleased was his Majesty with the exhibition; and when the

troops had been dismissed, he said that its moral influence would be

felt from Pekin to Constantinople.[320] But the miserable paucity of

Afghans who appeared to do homage to the King, must have warned Shah

Soojah, with ominous significance, of the feebleness of his tenure upon

the affections of the people, as it bitterly disappointed and dismayed

his principal European supporters. Every effort had been made to give

publicity to the programme of the ceremony; and yet it is said, by the

most trustworthy witnesses, that barely a hundred Afghans had been

attracted, either by curiosity or by loyalty, to the installation of

the adored King.

Such were the mere outward facts of Shah Soojah’s reception as recorded

by the chroniclers of the day. Surrounded by his own Contingent, and

supported by the British army, he had advanced unopposed to Candahar.

But the brief local excitement, which his entrance into the city

had aroused, cannot be regarded as national enthusiasm. When the

first outbreak of curiosity had subsided the feeling which greeted

the restored King was rather that of sullen indifference than of

active devotion. In the vicinity of Candahar the Douranee tribes

constituted the most influential section of the inhabitants. They

had been oppressed and impoverished by the Barukzye Sirdars, and had

longed to rid themselves of the yoke of their oppressors. But when

the representative of the Suddozye dynasty, under which they had been

pampered and protected, appeared at the gates of the Douranee Empire,

they had neither spirit nor strength to make a strenuous effort to

support or to oppose the restored monarch. It is doubtful whether,

in the conjuncture which had then arisen, the Douranees, had they

possessed any military strength, would have openly arrayed themselves

on the side of the Shah; for although they hated the Barukzyes who

had oppressed them, there were the strongest national and religious

feelings to excite them against a Prince who had brought an army of

Franks to desolate their country. Had they stood erect in their old

pride of conscious power, a mighty conflict would have raged within

them. The antagonism of personal and national interests would have rent

and convulsed them; and it is not improbable that in the end, abhorring

the thought of an infidel invasion, they would have determined to

support the cause of the Sirdars. But when Shah Soojah was advancing

upon Candahar, the Douranees were in a state of absolute feebleness and

paralysis. They held aloof, for they had neither power nor inclination

to take any conspicuous part in the revolution which was then brooding

over the empire.

But when, supported by his Feringhee allies, the Shah had established

himself in Candahar, the Douranees, offering their congratulations

and tendering their allegiance, gathered round the restored monarch.

The issue of the contest seemed no longer doubtful. The dominion of

the Barukzye Sirdars had received its death-blow. The restoration

of the Suddozye dynasty was certain; and with whatever feelings the

Douranees may have inwardly regarded it, it was politic to make an

outward show of satisfaction and delight. The change had been effected

without their agency; but they might turn it to good account. So they

clustered around the throne, and began to clamour for the wages of

their pretended forbearance. They put forward the most extravagant

claims and pretensions; bargained for the restoration of all the old

privileges and immunities which they had enjoyed under Ahmed Shah and

his successors; and would fain have swept the entire revenues of the

state into their own hands.

It was plain that the King could not recognise the claims which were

thus profusely asserted. But it would have been imprudent, at such a

time, to have offended or disappointed these powerful tribes. The Shah

had established himself at Candahar. Kohun-dil-Khan and his brothers

had fled for safety across the Helmund, and sought an asylum in

Persia.[321] But Dost Mahomed was still dominant at Caubul. There was

work yet to be done. There were dangers yet to be encountered. It was

necessary, therefore, to conciliate the Douranees. So steering, as well

as he could, a middle course, the Shah granted much that was sought

from him; but he did not grant all. He restored the Sirdars to the

chieftainships of their clans, and to the offices which they had been

wont to hold about the Court. He gave them back the lands of which they

had been denuded, and granted them allowances consistent with the rank

which they had been suffered to reassume. Some vexatious and oppressive

imposts were removed, and a considerable remission of taxation was

proclaimed. But the system of assessment which the Barukzye Sirdars

had introduced was continued in operation; and the same revenue

officers continued to collect the tax. These men were thoroughly

hateful to the Douranees. They had been the willing instruments of

Barukzye oppression, and had carried out the work of their masters

with a ferocity, strengthened by the recollection of one of those old

hereditary blood-feuds, which keep up from generation to generation a

growth of unextinguishable hate.

If any feelings of delight at the thought of the restoration of the

Suddozye dynasty welled up anywhere in the breasts of the people of

Afghanistan, it was among these Douranee tribes. As the grandson of

Ahmed Shah, they were prepared to welcome Shah Soojah. They were

prepared to welcome him as the enemy of the Barukzye Sirdars. But the

ugly array of foreign bayonets in the background effectually held in

control all their feelings of national enthusiasm. They regarded

the movement for the restoration of the Suddozye Prince in the light

of a foreign invasion; and chafed when they saw the English officers

settling themselves in the palaces of their ancient Princes.

In the meanwhile, the Army of the Indus remained inactive at Candahar.

The halt was a long and a weary one. Provisions were miserably scarce.

It was necessary to remain under the city walls until a sufficiency

could be obtained, and to obtain this sufficiency it was necessary to

await the ripening of the crops. Every one was impatient to advance.

The delay was painful and disheartening. There were no compensating

advantages to be obtained from a halt under the walls of Candahar. Save

a few who had the real artist’s eye to appreciate the picturesque,

the officers of the force were disappointed with the place. They had

believed that they were advancing upon a splendid city; but they now

found themselves before a walled town, presenting so few objects of

interest that it was scarcely worth exploring. After the desolate

tracts over which they had passed, the valley of Candahar appeared

to the eye of our officers to be a pleasant and a favoured spot.

There were green fields, and shady orchards, and running streams, to

vary the surrounding landscape. But they found the city itself to be

little better than a collection of mud-houses, forming very unimposing

streets.[322] The city was in ruins. “The interior consisted only of

the relics of houses of forgotten Princes.”[323] There was altogether

an air of dreariness and desolation about the place. Many of the houses

had been thrown down by repeated shocks of earthquake, and had not been

rebuilt. The public buildings were few; but conspicuous among them

was the tomb of Ahmed Shah, whose white dome, seen from a distance,

stood up above the houses of the city, whilst a spacious mosque, with

its domes and minarets, seen also from afar, enshrined a relict of

extraordinary sanctity—the shirt of the Prophet Mahomed.

When the British arrived before Candahar in April, 1839, it was said

that the principal inhabitants had forsaken the place. But enough

remained to give an animated and picturesque aspect to the city. The

streets and bazaars were crowded with people of different castes and

different costumes—Afghans, Persians, Oosbegs, Beloochees, Armenians,

and Hindoos; whilst strings of laden camels everywhere passing and

repassing, enhanced the picturesque liveliness of the scene.

There was little to break the monotony of the halt at Candahar. The

movements of the enemy, and the probabilities of a stirring or a

languid campaign were discussed in our officers’ tents; and when, on

the 9th of May, a brigade under Colonel Sale—an officer who had already

done much good service to his country, and was destined now to play

a conspicuous part in the great Central-Asian drama—was despatched

to Ghiresk, a place some seventy-five miles in a westerly direction

from Candahar, in pursuit of the fugitive Sirdars, there were few

officers in Keane’s army who did not long to accompany it. But the

campaign was a brief and an inglorious one—Sale marched to Ghiresk and

returned to Candahar. The Sirdars had abandoned the place, and fled

across the Persian frontier. They had but a handful of followers, and

they were powerless to offer any resistance to our advancing troops.

From Kohun-dil-Khan and his brothers nothing was to be apprehended.

Their very names were soon almost forgotten by the Feringhees who had

driven them from their homes. Candahar and the surrounding country was

in possession of the restored Suddozye Princes. But Shah Soojah and

his supporters still looked anxiously towards the north, where Dost

Mahomed, the ablest and the most powerful of the Barukzye brotherhood,

was still mustering his fighting men—still endeavouring to rouse

the chiefs to aid him in the defence of his capital against the

often-rejected King, who had now come back to them again, supported by

the gold and bayonets of the infidels.

But the very circumstances which might be supposed to work to our

disadvantage, and to give strength to the enemy, really favoured our

cause. The protracted halt at Candahar gave Dost Mahomed and his

adherents abundant time to mature their measures of defence. Whilst

the British army was starving in that city, the Barukzyes at Caubul

might have been collecting troops and strengthening their defences for

a vigorous and well-organised opposition. But to Dost Mahomed this

continued halt was altogether unintelligible. He could not understand

why, if they really purposed to advance upon Caubul, Macnaghten and

Keane were wasting their strength in utter idleness at Candahar. It was

the Ameer’s belief that the British were projecting a movement upon

Herat; that the Army of the Indus would branch off to the westward; and

that its operations against Caubul would be deferred to the following

year. Believing this, Dost Mahomed turned his thoughts rather to the

defence of the eastern than of the western line of road. It had been

arranged, under the Tripartite treaty,[324] that Prince Timour, the

eldest son of Shah Soojah, accompanied by Captain Wade and a Sikh

force, should penetrate the passes beyond Peshawur, and advance upon

Caubul by the road of Jellalabad and Jugdulluck. This force was now

advancing. Dost Mahomed sent out against it some of his best fighting

men, under the command of his favourite son, Akbar Khan—the young chief

who was destined to stand out with such terrible prominence from among

the leading personages distinguished in the later history of the war.

No thought, however, of a movement upon Herat weighed at this time

on Macnaghten’s mind. It appeared to him little desirable to march a

British army into the dominions of Shah Kamran, so long as there was a

possibility of attaining the desired results by any means less costly

and hazardous. There was little immediate prospect then of Mahomed

Shah returning for the re-investment of Herat. There was no pressing

danger to be combated. So Macnaghten determined to send, instead of a

British army, a British mission to Herat, with a handful of engineer

and artillery officers, and a few lakhs of rupees, to be expended on

the defences of the place.

It was in the month of September, 1838, that, after a nine months’

investment of Herat, Mahomed Shah struck his camp, and turned his face

towards his own capital. Eldred Pottinger had saved the city from the

grasp of the Persians. But his work was not yet done. The wretched

people were starving. The necessary evils of the protracted siege had

been greatly enhanced by the grinding cruelty of Yar Mahomed. To have

left Herat immediately on the departure of the Persian army would have

been to have left the inhabitants to perish. Moreover, the accursed

traffic in human flesh, which the Persian Prince had set forth as

the just cause of his invasion of Herat, had not been suppressed.

So Pottinger remained in Herat, and Stoddart, having witnessed the

breaking up of the Persian camp, joined his brother-officer in the

city, and then the two began to labour diligently together in the great

cause of universal humanity.

But these labours were distasteful to the Wuzeer. Pottinger and

Stoddart had done the work which Yar Mahomed required of them. The

one had driven off, and the other had drawn off, the Persian army.

