_Socr._ Before a man knows the truth of each subject on which he speaks
or writes, and is able to define the whole of a thing, and when he has
defined it again knows how to divide it into species until he comes to
the indivisible; and in like manner, having distinguished the nature of
the soul, and having found out what kind of speech is adapted to the
nature of each, he so disposes and adorns his speech, applying to a soul
of varied powers speeches that are various and all-harmonious, and
simple ones to a simple soul, before this is done, he will not be able
to manage speech with art, as far as it might be done, either for the
purpose of teaching or persuading, as the whole of our former argument
has proved.
_Phæ._ This is exactly how it appeared.
142. _Socr._ But what as to its being honourable or disgraceful to speak
and write speeches, and under what circumstances it may be called a
reproach or not, has not what we have said a little before sufficed to
prove?
_Phæ._ What was that?
_Socr._ That if either Lysias, or any one else, has ever written, or
shall hereafter write, privately or publicly, writing a state document
in proposing a law, and thinks that there is in it great stability and
clearness, this is a reproach to the writer, whether any one says so or
not. For to be utterly ignorant of what is just and unjust, evil and
good, cannot be otherwise than truly disgraceful, though the whole mass
of mankind should unite in its praise.