_Theæ._ I do.
_Socr._ And, likewise, astronomy, and harmony, and reasoning?
_Theæ._ I endeavour to do so.
_Socr._ I too, my boy, endeavour to learn both from him and from others
who I think understand any thing of these matters. However, though I am
tolerably well informed in other subjects, yet I am in doubt about a
trifle which I wish to consider with you, and these here present. Tell
me, then, is not to learn to become wiser in that which one learns?
_Theæ._ How otherwise?
_Socr._ And by wisdom, I think, the wise are wise.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But does this differ at all from science?
_Theæ._ What?
_Socr._ Wisdom. Are not men wise in things of which they have a
scientific knowledge?
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ Then are wisdom and science the same?
_Theæ._ Yes.
10. _Socr._ This, then, is the thing that I doubt about, and I am not
able to determine satisfactorily by myself what science is. Can we then
explain it? What do you say? Which of us shall speak first? But he that
mistakes, and as often as any one mistakes, shall sit as an ass, as the
boys say when they play at ball; but whoever shall get the better
without making a mistake shall be our king, and shall order any question
he pleases to be answered. Why are you silent? Am I rude at all,
Theodorus, from my love of talking, and in my anxiety to bring about a
conversation amongst us, and of making us all friends, and sociable with
one another?
_Theo._ Such a thing, Socrates, cannot by any means be rude, but bid one
of these young men answer you. For I am unaccustomed to this kind of
conversation, and am not of an age to accustom myself to it; whereas it
is suitable to them, and they will benefit by it much more; for, in
truth, youth can derive benefit from every thing. As you begun,
therefore, do not let Theætetus off, but question him.
11. _Socr._ You hear, Theætetus, what Theodorus says, whom, I think, you
will neither be willing to disobey, nor is it right for a young man not
to submit to a wise man, when he commands him in matters of this kind.
Tell me, therefore, frankly and ingenuously, what does science appear to
you to be?
_Theæ._ I must then, Socrates, since you bid me. And if I make any
mistake you will assuredly correct me.
_Socr._ Certainly, if we are able.
_Theæ._ It appears to me, then, that sciences are such things as one may
learn from Theodorus, geometry, and the others which you just now
enumerated; and again, the shoemaker’s art, and those of other artizans,
all and each of these are nothing else but science.
_Socr._ Nobly and munificently, my friend, when asked for one thing you
give many, and various things instead of the single one.
_Theæ._ What mean you by this, Socrates?
_Socr._ Perhaps nothing: but I will tell you what I think. When you
speak of the shoemaker’s art, do you mean any thing else than the
science of making shoes?
_Theæ._ Nothing.
12. _Socr._ But what of the carpenter’s art? Do you mean any thing else
than the science of making implements in wood?
_Theæ._ Still nothing else.
_Socr._ In both, then, do you not define that of which each is the
science?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But the question asked, Theætetus, was not this, of what things
there is science, nor how many sciences there are; for we did not
enquire, with a view to enumerate them, but to know what science itself
is. Do I say nothing to the purpose?
_Theæ._ You speak very correctly.
_Socr._ Consider this too. If any one should ask us about any mean and
obvious thing, as, for instance, clay, what it is, if we were to answer
him, there is the potters’ clay, the oven-builders’ clay, and the
brick-makers’ clay, should we not be ridiculous?
_Theæ._ Probably.
_Socr._ In the first place, _we should be ridiculous_ for thinking that
he who asks the question can understand from our answer, when we say
Clay, adding, image-makers, or any other artizans whatever. Do you think
that any one can understand the name of a thing when he does not know
what that thing is?
_Theæ._ By no means.
13. _Socr._ Neither does he understand the science of shoes who does not
know what science is?
_Theæ._ He does not.
_Socr._ He then does not understand what is the art of shoe-making, or
any other art, who is ignorant of what science is?
_Theæ._ It is so.
_Socr._ It is, therefore, a ridiculous answer for one to give who is
asked what science is, when he answers the name of some art. For he
answers, of what there is a science, though this is not what he was
asked.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ In the next place, when he might have answered plainly and
briefly he goes round an endless way. As for instance to the question
about clay, it is a plain and simple answer to give, that clay is earth
mixed with moisture, without mentioning what use is made of it.
_Theæ._ It appears easy now, in this way, Socrates; for you appear to
ask just such a question as lately occurred to me when we were
conversing together, I and your namesake here, Socrates.
_Socr._ What was that, Theætetus?