He did not desire that they should interfere with his internal

tyranny. To oppress the helpless people at his will seemed to be his

rightful prerogative. The slave-trade, which he carried on with such

barbarous activity, was the main source of the Heratee revenue. The

English officers did not propose to effect its suppression without

securing adequate compensation to the slave-dealing state. But Yar

Mahomed viewed all their proceedings with jealousy and suspicion;

and two months after the close of the siege of Herat, they were

grossly insulted in the presence of the King, and ordered to withdraw

themselves beyond the limits of the Heratee territory.

Stoddart had work to do in another quarter. He quitted Herat and

made his way to Bokhara. But Pottinger was solicited to postpone his

departure, and the dawn of the new year still found him at the Court

of Herat. He only remained to be insulted. In January, 1839, another

outrage was committed upon him. His house was attacked by the retainers

of Yar Mahomed. One of his public servants was seized and mutilated.

As the year advanced, the hostile temper of the Wuzeer became more and

more apparent. Tidings of the advance of Shah Soojah and his British

allies had reached Herat; and although the integrity of that state had

been especially guaranteed by the Tripartite treaty, and British money

was then maintaining both the government and the people of Herat, Yar

Mahomed began to intrigue both with the Persian Court and the Candahar

Sirdars, and endeavoured to form a confederacy for the expulsion of the

Shah and his allies from Afghanistan.[325]

But the Persian Court was little inclined to commit itself to an

act of such direct hostility against Great Britain. The Army of the

Indus continued to advance; there was no prospect of any organised

opposition. Our success was sufficiently intelligible to Yar Mahomed.

He respected success. So, when Shah Soojah entered Candahar, and

the British army encamped beneath its walls, the Wuzeer hastened to

congratulate the Shah upon his restoration, and sent a friendly mission

to the British camp. In return for this, Macnaghten now determined to

despatch a British officer to Herat, to negotiate a friendly treaty

with Shah Kamran. His first thought was to entrust the duty to Burnes;

but Burnes was disinclined to undertake it; and Sir John Keane was of

opinion that he could not be spared.

So the choice of the Envoy fell upon Major Todd, an officer of the

Bengal Artillery, who had been for many years employed in Persia,

instructing the artillerymen of Mahomed Shah in the mysteries of

his profession, and assisting the British Mission in matters lying

beyond the circle of mere military detail. Thoroughly acquainted

with the languages and politics of Western Asia, a man of good

capacity, good temper, and good principle, he appeared to be well

fitted for the office which the Envoy now thought of delegating to

him. He had been in the camp of Mahomed Shah during the siege of

Herat, and had been employed in the negotiations which had arisen

between the two contending states. He had subsequently travelled

down through Afghanistan to India, charged with information for the

Governor-General, and had then recommended himself, by the extent of

his local knowledge and general acquirements, scarcely more than by

the integrity of his character and the amiability of his disposition,

for employment upon the Minister’s staff. He was military secretary

and political assistant to Mr. Macnaghten when the Envoy deputed him

to Herat. There went at the same time other officers, whose names

have since been honourably associated with the great events of the

Central-Asian War—James Abbott and Richmond Shakespear, of the Bengal

Artillery; and Sanders, of the Engineers, who fell nobly upon the

field of Maharajhpore.[326] They went to strengthen the fortifications

of the place, and they took with them guns and treasure.

A few days after the departure of the Mission to Herat, the army

recommenced its march. It had been halted at Candahar from the 25th

of April to the 27th of June. During this time the harvest had

ripened; the carriage-cattle had gained strength; but sickness had

broken out among our troops. The heat under canvass had been extreme.

Fever, dysentery, and jaundice had been doing their work; and many

a good soldier had been laid in a foreign grave. Money, too, had

been painfully scarce. It had been scattered about so profusely on

our first arrival at Candahar, that now an empty treasury stared

Macnaghten in the face; and he tried in vain to negotiate a loan. All

these were dispiriting circumstances; and there were others which

pressed heavily upon the mind of the Envoy. It was becoming clearer to

him every day that the Afghans regarded the intrusion of the British

into their dominions with the strongest feelings of national hatred

and religious abhorrence. A different class of men from the Belooch

marauders, who had carried off our cattle and plundered our stores in

the southern country, were now surrounding our camp. If our people

straggled far from their supports, they did it at the peril of their

lives. “Remember, gentlemen, you are not now in Hindostan,”[327] was

the significant warning which broke from Shah Soojah, when two young

officers,[328] returning from a fishing excursion along the banks of

the Urghundab, had been cut down by a party of assassins. It was plain,

too, that the Ghilzyes of Western Afghanistan—the original lords of

the land—were disinclined to bend their necks to the Suddozye yoke.

They had rejected the overtures made to them. They were not to be

bought by British gold, or deluded by British promises. Perhaps they

may have doubted the sincerity of the latter. Already were Shah Soojah

and Macnaghten scattering about those promises even more freely than

their money; and already were they ceasing to respect the obligation

of fulfilling them. The Ghilzyes now regarded us with unconquerable

mistrust. There was every prospect of their long continuing to be a

thorn in the flesh of the restored monarch and his supporters—a wild

and lawless enemy, not to be reduced to loyalty by Douranee Kings, or

to subjection by foreign bayonets.

This, at all events, had been learnt at Candahar during the two

months’ halt of our army, which, when everything has been said on

the subject of supplies, seems still to demand from the pen of the

historian something more in the way of explanation. The supplies had

now come into camp. They might not be available for the troops on the

line of march to Caubul;[329] but there was no longer any excuse for

protracting the halt. So, on the 27th of June, as Runjeet Singh, the

old Lion of Lahore, was wrestling with death at his own capital, the

British army resumed its march; and on the 21st of July was before the

famous fortress of Ghuznee.

CHAPTER III.

[June—August: 1839.]

The Disunion of the Barukzyes—Prospects of Dost Mahomed—Keane’s

Advance to Ghuznee—Massacre of the Prisoners—Fall of Ghuznee—Flight of

Dost Mahomed—Hadjee Khan, Khaukur—Escape of Dost Mahomed—Entry of Shah

Soojah into Caubul.

The disunion of the Barukzye brethren lost Afghanistan to the Sirdars.

The bloodless fall of Candahar struck no astonishment into the soul of

Dost Mahomed. He had long mistrusted his kinsmen. Candahar, too, was

the home of the Douranees. He knew that the Barukzyes had nothing to

expect from the allegiance of that powerful tribe. He knew that they

were little inclined to strike a blow for the existing dynasty; but he

knew at the same time, that they were so prostrate and enfeebled, that

the Suddozye Prince would derive no active assistance from them—that

they would only throw into the scale the passive sullenness and

harmless decrepitude of men broken down by a long course of oppression.

If Dost Mahomed and the Candahar Sirdars had leagued themselves firmly

together, without jealousy and without suspicion—if they had declared a

religious war, and appealed to the Mahomedan feelings of the people—if

they had, by their own energy and activity, encouraged Mehrab Khan of

Khelat to array himself against the invaders, and throwing themselves

heart and soul into the cause, had opposed our passage through the

Bolan and Kojuck Passes, they might have turned to the best recount

the sufferings of our famine-stricken army, and have given us, at

the outset of the campaign, a check from which we should not have

speedily recovered. But it seems to have been the design of Providence

to paralyse our enemies at this time, and so to lure us into greater

dangers than any that could have beset us at the opening of the

campaign.

But although with slight feelings of astonishment Dost Mahomed now

contemplated the successful establishment of Shah Soojah at Candahar,

it could not have been without emotions of bitterness and mortification

that he beheld his countrymen either flying ignobly before the

invaders, or bowing down without shame before the money-bags of the

infidels. It was a sore trial to him to see how almost every chief

in the country was now prepared to sell his birthright for a mess of

pottage. He had not sufficient confidence in his own strength, or the

loyalty of his people, to believe that he could offer any effectual

resistance to the approach of the Suddozye King, supported as he was

by British bayonets and British gold. His enemies were advancing upon

Caubul, both along the eastern and western lines of approach; and he

was necessitated to divide his strength. Nor could he even give his

undivided attention to his foreign enemies. There were danger and

disaffection at home. The Kohistan was in rebellion.[330] He could

see plainly that the Kuzzilbashes were against him. Indeed, all the

bulwarks of national defence which he could hope to oppose to the

advancing enemy, were crumbling to pieces before his eyes. Believing

that all nationality of feeling was utterly extinct in the souls of his

brethren, it had, ever since he had established himself at Caubul, been

his policy to place the least possible amount of power in their hands,

and to entrust all his delegated authority to the hands of his sons.

His only trust now was in them. Akbar Khan had been despatched through

the eastern passes to oppose the march of Wade and the Sikhs; Hyder

Khan was in command of the garrison of Ghuznee; and Afzul Khan, with a

body of horse, was in the neighbourhood of that fortress, instructed

to operate against the flanks of our army in the open country. The

Ameer himself was at the capital waiting the progress of events, and

husbanding his strength for the final conflict.

In the Ameer’s camp there seems to have been little knowledge of the

movements and designs of the enemy. It had been for some time believed

that it was the intention of the British chiefs to march upon Herat,

and now again it was the opinion that they purposed to mask Ghuznee

and move at once upon Caubul. It seems, therefore, to have been the

design of Dost Mahomed that Afzul Khan and Hyder Khan, having suffered

us to advance a march or two beyond Ghuznee, should fall upon our rear,

whilst Dost Mahomed himself was to give us battle from the front.[331]

But he had not measured aright the policy of the British Commander. It

was not Sir John Keane’s intention to mask Ghuznee, but to reduce it.

The strength of Ghuznee was the boast of the Afghans. They believed

that it was not to be carried by assault. On the other hand, Sir John

Keane, persuaded that it was not a place of any strength, had advanced

upon Ghuznee without any siege guns. A battering train had been brought

up, with great labour and at great expense, to Candahar, and now that

it was likely to be brought into use, and so to repay the labour and

the expense, Sir John Keane dropped it by the way. He was nearing the

strongest fortress in the country; he knew that it was garrisoned by

the enemy, and that, if he advanced upon it, it would be vigorously

defended. He determined to advance upon it; and yet, with an amount

of infatuation which, although after-events have thrown it into the

shade, at the time took the country by surprise, and was, perhaps,

unexampled in Indian warfare, he left his heavy guns at Candahar, and

advanced upon Ghuznee with nothing but light field-pieces. He had been

told that it was a place of no considerable strength, and that it

would give him no trouble to take it. Major Todd and Lieutenant Leech

had seen Ghuznee, and their reports had dissipated the anxieties of

the Commander-in-Chief. So he found himself before a place which he

subsequently described as one of “great strength both by nature and by

art,” without any means of effecting a breach in its walls.

