_Theæ._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ And should you not speak in the same way of Socrates asleep, and
in the several states we just now described?
_Theæ._ I should.
_Socr._ But will not each of those things whose nature it is to make any
thing something else, when it lights upon Socrates in health, treat me
as one thing, and when ill, as a different thing?
_Theæ._ How should it not?
_Socr._ And shall we not produce different things in each case, both I
the patient, and that the agent?
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ Now when I drink wine, being in health, it appears to me
pleasant and sweet.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ For, from what has been already granted, the agent and the
patient produce sweetness and perception, both being put in motion
together; and the perception proceeding from the patient causes the
tongue to perceive, but the sweetness proceeding from the wine and set
in motion about it, causes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to a
healthy tongue.