14. _Theæ._ Theodorus here was describing to us something about powers,
with respect to magnitudes of three and five feet, shewing that they are
not commensurate in length to a magnitude of one foot, and thus
proceeding through every number as far as to a magnitude of seventeen
feet; at this he stopped. Since then powers appeared to be infinite in
multitude, something of the following kind occurred to us, to endeavour
to comprehend them in one name, by which we might denominate all these
powers.
_Socr._ And did you discover any thing of the kind?
_Theæ._ I think we did. But do you also consider.
_Socr._ Say on.
_Theæ._ We divided all number into two classes; then comparing that in
which the factors[146] are the same to a square figure, we called it
square and equilateral.
-----
Footnote 146:
The literal translation instead of “in which the factors are the
same,” is “which is able to become equally equal,” by which is meant a
number multiplied by itself.
-----
_Socr._ Very well.
_Theæ._ But the intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every
one in which the factors are not the same, but a greater number is
multiplied by a less, or a less by a greater, so that a greater and a
lesser side always enclose them, we compared to an oblong figure, and
called them oblong numbers.
_Socr._ Admirable. But what next?
_Theæ._ Such lines as square an equilateral and plane number, we defined
to be length, and such as square an oblong number, powers, as not being
commensurate with them in length, but with the planes which they
produce. And the case is the same with solids.
15. _Socr._ Excellently done, my boys; so that Theodorus appears to me
not liable to the charge of having given false testimony.
_Theæ._ However, Socrates, I shall not be able to answer your question
about science, as I did that about length and power; though you appear
to me to seek something of the same kind. So that Theodorus again
appears to be a false witness.
_Socr._ How so? If, praising you for running, he should say that he
never met with any youth who ran so swift, and afterwards you should be
defeated in running by a man who is full grown and very swift, do you
think he would have praised you with less truth?
_Theæ._ I do not.
_Socr._ But with respect to science, as I just now spoke of it, do you
think it is a trifling matter to find out what it is, and not in every
way difficult?
_Theæ._ By Jupiter, I think it difficult in the extreme.
16. _Socr._ Have confidence, then, in yourself, and think that Theodorus
spoke to the purpose, and endeavour by all possible means to comprehend
the notion both of other things, and also of science, what it is.
_Theæ._ As far as endeavour goes, Socrates, it shall be found out.
_Socr._ Come then: for you began very well just now; endeavour, in
imitation of your answer about powers, as you comprised those, which are
many, under one general idea, so likewise to designate many sciences by
one notion.
_Theæ._ Be assured, Socrates, I have often attempted to examine this, on
hearing the questions that are propounded by you; but I can neither
persuade myself that I can say any thing satisfactory, nor can I hear
any one else answering in the manner you require, though still I do not
desist from the attempt.
17. _Socr._ You are in labour, my dear Theætetus, not because you are
empty, but pregnant.
_Theæ._ I know not, Socrates; however I tell you how the case stands
with me.
_Socr._ What, absurd youth, have you not heard that I am son of the very
noble and awful midwife Phænarete?
_Theæ._ I have heard so.
_Socr._ And have you also heard that I study the same art?
_Theæ._ By no means.
_Socr._ Be assured, however, that it is so: but do not betray me to
others. For they are not aware, my friend, that I possess this art? but
they, since they are ignorant of it, do not say this of me, but that I
am a most absurd man, and make men doubt. Have you not heard this?
_Theæ._ I have.
_Socr._ Shall I tell you the reason of it?
_Theæ._ By all means.
_Socr._ Consider, then, every thing that relates to midwives, and you
will more easily understand what I mean. For you doubtless know, that
not one of them delivers others, while she herself can conceive and
bring forth, but those who can no longer bring forth.
_Theæ._ Certainly.
18. _Socr._ But they say that Diana is the cause of this, because being
herself a virgin she has the charge of child-births. Now to barren women
she has not given the power of becoming midwives, because human nature
is too weak to undertake an art in things of which it has had no
experience, but she has imposed that office on those who from their age
are incapable of bearing children, doing honour to the resemblance of
herself.
_Theæ._ That is reasonable.
_Socr._ And is not this also reasonable and necessary, that who are
pregnant and who are not should be better known by midwives than by
others?
_Theæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Moreover, midwives by applying drugs and using enchantments, are
able both to excite and, if they please, to alleviate the pangs, and to
deliver those that bring forth with difficulty, and if the child appears
to be abortive, they produce a miscarriage.
_Theæ._ It is so.