The city of Ghuznee lies between Candahar and Caubul—about 230 miles

distant from the former, and ninety miles from the latter place. The

entire line of country from Candahar to Caubul is, in comparison with

that which lies between Caubul and Peshawur, an open and a level

tract, opposing no difficulties to the march of an army encumbered

with artillery and baggage. As a city, it was of less importance than

either Caubul or Candahar.[332] But the strength of the citadel had

been famous throughout many generations; and the first sight of the

fortress, as it burst suddenly on the view of our advancing army, “with

its fortifications rising up, as it were, on the side of a hill, which

seemed to form the background to it,” must have thrust upon every

officer of the force the conviction that, at Candahar, they had all

underrated the strength of the place. It obviously was not a fortress

to be breached by nine-pounder and six-pounder guns.

From the fortifications of the citadel Hyder Khan looked out through a

telescope, and beheld our British columns advancing slowly and steadily

across the plain. Some preparations had been made for external defence;

but not on any extensive scale. Parties of the enemy were posted in

the villages and gardens around the fort; but our light companies soon

dislodged them. The morning was spent in brisk skirmishing;[333] the

range of the enemy’s guns was tried; the engineers reconnoitred the

place; and then it was determined that the camp should be pitched upon

the Caubul side of the city. It was reported that Dost Mahomed himself

was advancing from the capital, and it was expedient to cut off his

direct communication with the fort. Not without some confusion the camp

was pitched. Had Afzul Khan descended with his cavalry upon us at this

time, he might have wrought dire mischief amongst us.

Day had scarcely dawned on the 22nd of July, when Sir John Keane,

accompanied by Sir Willoughby Cotton and the engineers, ascended the

heights commanding the eastern face of the works, and reconnoitred

the fortress. He had determined on carrying the place by assault. In

ignorance of the means whereby this was to be accomplished, the King

had recommended that the army should leave Ghuznee to itself, and march

on at once to Caubul. It was evident that the light field-pieces which

Keane had brought up with him from Candahar could not breach the solid

walls of Ghuznee. “If you once breach the place,” said the Shah, “it

is yours; but I cannot understand how you are to breach it—how you are

to get into the fort.” But Sir John Keane did understand this; for his

engineers had taught him. He understood, though he had left his siege

train behind, that there was still a resource remaining to him. Though

the walls could not be breached, a gate, Captain Thomson assured him,

might be blown in with gunpowder.

The gate to be blown in was the Caubul gate. All the others had been

built up. The military historians leave it to be surmised by the

reader that the knowledge of this important fact was derived from the

_reconnaissances_ of the British Commander and his engineers. The

truth is, that the British had then in their camp a deserter from the

Ghuznee garrison—a Barukzye of rank, who had been induced to turn his

traitorous back upon his tribe. Abdool Reshed Khan was the nephew of

Dost Mahomed. When the “Commercial Mission” was in Afghanistan, Mohun

Lal had made the acquaintance of this man. The Moonshee seems to have

been endowed with a genius for traitor-making, the lustre of which

remained undimmed to the very end of the war. He now began to operate

upon his friend; and he achieved a brilliant success. Abdool Reshed was

not deaf to the voice of the charmer. Mohun Lal wrote him a seductive

letter, and he determined to desert. As the British army approached

Ghuznee he joined our camp. “I introduced him,” says Mohun Lal, “to

the Envoy, who placed him under the immediate disposal of Lord Keane.

The information which he gave to Major Thomson, the chief engineer,

relative to the fortifications of Ghuznee, was so valuable and

necessary, that my friend Abdool Reshed Khan was requested to attend

upon him in all his reconnoitring expeditions.” He was precisely the

man we wanted. He gave us all the information we required. He taught us

how to capture Ghuznee.

Having determined to enter Ghuznee through an entrance effected by

an explosion of gunpowder, Keane began to issue his instructions for

the assault, which was to take place before daybreak on the following

morning. Every preparation was made, and every precaution was taken

to ensure success. It was a day of expectation and anxiety, and not

wholly uneventful. On that 22nd of July was made known to us, with

fearful demonstrativeness, the character of those fanatic soldiers

of Islam, who have since become so terribly familiar to us under the

name of _Ghazees_. Incited by the priesthood, they flock to the green

banner, eager to win Paradise by the destruction of their infidel foes,

or to forestall the predestined bliss by dying the martyr’s death in

the attempt. A party of these fearless followers of the Prophet had

assembled in the neighbourhood of Ghuznee, and now they were about to

pour down upon the Shah’s camp, and to rid the country of a King who

had outraged Mahomedanism by returning to his people borne aloft on the

shoulders of the infidels. A gallant charge of the Shah’s Horse, led by

Peter Nicolson, who took no undistinguished part in the after-events of

the war, checked the onslaught of these desperate fanatics; and Outram,

with a party of foot, followed them to the heights where the cavalry

had driven them, and captured their holy standard. Some fifty prisoners

were taken. It is painful to relate what followed. Conducted into the

presence of Shah Soojah, they gloried in their high calling, and openly

reviled the King. One of them, more audacious than the rest, stabbed

one of the royal attendants. Upon this, a mandate went forth for the

massacre of the whole.

The Shah ordered them to be beheaded, and they were hacked to death,

with wanton barbarity, by the knives of his executioners. Coolly and

deliberately the slaughter of these unhappy men proceeded, till the

whole lay mangled and mutilated upon the blood-stained ground.[334]

Macnaghten, a little time before, had been commending the humane

instincts of the King. The humanity of Shah Soojah was nowhere to be

found except in Macnaghten’s letters. It is enough simply to recite the

circumstances of a deed so terrible as this. It was an unhappy and an

ominous commencement. The Shah had marched all the way from Loodhianah

without encountering an enemy. And now the first men taken in arms

against him were cruelly butchered in cold blood by the “humane”

monarch. The act, impolitic as it was unrighteous, brought its own sure

retribution. That “martyrdom” was never forgotten. The day of reckoning

came at last; and when our unholy policy sunk unburied in blood and

ashes, the shrill cry of the _Ghazee_ sounded as its funeral wail.

A gusty night had heralded a gusty morn, when Keane, inwardly bewailing

the absence of his heavy guns, planted his light field-pieces on some

commanding heights opposite the citadel, and filled the gardens near

the city walls with his Sepoy musketeers. No sound issued from the

fortress, nor was there any sign of life, whilst unseen under cover

of the night, and unheard above the loud wailings of the wind, the

storming column was gathering upon the Caubul road, and the engineers

were carrying up their powder-bags to the gate. The advance was under

Colonel Dennie, of the 13th Light Infantry; and the main column under

Brigadier Sale.[335] Captain Thomson, of the Bengal Engineers, directed

the movements of the explosion party; and with him were his two

subalterns, Durand and Macleod, and Captain Peat, of the Bombay corps.

Three hours after midnight everything was ready for the assault.

Then Keane ordered the light batteries to open upon the works of

Ghuznee. It was a demonstration—harmless but not useless; for it fixed

the attention of the enemy, and called forth a responsive fire. A row

of blue lights along the walls now suddenly broke through the darkness

and illuminated the place. The enemy had been beguiled by the false

attack, and were now looking out towards our batteries, eager to learn

the nature of the operations commenced by the investing force. And

whilst the Afghans were thus engaged, anticipating an escalade and

manning their walls, the British engineers were quietly piling their

powder-bags at the Caubul gate.

The work was done rapidly and well. The match was applied to the hose.

The powder exploded.[336] Above the roaring of the guns and the rushing

of the wind, the noise of the explosion was barely audible.[337] But

the effect was as mighty as it was sudden. A column of black smoke

arose; and down with a crush came heavy masses of masonry and shivered

beams in awful ruin and confusion. Then the bugle sounded the advance.

Dennie at the head of his stormers, pushed forward through the smoke

and dust of the aperture; and soon the bayonets of his light companies

were crossing the swords of the enemy who had rushed down to the point

of attack. A few moments of darkness and confusion; and then the

foremost soldiers caught a glimpse of the morning sky, and pushing

gallantly on, were soon established in the fortress. Three hearty,

animating cheers—so loud and clear that they were heard throughout the

general camp[338]—announced to their excited comrades below that Dennie

and his stormers had entered Ghuznee.

Then Sale pressed on with the main column, eager to support the

stormers in advance; and as he went he met an engineer officer of the

explosion party, who had been thrown to the ground, shattered and

bewildered by the concussion,[339] and who now announced that the gate

was choked up, and that Dennie could not force an entrance. So Sale

sounded the retreat. The column halted. There was a pause of painful

doubt and anxiety; and then the cheering notes of the bugle, sounding

the advance, again stirred the hearts of our people. Another engineer

officer had reported that, though the aperture was crowded with fallen

rubbish, Dennie had made good his entrance. Onward, therefore, went

Sale; but the enemy had profited by the brief pause. The opposition at

the gateway now was more resolute than it would have been if there had

been no check. The Afghans were crowding to the gate; some for purposes

of defence, others to escape the fire which Dennie was pouring in upon

them. Sale met them amidst the ruins—amidst the crumbled masonry and

the fallen timbers. There was a sturdy conflict. The Brigadier himself

was cut down;[340] but after a desperate struggle with his opponent,

whose skull he clove with his sabre, he regained his feet, again issued

his commands; and the main column was soon within the fortress. The

support, under Colonel Croker, then pushed forward; the reserve in due

course followed; the capture of Ghuznee was complete; and soon the

colours of the 13th and 17th regiments were flapping in the strong

morning breeze on the ramparts of the Afghans’ last stronghold.[341]

But there was much hard fighting within the walls. In the frenzy of

despair the Afghans rushed out from their hiding-places, sword in

hand, upon our stormers, and plied their sabres with terrible effect,

but only to meet with fearful retribution from the musket-fire or the

bayonets of the British infantry. There was horrible confusion and

much carnage. Some, in their frantic efforts to escape by the gateway,

stumbled over the burning timbers, wounded and exhausted, and were

slowly burnt to death. Some were bayoneted on the ground. Others were

pursued and hunted into corners like mad dogs, and shot down, with

the curse and the prayer on their lips. But never, it is said by the

historians of the war, after the garrison had ceased to fight, did the

wrath of their assailants overtake them. Many an Afghan sold his life

dearly, and, though wounded and stricken down, still cut out at the

hated enemy. But when resistance was over, mercy smiled down upon him.

The appeals of the helpless were never disregarded by the victors in

their hour of triumph. The women, too, were honourably treated. Hyder

Khan’s zenana was in the citadel; but not a woman was outraged by the

captors.[342]

Resistance over, the Commander-in-Chief and the Envoy entered Ghuznee

by the Caubul gate. Shah Soojah, before the contest was over, had

ridden down to the point of attack, and watched the progress of events

with the deepest interest, but with no apparent want of collectedness

and nerve.[343] Keane and Macnaghten now led him up to the citadel.

