“Certainly.”
“Will he then set the same value on an earthenware cup as he does upon
his son, or three measures of wine as on his son? or is the case thus?
all such anxiety is employed not about those things that are procured
for the sake of something else, but about that for the sake of which all
such things are procured: for although we often say that we value gold
and silver very highly, yet we may observe that the truth is not at all
the more thus; but what we value so very highly is that, whatever it may
prove to be, for the sake of which gold and all other provisions are
procured. Shall we not say so?”
“Certainly.”
“May not the same thing also be said of a friend? for whatever things we
say are friendly to us, for the sake of some friendly thing, we appear
to describe by a name that belongs to another, but that very thing seems
in reality to be friendly in which all those so-called friendships
terminate?”
“This seems to be the case,” said he.
“That, then, which is in reality friendly is not friendly for the sake
of any other friendly thing?”
“True.”
“This, then, is settled, that what is friendly is not friendly for the
sake of any other friendly thing. Is the good, then, friendly?”
“It seems so to me.”
38. “Is the good, then, loved on account of evil, and is the case thus?
If of the three things which we just now mentioned, good, evil, and that
which is neither good nor evil, two only were to be left, but evil were
to depart altogether, and not come in contact with any thing, either
with body, or soul, or any other of the things which we say in
themselves are neither evil nor good, in that case would not good be of
no use to us, but become useless? For if there were nothing to hurt us
any more, we should stand in need of no assistance whatever. And thus it
would then become evident that we had a regard for and loved the good on
account of evil, since good is a medicine for evil, but evil is a
disease. But when there is no disease, there is no need of medicine. Is
this, then, the nature of good, and is it loved on account of evil, by
us who are placed between evil and good, and is it of no use itself, for
the sake of itself?”
“Such seems to be the case,” he replied.
“That which is friendly, therefore, to us, is that in which terminate
all other things, which we said are friendly for the sake of some other
friendly thing, but in no respect resembles them? 39. For these are
called friendly for the sake of a friendly thing; but that which is in
reality friendly appears to be of a nature quite contrary to this; for
we have found it to be friendly for the sake of that which is hostile:
but if that which is hostile should depart, it would no longer, as it
seems, be friendly to us.”
“It seems to me that it would not,” said he, “according to what is now
said.”
“Whether, by Jupiter,” said I, “if evil were to be destroyed, would
there no longer be any hunger or thirst, or any thing else of the kind?
or would there be hunger, if men and other animals existed, yet not so
as to be hurtful? and thirst, and other desires, yet not be evil, since
evil is destroyed? or is the question ridiculous, what would then be the
case or not be the case? for who knows? This, however, we know, that at
present it is possible to be harmed by being hungry, and it is also
possible to be benefited; is it not so?”
“Certainly.”
“Therefore it is possible that one who thirsts, or is affected by any
other similar desire, may sometimes be affected by it beneficially, and
sometimes harmfully, and sometimes neither?”
“Assuredly.”
“If, therefore, evil were destroyed, must things that are not evil be
destroyed together with the evil?”
“Not at all.”
“There will be, then, such desires as are neither good nor evil, even if
evils were destroyed?”
“It appears so.”
40. “Is it, then, possible, that one who desires and is fond of any
thing, should not love that which he desires and is fond of?”
“It does not appear so to me.”
“When evils, then, are destroyed, there will remain, as it seems,
certain friendly things?”
“Yes.”
“Not so; at least if evil were the cause of any thing being friendly,
for, when that is destroyed, one thing could not be friendly to another:
for when the cause is destroyed, it is surely impossible that that of
which it was the cause should any longer exist?”
“You say rightly.”
“Did we not admit that the friendly loved something, and on account of
something, and did we not then think that, on account of evil, that
which is neither good nor evil loved the good?”
“True.”
“But now, as it seems, there appears to be some other cause of loving
and being loved?”
“So it seems.”
“Whether, then, in reality, as we just now said, is desire the cause of
friendship, and is that which desires friendly to that which it desires,
and at the time when it desires, but is what we before said was friendly
mere trifling, like a poem[175] heedlessly composed?”
-----
Footnote 175:
I have adopted Ast’s suggestion of μάτην for μακρόν. Stallbaum would
retain both, and read μακρὸν μάτην.
-----
“It seems so,” said he.
“However,” I said, “that which desires desires that which it stands in
need of; does it not?”
“Yes.”
“And is that which stands in need friendly to that of which it stands in
need?”
“It seems so to me.”
“And it stands in need of that which is taken from it?”