“‘But what, if the safety of our life consisted in the choice of even
and odd, when more ought properly to be chosen, and when less, each with
reference to itself, or one with reference to the other, whether they
might be near or distant, what, in this case, would preserve our life?
Would it not be a science? and would it not be one of mensuration, since
it is an art of excess and defect? But since it has relation to even and
odd, can it be any other than arithmetic?’ Would the men grant us this,
or not?”
It appeared also to Protagoras that they would.
“‘Be it so, my friends; but since the safety of our life has appeared to
consist in the right choice of pleasure and pain, and of more and fewer,
greater and smaller, more distant and nearer; does it not first of all
appear to be an art of mensuration, since it is a consideration of
excess and defect and equality of these with respect to each other?’
‘Necessarily so.’ ‘But since it has to do with mensuration, it must of
necessity be an art and a science.’ 115. They will assent to this. What
then this art and science may be, we will consider hereafter; but that
it is a science is sufficient for the proof of that which Protagoras and
I had to make good in answer to the question you asked us. You asked, if
you remember, when we agreed with each other that nothing is more
powerful than knowledge, but that it always gets the mastery, wherever
it may be, both of pleasure and every thing else; but you said that
pleasure often gets the mastery, even of a man possessed of knowledge,
and when we did not agree with you, you thereupon asked us, ‘Protagoras
and Socrates, if this affection is not the being overcome by pleasure,
what is it then, and what do you say it is? tell us.’ 116. If, then, we
had immediately said to you, that it is ignorance, you would have
laughed at us. But now if you laugh at us, you will also laugh at
yourselves. For you have admitted that they err through want of
knowledge, who err in the choice of pleasures and pains; but these are
things good and evil; and not only through want of knowledge, but as you
afterwards further admitted, a knowledge of mensuration. Now an
erroneous action done without knowledge, as you must yourselves know, is
done through ignorance: so that to be overcome by pleasure is the
greatest ignorance; of which Protagoras here says he is a physician, and
so do Prodicus and Hippias. But you, because you think it is something
else than ignorance, neither go yourselves, nor send your children to
the teachers of these things, the sophists, as if this knowledge could
not be taught, but by saving your money, and not giving it to these men,
you fare badly, both in private and public. 117. Such is the answer we
should give to the many. But I ask you, Hippias and Prodicus, as well as
Protagoras, for let the conversation be common to you all, whether I
appear to you to speak the truth, or to speak falsely?”
What had been said appeared to all to be eminently true.
“You admit, then,” said I, “that the pleasant is good, but the painful
evil. But I deprecate Prodicus’s verbal distinctions: for whether you
call it pleasant, or delightful, or enjoyable, or from whatever
derivation or in whatever way you please to denominate such things, most
excellent Prodicus, use your own word and answer what I wish.”