_Socr._ But when it lights on me, being ill, first of all does not a
different thing in reality light on one who is not the same person? for
it approaches one who is dissimilar.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But Socrates in this state, and the wine drunk, again generate
different things, with regard to the tongue a perception of bitterness,
and with regard to the wine bitterness produced and set in motion, and
that, indeed, not bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but
perceiving.
_Theæ._ Exactly so.
_Socr._ Therefore I shall never become any thing else while I perceive
thus; for a different perception of a different thing causes the
percipient to be changed and different: nor will that, which thus
affects me, by coming in contact with another, though it produces the
same effect, ever become such as it was to me; for by generating a
different thing from a different thing it will become changed.
_Theæ._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ Neither, then, shall I become such by myself, nor will it become
such by itself[153].
-----
Footnote 153:
That is to say, the relation between agent and patient is so close
that neither can be what it is, under that particular aspect, without
the other.
-----
_Theæ._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ But it is necessary that I, when I become percipient, should
become so in relation to something: for it is impossible to become
percipient, and yet percipient of nothing: and it is likewise necessary,
when any thing becomes sweet or bitter, or any thing of the kind, that
it should become so in relation to some one; for it is impossible for a
thing to become sweet, and yet sweet to no one.
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
45. _Socr._ It remains, I think, that we[154], if we are, should be, or
if we are produced, should be produced, by relation to each other; since
necessity unites our existence together, and unites it to no other
thing, nor even to ourselves. It remains, therefore, that we are united
to each other. So that, if any one says that any thing exists, he must
say that it exists for something, or of something, or in relation to
something, and in like manner of any thing said to be produced: but he
must not say, nor must he allow any one else to say, that any thing
exists or is produced of itself, as the argument we have deduced clearly
proves.
-----
Footnote 154:
“We,” that is, the agent and patient.
-----
_Theæ._ Assuredly, Socrates.
_Socr._ Since, then, that which affects me is relative to me and not to
another, do not I perceive it, and another not perceive it?
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ My perception, therefore, is true to me; for it always belongs
to my existence. And I, according to Protagoras, am a judge of things
that exist in relation to me, that they do exist, and of things that do
not so exist, that they do not exist.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
46. _Socr._ How then, since I am not deceived and do not falter in my
mind about things that exist or are produced, can I fail to have a
scientific knowledge of things which I perceive?
_Theæ._ It cannot fail to be so.
_Socr._ It was, therefore, very finely said by you, that science is
nothing else than perception; and all come to the same result, the
doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all that tribe, that all things are
in motion like streams, and that of the very wise Protagoras, that man
is the measure of all things, and that of Theætetus, that, if this is
the case, perception must be science. Is it not so, Theætetus? Shall we
say that this is your new-born infant as it were, delivered by my
midwifery? How say you?
_Theæ._ It is necessary to say so, Socrates.
47. _Socr._ This, then, as it appears, we have with much difficulty
produced, whatever it may turn out to be. But after the birth, we must,
in truth, perform the ceremony of running[155] round in argument, and
consider whether, without our perceiving it, that which is produced is
not unworthy of being reared, but empty and false. Do you think that we
ought by all means to rear your offspring, and not expose it? and will
you endure to see it refuted, and not be very much offended if any one
should take it away from you, as having been delivered for the first
time?
-----
Footnote 155:
On the fifth day after the birth of a child the midwives, having
purified their hands, ran with it round the hearth, so Socrates
proposes that the bantling of Theætetus should run the gauntlet of
discussion.
-----
_Theo._ Theætetus will endure this, Socrates, for he is not at all
morose. But, by the gods, say whether it is not so.
_Socr._ You are really very fond of discussion, Theodorus, and pleasant,
in thinking that I am a sack full of arguments, and that I can easily
pick one out and prove that these things are not so. But you do not
observe how the case stands, that no argument proceeds from me, but
always from the person who is conversing with me, and that I know
nothing but a very little, just enough to apprehend and examine
moderately well an argument advanced by another who is wise. And now I
will endeavour to do this from him, without saying any thing of myself.