_Socr._ In the third place, having set in order the different kinds of
speech and of soul, and the different manners in which these are
affected, he will go through the several causes, adapting each to each,
and teaching what kind of soul is necessarily persuaded, and what not
persuaded, by particular kinds of speech, and for what reason.
_Phæ._ It will assuredly be best done in this way, as it seems.
_Socr._ Never then, my dear friend, will any thing that is otherwise
explained or spoken, be spoken or written by art, either in any other
case or in this. But the modern writers on the art of speech-making,
whom you yourself have heard, are dissemblers, and conceal the very
admirable knowledge they have of the soul. Until, then, they both speak
and write according to this method, let us never be persuaded that they
write artistically.
_Phæ._ What method is this?
_Socr._ It is not easy to mention the very words themselves; but how it
is proper to write, if a man means to be as artistic as he possibly can,
I am willing to tell you.
_Phæ._ Tell me then.
125. _Socr._ Since the power of speech is that of leading the soul, it
is necessary that he who means to be an orator should know how many
kinds of soul there are: but they are so many, and of such and such
kinds; whence some men are of this character and some of that character.
These then being thus divided, there are again so many kinds of speech,
each of a certain character. Now men of such a character are for this
particular reason easily persuaded by certain speeches, and persons of a
different character are for these reasons with difficulty persuaded. It
is necessary, therefore, that he, after having sufficiently understood
all this, when he afterwards perceives these very things taking place in
actions, and being done, should be able to follow them rapidly by
perception, otherwise he will know nothing more than the very things
which he formerly heard from his preceptor. 126. But when he is
sufficiently competent to say, what kind of person is persuaded by what
kind of speeches, and is able, when he sees him before him, to point out
to himself that this is the person and this the nature for which those
speeches were formerly made now actually present before me, and to which
these particular speeches are to be addressed, in order to persuade him
to these particular things,—when he has acquired all this, and has
learnt moreover the proper seasons for speaking and being silent, and
again has made himself master of the seasonable and unseasonable
occasions for brevity, plaintiveness, and vehemence, and all the other
several kinds of speech which he has learnt, then his art will be
beautifully and perfectly accomplished, but not before. But whoever is
deficient in any of these particulars, either in speaking, or teaching,
or writing, and yet asserts that he speaks by art, is overcome by the
person who will not be persuaded. 127. “What then,” perhaps the writer
on rhetoric will say, “does it appear to you, Phædrus and Socrates, that
the art of speaking, as it is called, must be obtained in this or some
other way?”
_Phæ._ It is impossible, Socrates, that it should be obtained in any
other way; though it seems to be a work of no small labour.
_Socr._ You say truly. And on this account we ought to turn over all
speeches again and again, and consider whether any easier and shorter
way to it can be found, in order that we may not in vain go by a long
and rough one, when we might have taken a short and smooth one. If,
therefore, you have heard of any thing that will assist us, from Lysias
or any one else, endeavour to call it to mind, and tell it me.
_Phæ._ If the endeavour were enough I should be able to do so, but just
at present I cannot.
128. _Socr._ Are you willing, then, that I should repeat to you a
statement which I heard from persons who take an interest in such
matters?
_Phæ._ How not?
_Socr._ It is said, however, Phædrus, to be right to state even the
wolf’s case.
_Phæ._ And do you do so.
_Socr._ They say, then, that there is no occasion to treat these matters
so solemnly, nor to carry them back so far, by such long windings. For
as we said in the beginning of our discussion, there is no need at all
for one who wishes to become a competent orator to have any thing to do
with the truth respecting actions just or good, or men who are such,
either by nature or education. For that in courts of justice no
attention whatever is paid to the truth of these things, but only to
what is plausible, and that it is probability to which one who wishes to
speak by art ought to apply himself. And that sometimes even facts that
have actually happened must not be stated, unless they are probable, but
probabilities both in accusation and defence: and, in short, that a
speaker should pursue the probable, and pay no regard at all to truth.
For that when this method is observed throughout the whole speech, it
constitutes the perfection of the art.
129. _Phæ._ You have described the very things, Socrates, which they say
who profess to be skilled in speech-making; and I remember that we
touched briefly upon this in a former part of our discussion; but this
appears to be matter of the utmost consequence to those who study these
things.
_Socr._ However you have thoroughly fumbled Tisias himself. Let Tisias
then tell us this, whether he means any thing else by the probable than
that which accords with the opinion of the multitude.
_Phæ._ What else can it be?
_Socr._ Having made, then, as it seems, this wise and artistic
discovery, he has written, that if a weak but brave man should be
brought to trial for having knocked down a strong and cowardly one, and
for having robbed him of his clothes or any thing else, then that
neither of them ought to speak the truth, but the coward should say that
he was not knocked down by the brave man alone, and the latter should
prove this, that they were alone, and then urge this; “How could a man
like me ever attack a man like him?” But the other will not admit his
own cowardice, but, in attempting to tell some other falsehood, will
perhaps supply his adversary with the means of refuting him. And in
other cases, such things as these are said according to art. Is it not
so, Phædrus?