The wife of Hyder Khan, and the other women of his zenana, were

conducted, under the orders of the political and military chiefs, by

John Conolly, a cousin of the Envoy, to a house in the town, where

they were placed under the charge of the Moonshee Mohun Lal.[344] But

Hyder Khan himself had not yet been discovered. The Suddozye Prince

and the British chiefs were inquiring after the commander of the

garrison; but no tidings of him were to be obtained. He might have

been concealed in the fortress, or he might have effected his escape.

Accident only betrayed the position of the young Sirdar. He was found

in a house near the Candahar gate, by an officer of the Company’s

European regiment.[345] At once acknowledging that he was the governor

of Ghuznee, he threw himself upon the mercy of his captors. Conducted

to Keane’s tent, the Sirdar was guaranteed his personal safety, and

placed under the charge of Sir Alexander Burnes.[346] He was unwilling

at first to appear in the presence of Shah Soojah; but the assurances

of the Commander-in-Chief overcame his reluctance, and Keane conducted

him both to the Mission and to the King. Instructed as to the reception

he was to accord to the fallen Barukzye chief, the Suddozye monarch

received him with an outward show of kindness, and, with a dignified

courtesy which he so well knew how to assume, declared that he forgave

the past, and told him to go in peace.

And so Ghuznee fell to the British army, and was made over to the

Suddozye King. It cost the victors only seventeen killed and a hundred

and sixty-five wounded. Of these last eighteen were officers. The

carnage among the garrison was most fearful. Upwards of five hundred

men were buried by the besiegers; and many more are supposed to have

fallen beyond the walls, under the sabres of the British horsemen.

Sixteen hundred prisoners were taken. Immense stores of grain and

flour, sufficient for a protracted defence, fell into our hands; and

a large number of horses and arms swelled the value of the captured

property.

The fall of Ghuznee—a fortress hitherto deemed by the Afghans

impregnable—astounded Dost Mahomed and his sons, and struck terror into

their souls. Afzul Khan, who was hovering about the neighbourhood,

prepared to fall upon our baffled army, found, to his wonderment, that

the British colours were waving over the far-famed citadel of Ghuznee,

and immediately sought safety in flight. Abandoning his elephants and

the whole of his camp-equipage which fell as booty into the hands of

Shah Soojah, the Sirdar fled to Caubul. His father, greatly incensed,

ordered him immediately to halt, and “peremptorily refused to receive

him.”[347] He had expected something better from one who had done such

good service on the boasted battle-field of Jumrood.

In little more than four-and-twenty hours after the fall of Ghuznee,

intelligence of the event reached the camp of the Ameer. He at once

assembled his chiefs, spoke of the defection of some of his people,

expressed his apprehension that others were about to desert him, and

declared his conviction that, without the aid of treachery, Ghuznee

would not have fallen before the Feringhees. Then he called upon all

present, who wavered in their loyalty, at once to withdraw from his

presence, that he might know the extent of his resources, and not rely

upon the false friendship of men who would forsake him in the crisis of

his fate. All protested their fidelity. A council of war was held, and

the Newab Jubbar Khan was despatched to the British camp[348] to treat

with Shah Soojah and his allies.

The Newab mounted his horse and rode with unaccustomed rapidity to

Ghuznee. Mohun Lal went out to meet him some miles beyond the camp;

and Burnes received him at the piquets. A tent was pitched for his

accommodation near the Envoy’s; and he was well received by the British

Mission. The King received him, too, with the same well-trained

courtesy that he had bestowed on Hyder Khan—but the efforts of the

Newab were fruitless. He tendered on the part of the Ameer submission

to the Suddozye Prince; but claimed, on the part of the brother of

Futteh Khan, the hereditary office of Wuzeer, which had been held so

long and so ably by the Barukzyes. The claim was at once rejected,

and the mockery of an “honourable asylum” in the British dominions

offered in its stead. Jubbar Khan spoke out plainly and bluntly, like

an honest man. His brother had no ambition to surrender his freedom and

become a pensioner on the bounty of the British Government. Had his

cause been far more hopeless than it was, Dost Mahomed, at that time,

would have rather flung himself upon the British bayonets than upon

the protection of the Feringhees. Jubbar Khan then frankly stating his

own determination to follow the fortunes of his brother, requested and

received his dismissal.[349]

The Newab returned to the Ameer’s camp. All hope of negotiation was

now at an end, and Dost Mahomed, with resolution worthy of a better

fate, marched out to dispute the progress of the invaders. At the head

of an army, in which the seeds of dissolution had already been sown,

he moved down upon Urghundeh. There he drew up his troops and parked

his guns. But it was not on this ground that he had determined to give

the Feringhees battle. The last stand was to have been made at Maidan,

on the Caubul river—a spot, the natural advantages of which would

have been greatly in his favour. But the battle was never fought. At

Urghundeh it became too manifest that there was treachery in his camp.

The venal Kuzzilbashes were fast deserting his standard. There was

scarcely a true man left in his ranks. Hadjee Khan Khaukur, on whom

he had placed great reliance, had gone over to the enemy, and others

were fast following his example. This was the crisis of his fate.

He looked around him and saw only perfidy on the right hand and on

the left. Equal to the occasion, but basely deserted, what could the

Ameer do? Never had the nobility of his nature shone forth more truly

and more lustrously. In the hour of adversity, when all were false,

he was true to his own manhood. Into the midst of his own perfidious

troops he rode, with the Koran in his hand; and there called upon his

followers, in the names of God and the Prophet, not to forget that they

were true Mahomedans—not to disgrace their names and to dishonour their

religion, by rushing into the arms of one who had filled the country

with infidels and blasphemers. He besought them to make one stand,

like brave men and true believers; to rally round the standard of the

commander of the faithful; to beat back the invading Feringhees or

die in the glorious attempt. He then reminded them of his own claims

on their fidelity. “You have eaten my salt,” he said, “these thirteen

years. If, as is too plain, you are resolved to seek a new master,

grant me but one favour in requital for that long period of maintenance

and kindness—enable me to die with honour. Stand by the brother of

Futteh Khan, whilst he executes one last charge against the cavalry

of these Feringhee dogs; in that onset he will fall; then go and make

your own terms with Shah Soojah.”[350] The noble spirit-stirring appeal

was vainly uttered; few responded to it. There was scarcely a true

heart left. With despairing eyes he looked around upon his recreant

followers. He saw that there was no hope of winning them back to their

old allegiance he felt that he was surrounded by traitors and cowards,

who were willing to abandon him to his fate. It was idle to struggle

against his destiny. The first bitter pang was over; he resumed his

serenity of demeanour, and, addressing himself to the Kuzzilbashes,

formally gave them their discharge. He then dismissed all who were

inclined to purchase safety by tendering allegiance to the Shah; and

with a small handful of followers, leaving his guns still in position,

turned his horse’s head towards the regions of the Hindoo-Koosh.[351]

It was on the evening of the 2nd of August that Dost Mahomed fled from

Urghundeh. On the following day the British army, which had moved from

Ghuznee on the 30th of July, received tidings of his flight. It was

now determined to send a party in pursuit. It was mainly to consist

of Afghan horsemen; but some details from our cavalry regiments were

sent with them, and Captain Outram, ever ready for such service,

volunteered for the command. Other officers—bold riders and dashing

soldiers[352]—were eager to join in the pursuit; and a party of ten,

with about five hundred mounted men, mustered that afternoon before the

Mission tents, equipped for the raid.

If the success of this expedition had depended upon the zeal and

activity of the officers, Dost Mahomed would have been brought back a

prisoner to the British camp; for never did a finer set of men leap

into their saddles, flushed with the thought of the stirring work

before them. But when they set out in pursuit of the fallen Ameer,

a traitor rode with them, intent on turning to very nothingness all

their chivalry and devotion. There was an Afghan chief known as Hadjee

Khan Khaukur, of whom mention has been made. He was a man of mean

extraction, the son of a goat-herd,[353] but from this low estate had

risen into notice, and obtained service with Dost Mahomed. It was not

in his nature to be faithful. He deserted Dost Mahomed, and attached

himself to the Candahar Sirdars. On the advance of the British army he

deserted the Sirdars, and flung himself at the feet of the Suddozye.

Delighted with such an accession to his strength, the King appointed

him Nassur-ood-dowlah, or “Defender of the State,” and conferred on him

a Jaghire of the annual value of three lakhs of rupees.

At Candahar, whence the Sirdars had fled, the Hadjee, profoundly

conscious of the hopelessness of their cause, broke out into loyalty

and enthusiasm, and was, to all outward seeming, a faithful adherent of

the Shah. But as he entered the principality of the Caubul Ameer, he

seemed to stand upon more uncertain ground; the issue of the contest

was yet doubtful. Dost Mahomed and his sons were in the field. So the

Hadjee made many excuses; and fell in the rear of the British army. He

was sick; it was necessary that he should march easily; he could not

bear the bustle of the camp. Keeping, therefore, a few marches in the

rear, he followed our advancing columns, with his retainers; and there,

it is said, “enjoyed the congenial society of several discontented and

intriguing noblemen.”[354]

If Ghuznee had not fallen, Hadjee Khan and his friends would have

gone over in a body to the Ameer, and on the slightest information

of a reverse having befallen us, would have flung themselves on our

rear. But the fall of this great Afghan stronghold brought the Hadjee

again to the stirrup of the Shah; and he was again all loyalty and

devotion. Confident of his fidelity, and perhaps anxious to establish

it in the eyes of all who had viewed with suspicion the proceedings of

the Hadjee, the King now put it to the proof. The man had once been

Governor of Bameean. He knew the country along which the Ameer had

taken his flight. What could be better than to entrust the conduct

of the expedition to the veteran chief? The King and Macnaghten were

of the same mind; so Hadjee Khan, who had been for some time in

treasonable correspondence with Dost Mahomed, was now despatched to

overtake him and bring him back a prisoner to the camp of the Shah.

The result may be easily anticipated. Hadjee Khan cheerfully undertook

the duty entrusted to him. The enterprise required the utmost possible

amount of energy and promptitude to secure its success. The Ameer and

his party were more than a day’s journey in advance of his pursuers.

Every hour’s delay lessened the chance of overtaking the fugitive. So

the Hadjee began at once to delay. The pursuers were to have started

four hours after noon; Hadjee Khan was not ready till nightfall. Then

he was eager to take the circuitous high road instead of dashing

across the hills. His people lagged behind to plunder. He himself, when

Outram was most eager to push on, always counselled a halt, and in

the hour of need the guides deserted. The Ameer was now but little in

advance; he was encumbered with women, and children, and much baggage.