_Socr._ Have you not also heard this of them, that they are most skilful
match-makers, as being perfectly competent to distinguish what kind of
woman ought to be united to what kind of man, in order to produce the
finest children?
_Theæ._ I did not altogether know that.
19. _Socr._ Be assured, then, that they pride themselves more in this
than in cutting the navel-string. For consider; do you think it belongs
to the same or a different art to cultivate and gather in the fruits of
the earth, and again to know in what soil what plant or seed ought to be
sown?
_Theæ._ No, but to the same art.
_Socr._ But with respect to women, my friend, do you think that there is
one art of that kind[147], and another of gathering in the fruit?
-----
Footnote 147:
That is, of choosing the soil.
-----
_Theæ._ It is not reasonable to suppose so.
_Socr._ It is not. But by reason of the illegitimate and ill-assorted
unions of men and women, to which the name of pandering has been given,
midwives out of regard to their own dignity avoid match-making also,
fearing lest by this they should incur the other imputation, since it
doubtless belongs to real midwives only to make marriages properly.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Such then is the office of midwives, but less important than my
task. For it does not happen to women, sometimes to bring forth images,
and sometimes realities, which cannot be easily discriminated; for, if
it did happen, it would be the greatest and noblest work for midwives to
distinguish that which is true and that which is not; do you not think
so?
_Theæ._ I do.
20. _Socr._ But in my art of midwifery all other things are the same as
in theirs; but it differs in this, that it delivers men and not women,
and that it attends to their souls bringing forth and not their bodies.
But the most important thing in my art is, that it is able to test in
every possible way whether the mind of a young man is bringing forth an
image and a cheat, or what is genuine and true: for the case is the same
with me as with midwives; I am barren of wisdom, and as to what many
have reproached me with, that I question others, but give no answer
myself on any subject, because I have no wisdom, they reproach me truly.
But the cause of this is as follows: the deity compels me to act the
part of a midwife, but forbids me to bring forth myself. I am not,
therefore, myself at all wise, and I have no such discovery as is the
offspring of my own mind; but those who associate with me at first
appear, some of them, exceedingly ignorant, but all, as our intimacy
continues, to whom the deity grants that privilege, make a wonderful
proficiency, as is evident both to themselves and others; and this is
clear, that they make this proficiency without ever learning any thing
from me, but from their own resources finding and becoming possessed of
many beautiful things; of the midwife’s office, however, the deity and I
are the cause. 21. But it is evident from this: many, from not knowing
this, and deeming themselves to be the cause, but despising me, either
of themselves or through the persuasion of others, have left me sooner
than was proper, and after they have left me have miscarried for the
future, in consequence of their depraved associations, and badly
nurturing what they have been delivered of through me, they have
destroyed it, setting a higher value on cheats and images than on that
which is true, they have at last appeared to be ignorant both to
themselves and others. One of these was Aristides son of Lysimachus, and
many others, with some of whom, when they again come to me, begging to
renew their intercourse with me, and doing every thing in their power to
obtain it, the demon that attends me prevents me from associating, but
with others it allows me, and these again make considerable proficiency.
And they that associate with me are in this respect affected in the same
way as women who bring forth; they suffer pangs, and are filled with
anxieties, to a far greater degree than the women are. But their pangs
my art is able both to excite and appease. And these are affected in
this way. 22. But sometimes, Theætetus, there are some who do not appear
to me to be at all pregnant, and I, knowing that they do not need my
assistance, very kindly sue others for them, and with the aid of the
deity, conjecture well enough, from associating with whom they will
derive benefit. Of these I have handed many over to Prodicus, and many
to other wise and divine men. I have dwelt long on this, my excellent
friend, for this reason, because I suspect, as you also think yourself,
that you are in pain from being pregnant with something inwardly. Deal
with me, then, as son of a midwife, and as myself skilled in midwifery,
and endeavour to answer the questions I put to you to the best of your
ability. And if, on examining any thing that you say, I shall consider
it to be an image and not true, and should thereupon remove it and throw
it away, do not be angry with me, like women who are delivered for the
first time are for their children: for many, my admirable friend, have
ere this been so affected towards me as to be actually ready to bite me,
when I take away any trifle from them, and they do not think that I do
this with a good design, in that they are very far from knowing that no
deity designs ill to men, and that neither do I do any thing of this
kind through ill-will, but because it is by no means allowable for me to
give way to falsehood and conceal the truth. 23. Again, therefore, from
the beginning, Theætetus, endeavour to tell me what science is; but
never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills and you strive
manfully you will be able.
