118. Prodicus, therefore, laughing, agreed with me, as did the others.

“But what, my friends,” I continued, “do you say to this? All actions

that tend to this, that we may live without pain and pleasantly, are

they not beautiful? and is not a beautiful action good and profitable?”.

They agreed.

“If then,” I said, “the pleasant is good, no one who either knows or

thinks that other things are better than what he is doing, and that they

are possible, still continues to do the same, when it is in his power to

do the better; nor is to be overcome by one’s-self any thing else than

ignorance, nor to be master of one’s-self any thing else than wisdom.”

All agreed to this.

“What then? Do you say that ignorance is a thing of this kind, to have a

false opinion, and to be deceived about matters of great importance?”

To this, likewise, all agreed.

“Is it not the case then,” I said, “that no one willingly sets about

things evil, or things which he thinks are evil, nor is this, as it

seems, in the nature of man willingly to engage in things which he

thinks are evil, instead of such as are good; and when of two evils he

is compelled to choose one, no one will choose the greater, when it is

in his power to choose the less.”

The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) · 第 78 / 147 题