He had a sick son,[355] on whose account it was necessary to diminish

the speed of his flight. Outram seemed almost to have the Ameer in his

grasp; when Hadjee Khan again counselled delay. It was necessary, he

said, to wait for reinforcements. The Ameer had two thousand fighting

men. The Afghans under Hadjee Khan were not to be relied upon. They

had no food: their horses were knocked up; they were unwilling to

advance. Angry and indignant, Outram broke from the Hadjee in the

midst of his entreaties, and declared that he would push on with his

own men. Again and again there was the same contention between the

chivalrous earnestness of the British officer and the foul treachery

of the Afghan chief. At last, on the 9th of August, they reached

Bameean, where Hadjee Khan had repeatedly declared that Dost Mahomed

would halt, only to learn that the fugitives were that morning to be

at Syghan, nearly thirty miles in advance. The Ameer was pushing on

with increased rapidity, for the sick Prince, who had been carried

in a litter, was now transferred to the back of an elephant, and his

escape was now almost certain. The treachery of Hadjee Khan had done

its work. Outram had been restricted in his operations to the limits of

the Shah’s dominions; and the Ameer had now passed the borders. Further

pursuit, indeed, would have been hopeless. The horses of our cavalry

were exhausted by over-fatigue and want of food. They were unable any

longer to continue their forced marches. The game, therefore, was up.

Dost Mahomed had escaped. Hadjee Khan Khaukur had saved the Ameer; but

he had sacrificed himself. He had overreached himself in his career

of treachery, and was now to pay the penalty of detection. Outram

officially reported the circumstances of the Hadjee’s conduct, which

had baffled all his best efforts—efforts which, he believed, would

have been crowned with success[356]—and the traitor, on his return to

Caubul, was arrested by orders of the Shah. Other proofs of his treason

were readily found; and he was sentenced to end a life of adventurous

vicissitude as a state prisoner in the provinces of Hindostan.[357]

So fled Dost Mahomed Khan across the frontier of Afghanistan. His

guns were found in position at Urghundeh by a party of cavalry and

horse artillery sent forward to capture them. They were mostly light

pieces;[358] and neither the ordnance nor the position which had been

taken up, could be considered of a very formidable character.[359] It

has been already said, however, that the Ameer had fixed upon another

spot on which to meet the advancing armies of the Shah and his allies—a

spot well calculated for defence, which, three years afterwards,

Shumshoodeen Khan selected for his last stand against the battalions of

General Nott; but on which, like his distinguished clansman, he never

gave us battle.

On the 6th of August, Shah Soojah and the British army appeared before

the walls of Caubul. On the following day the King entered the capital

of Afghanistan. The exile of thirty years—the baffled and rejected

representative of the legitimacy of the Douranee Empire, was now at

the palace gates. The jingling of the money-bags, and the gleaming of

the bayonets of the British, had restored him to the throne which,

without these glittering aids, he had in vain striven to recover.

The Balla Hissar of Caubul now reared its proud front before him,

It was truly a great occasion. The King, gorgeous in regal apparel,

and resplendent with jewels, rode a white charger, whose equipments

sparkled with Asiatic gold.[360] It was a goodly sight to see the

coronet, the girdle, and the bracelets which scintillated upon the

person of the rider, and turned the fugitive and the outcast into a

pageant and a show. There were those present to whom the absence of the

_Koh-i-noor_, which, caged in Hyde Park, has since become so familiar

to the sight-seers of Great Britain, suggested strange reminiscences of

the King’s eventful career. But the restored monarch, wanting the great

diamond, still sparkled into royalty as he rode up to the Balla Hissar,

with the white-faced Kings of Afghanistan beside him. In diplomatic

costume, Macnaghten and Burnes accompanied the Suddozye puppet. The

principal military officers of the British army rode with them. And

Moonshee Mohun Lal, flaunting a majestic turban, and looking, in his

spruceness, not at all as though his mission in Afghanistan were to do

the dirty work of the British diplomatists, made a very conspicuous

figure in the gay cavalcade.[361]

But never was there a duller procession. The King and his European

supporters rode through the streets of Caubul to the palace in the

citadel; but as they went there was no popular enthusiasm; the voice of

welcome was still. The inhabitants came to the thresholds of the houses

simply to look at the show. They stared at the European strangers

more than at the King, who had been brought back to Caubul by the

Feringhees; and scarcely even took the trouble to greet the Suddozye

Prince with a common salaam. It was more like a funeral procession

than the entry of a King into the capital of his restored dominions.

But when Shah Soojah reached the palace from which he had so long been

absent, he broke out into a paroxysm of childish delight—visited the

gardens and apartments with eager activity—commented on the signs of

neglect which everywhere presented themselves to his eyes—and received

with feelings of genial pleasure the congratulations of the British

officers, who soon left his Majesty to himself to enjoy the sweets of

restored dominion.

The restoration of Shah Soojah-ool Moolk to the sovereignty of

Afghanistan had thus been outwardly accomplished. The Barukzye Sirdars

had been expelled from their principalities; a British garrison had

been planted in Candahar and in Ghuznee; and a British army was now

encamping under the walls of Caubul. A great revolution had thus

been perfected. The Douranee monarchy had been restored. The objects

contemplated in the Simlah manifesto had been seemingly accomplished,

and the originators of the policy which had sent our armies thus to

triumph in Afghanistan shouted with exultation as they looked upon

their first great blaze of success.

APPENDIX.

[Vol. I., page 70.]

_Preliminary Treaty with Persia, concluded by Sir Harford Jones on the

12th of March, 1809._

In the Name of Him who is ever necessary, who is all-sufficient, who

is everlasting, and who is the only Protector.

In these times distinguished by felicity, the excellent Ambassador,

Sir Harford Jones, Baronet, Member of the Honourable Imperial Ottoman

Order of the Crescent, has arrived at the Royal City of Teheran, in

quality of Ambassador from His Majesty the King of England (titles),

bearing His Majesty’s credential letter, and charged with full powers

munited with the great seal of England, empowering him to strengthen

the friendship and consolidate the strict union subsisting between

the high states of England and Persia. His Majesty the King of Persia

(titles) therefore, by a special firmaun delivered to the said

Ambassador, has appointed the most excellent and noble Lords Meerza

Mahomed Sheffeeh, qualified with the title of Moatumed-ed-Dowlah, his

First Vizier, and Hajee Mahomed Hoossein Khan, qualified with the

title of Ameen-ed-Dowlah, one of the Ministers of Record, to be his

Plenipotentiaries to confer and discuss with the aforesaid Ambassador

of His Britannic Majesty, all matters and affairs touching the

formation and consolidation of friendship, alliance, and strict union

between the two high states, and to arrange and finally conclude the

same for the benefit and advantage of both Kingdoms. In consequence

whereof, after divers meetings and discussions, the aforesaid

Plenipotentiaries have resolved that the following Articles are for the

benefit and advantage of both the high states, and are hereafter to be

accordingly for ever observed:

ART. I.—That as some time will be required to arrange and form a

definitive treaty of alliance and friendship between the two high

states, and as the circumstances of the world make it necessary for

something to be done without loss of time, it is agreed these Articles,

which are to be regarded as preliminary, shall become a basis for

establishing a sincere and everlasting definitive treaty of strict

friendship and union; and it is agreed that the said definitive treaty,

precisely expressing the wishes and obligations of each party, shall be

signed and sealed by the said Plenipotentiaries, and afterwards become

binding on both the high contracting parties.

II. It is agreed that the preliminary articles, formed with the hand of

truth and sincerity, shall not be changed or altered, but there shall

arise from them a daily increase of friendship, which shall last for

ever between the two most serene Kings, their heirs, successors, their

subjects, and their respective kingdoms, dominions, provinces, and

countries.

III. His Majesty the King of Persia judges it necessary to declare that

from the date of these preliminary articles, every treaty or agreement

he may have made with any one of the powers of Europe, becomes null

and void, and that he will not permit any European force whatever to

pass through Persia, either towards India, or towards the ports of that

country.

IV. In case any European forces have invaded, or shall invade, the

territories of His Majesty the King of Persia, His Britannic Majesty

will afford to His Majesty the King of Persia, a force, or, in lieu

of it, a subsidy with warlike ammunition, such as guns, muskets, &c.,

and officers, to the amount that may be to the advantage of both

parties, for the expulsion of the force so invading; and the number

of these forces, or the amount of the subsidy, ammunition, &c., shall

be hereafter regulated in the definitive treaty. In case His Majesty

the King of England should make peace with such European power, His

Britannic Majesty shall use his utmost endeavours to negotiate and

procure a peace between His Persian Majesty and such power. But if

(which God forbid) His Britannic Majesty’s efforts for this purpose

should fail of success, then the forces or subsidy, according to the

amount mentioned in the definitive treaty, shall still continue in

the service of the King of Persia as long as the said European forces

shall remain in the territories of His Persian Majesty, or until

peace is concluded between His Persian Majesty and the said European

power. And it is further agreed, that in case the dominions of His

Britannic Majesty in India are attacked or invaded by the Afghans or

any other power, His Majesty the King of Persia shall afford a force

for the protection of the said dominions, according to the stipulations

contained in the definitive treaty.

V. If a detachment of British troops has arrived from India in the

Gulf of Persia, and by the consent of His Persian Majesty landed on

the Island of Karrak, or at any of the Persian ports, they shall not

in any manner possess themselves of such places; and, from the date

of these preliminary articles, the said detachment shall be at the

disposal of His Majesty the King of Persia, except his Excellency the

Governor-General of India judges such detachment necessary for the

defence of India, in which case they shall be returned to India, and

a subsidy, in lieu of the personal services of these troops, shall be

paid to His Majesty the King of Persia, the amount of which shall be

settled in the definitive treaty.

VI. But if the said troops remain, by the desire of His Majesty the

King of Persia, either at Karrak, or any other port in the Gulf of

Persia, they shall be treated by the Governor there in the most

friendly manner, and orders shall be given to all the Governors of

Farsistan, that whatever quantity of provisions, &c., may be necessary,

shall, on being paid for, be furnished to the said troops at the fair

prices of the day.

VII. In case war takes place between His Persian Majesty and the

Afghans, His Majesty the King of Great Britain shall not take any part

therein, unless it be at the desire of both parties, to afford his

mediation for peace.

VIII. It is acknowledged the intent and meaning of these preliminary

articles are defensive. And it is likewise agreed, that as long as

these preliminary articles remain in force, His Majesty the King of

Persia shall not enter into any engagements inimical to His Britannic

Majesty, or pregnant with injury or disadvantage to the British

territories in India.

This treaty is concluded by both parties, in the hope of its being

everlasting, and that it may be productive of the most beautiful fruits

of friendship between the two most serene Kings.

In witness whereof we, the said Plenipotentiaries, have hereunto set

our hands and seals in the Royal City of Teheran, this twelfth day of

March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and nine,

answering to the twenty-fifth of Mohurrum el Haram, in the year of the

Hegira one thousand two hundred and twenty-four.