_Theæ._ Indeed, Socrates, when you are thus urgent, it would be
disgraceful for one not to endeavour to the utmost of one’s power to say
what one is able. He, then, that knows any thing appears to me to
perceive what he knows, and, as it now seems, science is nothing else
than perception.
_Socr._ Well and nobly said, my boy; for it is right thus to declare
one’s opinion. But come, let us consider this together, whether it is
solid or empty. Science, you say, is perception?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ You appear, indeed, to have given no mean definition of science,
but that which Protagoras has given; but he said the same thing in a
different manner. For he says that man is the measure of all things, of
the existence of those that exist, and of the non-existence of those
that do not exist. You have doubtless read this?
_Theæ._ I have read it, and that often.
24. _Socr._ Does he not say pretty much, that such as every thing
appears to me, such it is to me, and as it appears to you, such it is to
you, but you and I are men?
_Theæ._ He does indeed say so.
_Socr._ It is probable however that a wise man does not trifle; let us,
therefore, follow him. Does it not sometimes happen that when the same
wind blows, one of us is cold, and another not, and one slightly, but
another exceedingly?
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ Whether, then, shall we say, that the wind at that time is in
itself cold or not cold? or shall we believe Protagoras, that it is cold
to him that is cold, but not to him that is not?
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ Does it not, then, appear so to both of them?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But to appear is the same as to be perceived?
_Theæ._ It is.
_Socr._ Appearance then and perception are the same in things hot, and
every thing of that kind; for such as every one perceives things to be,
such also they seem to be to every one.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ Perception, therefore, has always reference to that which really
is, and is free from falsehood, as being science.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
25. _Socr._ By the graces, then, was not Protagoras a very wise man, and
did he express himself thus enigmatically to us, the general rabble, but
speak the truth to his disciples in secret?
_Theæ._ What mean you by this, Socrates?
_Socr._ I will tell you, and that no mean account; he asserts, that no
one thing exists of itself, nor can you correctly designate any thing by
any quality, but if you call it great, it will appear small, and if
heavy, light, and so with every thing else; as if nothing was one thing,
or any thing, or possessed of any quality: but as if all things which we
say exist, become so from impulse, motion, and admixture with each
other, thereby designating them incorrectly; for nothing ever is, but is
always becoming. And in this all the wise men in succession, except
Parmenides, agreed, namely, Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, and
of the poets, those who rank highest in each kind of poetry, in comedy
Epicharmus, and in tragedy Homer; for in saying that[148] “Oceanus is
father of the gods, and Tethys mother,” he asserts that all things are
produced by flux and motion. Does he not seem to say so?
-----
Footnote 148:
Iliad, xiv. 201.
-----
_Theæ._ To me he does.
26. _Socr._ Who then can contend with such an army, with Homer for its
leader, and not be ridiculous?
_Theæ._ It is not easy, Socrates.
_Socr._ It is not, indeed, Theætetus. For this is a strong proof in
favour of their argument, that motion gives the appearance of existence
and of generation, but repose of non-existence and decay; for heat and
fire, which engenders and supports other things, is itself engendered by
impulse and friction, but this is motion. Are not these the origin of
fire?
_Theæ._ Surely they are.
_Socr._ And moreover the race of animals springs from the same causes.
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ But what? Does not the habit of the body perish by rest and
inaction, but is it not for the most part preserved by exercise and
motion?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But does not the habit of the soul acquire and retain learning
and become better by study and practice, which are motions, but by rest,
which is want of practice and ignorance, it neither learns any thing,
and forgets what it has learnt?
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
27. _Socr._ Motion, therefore, is good both for the soul and the body;
but rest, the contrary.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ Shall I add further, with respect to stillness of the air, and
calms and things of that kind, that rest corrupts and destroys, but the
contrary preserves. And besides this shall I put the finishing stroke to
my argument by compelling you to admit, that by the golden chain Homer
meant nothing else than the sun, and intimated that as long as the
universe and the sun are moved, all things exist, and are preserved,
both amongst gods and amongst men; but if they were to stand still, as
it were bound, all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is,
turned upside down.
_Theæ._ He appears to me too, Socrates, to intimate what you say.
_Socr._ Then put the argument thus, my excellent friend: first with
respect to the eyes, suppose that what you call white colour is not any
thing different, external to your eyes, nor in your eyes; nor can you
assign it any place; for then it would have a fixed position, and would
continue, and not be liable to production.