“Yes.”
“And indeed of something friendly, if we will keep to our former
admission?”
“Certainly.”
“Will not, therefore, that again be a friend, for the sake of something
friendly?”
“Yes.”
“Must we not, then, necessarily be tired out with going on thus, and
arrive at some principle, which will not have to be referred to another
friend, but will arrive at that which is the first friend, for the sake
of which we say that all other things are friendly?”
“Necessarily so.”
“This, then, is what I say, we must take care that all those other
things which we said were friendly for the sake of that, do not, as
being certain images of it, deceive us, but that that may be the first
which is truly a friend. For let us consider it thus. If any one values
any thing very highly, as, for instance, sometimes a father prizes a son
above all other things, will not such an one, because he esteems his son
above every thing, also value something else very highly? For instance,
if he were to hear that he had drunk hemlock, would he not value wine
very highly, if he thought this would save his son?”
“How should he not?” said he.