(L.S.) HARFORD JONES.

(L.S.) MAHOMED SHEFFEEH.

(L.S.) MAHOMED HOOSSEIN.

[Vol. I., page 85.]

_Treaty with Runjeet Singh, the Rajah of Lahore, dated 25th April,

1809._

Whereas certain differences which had arisen between the British

Government and the Rajah of Lahore, have been happily and amicably

adjusted, and both parties being anxious to maintain the relations of

perfect amity and concord, the following articles of treaty, which

shall be binding on the heirs and successors of the two parties, have

been concluded by Rajah Runjeet Singh on his own part, and by the

agency of Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, Esquire, on the part of the

British Government:

ART. I. Perpetual friendship shall subsist between the British

Government and the State of Lahore. The latter shall be considered,

with respect to the former, to be on the footing of the most favoured

powers; and the British Government will have no concern with the

territories and subjects of the Rajah to the northward of the river

Sutlej.

II. The Rajah will never maintain, in the territory occupied by him and

his dependents on the left bank of the river Sutlej, more troops than

are necessary for the internal duties of that territory, nor commit, or

suffer, any encroachment on the possessions or rights of the chiefs in

its vicinity.

III. In the event of a violation of any of the preceding articles, or

of a departure from the rules of friendship, on the part of either

state, this treaty shall be considered null and void.

IV. This treaty, consisting of four articles, having been settled and

concluded at Umritser, on the 25th day of April, 1809, Mr. Charles

Theophilus Metcalfe has delivered to the Rajah of Lahore a copy of the

same in English and Persian, under his seal and signature; and the

said Rajah has delivered another copy of the same under his seal and

signature; and Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalfe engages to procure,

within the space of two months, a copy of the same, duly ratified by

the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the receipt

of which by the Rajah, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and

binding on both parties, and the copy of it now delivered to the Rajah

shall be restored.

[Vol. I., page 92.]

_Treaty with the King of Caubul, dated 17th June, 1809._

Whereas in consequence of the confederacy with the state of Persia,

projected by the French for the purpose of invading the dominions of

His Majesty the King of the Douranees, and ultimately, those of the

British Government in India, the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone

was despatched to the Court of His Majesty, in quality of Envoy

Plenipotentiary, on the part of the Right Honourable Lord Minto,

Governor-General, exercising the supreme authority over all affairs,

civil, political, and military, in the British possessions in the East

Indies, for the purpose of concerting with His Majesty’s Ministers the

means of mutual defence against the expected invasion of the French

and Persians; and whereas the said Ambassador having had the honour

of being presented to His Majesty, and of explaining the friendly

and beneficial object of his mission, His Majesty, sensible of the

advantages of alliance and co-operation between the two states, for

the purpose above described, directed his Ministers to confer with the

Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, and, consulting the welfare of both

states, to conclude a friendly alliance; and certain articles of treaty

having accordingly been agreed to between His Majesty’s Ministers

and the British Ambassador, and confirmed by the Royal Signet, a

copy of the treaty so framed has been transmitted by the Ambassador

for the ratification of the Governor-General, who, consenting to the

stipulations therein contained without variation, a copy of these

articles, as hereunder written, is now returned, duly ratified by the

seal and signature of the Governor-General, and the signatures of the

members of the British Government in India. And the obligations upon

both governments, both now and for ever, shall be exclusively regulated

and determined by the tenor of those Articles which are as follow:

ART. I. As the French and Persians have entered into a confederacy

against the state of Caubul, if they should wish to pass through the

King’s dominions, the servants of the heavenly throne shall prevent

their passage, and exerting themselves to the extent of their power in

making war on them and repelling them, shall not permit them to cross

into British India.

II. If the French and Persians, in pursuance of their confederacy,

should advance towards the King of Caubul’s country in a hostile

manner, the British state, endeavouring heartily to repel them, shall

hold themselves liable to afford the expenses necessary for the

above-mentioned service, to the extent of their ability. While the

confederacy between the French and Persians continues in force, these

articles shall be in force, and be acted on by both parties.

III. Friendship and union shall continue for ever between these two

states. The veil of separation shall be lifted up from between them,

and they shall in no manner interfere in each other’s countries; and

the King of Caubul shall permit no individual of the French to enter

his territories.

The faithful servants of both states having agreed to this treaty, the

conditions of confirmation and ratification have been performed, and

this document has been sealed and signed by the Right Honourable the

Governor-General and the Honourable the Members of the Supreme British

Government in India, this 17th day of June, 1809, answering to the 1224

of the Hegira.

[Vol. I, p. 96.]

_Treaty with the Ameers of Sindh, dated 22nd August, 1809._

ART. I. There shall be eternal friendship between the British

Government and that of Sindh, namely, Meer Gholam Alee, Meer Kurreem

Alee, and Meer Murad Alee.

II. Enmity shall never appear between the two states.

III. The mutual despatch of the Vakeels of both Governments, namely,

the British Government and Sindhian Government, shall always continue.

IV. The Government of Sindh will not allow the establishment of the

tribe of the French in Sindh.

Written on the 10th of the month of Rujeeb-ool-Moorujub, in the year of

the Hegira, 1224, corresponding with the 22nd of August, 1809.

[Vol. I., p. 144.]

_Definitive Treaty with Persia, concluded at Teheran, by Messrs. Morier

and Ellis, on the 25th November, 1814._

Praise be to God, the all-perfect and all-sufficient.

These happy leaves are a nosegay plucked from the thornless Garden of

Concord, and tied by the hands of the Plenipotentiaries of the two

great states in the form of a definitive treaty, in which the articles

of friendship and amity are blended.

Previously to this period, the high in station, Sir Harford Jones,

Baronet, Envoy Extraordinary from the English Government, came to

this Court, to form an amicable alliance, and in conjunction with the

Plenipotentiaries of Persia, their Excellencies (titles) Meerza Mahomed

Sheffeeh and Hajee Mahomed Hussein Khan, concluded a preliminary

treaty, the particulars of which were to be detailed and arranged in

a definitive treaty; and the above-mentioned treaty, according to its

articles, was ratified by the British Government.

Afterwards, when His Excellency Sir Gore Ouseley, Ambassador

Extraordinary from His Britannic Majesty, arrived at this exalted and

illustrious Court, for the purpose of completing the relations of amity

between the two states, and was invested with full powers by his own

government to arrange all the important affairs of friendship, the

ministers of this victorious state, with the advice and approbation

of the above-mentioned Ambassador, concluded a definitive treaty,

consisting of fixed articles and stipulations.

That treaty having been submitted to the British Government, certain

changes in its articles and provisions, consistent with friendship,

appeared necessary, and Henry Ellis, Esquire, was accordingly

despatched to this court, in charge of a letter explanatory of the

above-mentioned alterations. Therefore, their Excellencies Meerza

Mahomed Sheffeeh, Prime Minister, Meerza Bozoork, Caimacan (titles),

and Meerza Abdul Wahab, Principal Secretary of State (titles), were

duly appointed, and invested with full powers to negotiate with the

Plenipotentiaries of His Britannic Majesty, James Morier, Esquire,

recently appointed minister at this court, and the above-mentioned

Henry Ellis, Esquire. These Plenipotentiaries having consulted on the

terms most advisable for this alliance, have comprised them in eleven

articles. What relates to commerce, trade, and other affairs, will be

drawn up and concluded in a separate commercial treaty.

ART. I. The Persian Government judge it incumbent on them, after

the conclusion of this definitive treaty, to declare all alliances

contracted with European nations in a state of hostility with Great

Britain, null and void, and hold themselves bound not to allow any

European army to enter the Persian territory, nor to proceed towards

India, nor to any of the ports of that country; and also engage not to

allow any individuals of such European nations, entertaining a design

of invading India, or being at enmity with Great Britain, whatever,

to enter Persia. Should any European powers wish to invade India by

the road of Kharazm, Tartaristan, Bokhara, Samarcand, or other routes,

His Persian Majesty engages to induce the Kings and Governors of those

countries to oppose such invasion, as much as is in his power, either

by the fear of his arms, or by conciliatory measures.

II. It is agreed, that these articles, formed with the hand of truth

and sincerity, shall not be changed or altered; but, there shall arise

from them a daily increase of friendship, which shall last for ever

between the two most serene Kings, their heirs, successors, their

subjects and their respective kingdoms, dominions, provinces, and

countries. And His Britannic Majesty further engages not to interfere

in any dispute which may hereafter arise between the princes, noblemen,

and great chiefs of Persia; and if one of the contending parties should

even offer a province of Persia, with view of obtaining assistance, the

English Government shall not agree to such a proposal, nor by adopting

it, possess themselves of such part of Persia.

III. The purpose of this treaty is strictly defensive, and the object

is that from their mutual assistance both states should derive

stability and strength; and this treaty has only been concluded for the

purpose of repelling the aggressions of enemies; and the purport of the

word aggression in this treaty is, an attack upon the territories of

another state. The limits of the territory of the two states of Russia

and Persia shall be determined according to the admission of Great

Britain, Persia, and Russia.

IV. It having been agreed by an article in the preliminary treaty

concluded between the high contracting parties, that in case of any

European nation invading Persia, should the Persian Government require

the assistance of the English, the Governor-General of India, on

the part of Great Britain, shall comply with the wish of the Persian

Government, by sending from India the force required, with officers,

ammunition, and warlike stores, or, in lieu thereof, the English

Government shall pay an annual subsidy, the amount of which shall be

regulated in a definitive treaty to be concluded between the high

contracting parties; it is hereby provided, that the amount of the said

subsidy shall be two hundred thousand (200,000) tomauns annually. It is

further agreed, that the said subsidy shall not be paid in case the war

with such European nation shall have been produced by an aggression on

the part of Persia; and since the payment of the above subsidy will be

made solely for the purpose of raising and disciplining an army, it is

agreed that the English minister shall be satisfied of its being duly

applied to the purpose for which it is assigned.

V. Should the Persian Government wish to introduce European discipline

among their troops, they are at liberty to employ European officers for

that purpose, provided the said officers do not belong to nations in a

state of war or enmity with Great Britain.

VI. Should any European power be engaged in war with Persia when at

peace with England, His Britannic Majesty engages to use his best

endeavours to bring Persia and such European power to a friendly

understanding. If, however, His Majesty’s cordial interference should

fail of success, England shall still, if required, in conformity with

the stipulations in the preceding articles, send a force from India,

or, in lieu thereof, pay an annual subsidy of two hundred thousand

(200,000) tomauns for the support of a Persian army, so long as a war

in the supposed case shall continue, and until Persia shall make peace

with such nation.

VII. Since it is the custom of Persia to pay the troops six months in

advance, the English minister at that court shall do all in his power

to pay the subsidy in as early instalments as may be convenient.

