_Socr._ Wonderfully clever seems to have been the inventor of this
abstruse art, whether Tisias or whoever else he was, and by whatever
name he delights to be called. But, my friend, shall we say to him or
not?
_Phæ._ What?
_Socr._ Tisias, long since before your arrival, we happened to say, that
this probability of yours derives its influence with the multitude from
its resemblance to truth; and we just now concluded that in all cases he
knows best how to discover resemblances who is best acquainted with the
truth. So that, if you have any thing else to say about the art of
speaking, we will listen to you; but if not, we shall hold to the
conclusions we have lately come to, that unless a man has reckoned up
the different natures of those who will have to hear him, and is able to
divide things themselves into species, and to comprehend the several
particulars under one general idea, he will never be skilled in the art
of speaking so far as it is possible for a man to be so. 131. But this
he can never acquire without great labour, which a wise man ought not to
bestow for the purpose of speaking and acting amongst men, but that he
may be able to speak such things as are acceptable to the gods, and act
acceptably to them, to the utmost of his power. For, as wiser men than
we say, Tisias, a man of understanding ought not to make it his
principal study to gratify his fellow-servants, except by the way, but
good masters and of good extraction. If therefore the circuit be long,
wonder not; 132. for it is to be undertaken for the sake of great ends,
not such as you think. And even these, as our argument proves, if any
one is willing, will be best attained by those means.
_Phæ._ This appears to me, Socrates, to be very finely said, if only a
man could attain to it.
_Socr._ But when one is attempting noble things, it is surely noble also
to suffer whatever it may befal us to suffer.
_Phæ._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ As regards, then, the art and want of art in speaking, let this
suffice.