_Pol._ I do ask you; what kind of an art is cookery?
_Socr._ None at all, Polus.
_Pol._ What is it? say.
_Socr._ I say, then, it is a certain skill.
_Pol._ Of what? say.
_Socr._ I say, of procuring gratification and pleasure, Polus.
_Pol._ Are cookery and rhetoric the same thing?
_Socr._ By no means, but a part of the same study.
_Pol._ Of what study are you speaking?
_Socr._ I fear it would be too rude to speak the truth, for I hesitate
to speak on account of Gorgias, lest he should think that I ridicule his
profession. But I know not whether this is the rhetoric which Gorgias
studies: for it was not at all clear from our late discussion what his
opinion is. But what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain thing which
does not rank among things beautiful.
_Gorg._ Of what thing, Socrates? say, without fear of offending me.
_Socr._ It appears to me, then, Gorgias, to be a certain study, that
does not belong to art, but to a soul that is sagacious and manly, and
naturally powerful in its intercourse with men. The sum of it I call
flattery. 42. Of this study there appears to me to be many other
divisions, and one of them is that of cookery; which, indeed, appears to
be an art, but, as I maintain, is not an art, but skill and practice. I
also call rhetoric a division of this, and personal decoration, and
sophistry, these four divisions relating to four particulars. If,
therefore, Polus wishes to enquire, let him enquire, for he has not yet
heard what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to be: but he did not
observe that I had not yet finished my answer, nevertheless he asks me,
if I do not think that it is beautiful. But I shall not answer him,
whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or base, till I have first
answered what it is. For that would not be right, Polus. If then you
wish to enquire, ask me what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to
be.
_Pol._ I ask, then, and do you answer, what division it is.
_Socr._ Will you understand me when I answer? For rhetoric, in my
opinion, is a semblance of a division of the political art.
_Pol._ What then? Do you say that it is beautiful, or base?
_Socr._ Base, I say; for I call evil things base: since I must answer
you, as now knowing what I mean.
43. _Gorg._ By Jupiter, Socrates, but I do not myself understand what
you mean.
_Socr._ Very likely, Gorgias: for I have not yet spoken clearly. But
Polus here is young and hasty.
_Gorg._ But leave him alone; and tell me in what way you say that
rhetoric is a semblance of a division of the political art.
_Socr._ I will endeavour to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be.
And if it is not such as I describe it, Polus here will confute me. Do
you not call body something, and soul something?
_Gorg._ How not?
_Socr._ Do you not, then, think that there is a certain good habit of
each of these?
_Gorg._ I do.
_Socr._ What then? an apparent good habit, which is not really so? for
instance, to explain my meaning, many appear to have a good constitution
of body, whom no one but a physician, and a teacher in gymnastics, could
easily perceive not to have a good constitution.
_Gorg._ You say truly.
_Socr._ I say that there is something of this kind both in the body and
in the soul, which causes the body and the soul to appear to be in a
good condition, when they are any thing but so.