VIII. Should the Afghans be at war with the British nation, His Persian

Majesty engages to send an army against them in such manner and of such

force as may be concerted with the English Government. The expenses

of such an army shall be defrayed by the British Government, in such

manner as may be agreed upon at the period of its being required.

IX. If war should be declared between the Afghans and Persians, the

English Government shall not interfere with either party, unless their

mediation to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties.

X. Should any Persian subject of distinction, showing signs of

hostility and rebellion, take refuge in the British dominions, the

English Government shall, on intimation from the Persian Government,

turn him out of their country, or, if he refuse to leave it, shall

seize and send him to Persia.

Previously to the arrival of such fugitive in the English territory,

should the governor of the district to which he may direct his flight

receive intelligence of the wishes of the Persian Government respecting

him, he shall refuse him admission. After such prohibition, should such

person persist in his resolution, the said governor shall cause him to

be seized and sent to Persia; it being understood that the aforesaid

obligations are reciprocal between the contracting parties.

XI. Should His Persian Majesty require assistance from the English

Government in the Persian Gulf, they shall, if convenient and

practicable, assist him with ships of war and troops. The expenses of

such expedition shall be accounted for and defrayed by the Persian

Government, and the above ships shall anchor in such ports as shall be

pointed out by the Persian Government, and not enter other harbours

without permission, except from absolute necessity.

The articles are thus auspiciously concluded:

A definitive treaty between the two states having formerly been

prepared, consisting of twelve articles, and certain changes, not

inconsistent with friendship, having appeared necessary, we the

Plenipotentiaries of the two states comprising the said treaty in

eleven articles, have hereunto set our hands and seals, in the royal

city of Teheran, this twenty-fifth day of November, in the year of our

Lord one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the

twelfth Zealhajeh, in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred

and twenty-nine.

(L.S.) JAMES MORIER.

(L.S.) HENRY ELLIS.

(L.S.) MAHOMED SHEFFEEH.

(L.S.) ABDUL WAHAB.

(L.S.) ISAH (MEERZA BOZOORK).

[Vol. I., page 153.]

_Bonds given by Abbas Meerza, Prince Royal of Persia, and by the Shah,

cancelling the Subsidy Articles of the Treaty of 25th November, 1814._

_Bond granted by Abbas Meerza, Prince Royal of Persia, to

Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, British Envoy._

Be it known to Colonel Macdonald, British envoy at our Court, that we,

the heir apparent to the Persian throne, in virtue of the full powers

vested in us by the Shah, in all matters touching the foreign relations

of this kingdom, do hereby pledge our solemn word and promise, that

if the British Government will assist us with the sum of two hundred

thousand tomauns (200,000), towards the liquidation of the indemnity

due by us to Russia, we will expunge, and hereafter consider as

annulled, the IIIrd and IVth articles of the definitive treaty, between

the two states, concluded by Mr. Ellis, and obtain the royal sanction

to the same.

This paper bears the seal of His Royal Highness Abbas Meerza, and that

of His Persian Majesty’s Minister, the Kaim-Mukam.

Dated in the month of Shaban, or March, 1828.

_Ruckum of His Royal Highness the Heir Apparent, in ratification

of the Annulment of the IIIrd and IVth Articles of the Treaty with

England._

Relative to the articles III. and IV. of the propitious treaty

between England and Persia, which was concluded by Mr. Ellis, in

the month Zekaud, A.H. 1229, agreeably to the engagements entered

into with your Excellency, that, in consequence of the sum of 200,000

tomauns, the currency of the country, presented as an aid to Persia,

in consideration of the losses she has sustained in the war with

Russia, we, the heir apparent, vested with full powers in all matters

connected with the politics of this nation, have agreed that the said

two articles shall be expunged, and have delivered a bond to your

Excellency, which is now in your hands.

In the month of Zikeyla, A.H. 1243, on our going to wait upon His

Majesty at Teheran, in consistence with the note addressed to your

Excellency by Meerza Abul Hassan Khan, the Minister for Foreign

Affairs, we were appointed sole agent in this matter by His Majesty,

with unlimited authority; therefore, as the Government of England,

through the medium of Colonel Macdonald, have afforded us the

assistance of 200,000 tomauns, we, the representative of His Majesty,

have, on this day, the 14th of the month Suffer, and the 24th of

the Christian month August, annulled the two obnoxious articles of

our propitious treaty. The envoy, considering this document as a

ratification on the subject of the two articles, will know that it is

liable to no further comment from the ministers of His Majesty’s Court.

Sealed by

Month of Suffer, A. H. 1244. H. R. H. ABBAS MEERZA.

_Firmaun from His Majesty the Shah to Colonel Macdonald, British Envoy

in Persia._

A.C.

Let it be known to Colonel Macdonald, the English envoy, exalted by our

munificence, that our noble son having represented to us his having

recently come to an arrangement relative to the two articles of the

treaty with England, we have ordered that what has been executed by our

son, touching this transaction, in conformity with the firmaun of full

powers granted to him by us, be confirmed by our royal ratification

and consent; and we duly appreciate the exertions of your Excellency

during the last year, which have obtained you the good-will of the Shah.

Regarding the crore of tomauns required for the redemption of Khoee,

agreeably to what has been laid before us, H.R.H. Abbas Meerza has

directed the payment of 400,000 tomauns by Mohamed Meerza; and we have

besides instructed the remaining 100,000 tomauns to be delivered to

Meerza Abul Hassan Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose

of being transmitted to you.

Your Excellency will, therefore, conceiving this firmaun as your

security, become responsible for the payment of the above sum, which

will be afterwards paid to you by the lord of exalted rank, Meerza Abul

Hassan Khan. Also make known to us all your wishes.

Sealed by

HIS MAJESTY FUTTEH ALEE SHAH.

[Vol. I., page 352.]

[The following is the passage, from Mr. Henry Torrens’ letters to the

“Friend of India,” cited by his biographer, (Mr. James Hume), and

referred to in a note to the above page.]

“On the sound historical basis of ‘general opinion’ and ‘well credited

report’ you do me the honour of ascribing to me the creation of a

policy which was a sound and wise one, _had it been carried out as

devised_, and of which I only wish I could claim the authorship; but

you will perhaps allow me to cite against ‘general opinion’ and ‘well

credited report,’ the assurance of a late Cabinet Minister, Lord de

Broughton, that _he_ was the author of the expedition, the which he

undoubtedly was. Without this declaration publicly made, I could not

state what follows.

“The facts now related for the first time are simply these. Mr.

Macnaghten, with me for his under Secretary, most unwillingly

accompanied the Governor-General in 1837 towards the North-West, in

which his presence was not required. Mr. Macnaghten, in the conviction

that with the peculiar turn of mind of the Governor-General, it were

better for him to be with his Council, did his utmost to persuade his

Lordship to return from Cawnpore to Calcutta, the rather that it was

the famine year of 1837-38. Orders were at once given for our return,

but countermanded. Before our arrival at Cawnpore, Mr. Macnaghten,

pressed by his Lordship’s anxiety and uncertainties, had prepared

a scheme, based upon the independent expedition of Shah Soojah in

1832—of which we often spoke together, with reference to the stormy

aspect of the times,—which contained the germ of the famous Afghan

expedition; the scope of this scheme was: 1. According to the policy

of this Government in 1809, to interpose a friendly power in Central

Asia between us and any invasive force from the West. 2. To exhibit the

military resources of the Government which had experienced a dangerous

decline in a native estimation. 3. To set at rest the frontier wars

between Afghans and Sikhs which interfered with the extension of our

trade. 4. To effect these objects by means of our pensioner, Shah

Soojah, acting in concert with Runjeet Singh; settling through our

mediation the claims of the latter on Scinde, and of the former on

Cashmere and Peshawur; satisfying Runjeet as to his demand for Swat

and Booneer, and purchasing from the Ameers of Scinde, by relieving

them of tribute and vassalage to the Douranee Crown (Shah Soojah’s),

the complete opening of the Indus navigation, and the abolition of

all tolls. 5. To establish in the person of a subsidized Monarch in

Afghanistan so firm an ally at the head of a military people as might

assure us that, in the event of Runjeet’s death, the Sikhs would find

occupation on the frontiers of Peshawur, for so large a portion of

their army as might materially interfere with the assemblage of an

imposing force on our own frontier. 6. To pass into Afghanistan, as

Shah Soojah had done in 1832, by the Bolan Pass, place him on his

throne, subsidized at twenty lakhs a year, and march home through the

Punjab, showing our power.

“Such was the project submitted, rather to propose _something_ to

the Governor-General in his uncertainty, than to suggest a plan for

absolute adoption. A few days afterwards, Mr. Macnaghten told me,

that his Lordship had peremptorily rejected it, saying, “_such a

thing was not to be thought of_.” Some fortnight or three weeks

afterwards, letters arrived, I believe from Her Majesty’s Ministers

in England, suggesting various schemes of diversion in the East as

respected the aggressive views of Persia in connection with a great

European power;—one, I believe, was analagous to that suggested by Mr.

Macnaghten, and it was then Lord Auckland asked for the paper which

had been previously submitted to him. I never saw it again after that

time; but on it was framed a scheme in consonance with the views of

Her Majesty’s Ministers _which was approved by them and acted on_;

but which only contemplated the expedition to, not the occupation

of, Afghanistan, and it was the change of policy which fathered our

disasters. My duties, which as under and officiating Secretary were

purely executive, brought me subsequently much into official contact

with the Governor-General, but not until after the policy had been

decided upon as respected Afghanistan, and so thoroughly decided, that

Mr. Macnaghten was ascending the hill with the tripartite treaty in

his pocket, at the time when ‘well credited report’ represents ‘some

body’—myself—as rushing down the hill _to tell him of the adoption

during his absence, of the policy on which the treaty in his pocket was

founded_! I well recollect the subsequent discussions and difficulties

as to execution, and in these Clerk, Wade, Colvin, Mackeson, Burnes,

D’Arcy Todd, Lord, and others had a share. Of those curious councils it

does not behove me to speak—save that previous to one I remember poor

Burnes making his fifth suggestion within the week, to the effect that

‘we had but to send Shah Soojah to the mouth of the Khyber Pass with

two battalions of Sepoys, and the Afghans would carry him through it in

their arms,’[362] when I recollect saying with some asperity—‘surely

it is better not to confuse high authority with fresh plans, when all

our energies are needed to carry out the one decided upon.’ As you have

honoured me with the title of adviser of Lord Auckland, and given me

the opportunity of divesting myself of the unreal credit or discredit,

as you may decide it to be, before the expedition was decided upon, I

will in justice to myself record with you, two of the few opinions I

ever had the opportunity of delivering _after_ it began; the one was

strongly against the fortification of Herat, the other strongly against

the admission of English women of any rank into Afghanistan, for giving

each of which I was strongly reprimanded, and from this anecdote I

leave you to conclude the slight amount of my utility out of my strict

line of duty.”

* * * * *

[If there is anything in this at variance with the statements in my

narrative, the reader will now have an opportunity of comparing the

one with the other, and forming his own judgment. It is necessary only

to observe that there are two distinct questions to be considered,

and that it rather appears that Mr. Torrens has evaded the more

important one, and the one, too, with which he is more immediately

concerned. The scheme of the tripartite treaty is one thing, the march

of a British army on Caubul by way of the Bolan Pass is another.

Mr. Torrens appeals triumphantly to the fact that at a time when he

and others are represented (by Mr. Masson) as rushing down the hill

to tell Mr. Macnaghten of the adoption of the policy of the war, he

(Mr. Macnaghten) was ascending the hill with the treaty in his pocket

founded on that policy. But, in the first place, the story to which Mr.

Torrens refers (and which will be found in a note at page 353 of this

volume) was not told with respect to Mr. Macnaghten’s, but to Captain

Burnes’s, arrival at Simlah, in Mr. Macnaghten’s absence. And in the

second place, the policy into which Lord Auckland is said to have been

persuaded at this time was not the policy of the tripartite treaty,

but the policy of marching a British army into Afghanistan. It will

have been seen that when Mr. Macnaghten negociated the treaty with

Runjeet Singh and Shah Soojah, it was no part of the scheme that the

restoration of the Shah should be mainly accomplished by our British

bayonets. This was obviously an after-thought. The question then is,

how it arose—how “the army of the Indus,” to which Macnaghten at

Lahore and Loodhianah had never once alluded, grew into a substantial

fact. This is not explained by Mr. Torrens: I therefore leave the

statements in the text of my narrative as they were originally written,

and I will only add in this place—what I could produce living testimony

of the highest order to prove—that when the war in Afghanistan was

believed to be a grand success, Mr. Torrens boasted, not merely of his

participation in the councils from which it emanated, but of the actual

authorship of the war. He said, indeed, _totidem verbis_, that he “made

the Afghan war,” an assertion which need not be taken too literally,

but which, at all events, warrants the presumption that he counselled

and approved the war in the shape in which it was undertaken. K.]

[Vol. I., page 356.]

[The following is the letter from Sir A. Burnes referred to in this

page.]

_Husn Abdul, 2nd June, 1838_,

MY DEAR MR. MACNAGHTEN,

Just as I was entering this place, I had the pleasure to receive your

letter of the 23rd, requesting me to state my views on the means of

counteraction which should be presented to Dost Mahomed Khan, in the

policy that he is pursuing. I should have liked to have conversed

with you on this important subject, for it has so many bearings, and

involves so many conflicting interests, that it is impossible to do it

justice; but I do not delay a moment in meeting your wishes, as far as

can be done in a letter.

It is clear that the British Government cannot, with any credit or

justice to itself, permit the present state of affairs at Caubul to

continue. The counteraction applied must, however, extend beyond Dost

Mahomed Khan, and to both Persia and Russia. A demand of explanation

from the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh would, I conceive, be met by an

evasive answer, and gain for us no end; besides, the policy of Russia

is now fairly developed, and requires no explanation, for it explains

itself, since that government is clearly resolved upon using the

influence she possesses in Persia (which is as great there as what the

British command in India), to extend her power eastward. It had better,

therefore, be assumed at once that such are her plans, and remonstrate

accordingly. If we can do but little with Russia, the cause is widely

different with Persia. She should at once be warned off Afghanistan,

and our continuance of an alliance with her should depend upon her

compliance. I believe that a letter from the Governor-General of India,

sent to the Shah of Persia at Herat, would gain our end, and this

effected, there is nothing to fear from the proceedings of Dost Mahomed

Khan, or any other of the Afghan chiefs. If this be left undone,

they will succumb to Persia and Russia, and become the instruments

for whatever those powers desire. I therefore distinctly state my

conviction that the evil lies beyond Afghanistan itself, and must be

dealt with accordingly.

If it is the object of government to destroy the power of the present

chief of Caubul, it may be effected by the agency of his brother,

Sultan Mahomed Khan, or of Soojah-ool-Moolk; but to ensure complete

success to the plan, the British Government must appear directly in

it; that is, it must not be left to the Sikhs themselves. Let us

discuss the merits of these two plans; but first I must speak on the

establishment of Sikh power in Afghanistan, to which you refer as a

general question.

No one entertains a more exalted opinion than I do of the Maharajah’s

head to plan, and ability to achieve; but I look upon the power of the

Sikhs beyond the Indus to be dependent on his life alone. It is mere

temporising, therefore, to seek to follow up any such plan; and were

this of itself not conclusive against it, the fact of its alienating

the Afghan people, who are cordially disposed as a nation to join us,

would be a sufficiently valid objection for not persevering in it. I

conclude always that our object is to make the Afghans our own, and to

guide Afghanistan by Afghans, not by foreigners. It is, I assure you,

a mere visionary delusion to hope for establishing Sikh ascendancy in

Caubul. For argument’s sake, I will admit that the Maharajah may take

it; but how is it to be retained? Why, he cannot keep his ground with

credit in Peshawur, and the Sikhs themselves are averse to service

beyond the Indus. But facts are more illustrative than arguments; the

French officers could not with safety leave their homes to an evening

dinner whilst we were at Peshawur and our intercourse was confined to

breakfasts. I saw this morning two tumbrils of money the followers of

dozens of others, on their way to Peshawur to pay the troops, and the

Maharajah only wishes a road of honour to retreat from it. If you use

him, therefore, as an agent to go further a-head, the first request he

will make of the British will be for money, and we shall waste our

treasure without gaining our ends, which, as I understand them, are an

influence in Caubul, to exclude all intrigues from the West.

Of Sultan Mahomed Khan, the first instrument at command, you will

remember that his brother Dost Mahomed, plainly confessed his dread of

him if guided by Sikh gold, and with such aid the ruler of Caubul may

be readily destroyed; but Sultan Mahomed has not the ability to rule

Caubul; he is a very good man, but incapable of acting for himself; and

though fit as an instrument in getting rid of a present evil, he would

still leave affairs as unsettled as ever when fixed in Caubul, and he

is consequently a very questionable agent to be used at all.

As for Soojah-ool-Moolk personally,[363] the British Government

have only to send him to Peshawur with an agent, and two of its own

regiments as an honorary escort, and an avowal to the Afghans that we

have taken up his cause, to ensure his being fixed for ever on his

throne. The present time is, perhaps, better than any previous to it,

for the Afghans as a nation detest Persia, and Dost Mahomed having gone

over to the Court of Teheran, though he believes it to be from dire

necessity, converts many a doubting Afghan into a bitter enemy.

The Maharajah’s permission has only, therefore, to be asked for the

ex-king’s advance on Peshawur, granting him at the same time some

four or five of the regiments which have no Sikhs in their ranks, and

Soojah becomes king. He need not remove from Peshawur, but address

the Khyburees, Kohistanees of Caubul, and all the Afghans from that

city, that he has the co-operation of the British and the Maharajah,

and with but a little distribution of ready money—say two or three

lakhs of rupees—he will find himself the real King of the Afghans in

a couple of months. It is, however, to be remembered always that we

must appear directly, for the Afghans are a superstitious people, and

believe Soojah to have no fortune (bukht); but our name will invest him

with it. You will also have a good argument with the Maharajah in the

honour of “Taj Bukhshie;” but still his Highness will be more disposed

to use Sultan Mahomed Khan as an instrument than Soojah, for he will,

perhaps, have exaggerated notions of Afghan power in prospect; but our

security must be given to him, and we must identify ourselves with all

the preceedings to make arrangements durable.

I have thus pointed out to you how the chief of Caubul is to be

destroyed, and the best means which have occurred to me for effecting

it; but I am necessarily ignorant of the Governor-General’s views

on what his Lordship considers the best mode of hereafter managing

Afghanistan. It has been notified to me in various despatches, that

this end may best be gained by using one small state to balance

another, to keep all at peace, and thus prevent any great Mahomedan

power growing up beyond the Indus, which might cause future

inconvenience. It is with every respect that I differ; but these are

not my sentiments, and though in theory nothing may appear more just

and beneficial, I doubt the possibility of putting the theory into

practice, and more than doubt the practice producing the benefit

expected from it; for while you were trying to bring it about, another

power steps in, paves the way for destroying the chiefships in detail,

and the policy along with it. Our fears of a powerful Mahomedan

neighbour are quickened by what we read of Ahmed Shah’s wars in India,

and the alarms spread even by Shah Zemaun, so late as the days of

Lord Wellesley; but our knowledge of these countries has wondrously

improved since that time; and though the noble Marquis, in his splendid

administration, made the Afghans feel our weight through Persia, and

arrested the evil, we should have had none of these present vexations

if we had dealt with the Afghans themselves. We then counteracted

them through Persia. We now wish to do it through the Sikhs. But

as things stand, I maintain it is the best of all policy to make

Caubul _in itself as strong as we can make it_, and not weaken it by

divided power; it has already been too long divided. Caubul owed its

strength in bygone days to the tribute of Cashmere and Sindh. Both are

irrevocably gone; and while we do all we can to keep up the Sikhs as a

power east of the Indus during the Maharajah’s life, or afterwards, we

should consolidate Afghan power west of the Indus, and have a King and

not a collection of chiefs. _Divide et impera_ is a temporising creed

at any time; and if the Afghans are united, we and they bid defiance to

Persia, and instead of distant relations, we have everything under our

eye, and a steadily progressing influence all along the Indus.

I have before said, that we cannot with justice to our position in

India allow things to continue as at present in Caubul; and I have

already, in my despatch of the 30th April, suggested a prompt and

active counteraction of Dost Mahomed Khan, since we cannot act with

him. But it remains to be reconsidered why we cannot act with Dost

Mahomed. He is a man of undoubted ability, and has at heart a high

opinion of the British nation; and if half you must do for others

were done for him, and offers made which he could see conduced to his

interests, he would abandon Persia and Russia to-morrow. It may be

said that that opportunity has been given to him, but I would rather

discuss this in person with you, for I think there is much to be said

for him. Government have admitted that at best he had but a choice of

difficulties; and it should not be forgotten that we promised nothing,

and Persia and Russia held out a great deal. I am not now viewing the

question in the light of what is to be said to the rejection of our

good offices as far as they went, or to his doing so in the face of

a threat held out to him; but these facts show the man has something

in him; and if Afghans are proverbially not to be trusted, I see no

reason for having greater mistrust of him than of others. My opinion

of Asiatics is, that you can only rely upon them when their interests

are identified with the line of procedure marked out to them; and this

seems now to be a doctrine pretty general in all politics.